In re Jaelynn K.-M.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

IN RE JAELYNN K.-M. ET AL.*
(AC 47367)
Alvord, Cradle and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgments rendered
for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating
her parental rights with respect to her minor children. The mother, who
had been defaulted for failure to appear at the termination proceedings,
claimed, inter alia, that the court violated her right to due process by con-
structively depriving her of her right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. Held:

The respondent mother’s claim that the trial court’s constructive deprivation
of counsel constituted structural error for which prejudice was presumed
and a rule of automatic reversal applied was unavailing, as this court declined
to apply such a rule in the context of child protection cases.

Even if this court assumed that the trial court constructively deprived the
respondent mother of her right to the effective assistance of counsel, the
mother failed to show resulting prejudice and, thus, any violation of that
right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even if this court assumed that the trial court violated the respondent
mother’s due process rights when it denied her counsel’s request for a
continuance of the hearing on the termination petitions because the mother
was not present, any error was harmless.

Even if this court assumed that the trial court violated the respondent
mother’s due process rights by failing to provide her and her counsel with
adequate notice of the hearing on the petitions to terminate the mother’s
parental rights, the mother failed to explain at the hearing on the motion
to open the judgments what additional evidence she would have presented
had she and her counsel received proper notice and, accordingly, the trial
court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Argued September 10—officially released November 25, 2024**

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** November 25, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Mat-
ters, and tried to the court, Torres, J.; judgments termi-
nating the respondents’ parental rights; thereafter, the
court, Torres, J., denied the respondent mother’s
motion to open the judgments, and the respondent
mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom were
John R. Weikart, and, on the brief, Gail Oakley Pratt,
for the appellant (respondent mother).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The respondent mother, Jessica K.,
appeals following the trial court’s judgments terminat-
ing her parental rights with respect to her children,
twins Jayden and Jaelynn.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that the trial court violated her due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution with respect to the termination trial in (1)
constructively depriving her of her right to counsel, (2)
denying her assigned counsel’s request for a continu-
ance, and (3) finding that the respondent and her coun-
sel had adequate notice of the proceeding. We affirm
the judgments of the trial court.2
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Jonathan M. and John
Doe, the putative fathers of the children. Paternity of the children has not
been established. Because neither putative father is participating in this
appeal, we refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as the respondent.
2
The attorney for the minor children filed a statement taking no position
regarding the issues on appeal.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our consideration of the respondent’s appeal.
Although this appeal concerns only the respondent’s
parental rights with respect to Jayden and Jaelynn, the
respondent has two older children. Prior to the birth
of Jayden and Jaelynn, the two older children had been
adjudicated neglected due to the respondent’s sub-
stance abuse, and the respondent’s parental rights with
respect to the older children were terminated at sepa-
rate proceedings in 2021. Thereafter, Jayden and Jae-
lynn were born prematurely in August, 2022. The
Department of Children and Families (department)
immediately became involved with the children’s care
after a mandated reporter at the hospital notified the
department that the children had tested positive for
cocaine and opiates at birth. Due to their premature
births and exposure to drugs in utero, the children have
medically complex needs.
On August 30, 2022, the petitioner, the Commissioner
of Children and Families, filed neglect petitions on
behalf of the children. On the same date, the petitioner
obtained ex parte orders of temporary custody. The
respondent failed to appear at both the September 7,
2022 hearing on the orders of temporary custody and the
September 28, 2022 initial plea hearing on the neglect
petitions, and, each time, the court rendered a default
judgment against the respondent. After the respondent
again failed to appear at the October 12, 2022 disposi-
tional hearing on the neglect petitions, the court adjudi-
cated the children neglected and committed them to
the care of the petitioner.
On June 6, 2023, the court approved permanency
plans for the termination of the respondent’s parental
rights. On July 11, 2023, pursuant to the approved per-
manency plans, the petitioner filed a petition for termi-
nation of parental rights on behalf of each child. On
the same day, the petitioner also filed, and the court
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

granted, a motion for order of notice by publication
with respect to the respondent.3 On July 20, 2023, notice
of the next hearing, which was scheduled for August
2, 2023, was published in the Waterbury Republican-
American.4 On the same day the notice was published,
Morgan Bell, a department social worker assigned to
the respondent’s case, spoke on the phone with the
respondent, who was at Rushford, a provider of addic-
tion and mental health treatment programs, after enter-
ing an inpatient drug detoxification treatment program
two days earlier, and told the respondent about the
upcoming hearing.5 The respondent also asked Bell
about visitation with her children, but a clinician at
Rushford informed Bell that the respondent could not
have visitors while in the detoxification treatment pro-
gram. On July 26, 2023, the respondent went to the trial
court clerk’s office and applied for the appointment
of counsel with respect to the termination petitions,
indicating on the application that she was homeless
3
The petitioner included with her motion an affidavit indicating that the
respondent’s whereabouts were unknown despite the department’s diligent
efforts to search for the parent, which stated: ‘‘The following efforts were
made to locate the parent: [Department of Correction] search; Judicial
search; Lexis Nexis; certified letters sent to the last known address; unan-
nounced home visits to last known address.’’
4
The published notice stated: ‘‘NOTICE TO: Jessica [K.], mother of male
and female child born [in August, 2022] to Jonathan M./John Doe. A petition
has been filed seeking: Termination of parental rights of the above named
in minor child(ren). The petition, whereby the court’s decision can affect your
parental rights, if any, regarding minor child(ren) will be heard on 8/2/23
at 3:00 p.m. at SCJM, 7 Kendrick Ave, Waterbury, CT, 06702. . . . RIGHT
TO COUNSEL: Upon proof of inability to pay for a lawyer, the court will
provide one for you at court expense. Any such request should be made
immediately at the court office where your [h]earing is to be held.’’
5
The following colloquy between the court and Bell occurred at the August
2, 2023 proceeding:
‘‘The Court: [D]id you ever connect with [the respondent]?
‘‘The Witness: Yes, I have. . . . I talked to her on the phone on July 20th.
‘‘The Court: Did you tell her about today’s hearing?
‘‘The Witness: Yes, I did.’’
It is not clear from the record whether Bell had informed the respondent
of the exact date, time, location, or purpose of the hearing.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

and had ‘‘just got[ten] out of detox . . . .’’ She listed
a homeless shelter for her address. Thereafter, Attorney
Deborah Dombek was appointed counsel for the respon-
dent, and she filed her appearance on July 31, 2023.
Two days after Dombek filed her appearance, on
August 2, 2023, the court, Torres, J., held a hearing
on the termination petitions. The respondent did not
appear. The court made a finding of notice by publica-
tion to the respondent and defaulted the respondent
for failure to appear. Dombek objected to proceeding
with the hearing without her client, explaining to the
court that she had been appointed just days earlier and
had not been able to communicate with the respondent
because the phone number the department had pro-
vided for her was no longer in service. Dombek then
orally requested additional time to try to locate the
respondent, stating that she had received new informa-
tion concerning the respondent’s whereabouts from a
department worker earlier that day. The court overruled
Dombek’s objection and denied her request for a contin-
uance.
The court proceeded to hold a termination trial on the
merits. The petitioner presented her evidence, which
consisted only of testimony by Bell and the depart-
ment’s social study, which was admitted as a full
exhibit.6 Dombek did not cross-examine Bell, and when
6
Although Bell had been assigned to the respondent’s case in July, 2023,
one month prior to the hearing, she testified that, after receiving the assign-
ment, she familiarized herself with the respondent’s case by ‘‘briefly look[ing]
through the . . . case record . . . .’’ During Bell’s brief testimony, which
lasted seven minutes, she discussed her July 20, 2023 phone conversation
with the respondent, noting that the respondent had requested visitation,
but further stated that, to the best of her knowledge, the respondent had
never visited with the children, had never provided any gifts, letters, or
financial support, and, prior to that request, had never inquired of the depart-
ment about the children’s education, health, or well-being. Bell also indicated
that she was unsure whether the respondent was still in treatment at the
time of the August 2, 2023 proceeding because Bell had been unable to
reach the respondent or receive information on her treatment in subsequent
calls to Rushford.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

the court asked Dombek whether she wished to present
any evidence, she stated that she did not and reiterated
that she had not had an opportunity to speak with
her client.
On the basis of the evidence presented, the court
rendered a decision from the bench terminating the
respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 17a-112 (j),7 on the grounds that the respondent
had abandoned her children and had failed to rehabili-
tate herself.8 With respect to the ground of abandon-
ment, the court found that ‘‘[the respondent] has failed
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility. From the birth of these children, it looks
like the [respondent] has failed to visit with them. She
hasn’t provided any gifts, letters or financial support
7
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable
efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . .
unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling
to benefit from reunification efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best inter-
est of the child, and (3) (A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in
the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child; [or] (B)
the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent
of such child . . . has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilita-
tion as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible
position in the life of the child . . . .’’
8
The termination of parental rights petitions also asserted as grounds for
termination § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D) (‘‘there is no ongoing parent-child relation-
ship’’) and (E) (‘‘the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is
neglected, abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of
the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child and such parent’s parental rights of another child were previously
terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children
and Families’’). In rendering its judgments at the August 2, 2023 proceeding,
the court indicated that it was ‘‘not making findings at this time’’ with respect
to those grounds.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

during the time that the case has been pending and the
filing of the termination petitions . . . [a]nd she has
not inquired about the children’s well-being as of the
filing of [these] termination of parental rights peti-
tion[s].’’ As to the ground of failure to rehabilitate, the
court made the following findings: ‘‘[Neglect] [p]etitions
were filed on August 30 [2022]. On September 7, 2022,
the [respondent was] defaulted for [her] failure to
appear. . . . On September 28, 2022, both children
were adjudicated ‘neglected,’ based on the default of
[the respondent]. Specific steps were issued . . . and
have been provided for the [respondent] as an outline
for [her] to rehabilitate. [The respondent] has [not]
made [herself] available to the [department] to review
or engage in services, and it is unlikely at this point in
[her life] that [she is] likely to take a responsible posi-
tion in these children’s lives, who have been in care for
almost a year of time.’’9 The court further concluded
that it was in the children’s best interests for the respon-
dent’s parental rights to be terminated.
After rendering its judgments, the court stated that
the default judgments against the respondent would
remain on file for 120 days and that if Dombek were
to discover ‘‘any information that . . . [would have]
precluded [the respondent] from appearing in court
today,’’ she was ‘‘more than welcome’’ to present that
evidence by November 30, 2023.10
Thereafter, on November 8, 2023, the respondent moved
to open the August 2, 2023 default judgments pursuant
9
The court also found, as required under § 17a-112 (j) (1), that the depart-
ment had made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent and reunify the
children with the respondent and, additionally, that the respondent was
unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Jorden
R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009) (explaining that either finding
is sufficient to satisfy statutory requirement).
10
The court’s memorandum of the August 2, 2023 proceeding stated: ‘‘Dom-
bek can reopen case within the next 120 days starting today until 11/30/23
if contact information arises for [the respondent].’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

to General Statutes § 52-212 (a)11 on the ground that
she ‘‘was homeless for a period of time and was not
properly served’’ with the termination petitions. The
petitioner filed a written objection specifically asserting
that the respondent did not comply with § 52-212 (a)
in that she did not state a good defense that existed at
the time the termination of parental rights judgments
were rendered.12 On January 4, 2024,13 the court, Torres,
J., held a hearing on the motion to open, at which both
the respondent and Dombek were present. Dombek
argued at the hearing that ‘‘[the motion to open is] all
under good cause . . . . [The court] had given me the
opportunity in [its August 2, 2023] order . . . that if I
filed [this motion] in a timely fashion and new informa-
tion came to light about [the respondent’s] where-
abouts, that I could, in fact, open the [August 2, 2023]
judgment[s]. The other arguments are that my client, I
believe, was in a rehab facility . . . . She was not
served. . . . It’s a due process right. It’s the most fun-
damental right. The most precious of rights [is] to raise
your children without government interference, and I
think that [the respondent] deserves an opportunity to
11
To set aside a default judgment, General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides
in relevant part that the moving party must show (1) ‘‘reasonable cause, or
that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the
time of the rendition of the judgment’’ and (2) ‘‘that the [moving party] was
prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from . . . making
the defense.’’
12
The petitioner’s written objection further asserted that the respondent’s
motion also failed to satisfy the second prong of § 52-212 (a) in that it failed
to show that the respondent’s absence at the August 2, 2023 proceeding
was due to ‘‘mistake, accident or other reasonable cause.’’ In addition, the
petitioner argued that the respondent failed to comply with § 52-212 (c)
because the motion was not verified by an oath of the respondent or her attor-
ney.
13
The hearing originally was scheduled for December 12, 2023. On that
date, the court noted that the respondent, who was incarcerated at the time,
was present in the building but that Dombek was unable to attend the
hearing due to illness. The court continued the hearing to January 4, 2024,
over the objection of the petitioner’s counsel, stating that ‘‘it would be
fundamentally unfair for the [respondent] to proceed [as a self-represented
party] without her counsel present . . . .’’
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

have the case heard on its merits . . . .’’ Following
Dombek’s argument, the court inquired whether the
respondent wished to testify, stating: ‘‘She doesn’t have
to. She has the right to remain silent. If [she is] going
to testify . . . the issues she’s going to have to testify
to [are] where was she, what the defense is. . . . So,
it’s grounds [of abandonment and failure to rehabilitate]
from the time of the birth of the children to the time
of the filing of the [termination petitions] . . . there
needs to be a defense. So, if [the respondent is] able
to testify as to . . . a valid defense as to the grounds
for abandonment and failure to rehabilitate, then [the
court will] hear that testimony.’’ After a brief discussion
with her counsel off the record, the respondent declined
to testify. The court proceeded to render a decision
from the bench denying the motion to open, finding
that the respondent failed to satisfy either requirement
of § 52-212 (a) because she did not present a ‘‘good
defense . . . with respect to the [termination] peti-
tion[s]’’ regarding either ground for termination and
because ‘‘there [was] no information before the court
that there was something that prevented [the respon-
dent] from presenting [a] valid defense at the time of
the [August 2, 2023 hearing].’’14
The respondent thereafter filed an appeal from the
court’s denial of her motion to open, and, on March 25,
2024, this court granted the respondent’s motion for
permission to file a late appeal challenging the trial
court’s August 2, 2023 judgments terminating the respon-
dent’s parental rights.
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court con-
structively deprived her of her right to the effective
14
The court also denied the motion to open on the ground that the respon-
dent had not verified the motion under oath, as required by statute. See
General Statutes § 52-212 (c).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

assistance of counsel under the fourteenth amendment
to the federal constitution ‘‘[b]y requiring [Dombek] to
represent a client she had never met, let alone discussed
the case with, at [the August 2, 2023] termination of paren-
tal rights trial after having been assigned only three days
earlier . . . .’’ The respondent claims that the court’s
constructive denial of counsel constitutes structural
error for which prejudice is presumed and, therefore, a
rule of automatic reversal applies. We disagree and decline
to apply such a rule in the context of child protection
cases. Accordingly, even if the respondent was con-
structively deprived of her constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel at the August 2, 2023
termination proceeding,15 we conclude that the respon-
dent fails to show resulting prejudice and, therefore,
any violation of that right was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
It is clear, and the parties do not dispute, that the
respondent had a statutory right to counsel at the termi-
15
A parent facing termination of his or her parental rights ‘‘is constitution-
ally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel only if he [or she] had a
constitutional right to appointed counsel in the termination proceeding.’’
In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 225, 764 A.2d 739 (2001). On appeal, the
respondent claims only that her constitutional right to counsel derives from
the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution rather than any provi-
sion of the Connecticut constitution. In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court ‘‘declined to hold that due process requires the appointment
of counsel whenever a state seeks to terminate the parental rights of an
indigent parent. . . . Instead, the court held that whether the federal consti-
tution requires the appointment of counsel is a fact specific determination
that must be made . . . on a case-by-case basis.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re
Taijha H.-B., 333 Conn. 297, 319–20, 216 A.3d 601 (2019). This determination
must be made by applying the due process balancing test set forth in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)—that is,
by ‘‘weighing the competing private and governmental interests at stake and
the risk of an erroneous decision in the absence of appointed counsel
. . . .’’ In re Taijha H.-B., supra, 319. We assume, without deciding, that
the respondent had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel at the termination proceeding under this framework. We also
assume, without deciding, that the court constructively deprived her of
that right.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

nation proceeding. ‘‘Because of the substantial inter-
16

ests involved, a parent in a termination of parental rights
hearing has the [statutory] right not only to counsel but
to the effective assistance of counsel.’’ State v. Anony-
mous, 179 Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d 939 (1979). When
the right to effective assistance of counsel is challenged,
our Supreme Court has adopted the following standard:
‘‘The range of competence . . . requires not errorless
counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hind-
sight, but counsel whose performance is reasonably
competent, or within the range of competence displayed
by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in [that par-
ticular area of the] law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. ‘‘The defendant must, moreover, demonstrate
that the lack of competency contributed to the termina-
tion of parental rights.’’ Id. Even where a parent in a
termination proceeding has a constitutional, rather than
merely statutory, right to counsel, the parent must show
resulting prejudice to prevail on a claimed violation of
that right. ‘‘Under such circumstances, it would be a
waste of judicial resources, and a pedantic exercise, to
delve deeply into the constitutional merits of a claim
that can appropriately be resolved in accordance with
the relevant harmless error analysis.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Amias I., 343 Conn. 816,
834, 276 A.3d 955 (2022); see id., 837–38 (assuming
that children have constitutional right to conflict free
counsel in termination proceeding and concluding that
any violation was harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court’s
constructive deprivation of counsel constitutes a struc-
16
See General Statutes § 46b-135 (b) (‘‘[a]t the commencement of any
proceeding on behalf of a neglected, uncared-for or abused child or youth,
the parent or parents or guardian of the child or youth shall have the right
to counsel, and . . . if they are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be
provided for them’’); General Statutes § 45a-717 (b) (at hearing on petition
for termination of parental rights, ‘‘the court shall inform [the] respondent
parent of his or her right to counsel and upon request, if he or she is unable to
pay for counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent such respondent parent’’).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

tural error and, therefore, a showing of prejudice is not
necessary to merit reversal. ‘‘Structural [error] cases
defy analysis by harmless error standards because the
entire conduct of the trial, from beginning to end, is
obviously affected . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Brown, 279 Conn. 493, 505, 903 A.2d
169 (2006). In making this claim, the respondent relies
principally on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). In Cronic,
the United States Supreme Court held that, although a
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution
generally must show resulting prejudice, ‘‘[t]here are
. . . circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the
accused’’ in a criminal proceeding that a presumption of
prejudice applies, including, inter alia, ‘‘when although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial,
the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent
one, could provide effective assistance is so small that
a presumption of prejudice is appropriate . . . .’’ Id.,
658–60. Specifically, the respondent claims that Cron-
ic’s presumption of prejudice applies in this case
because the court called on Dombek ‘‘to render assis-
tance in a situation in which no competent attorney
could do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
We disagree with the respondent’s contention that
Cronic applies in the context of the respondent’s depri-
vation of counsel claim. Connecticut courts consis-
tently have declined to apply the structural error doc-
trine in the child protection context.17 ‘‘[T]he significant
17
See In re Amias I., supra, 343 Conn. 839 (‘‘[a]lthough this court has
recognized that structural error can occur outside the criminal context . . .
to the best of our knowledge, we have never applied it in the child depen-
dency context’’ (citation omitted)); see also In re Gabriel S., 347 Conn. 223,
237–38, 296 A.3d 829 (2023) (stating that, even if it had concluded that trial
court violated respondent parent’s due process right to adequate notice of
grounds for terminating his parental rights, respondent’s claim failed because
record indicated that such violation would be harmless beyond reasonable
doubt); In re Amias I., supra, 839 (declining to apply structural error doctrine
in context of termination proceeding where respondent parent claimed that
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

differences between child dependency proceedings and
other judicial proceedings militate decisively against
applying a per se reversible error rule in dependency
cases.’’ In re Amias I., supra, 343 Conn. 840. This is
because ‘‘dependent children have a critical interest in
avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-term place-
ment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 841. ‘‘[A]
sense of permanency, in and of itself, is crucial for a
child’s welfare.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Ivory W.,
342 Conn. 692, 734, 271 A.3d 633 (2022). These interests
are especially critical here, where the respondent’s chil-
dren have medically complex needs that require a stable
caregiver capable of attending medical appointments,
coordinating treatment, and meeting their ongoing med-
ical needs. Accordingly, we cannot agree ‘‘that prejudice
is irrelevant in a dependency proceeding when the wel-
fare of the child is at issue and delay in resolution of
the proceeding is inherently prejudicial to the child
. . . . [T]he price that would be paid for [applying such
a rule], in the form of needless reversals of dependency
judgments, is unacceptably high in light of the strong
public interest in prompt resolution of these cases so
that the children may receive loving and secure home
environments as soon as reasonably possible.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Amias I., supra, 840–41.
Because we conclude that Cronic’s presumption of
prejudice does not apply in this case, the respondent’s
constructive deprivation of counsel claim is subject to
harmless error review.18 See, e.g., In re Gabriel S., 347
trial court violated her children’s constitutional right to conflict free counsel
by failing to inquire into whether their attorney had conflict of interest); In
re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507 n.20, 78 A.3d 797 (2013) (disagreeing with
contention that structural error doctrine should apply where trial court
failed to provide statutorily required specific steps to parent in termination
of parental rights proceeding when record sufficiently demonstrated that
alleged error was harmless).
18
We further note that, although other states have applied Cronic’s pre-
sumption of prejudice to child protection cases, our Supreme Court prece-
dent does not support a finding of structural error where, as we conclude
here, ‘‘the effects of the error are quantifiable and . . . [the] court can
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

Conn. 223, 237–38, 296 A.3d 829 (2023) (noting that,
even if it were to conclude that respondent parent’s due
process rights were violated at termination of parental
rights proceeding, respondent’s claim would fail under
harmless error review). On appeal, the respondent
argues that the petitioner cannot prove the harm-
lessness of the alleged violation ‘‘because without rely-
ing on impermissible speculation, it cannot demon-
strate that the result would have been the same . . . .’’
We disagree and conclude that the record is sufficient
for us to determine that, even if the court constructively
deprived the respondent of her right to counsel, any
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We first reiterate that, although the court defaulted
the respondent for her failure to appear at the August
2, 2023 proceeding, the court, before rendering its judg-
ments, held a trial on the merits, requiring the petitioner
to prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory
requirements to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights, including the grounds for termination and that
it was in the minor children’s best interests for the
respondent’s parental rights to be terminated. Although
the respondent was not present at the termination trial
held at the August 2, 2023 proceeding, she thereafter
moved to open the August 2, 2023 judgments terminat-
ing her parental rights. It is well settled that a party who
has filed a motion to open has the burden of showing
(1) ‘‘reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action
or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of
the rendition of the judgment [he or she seeks to open]’’
and (2) ‘‘that [he or she] was prevented by mistake,
accident or other reasonable cause from . . . making
the defense.’’ General Statutes § 52-212 (a). It is thus
clear that to prevail on a motion to open, two things
must occur. ‘‘There must be a showing that (1) a good
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.’’ In re
Amias I., supra, 343 Conn. 839.
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

defense, the nature of which must be set forth, existed
at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) the party
seeking to set aside the judgment was prevented from
making that defense because of mistake, accident or
other reasonable cause. . . . Since the conjunctive and
meaning in addition to is employed between the parts
of the two prong test, both tests must be met.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa
G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45–46, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert.
denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘The mani-
fest purpose of a motion to open . . . is to provide a
mechanism by which a defaulted party has an opportu-
nity to be heard.’’ In re Skylar F., 191 Conn. App. 200,
208, 215 A.3d 750 (2019); see id. (concluding that respon-
dent father had opportunity to be heard in connection
with court’s judgment adjudicating his child neglected,
rendered after respondent was defaulted for failure to
appear, because ‘‘[b]y filing the motion to open, the
respondent invoked his right to due process, specifi-
cally, the right to be heard as to why he failed to appear
and whether he had a good defense [to the neglect
petition]’’).

Accordingly, in filing the motion to open the August
2, 2023 judgments, the respondent had an opportunity
to be heard with respect to the judgments terminating
her parental rights. On appeal, the respondent does
not claim that she lacked adequate representation of
counsel at any point during the pendency of her motion
to open, and the record indicates that the respondent
had ample time to prepare with counsel for the January
4, 2024 hearing on her motion to open.19 Nonetheless,
the respondent, both in her written motion to open and
at the January 4, 2024 hearing on the motion, failed to
present any evidence with respect to a good defense
19
The respondent filed the motion to open on November 8, 2023, roughly
two months prior to the January 4, 2024 hearing on the motion.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

to the termination petitions.20 Accordingly, where the
respondent and her counsel had an opportunity to pre-
sent evidence challenging the termination of her paren-
tal rights and failed to do so, we cannot conclude that
the respondent would have been able to present such
evidence at the August 2 proceeding if not for the court
allegedly depriving her of the right to counsel.
20
We note that, on appeal, the respondent asserts that ‘‘[Dombek] was
led to believe that her motion to open, which did not rely on [Practice Book]
§ 35a-18 or § 52-212, would be granted automatically if she were able to
locate the respondent and timely moved to open the termination judgment.’’
Accordingly, although the respondent concedes that the purpose of a motion
to open pursuant to § 52-212 is to provide a defaulted party with the opportu-
nity to be heard, she nonetheless argues that her ‘‘rights to due process
could not have been vindicated’’ by the motion to open in this case because
‘‘her attorney was not aware that the court would require’’ the respondent,
pursuant to her motion to open, to present a good defense to the termination
petitions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In light of the record before us, however, we cannot agree that the respon-
dent’s failure to avail herself of the opportunity to be heard pursuant to her
motion to open can be attributed to her counsel’s interpretation of the
requirements to prevail on that motion. Section 52-212 and the corresponding
rule of practice, Practice Book § 35a-18, expressly make clear the evidentiary
requirements a party must satisfy when filing a motion to open. Although
the court did not set forth these requirements expressly at the August 2,
2023 proceeding or in its corresponding memorandum of decision, we agree
with the petitioner that the court also did not indicate that the respondent
would be entitled to open the judgments as a matter of right or that she
would otherwise be relieved of those statutory requirements. We further
note that, although the respondent’s motion to open did not reference § 52-
212, the petitioner’s written objection to the motion, which it filed one day
after the respondent’s motion was filed and two months prior to the January
4, 2024 hearing, should have put the respondent on notice of the statutory
requirements she needed to satisfy to prevail on her motion to open. See
footnote 12 of this opinion. Moreover, at the January 4, 2024 hearing on the
motion to open, the court, before ruling on the motion, expressly stated
that the respondent has the burden of showing ‘‘a valid defense as to the
grounds for abandonment and failure to rehabilitate . . . .’’ We note that,
in response to the court’s statement, Dombek did not claim to be unaware
of this requirement or argue that the requirement did not apply to the
respondent’s motion to open, nor did Dombek request or indicate that she
needed additional time to present evidence of a good defense. Accordingly,
although the respondent argues on appeal that the failure to present evidence
of a good defense was because Dombek ‘‘was not prepared to put on [such]
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

For the first time on appeal, however, the respondent
argues, ‘‘[b]y way of an appellate offer of proof,’’ that
she ‘‘did make efforts to visit with her children, was
taking steps to address her substance abuse, and often
did not have notice of court proceedings.’’ Still, the
respondent fails to assert with any specificity what addi-
tional evidence she would have introduced, had she not
been constructively deprived of counsel at the termina-
tion proceeding, that would have rebutted the petition-
er’s evidence or affected the ultimate outcome of the
proceeding.21 See In re Ivory W., supra, 342 Conn. 732
n.26 (noting that, even if trial court unconstitutionally
precluded respondent from presenting defense to termi-
nation of parental rights petition by improperly denying
her request for continuance, it was incumbent on respon-
dent to make ‘‘proffer of the specific testimony’’ explain-
ing how her testimony could have affected outcome of
termination proceeding had court granted continuance).
The respondent, in support of her claims on appeal,
points specifically only to her request for visitation dur-
ing the July 20, 2023 phone call with Bell and to the
fact that she had been in a detoxification treatment
program at Rushford. Bell, however, testified to both
these points during the August 2, 2023 proceeding, and
the respondent fails to explain how, had she been able
to present evidence that had already been presented
evidence’’ at the January 4, 2024 hearing, we conclude that the record before
us does not support the respondent’s claim.
21
The respondent also argues that, ‘‘even if [she] did not have a defense,
at [the] termination trial she would have [had] the opportunity to challenge
the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence sought to be admitted,
which could [have] cause[d] the court to find that the petitioner had failed
to meet her burden, despite the respondent not putting forth a defense.’’
We note, however, that, although the respondent contends that ‘‘[f]acts
found in the absence of due process are inherently unreliable,’’ she concedes
that she has not challenged any of the court’s factual findings as clearly
erroneous, nor does she challenge the reliability, accuracy, or admissibility
of any specific evidence the petitioner presented at the August 2, 2023
proceeding.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

by the petitioner, the outcome of the proceeding might
have been different. Additionally, the respondent fails
to point to any specific evidence to support her claim
on appeal that she often lacked notice of court proceed-
ings. Even if she had, however, such evidence would
have been extraneous to the court’s finding of abandon-
ment, which, rather than relying on the respondent’s
lack of attendance at prior proceedings, relied only on
the respondent’s failure to visit with the children, her
failure to provide any financial or emotional support,
and her lack of interest in the children’s well-being. It
is thus clear that none of the evidence the respondent
claims to proffer on appeal would have affected the
court’s finding of abandonment.22 The respondent there-
fore fails to explain on appeal what additional evidence
she would have presented, had the court not construc-
tively deprived her of counsel, that could have affected
the ultimate outcome of the August 2, 2023 proceeding.

Accordingly, even if the court constructively deprived
the respondent of her constitutional right to counsel at
the August 2, 2023 proceeding, we conclude that any
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II

Next, the respondent claims that the court violated
her due process rights in denying Dombek’s oral request
for a continuance at the August 2, 2023 proceeding.
22
Because we conclude that the respondent’s proffered evidence would
not have affected the court’s finding of abandonment as a ground for termina-
tion, it is not necessary for us to determine whether such evidence could
have affected the court’s finding of failure to rehabilitate as a ground for
termination. See In re Brea B., 75 Conn. App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003)
(‘‘Because the statutory grounds necessary to grant a petition for termination
of parental rights are expressed in the disjunctive, the court need find only
one ground to grant the petition. Thus, we may affirm the court’s decision
if we find that it properly concluded that any one of the statutory circum-
stances existed.’’).
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

Because Dombek did not frame the request for a contin-
uance as a matter of due process,23 we review the
respondent’s unpreserved constitutional claim pursu-
ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.
773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).24 ‘‘The test set forth in
Golding applies in civil as well as criminal cases. . . .
Pursuant to the Golding doctrine, we may review an
unpreserved claim only if all of the following conditions
are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged
claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magni-
tude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)
the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and
. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if
subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to
demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two
Golding requirements involve whether the claim is
reviewable, and the second two involve whether there
was constitutional error requiring a new trial.’’ (Empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Na-Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 7, 303 A.3d 1206, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
We assume, without deciding, that the respondent’s
claim satisfies the first three prongs of Golding, and we
proceed to determine whether, under Golding’s fourth
23
Dombek stated only that she would ‘‘like a little bit of an opportunity
to try to track [the respondent] to see where she’s at.’’
24
The respondent claims that she ‘‘advanced a due process argument [at
trial] that can be expanded upon on appeal to encompass the other due
process claims’’ she raises on appeal. Dombek, however, did not raise a
due process claim at the August 2, 2023 termination proceeding, and,
although she stated at the January 4, 2024 hearing on the motion to open
that the respondent has a ‘‘due process right’’ to raise her children, Dombek
did not argue specifically that the denial of the continuance violated the
respondent’s due process rights. Accordingly, to the extent that the respon-
dent contends that her due process claims were preserved before the trial
court, we disagree. See In re Kiara Liz V., 203 Conn. App. 613, 621 n.8,
248 A.3d 813, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 904, 252 A.3d 364 (2021).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

prong, the court’s denial of Dombek’s request for a
continuance to locate her client was harmless error. As
set forth previously in this opinion, Dombek subse-
quently located the respondent, and the respondent
thereafter filed the motion to open the August 2, 2023
judgments. In doing so, the respondent had the opportu-
nity to be heard with respect to the termination judg-
ments at the January 4, 2024 hearing on her motion to
open. Despite having nearly two months to prepare with
her counsel for the upcoming January 4, 2024 hearing,
the respondent failed to present any evidence with
respect to a good defense to the termination of her
parental rights. We therefore conclude that the court’s
denial of Dombek’s request for a continuance was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt for the same reasons
set forth in part I of this opinion. Accordingly, the
respondent’s claim fails under the fourth prong of Gold-
ing.25
III
The respondent next claims that the court violated
her due process rights in failing to provide her and her
counsel with adequate notice of the August 2, 2023
proceeding. Specifically, the respondent claims that
notice was constitutionally insufficient in that the court
25
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the compelling interests
that are at stake in proceedings to terminate parental rights, including the
strong public interest in the prompt resolution of these cases. However, we
emphasize that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding
has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, and when assigned
counsel is appointed just days before a termination hearing and has not
had an opportunity to speak with his or her client, and counsel makes a
reasonable request for a continuance, the trial court ordinarily should
strongly consider granting that request. This is especially the case where,
as here, counsel had obtained new information as to how to contact the
client with whom she previously had been unable to communicate. In the
present case, the record reflects no compelling reason as to why the request
was denied. We conclude, however, for the reasons stated herein, that
the denial of counsel’s request for a continuance was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

(1) failed to notify Dombek that the hearing would
be an evidentiary trial to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights, (2) failed to state the grounds for the
termination of parental rights petitions, and (3) improp-
erly relied on notice by publication. Because the respon-
dent did not raise these arguments before the trial court,
we review her unpreserved constitutional claim pursu-
ant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40.26
We assume, without deciding, that the respondent’s
claim satisfies the first three prongs of Golding, and
we conclude that her claim fails under Golding’s fourth
prong for the same reasons set forth in parts I and II
of this opinion.27 Even if we were to assume that notice
26
Although the respondent concedes that she did not advance a claim of
inadequate notice before the trial court, she again argues that she ‘‘advanced
a due process argument [at trial] that can be expanded upon on appeal to
encompass’’ the notice claim she raises on appeal. It is clear from the record
before us, however, that to the extent the respondent advanced a due
process argument before the trial court, that argument never challenged
the constitutionality nor the adequacy of the court’s notice specifically. See
footnote 24 of this opinion. We therefore conclude that the respondent did
not preserve the due process claim regarding notice that she raises on appeal.
27
We note that ‘‘[n]otice by publication, although sometimes necessary,
is not the preferred method for assuring full participation in so significant
an impairment of constitutionally protected parental rights.’’ In re Baby
Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 295, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). Although the record indicates
that the respondent’s whereabouts were unknown on July 11, 2023, the date
that the petitioner filed, and the court granted, the motion for notice by
publication, the record also indicates that on the date of publication, July
20, 2023, Bell spoke with the respondent on the phone after learning that
the respondent was in a detoxification treatment program at Rushford.
Thereafter, on July 26, 2023, the respondent applied for the appointment of
counsel, indicating that she had just been released from the hospital and
listing her address as a homeless shelter. We note that between the July
20, 2023 phone call and the August 2, 2023 hearing, at which the court found
the published notice to be appropriate and sufficient, it does not appear that
the petitioner made any efforts to serve the respondent either at Rushford
or at the homeless shelter she listed as her address on her application for
counsel. Although we do not reach the merits of the respondent’s claim
under Golding’s third prong—that is, whether notice was constitutionally
insufficient and deprived the respondent of a fair trial—we emphasize that
‘‘[t]he purpose of the notice in this case was to inform the mother of the
hearing regarding the termination of her parental rights. Notice is not a
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
In re Jaelynn K.-M.

was constitutionally insufficient, the respondent fails
to explain what additional evidence she would have
presented had she and her counsel received proper
notice of the August 2, 2023 proceeding. See, e.g., In
re Gabriel S., supra, 347 Conn. 238 (finding any constitu-
tional violation harmless beyond reasonable doubt
where respondent made ‘‘no claim that there was addi-
tional evidence on that issue that he would have pre-
sented if he had received adequate notice’’). The respon-
dent does not challenge the sufficiency of the court’s
notice regarding the January 4, 2024 hearing on her
motion to open, and we reiterate that the respondent
failed to put on any evidence regarding a good defense
to the termination of her parental rights despite having
the opportunity—and the statutory burden—to do so
at that hearing.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

mere perfunctory act in order to satisfy the technicalities of a statute, but
has, as its basis, constitutional dimensions. An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 295–96.