In re Skye B.

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In re Skye B.

IN RE SKYE B.*
(AC 47760)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court for
the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his
parental rights as to his minor child. He claimed that the court violated
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when it terminated his
parental rights for failure to rehabilitate on the basis of his unwillingness
to admit to the potentially criminal conduct that initiated the underlying
child protection case. Held:

The respondent father’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination failed under the third prong
of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because the alleged constitutional viola-
tion did not exist, as the court’s decision was not based on an invocation
of the father’s right to remain silent but, instead, on his voluntary denials
of the existence of intimate partner violence in his relationship with the
child’s mother, which were contradicted by compelling evidence.
Argued December 19, 2024—officially released February 20, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Mat-
ters at Bridgeport, and tried to the court, Skyers, J.;
judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights,
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** February 20, 2025, the date that this opinion was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Skye B.

from which the respondent father appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Nisa J. Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Ciarra J. Minacci-Morey, assistant attorney gen-
eral, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general,
for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent father, Shane B., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his minor child, Skye B.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court violated his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination when it terminated his paren-
tal rights for failure to rehabilitate on the basis of his
unwillingness to admit to the potentially criminal con-
duct that initiated the underlying child protection case.2
We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the court found by clear
and convincing evidence, and procedural history are
relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The Depart-
ment of Children and Families (department) first
became involved with the respondent on February 24,
2021, when the Middletown Police Department reported
a domestic incident involving the respondent that
occurred on February 2, 2021. During that incident, the
respondent and the mother were engaged in a verbal
argument that ‘‘turned into a physical altercation
1
In the underlying proceeding, the respondent mother, Caleigh D., con-
sented to the termination of her parental rights, and she is not participating
in this appeal. All references in this opinion to the respondent are to Shane
B. only.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
filed by the petitioner.
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between the two parties and [the respondent] dragged
[the mother] out of bed, onto the floor, banging her
head into the wall, inflicting injuries to her head and
hand. Then he punched a hole into the wall. Thereafter,
he grabbed the front of her shirt and lifted her off the
ground where she had trouble breathing. At the time
. . . Skye was six months old and was in another room
during the incident.
‘‘As a result, [the respondent] was arrested and
charged with strangulation, assault, criminal mischief
and disorderly conduct. . . . The criminal case was
still pending in this matter as of the date of the [termina-
tion of parental rights] trial. A full no contact protective
order was issued where the mother was the protected
party. The protective order expired in March, 2023. . . .
There is a history of ongoing intimate partner violence
where both parents blame each other for the incident.’’
An order of temporary custody was granted by the
court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., on April 14, 2021, and sus-
tained on April 27, 2021. On February 22, 2022, the
court, Maronich, J., adjudicated Skye neglected and
committed her to the care and custody of the petitioner.
The court issued specific steps for the reunification of
Skye with her parents.3 On August 3, 2022, the petitioner
filed a termination of parental rights petition seeking
3
In particular, the court issued the following orders, inter alia, to the
respondent: ‘‘Take part in counseling and make progress toward the identi-
fied treatment goals . . . . Attend and complete an appropriate domestic
violence program. Address intimate partner violence/domestic violence with
a qualified therapist . . . .’’ In a section of the orders titled ‘‘Other,’’ the
court set forth two programs: ‘‘24/7 Dads––Participate in parenting program
to strengthen understanding of age and developmentally appropriate expec-
tations. Develop a plan for childcare and how you will ensure your child’s
physical, emotional and social needs are met. Yale [Intimate Partner Vio-
lence] Program for Fathers—Demonstrate understanding of how exposure
to [intimate partner violence] impacts your child. Develop coping skills to
deal with stress in a healthy way. Develop skills which demonstrate no
violent or intimidating behaviors toward anyone.’’
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to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and
the mother. On January 26, 2023, the respondent filed
a motion to revoke commitment.
On January 9 and 10, 2024, the court, Skyers, J., held
a consolidated hearing on the petitioner’s petition for
the termination of parental rights and the respondent’s
motion to revoke commitment.4 The respondent appeared
4
‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the
trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination
of parental rights [under General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)] exists by clear and
convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M.,
148 Conn. App. 308, 316, 84 A.3d 1265 (2014), aff’d, 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d
1247 (2015) Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a petition [to terminate
parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (B)
the child . . . has been found . . . to have been neglected . . . or uncared
for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided
specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent . . .
and [the parent] has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation
as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable amount of time,
considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a
responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’ General Statutes § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B) (i). ‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for
termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional
phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests
of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., supra, 316.
‘‘The trial court is required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to analyze the [parent’s]
rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and
further . . . such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable
time. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when
[he or she] will be able to assume a responsible position in [his or her]
child’s life. Nor does it require [him] to prove that [he] will be able to assume
full responsibility for [his] child, unaided by available support systems. It
requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level
of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would
reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a
responsible position in [his] child’s life. . . . Personal rehabilitation as used
in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or
her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing
rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his]
ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the
ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . [The]
completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps], however, does not
guarantee any outcome. . . .
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and was represented by counsel. Immediately prior to
the commencement of trial, the court advised the
respondent of his rights, including his right to remain
silent and to not testify.

The court heard testimony from Jessica Biren Cav-
erly, a licensed clinical psychologist who performed a
court-ordered evaluation of the respondent. In her
report, which was admitted as an exhibit at trial, Biren
Caverly reported that the respondent ‘‘appears to have
struggled with completing [court-ordered] specific
steps for approximately a year and a half before becom-
ing more consistent with services and visitation in the
fall of 2022. However, [the respondent] continues to
maintain that he has done nothing wrong and that there
has not been intimate partner violence. He represented
that the criminal court plans to dismiss his charges
once the protective order expires; however, there is no
documentation to support this assertion. . . . It is
unclear if [the respondent] has limited insight into his
behaviors and how they are impacting the current cus-
tody situation or if he is intentionally trying to present
himself in a positive light. Psychological testing as part
of the current evaluation supported that [the respon-
dent] is acting intentionally . . . . It is strongly
believed that [the respondent] is now only putting in
effort as a way to avoid his parental rights being termi-
nated for his criminal case. Therefore, it is unlikely that
he will make significant changes in his beliefs about
needing services.’’ According to Biren Caverly, the
respondent ‘‘initially declined engagement with Fathers
for Change and an intimate partner violence program.
‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court’s
factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether
those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B).’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 488–90, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348
Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
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He ultimately completed these programs but main-
tained that he had not done anything wrong and did
not need services. . . . Throughout this case, [the
respondent] has been reticent about completing neces-
sary services, often putting up impediments for atten-
dance or requiring workers to schedule appointments
but then saying that he was no longer available.’’ Biren
Caverly ‘‘strongly recommended that [the respondent]
engage in individual therapy with a provider who can
also work with him on gaining a better understanding
of domestic violence and its impact on children.’’
Biren Caverly testified that ‘‘[i]t’s very concerning if
he’s not able to take any accountability or ownership
with what had happened.’’ She further testified that
‘‘[she] had a lot of concerns about [the respondent’s]
personality functioning. And how much he was able to
accept responsibility for what had happened. How
much he was able to hear from others how likely he
would be to make changes to his own behavior.’’ Accord-
ing to Biren Caverly, the respondent did not demon-
strate the type of growth expected for someone who had
received counseling in a domestic violence program,
regardless of whether that person had actually engaged
in domestic violence. She explained that everyone in
a relationship could learn from a domestic violence
program, even if their relationship did not involve inti-
mate partner violence. According to Biren Caverly, the
respondent’s continuous denials demonstrated a lack
of growth. In her expert opinion, she ‘‘did not think it
was in [Skye’s] best interest to be returned to [the
respondent’s] care.’’
The court also heard testimony from Nancy Stewart,
a department social worker who prepared a social study
dated June 4, 2021. In her social study, which was admit-
ted as a full exhibit at trial, Stewart stated the following:
‘‘The last report received [from the office of victim
services and family relations] was that [the respondent]
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will be recommended to participate in a family violence
program regarding his current criminal charges. [The
respondent] reports that he is not in agreement with
participating in the court recommended services. He
maintains that he does not have a need for the services
as he has not done anything wrong.’’ Stewart further
indicated that the respondent ‘‘has been very difficult
to engage in treatment planning services . . . becomes
angry and defensive when confronted with concerns
. . . has unaddressed [intimate partner violence]
issues.’’ Stewart testified that she had spoken with the
respondent and that he denied having engaged in inti-
mate partner violence. Stewart also testified that she
interviewed the mother after the February 2, 2021 inci-
dent, and the mother provided her with photographs
depicting the injuries and bruising to her hands, arm,
neck, and body, as well as a photograph of an indenta-
tion in the wall where the respondent had punched it
during the incident. The photographs were introduced
as full exhibits at trial. Stewart also testified that the
mother showed her a copy of a text exchange between
the mother and the respondent in which he indicated to
her that ‘‘you’ve put hands on me too.’’ Stewart further
testified that her investigation revealed that there had
been a prior incident of intimate partner violence on
December 24, 2020, during which the mother reported
to her that the respondent hit her. Stewart testified that,
although the mother did not provide much detail about
the prior incident of intimate partner violence, the
mother characterized the December 24, 2020 incident
as worse than the February 2, 2021 incident.
Additionally, the court heard testimony from Randall
Brown, a department social worker assigned to Skye’s
case. Brown prepared a permanency plan study, dated
September 9, 2023, and a status report, dated December
19, 2023, which were introduced as full exhibits at trial.
Brown reported in the September 9, 2023 permanency
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plan study that the respondent ‘‘has not been able to
achieve a reasonable degree of rehabilitation in order
for Skye to be safely return[ed] to his care within a
reasonable amount of time,’’ in part due to his noncom-
pliance with the court-ordered specific steps. Specifi-
cally, the respondent has failed to ‘‘[d]emonstrate an
understanding of how mental health and intimate part-
ner violence . . . impacts the ability to safely parent
[children] . . . [and] [a]ddress mental health and [inti-
mate partner violence] needs.’’ Brown described the
respondent as noncompliant for denying the need for
mental health and intimate partner violence treatment
as well as minimizing the domestic violence programs
he was referred to and the intimate partner violence
incident that caused him to lose custody of Skye. In the
December 19, 2023 status report, Brown recommended
termination of the respondent’s parental rights in part
because, ‘‘although he finished the [intimate partner
violence] services, he continues to deny that he was
the aggressor and takes no responsibility.’’
At the hearing, Brown testified that, although the
respondent acknowledged to him that he had attended
intimate partner violence programs and had listened to
the speakers, he did not indicate that he had gained
any relevant knowledge concerning intimate partner
violence. Brown further testified that the respondent
seemingly attended these programs purely for the sake
of attendance instead of progress. Brown testified that
the petitioner was recommending the termination of the
respondent’s parental rights because ‘‘the respondent
hasn’t completed or [the respondent] hasn’t had any
acknowledgment of the issues that brought this case
to [the department]. And seen any insight to any
changes that he may make . . . with regards to rela-
tionships, especially relationships with women.’’
On April 29, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision terminating the respondent’s parental rights.
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In its memorandum of decision, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that, ‘‘[e]arly in the case,
[the respondent] found it very difficult to comply with
the court-ordered specific steps because he would not
engage in many of the recommended services. [The
respondent] denied a history of intimate partner vio-
lence with [the mother] and said that [the mother] was
not telling the truth about the [February 2, 2021] inci-
dent. However, in a text exchange with [the mother]
on February 12, 2021, he referred to the incident that
occurred on February 2, 2021, and stated, ‘[y]ou put
your hands on me too,’ essentially providing his admis-
sion’’ that he actively participated in the physical alter-
cation that took place on that date by also putting his
hands on the mother. (Emphasis omitted.)
The court provided the following additional analysis:
‘‘The department referred [the respondent] to partici-
pate in intimate partner violence services at the Yale
Fathers for Change program due to the allegation of
[intimate partner violence] in the relationship. He com-
pleted the intake on October 13, 2021, but, on November
16, 2021, he vehemently declined the services and would
not engage in the program, indicating that he had no
desire or intent on attending ‘this little group.’ The
Fathers for Change program reported that, on Novem-
ber 29, 2021, they attempted a second time to get [the
respondent] started with the program, and, once again,
he adamantly refused to engage in the program and
declined services. [The respondent] reported that there
was no intimate partner violence in the relationship,
therefore he did not need the Fathers for Change pro-
gram. The department referred [the respondent] to the
24/7 Dads Program. He successfully completed it on
December 20, 2021, and the reports reflect that [the
respondent] was fully engaged.
‘‘[The respondent] was recommended to Southwest
Community Health Center (SWCHC) to participate in
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a mental health and substance abuse evaluation in Octo-
ber, 2021. [The respondent] denied a history of illicit
substance abuse and completed the substance abuse
evaluation. However, he failed to complete the accom-
panying urine screen. He initially claimed that he was
unable to get there due to transportation issues. How-
ever, even after the department offered to provide trans-
portation, he did not show up and the screening never
took place. In November, 2021, [the respondent] partici-
pated in a psychiatric evaluation at [SWCHC]. As per the
evaluation, he was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder
with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood and was rec-
ommended for individual therapy. [The respondent]
would not engage in individual therapy as recom-
mended. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] was ordered by the criminal court
to engage in the Explore program. Explore is a twenty-
six session program for men for intimate partner vio-
lence. He was referred in August, 2022, and completed
the Explore program in January, 2023. Originally, he
was referred to the Family Violence Program . . . a
nine week diversionary program. However, the court
ordered a more intensive program for this case. . . .
The department again recommended [the respondent]
for further individual mental health counseling at Bir-
mingham Healthcare . . . in April, 2022. However, [the
respondent] felt that he did not need therapy, stating
that he ‘made it twenty-five years in life without counsel-
ing’ and decided that he would only engage in the pro-
gram that was ordered by the criminal court regarding
his pending criminal charges.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
The court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify
the respondent with Skye. The court further found that
the respondent ‘‘waited over a year before actively
engaging in services and, upon completion of the pro-
gram, still maintained that he did nothing wrong. [The
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In re Skye B.

respondent] has attended programs such as Explore,
24/7 Dads, and Circle of Security. During the pendency
of this case, [the respondent] has repeatedly showed
up for an intake, then subsequently refused to engage
or participate in the programs that were offered and
recommended by the department. His inconsistency
speaks volumes to his understanding of the role he
played in having his daughter removed from his care.
[The respondent] has failed to learn or take anything
from the programs he attended and apply them to his
life and circumstances. He has been going through the
motions and not benefitted from the programmatic sub-
stance.
‘‘Over the course of the three years since Skye’s
removal [the respondent] has failed to gain insight as
to the reasons why Skye was removed from his home.
[The respondent] continues to deny the very existence
of intimate partner violence in the relationship with
Skye’s mother, notwithstanding the photos of the injur-
ies to her and his text message admission. There is
no reasonable prospect that given additional time [the
respondent] could assume a responsible position in the
life of his daughter Skye.’’
The court further found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that ‘‘Skye . . . has been found in a prior pro-
ceeding to have been neglected or uncared for’’ and
that ‘‘the respondent . . . has failed to sufficiently
adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to
make it in the best interest of [Skye] to be reunified
with him in the foreseeable future. [The respondent]
consistently visited with Skye and has only sporadically
engaged in the recommended services during the pen-
dency of this case. He has been unable or unwilling to
sufficiently address the reasons why Skye was removed
from his care and is not able to provide her with a safe,
permanent and stable home environment where she
would be able to thrive.’’ The court concluded ‘‘that the
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termination of the [respondent’s] parental rights is in
the best interest of . . . Skye.’’ This appeal followed.
In this appeal, the respondent does not claim that
any of the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous
or that the court misapplied the relevant legal principles
to the issues before it. Instead, the respondent claims,
for the first time on appeal, that the court violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination based
on his unwillingness to admit to the potentially criminal
conduct that initiated the underlying child protection
case.5 Specifically, he argues that the court’s determina-
tion that he had failed to rehabilitate was improperly
‘‘drawn from his refusal to accept responsibility for
the February 2, 2021 domestic incident, [and, thus, the
court] improperly compelled him to tell [department]
investigators and the court-appointed psychological
evaluator that he had engaged in criminal conduct in
order to avoid the termination of his parental rights.’’
We disagree.
The respondent acknowledges that his claim was not
preserved at the time of trial but argues that it is review-
able under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567
A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317
Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Under Golding
review, which applies in both criminal and civil cases;
see, e.g., Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 402 n.10,
125 A.3d 920 (2015); ‘‘[a respondent] can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record
5
The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .’’ U.S. Const., amend. V.
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.
Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).
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In re Skye B.

is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)
the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the
violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitu-
tional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote
omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 239–40; see also In re
Yasiel R., supra, 781 (modifying third prong of Golding).
‘‘The first two [prongs of Golding] involve a determi-
nation of whether the claim is reviewable; the second
two . . . involve a determination of whether the [party
claiming error] may prevail.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Gray, 342 Conn. 657, 668, 271 A.3d
101 (2022).
We agree with the respondent that the record is ade-
quate to review the claim and that it is of constitutional
magnitude, alleging the deprivation of his fifth amend-
ment privilege. For the reasons that follow, however,
we disagree with the respondent that a constitutional
violation exists and deprived him of his right to a fair
trial.
The respondent’s constitutional claim presents a
question of law over which our review is plenary. See
In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 705, 271 A.3d 633 (2022).
‘‘It is well established that [t]he fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination not only protects the
individual against being involuntarily called as a witness
against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privi-
leges him not to answer official questions put to him
in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in
future criminal proceedings. . . . Although a defen-
dant has the right to refuse to testify in a civil proceeding
when doing so might be incriminatory, [a] defendant
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has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between
testifying in a civil matter and asserting his [f]ifth
[a]mendment privilege. . . . Put another way, the fact
that there may be adverse consequences when a defen-
dant invokes the fifth amendment in a civil proceeding
does not necessarily mean that the defendant is subject
to unlawful compulsion for fifth amendment pur-
poses. . . .
‘‘There are limits, however, to the general rule that
an individual constitutionally may be required to choose
between accepting the consequences of testifying at a
civil trial—namely, the potential for self-incrimina-
tion—and accepting the consequences of invoking his
or her fifth amendment right to remain silent. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a [s]tate
may not impose substantial penalties because a witness
elects to exercise his [f]ifth [a]mendment right not to
give incriminating testimony against himself.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 705–707.
For the right against self-incrimination to be impli-
cated, compulsion is required. ‘‘Voluntary statements
of any kind are not barred by the fifth amendment. . . .
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evi-
dence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 116, 156 A.3d
506 (2017). Moreover, in civil proceedings, the right
against self-incrimination ‘‘is not self-executing [and]
must be expressly invoked at the time that allegedly
incriminatory evidence is sought to be compelled or
introduced.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) John-
son v. Raffy’s Café I, LLC, 173 Conn. App. 193, 205, 163
A.3d 672 (2017). Termination of parental rights cases
are civil proceedings. See In re Katia V., 214 Conn.
App. 468, 486, 281 A.3d 509, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 913,
283 A.3d 980 (2022).
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Skye B.

In the present case, the respondent did not testify at
trial and never invoked his fifth amendment right to
remain silent during the pendency of the case.6 Instead,
he continuously and voluntarily denied engaging in inti-
mate partner violence to Biren Caverly, Stewart, and
Brown.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the
record does not reflect that the court terminated the
respondent’s parental rights because he did not admit
that his relationship with the mother involved intimate
partner violence. Rather, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that there was an incident of inti-
mate partner violence between the respondent and the
mother, for which he was arrested and charged with
assault, strangulation, disorderly conduct, and criminal
mischief, a finding the respondent does not challenge
on appeal. The court’s findings with respect to this
incident were supported, inter alia, by the photographs
of the mother’s injuries, the damage to their dwelling,
and the respondent’s self-incriminating text message to
her. Consequently, the court’s conclusion was not based
on the fact that the respondent wanted to remain silent
as to the incident but, instead, on the fact that he repeat-
edly denied that there was any intimate partner violence
in the relationship despite evidence to the contrary.
The court further found, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the respondent was referred to many inti-
mate partner violence programs, from which even a
person who had not been involved in intimate partner
violence would benefit, yet he consistently failed to gain
any insight into the impact intimate partner violence
has on children. As the court noted, his participation
6
Moreover, the respondent’s counsel conceded at oral argument before
this court that the respondent was never coerced to admit responsibility
for the incident of intimate partner violence. See State v. Edwards, supra,
325 Conn. 116 (‘‘[v]oluntary statements of any kind are not barred by the
fifth amendment’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
In re Skye B.

in these services was solely for the purpose of gaining
an advantage in his criminal and custody cases. The
court reasoned that the respondent’s failure to meaning-
fully engage in these services prevented him from
achieving such degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
amount of time, considering the age and needs of Skye,
he could assume a reasonable position in her life. In
sum, the court’s decision was based not on an invoca-
tion of the respondent’s right to remain silent but,
instead, on his voluntary denials of the existence of
intimate partner violence in his relationship with the
mother, which were contradicted by compelling evi-
dence. Consequently, the court’s decision did not impli-
cate, let alone violate, the respondent’s fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. In light of the fore-
going, we conclude that the respondent’s claim fails
under Golding’s third prong.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.