In re Aviana J.

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In re Aviana J.

IN RE AVIANA J.*
(AC 47807)
Elgo, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court termi-
nating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she had failed
to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by statute
(§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)). Held:

The trial court’s unchallenged factual findings, including findings regarding
the respondent mother’s ongoing struggles with substance abuse and her
lack of housing and income, supported its determination, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the mother failed to achieve such degree of per-
sonal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), as would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable time, she could assume a responsible
caretaking position in the child’s life.

The trial court’s determination that the termination of the respondent moth-
er’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest was not clearly erroneous
and was supported by sufficient evidence.

Argued January 13—officially released February 24, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, McLaughlin, J.; judg-
ment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent mother appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** February 24, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Aviana J.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
Joshua P. Britt, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Elizabeth T.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights with
respect to her minor child, Aviana J.1 On appeal, the
respondent claims that the court improperly deter-
mined (1) that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree
of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (2) that the termina-
tion of her parental rights was in Aviana’s best interest.2
We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the court found by clear
and convincing evidence or are otherwise undisputed,
and procedural history are relevant to the resolution
of this appeal. The respondent came to the attention of
the Department of Children and Families (department)
shortly after Aviana was born in June, 2021. ‘‘On June
18, 2021, the department received a call on its Careline3
1
Initially, the petitioner named the respondent’s boyfriend as the father
of Aviana. However, a subsequent paternity test conclusively established
that he was not the father. Thereafter, the court issued orders of nonpaternity
with respect to him, and the petitioner withdrew the action as to him. The
petitioner also named John Doe as the putative father of Aviana. The court
terminated the parental rights of John Doe as to Aviana, and he is not
participating in this appeal. All references in this opinion to the respondent
are to Elizabeth T. only.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
filed by the petitioner.
3
Careline ‘‘is a department telephone service that mandatory reporters
and others may call to report suspected child abuse or neglect.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re S. G., 229 Conn. App. 834, 837 n.3, 328 A.3d
737 (2024).
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In re Aviana J.

from the Bridgeport Hospital, where [Aviana] was born,
reporting that the [respondent] and [Aviana] had tested
positive for cocaine. [Aviana] experienced withdrawal
symptoms including hypertonia and jitters. [Aviana]
was fed by way of a [nasogastric] tube. The [respondent]
notified hospital staff that she had a history of heroin
use and last had used heroin on June 15 or 16 [2021,
mere] days before giving birth to [Aviana]. The [respon-
dent] denied using cocaine or marijuana. [That same
day], the department met with the [respondent]. She
reported that she never received any prenatal care
because she did not realize she was pregnant until
approximately a month to a month and half before
[Aviana] was born. She continued using heroin after
learning she was pregnant. The [respondent] told the
department that she did not have supplies for [Aviana].’’
(Footnote added.)
‘‘On June 24, 2021, the [petitioner] filed an ex parte
order of temporary custody (OTC) and neglect petition
on behalf of [Aviana]. On June 24, 2021, the court
granted the ex parte OTC. The court sustained the OTC
on July 2, 2021, vesting temporary custody of [Aviana]
in the [petitioner]. At the hearing sustaining the OTC,
the court ordered preliminary specific steps for the
[respondent]. On August 5, 2021, the court adjudicated
[Aviana] neglected and committed [her] care and cus-
tody to the [petitioner]. The court also ordered final
specific steps4 for the [respondent]. . . . On January
4
With respect to the respondent, the court ordered her, inter alia, to
‘‘[t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment
goals,’’ namely, ‘‘to remain substance abuse free [and] to address your mental
health in order to parent the child,’’ to ‘‘[s]ubmit to substance abuse evalua-
tion and follow the recommendations about treatment, including inpatient
treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention,’’ to ‘‘[n]ot use illegal
drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine,’’ to ‘‘[c]ooperate with service providers
recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support
services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment,’’ and to ‘‘[g]et and/
or maintain adequate housing and a legal income.’’
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17, 2023, the [petitioner] filed [the] termination of paren-
tal rights petition . . . . On February 6, 2024, the court
approved a permanency plan of termination of parental
rights and adoption.’’ (Footnote added; footnote omit-
ted.)
On May 2, 2024, the court, McLaughlin, J., held a
hearing on the petitioner’s petition for the termination
of parental rights. The respondent appeared and was
represented by appointed counsel. On May 16, 2024,
the court issued a memorandum of decision terminating
the respondent’s parental rights. In its memorandum
of decision, the court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent had an ongoing substance
abuse problem for which she failed to consistently
engage in treatment. The court found that, ‘‘[o]n June
18, 2021, the department referred the [respondent] to
[Center for Human Services (CHS)]—Recovery Net-
work Program for the methadone maintenance program
and Project Courage for substance use treatment. On
June 22, 2021, the [respondent] completed an intake
with Project Courage. She failed to engage in treatment.
The department referred the [respondent] to individual
therapy with Gary Vertula. She failed to engage.’’
The court further found that, ‘‘[i]n July, 2021, the
department referred the [respondent] to CHS for sub-
stance use treatment. She engaged with CHS and entered
the methadone maintenance program, the intensive out-
patient program [IOP] and attended individual counsel-
ing. At the commencement of her treatment in July,
2021, the [respondent] tested positive for cocaine, fen-
tanyl, and marijuana. In August, 2021, she tested posi-
tive for opiates, benzodiazepines, cocaine, and fentanyl.
In August, 2021, CHS recommended the [respondent]
attend a higher level of care through inpatient treatment
with New Prospects. The [respondent] failed to follow
through with treatment at New Prospects. In August,
2021, the [respondent] stopped engaging with CHS.
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In re Aviana J.

‘‘From August, 2021, until April, 2022, the [respon-
dent] failed to engage in any substance use treatment.5
On April 20, 2022, the [respondent] was arrested on
charges of larceny in the sixth degree, conspiracy to
commit larceny, interfering with an officer and violation
of probation. The criminal court placed the [respon-
dent] on conditions of release which included cooperat-
ing with the Pathway Program with [Jay Brothers Uni-
fied Resource Center (Jay Brothers)]—a treatment
program for women involved in the criminal justice
system with substance abuse issues. The Office of Adult
Probation supervised the [respondent] on her condi-
tions of release. In April, 2022, the [respondent] entered
a detoxification program. At her intake, the [respon-
dent] tested positive for cocaine, methadone, fentanyl,
and ecstasy.
‘‘From April, 2022, through July, 2022, the [respon-
dent] participated in inpatient treatment through the
Families in Recovery Program. The [respondent] suc-
cessfully completed inpatient treatment on July 27,
2022, and moved in with her mother. The [respondent]
was offered methadone maintenance, mental health ser-
vices and medication management services through the
Liberations Program. She completed her intake for the
methadone clinic on July 28, [2022], and the intake for
mental health services on July 29, [2022]. The [respon-
dent] attended her first medication management ses-
sion on August 3, 2022, and continued to participate
sporadically thereafter. She never followed up for men-
tal health services. . . .
‘‘Although, in the summer and fall of 2022, the
[respondent] was participating in substance use treat-
ment, she began using drugs on a regular basis. On
5
‘‘The [respondent] reported that she reengaged with CHS in January,
2022. CHS denied that [the respondent] was engaged in its programming at
that time.’’
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September 12, 2022, the [respondent] tested positive
for cocaine and fentanyl. On September 19, 2022, the
[respondent] tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and
fentanyl. On September 22, 2022, the [respondent] tested
positive for cocaine and opiates. Due to the [respon-
dent’s] consistent use of illicit substances, her provider
recommended that she participate in a higher level of
care through inpatient substance abuse treatment. . . .
‘‘From October, 2022, through November 22, 2022,
the [respondent] engaged in substance use treatment
with the Stonington Institute. The Stonington [Institute]
program included hospitalization and intensive outpa-
tient services. On November 22, 2022, the [respondent]
successfully completed her treatment and moved to a
sober house, the Tina Klem House.
‘‘On November 23, 2022, the [respondent] completed
an intake with CHS for methadone maintenance and
mental health services. On November 29, 2022, the
[respondent] started an IOP with Regional Counseling
Services (RCS). She inconsistently attended the group
sessions. Her toxicology screenings in November and
December, 2022, were negative for all substances.
‘‘In March, 2023, the [respondent] successfully com-
pleted outpatient treatment with RCS but continued,
as recommended, with group sessions. In April, 2023,
the [respondent] successfully left the Tina Klem House.
Although the [respondent] did not consistently attend
her IOP group sessions, in June, 2023, she successfully
completed her ongoing outpatient treatment with RCS.
At that time, she was testing negative for all substances.
‘‘Approximately a month after successfully complet-
ing her outpatient treatment, the [respondent] started
testing positive for illicit substances again. On July 20,
2023, the [respondent] tested positive for cocaine. The
Office of Adult Probation referred the [respondent] to
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In re Aviana J.

the APT Foundation for treatment. The [respondent]
failed to engage.
‘‘On August 28, 2023, the [respondent] tested positive
for cocaine and fentanyl. The Office of Adult Probation
referred the [respondent] for a substance abuse evalua-
tion with Southwest Community Health Center (SCHC).
The [respondent] failed to attend the evaluation. In
August, 2023, the department referred the [respondent]
to an [advanced practice registered nurse (APRN)] with
CHS for medication management. The [respondent]
never followed up with the APRN.
‘‘The [respondent] had been attending sporadically
the methadone maintenance program with CHS during
the summer months of 2023. In August, 2023, CHS dis-
charged the [respondent] from the methadone mainte-
nance program due to her failure to regularly attend.
The [respondent] told the department that she was
engaging with Kinsella Treatment Center for methadone
maintenance. When the department reached out to
Kinsella [Treatment Center] to confirm the [respon-
dent’s] engagement, [it] notified the department that
the [respondent] was not one of its clients. . . .
‘‘In October, 2023, the [respondent] tested positive
for cocaine. In October, 2023, the [respondent] claimed
that she was referred to [Midwestern Connecticut Coun-
cil of Alcoholism, Inc. (MCCA)], not SCHC, for a sub-
stance abuse evaluation. At this point, the Office of
Adult Probation told the [respondent] that she was in
technical violation of her probation because of her con-
tinued use of illicit substances and her failure to engage
in treatment. On November 9, 2023, the [respondent]
tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl. The Office of
Adult Probation referred the [respondent] to the APT
Foundation for treatment. The [respondent] failed to
engage.
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In re Aviana J.

‘‘On November 15, 2023, the [respondent] completed
an intake with MCCA. At intake, she tested positive
for cocaine, fentanyl, opiates, and marijuana. MCCA
recommended that the [respondent] engage in IOP. The
[respondent] failed to return to MCCA until November
29, 2023. When the [respondent] reengaged, MCCA
administrated a drug screen, and the [respondent]
tested positive for cocaine, fentanyl, opiates, and mari-
juana. MCCA discharged the [respondent] on December
18, 2023, and recommended that she engage in a detoxi-
fication program. On December 19, 2023, the [respon-
dent’s] adult probation officer notified her that she was
filing a formal violation of probation (VOP) due to the
[respondent’s] continued drug use and failure to engage
in treatment. On January 3, 2024, the VOP issued. . . .
‘‘In March, 2024, the [respondent] submitted to a drug
screen with Jay Brothers at the request of the depart-
ment. She tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl. . . .
On May 1, 2024, the day before the [termination of
parental rights] trial, the [respondent] submitted to an
‘instant’ drug screen with Jay Brothers. The screen was
positive for cocaine, fentanyl, and opiates.’’ (Footnote
in original; footnotes omitted.)
After setting forth the foregoing subordinate factual
findings, the court found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that (1) the department had made reasonable
efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify the
respondent with Aviana and that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification
efforts, (2) the petitioner established that a statutory
ground for termination of the respondent’s parental
rights exists, namely, that the respondent had failed to
achieve a sufficient level of personal rehabilitation as
required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (3) termination
of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best inter-
est of Aviana. Accordingly, the court terminated the
respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
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In re Aviana J.

The general legal principles applicable to proceedings
to terminate parental rights are well settled. ‘‘A hearing
on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of
two phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the
adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether
one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights [under § 17a-112 (j)] exists by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Shane M., 148 Conn. App. 308, 316, 84 A.3d 1265
(2014), aff’d, 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). Sec-
tion 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a peti-
tion [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that . . . (3) . . . (B) the
child . . . has been found . . . to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding
. . . and the parent of such child has been provided
specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child
to the parent . . . and [the parent] has failed to achieve
such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encour-
age the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child
. . . .’’ ‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory
ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the disposi-
tional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court
determines whether termination is in the best interests
of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Shane M., supra, 316.

I

On appeal, the respondent first claims that the court
improperly determined that she failed to achieve a suffi-
cient degree of personal rehabilitation within the mean-
ing of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). Specifically, the respon-
dent argues that the bond between her and Aviana
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In re Aviana J.

‘‘undermines confidence in the trial court’s conclu-
sions’’ and justifies affording the respondent additional
time to rehabilitate. We are not persuaded.
It is well established that a ‘‘trial court is required,
pursuant to § 17a-112, to analyze the [parent’s] rehabili-
tative status as it relates to the needs of the particular
child, and further . . . such rehabilitation must be
foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . . The statute
does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when
[she] will be able to assume a responsible position in
[her] child’s life. Nor does it require [her] to prove that
[she] will be able to assume full responsibility for [her]
child, unaided by available support systems. It requires
the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any,
falls short of that which would reasonably encourage
a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a
responsible position in [her] child’s life. . . . Personal
rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] refers
to the restoration of a parent to his or her former con-
structive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing
rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the par-
ent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life,
but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care
for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . [The]
completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps],
however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . .
‘‘During the adjudicatory phase of a termination pro-
ceeding, a court generally is limited to considering only
evidence that occurred before the date of the filing of
the petition or the latest amendment to the petition,
often referred to as the adjudicatory date. . . . Never-
theless, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudi-
catory] date . . . [in] considering the issue of whether
the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that
the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life
within a reasonable time.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
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In re Aviana J.

quotation marks omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn.
App. 471, 488–89, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024). ‘‘[T]he fact that [a parent] may
love [a] child does not in itself show rehabilitation, and
motivation to parent is not enough; ability is required.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lil’Patrick
T., 216 Conn. App. 240, 254, 284 A.3d 999, cert. denied,
345 Conn. 962, 285 A.3d 387 (2022).

‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its
weighing of the facts in assessing whether those find-
ings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate
standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,
that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, upon the facts established and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative
effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ulti-
mate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . We
will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . A factual find-
ing is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by
any evidence in the record or when there is evidence
to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. . . . Thus, [i]t is not the function of this court
to sit as the [fact finder] when we review the sufficiency
of the evidence . . . . In making this determination,
[t]he evidence must be given the most favorable con-
struction in support of the [judgment] of which it is
reasonably capable. . . . In other words, [i]f the [trial
court] could reasonably have reached its conclusion,
the [judgment] must stand, even if this court disagrees
with it.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal
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In re Aviana J.

quotation marks omitted.) In re Niya B., supra, 223
Conn. App. 489–90.
In the present case, the respondent has not challenged
the court’s subordinate factual findings as clearly
erroneous. Instead, she points to the bond between
herself and her daughter, arguing that it ‘‘undermines
confidence in the trial court’s conclusions and deci-
sion.’’ Because the respondent has not challenged any
of the court’s factual findings in support of its determi-
nation that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of
personal rehabilitation, we limit our review to whether
the court reasonably could have concluded, upon the
subordinate factual findings it made and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the respondent failed
to rehabilitate and to the impact of the bond between
the respondent and Aviana on such a conclusion. See
In re S. G., 229 Conn. App. 834, 853, 328 A.3d 737 (2024).
In concluding that the respondent failed to rehabili-
tate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), the court found
by clear and convincing evidence that, ‘‘[a]t the time
of the adjudication [of neglect], the issues for the
[respondent] were substance use and mental health.
The court ordered final specific steps for the [respon-
dent] at the adjudication. . . . From August, 2021, until
the filing of the petition in January, 2023, the [respon-
dent] failed to comply with her final steps in that she
failed to consistently engage in substance abuse and
mental health treatment, she continued using illicit sub-
stances, and she failed to gain employment or housing.
‘‘Taking into consideration the time after the filing
of the [termination of parental rights] petition, the
[respondent] still had not gained sobriety. She was not
engaged in substance use and mental health treatment.
She failed to visit [Aviana] consistently.6 She failed to
6
‘‘Visiting [Aviana] as often as possible was also part of the [respondent’s]
steps. [Sophie] Hale, [a department social worker assigned to the family’s
case] credibly testified that the [respondent] missed several visits or arrived
late for visits in 2024.’’
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In re Aviana J.

obtain employment. Throughout the summer and fall
of 2023, the [respondent] routinely tested positive for
illicit substances, including, but not limited to, cocaine
and fentanyl. Her drug use continued . . . just prior to
trial testing positive for cocaine and fentanyl in March,
2024, and positive for cocaine, fentanyl, and opiates on
May 1 [2024]. . . . The [respondent] failed to engage
in any substance use or mental health services in 2024.
‘‘At trial, the court observed the [respondent] to be
very thin and fidgety. At times, the [respondent]
appeared to fall asleep. . . . The [respondent] testified
in earnest that she loved her daughter. She also
explained to the court that addiction was hard. She was
candid about the safety plan the department instituted
for her visitations with [Aviana]. Pursuant to that plan,
the [respondent] testified that she washed her hands
and face before seeing [Aviana]. The [respondent] said
that the department had her wash her hands and face
to ensure that there was no drug residue on her that
could impact [Aviana]. The [respondent] testified that
she would not harm [Aviana]. The court believed that
the [respondent] would never intentionally harm
[Aviana]. However, the [respondent’s] continued drug
use demonstrated to the court that the [respondent]
could inadvertently physically harm [Aviana] and that
the [respondent] did not understand the impact her
continued drug use had on [Aviana].
‘‘The [respondent] argued that the court should not
consider the drug results from May 1 [2024] that were
positive for cocaine, fentanyl, and opiates because the
results had not been verified by a lab. [Anika] Alcala,
[the counselor at Jay Brothers] who supervised the test,
testified that, in her experience with the instant test, it
was highly likely that the lab would confirm the positive
results. The court credited [Alcala’s] testimony. Consid-
ering [Alcala’s] testimony and the [respondent’s] other
positive drug screens, the court finds it more likely than
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In re Aviana J.

not that the instant test results were accurate, and the
[respondent] used illicit substances just prior to trial.
It was clear to the court from the credible evidence
that at the time of the trial the [respondent] was an
active illicit drug abuser.
‘‘[Jessica] Biren Caverly [a licensed clinical psycholo-
gist who performed two court-ordered evaluations of
the respondent] testified that, in October, 2023, [after
her initial evaluation] it was her recommendation that
the [petitioner] provide the [respondent] with additional
time to gain sobriety before moving forward with the
[termination of parental rights] petition. It was undis-
puted that, by May, 2024, the [respondent] had not
gained sobriety. [Biren Caverly] testified that, based on
the [respondent’s] continued drug use and failure to
engage in treatment, she supported the [termination of
parental rights] petition.
‘‘The court notes that the [respondent] also failed to
obtain employment or housing. At [Aviana’s] birth, the
[respondent] lived a transient lifestyle. When the
[respondent] left the sober house in April, 2023, she
moved in with her mother. Living with her mother was
not a long-term solution for the [respondent’s] housing.
However, the [respondent] had no plans for housing.
Further, the [respondent] knew she needed to obtain
employment to support herself and [Aviana]. The
[respondent] had three years to find some employment.
She found none.
‘‘The [respondent] has had three years to rehabilitate.
She has failed to do so. The [respondent’s] active drug
use, complete disengagement in treatment, and failure
to obtain housing or employment leads the court to
conclude that she will not play (let alone resume) a
useful role in [Aviana’s] life in the foreseeable future.
[Aviana] needs permanency. She deserves a stable, nur-
turing home in which to develop. The [respondent] can-
not provide such a home.’’ (Footnote in original.)
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On the basis of the foregoing, the court found that
‘‘[t]he evidence established clearly and convincingly
that the [respondent] has not rehabilitated and will not
rehabilitate in the foreseeable future. To allow the
[respondent] any additional time to attempt to rehabili-
tate when she has shown no ability to do so would be
pointless and to the detriment of [Aviana].’’
In sum, the court found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that, over the past three years, the respondent’s
ongoing struggles with substance abuse and a lack of
housing and income have not improved to the point
whereby the respondent has gained the ability to care
for Aviana’s needs. Moreover, the court found that reha-
bilitation was unlikely to occur within a reasonable
time and that Aviana’s need for permanency, stability,
and a caretaker outweighed the remote possibility of
the respondent achieving rehabilitation in the future.
On the basis of these findings, it was reasonable for
the court to determine that the respondent failed to
rehabilitate. See In re S. G., supra, 229 Conn. App. 855–57
(respondent’s persistent drug use and failure to engage
in treatment were bases for failure to rehabilitate, par-
ticularly when children’s need for permanency was con-
sidered); In re Lil’Patrick T., supra, 216 Conn. App.
257–58 (respondent’s failure to achieve stable housing
and his delay in participating in treatment programs
were bases for failure to rehabilitate); In re Carissa K.,
55 Conn. App. 768, 779, 740 A.2d 896 (1999) (respon-
dent’s substance abuse and lack of housing and employ-
ment were bases for failure to rehabilitate). The respon-
dent’s bond with Aviana, albeit deep and sincere, does
not alter this conclusion, as ‘‘[t]he fact that [a parent]
may love [a] child does not in itself show rehabilitation
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lil’Pa-
trick T., supra, 254.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s factual
findings are sufficient to support its determination that
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the respondent failed to achieve such degree of personal
rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within
a reasonable time, she could assume a responsible care-
taking position in Aviana’s life.7
II
Next, the respondent claims that the court erred in
determining that the termination of her parental rights
was in Aviana’s best interest. Again, the respondent
does not challenge any subordinate finding made by
the court in support of its best interest determination.
Instead, the respondent argues that ‘‘[t]he evidence
clearly demonstrated that the respondent . . .
expresses love and affection for [Aviana], is concerned
for [Aviana’s] health and well-being, and while [Aviana]
is not able to live with her, the respondent . . . engages
enough with her daughter with love and affection so
that her daughter recognizes her as her mother.’’ More-
over, the respondent asserts that she ‘‘has been nurtur-
ing and giving to her daughter to the best of her abilities
and circumstances.’’ We are not persuaded that this
evidence undermines the court’s conclusion that termi-
nation of the respondent’s parental rights is in Aviana’s
best interest.
We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal
principles. ‘‘Our standard of review in a challenge to a
trial court’s best interest determination in a proceeding
to terminate parental rights is well established. [A]n
appellate tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s finding
that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interest unless that finding is clearly erroneous. . . .
We do not examine the record to determine whether
7
We note that, during oral argument before this court, the respondent’s
counsel conceded: ‘‘Admittedly, there is not a strong argument to be made
with respect to the failure to rehabilitate other than [that the respondent]
was attempting to engage in services but . . . to quote [the respondent]
. . . ‘addiction is hard.’ ’’ This assessment of the strength of the respondent’s
argument is consistent with our analysis and conclusion.
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the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other
than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable
presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.
. . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of
parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately
shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest
of the child. . . . In the dispositional phase . . . the
trial court must determine whether it is established by
clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of
the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best inter-
est of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court
is mandated to consider and make written findings
regarding seven factors delineated in . . . § 17a-112
[(k)].8 . . . The seven factors serve simply as guide-
lines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites
8
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termi-
nation of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to
terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the [department] has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family
pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended
from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into
and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent
to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the
feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents,
any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised
physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with
whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the
child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circum-
stances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child
to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited
to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child
as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court
may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions,
and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the
guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a
parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with
the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the
child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent.’’
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that need to be proven before termination can be
ordered. . . . Indeed . . . [t]he balancing of interests
in a case involving termination of parental rights is
a delicate task and, when supporting evidence is not
lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a
child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost deference.
. . . [A] trial court’s determination of the best interests
of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one
factor if that determination is otherwise factually sup-
ported and legally sound. . . .
‘‘Our appellate courts have recognized that long-term
stability is critical to a child’s future health and develop-
ment . . . . In addition to considering the seven fac-
tors listed in § 17a-112 (k), [t]he best interests of the
child include the child’s interests in sustained growth,
development, well-being, and continuity and stability
of [his or her] environment. . . . Furthermore, in the
dispositional stage, it is appropriate to consider the
importance of permanency in children’s lives. . . .
Additionally, although [a] respondent may love her chil-
dren and share a bond with them, the existence of a
bond between a parent and a child, while relevant, is
not dispositive of a best interest determination. . . .
Our courts consistently have held that even when there
is a finding of a bond between parent and a child, it
still may be in the child’s best interest to terminate
parental rights.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in origi-
nal; footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re S. G., supra, 229 Conn.
App. 861–63.
In the present case, the respondent argues that the
court’s best interest finding is clearly erroneous
because a strong bond exists between her and Aviana.
Our case law, however, treats the existence of a bond
between parent and child, even when deep and sincere,
as relevant to, but not dispositive of, a court’s best
interest determination. See id., 863–65 (respondent
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mother’s bond with children was not dispositive in light
of her ongoing substance abuse); In re Autumn O.,
218 Conn. App. 424, 444–45, 292 A.3d 66 (respondent
mother’s bond with children was not dispositive in light
of her repeated cohabitation with individuals who cre-
ated violent home environment), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
1025, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023). ‘‘Consequently, so long as
there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s reli-
ance on other factors, its best interest determination
is entitled to deference.’’ In re S. G., supra, 229 Conn.
App. 864.
In making its best interest determination, the court
took into consideration ‘‘all credible evidence and argu-
ments of counsel,’’ and it found by clear and convincing
evidence that it was in Aviana’s best interest to termi-
nate the parental rights of the respondent. Specifically,
the court considered that ‘‘[Aviana] is almost three years
old, born [in June, 2021], and has been in the care
of the [petitioner nearly] since birth. [Aviana] needs
permanency and stability in her life to successfully
develop. . . .
‘‘The [respondent] made nominal attempts to alter her
lifestyle until July, 2023, after that time the [respondent]
made no attempts. . . . She never parented [Aviana]
beyond her three hours of weekly visitation. . . .
Although the [respondent] continues to be addicted to
illicit substances, she made every effort to visit with
[Aviana] until 2024. As the trial date approached, the
[respondent] became less consistent with her visits;
however, the undisputed evidence was that the [respon-
dent] and [Aviana] have a bond. The [respondent] never
gained sobriety or stability for the department to con-
sider allowing the [respondent] to parent [Aviana] full-
time. [Aviana] has never lived with the [respondent].
She has known only one home; the home with her foster
mother.
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‘‘The overwhelming evidence established that the
[respondent] has not made real efforts to adjust her
circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in
[Aviana’s] best interest to be reunited or returned to
the [respondent’s] care.’’ Although the court observed
that ‘‘[t]he [respondent’s] love for [Aviana] was evident
at the trial,’’ it ultimately determined that the termina-
tion of the respondent’s parental rights was necessary
to provide Aviana with a ‘‘loving, nurturing, and stable
home,’’ which ‘‘love alone does not create’’ and the
respondent cannot provide due to her ongoing sub-
stance abuse, inability to meaningfully engage in ser-
vices, and lack of stable housing and employment.
In light of the court’s foregoing factual findings, we
conclude that the court’s finding, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the termination of the respondent’s
parental rights was in the best interest of Aviana, even
given the existence of a bond between the respondent
and Aviana, is not clearly erroneous and, moreover, is
factually supported and legally sound. We therefore will
not substitute our judgment for that of the court.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.