In re Isabella S.

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In re Isabella S.

IN RE ISABELLA S.*
(AC 47764)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Westbrook, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent parents appealed from the trial court’s denial of their applica-
tion for a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, in which they
sought to compel the Department of Children and Families to place their
minor child in a residential treatment setting to address her mental health
needs. The respondents claimed, inter alia, that the court had misinterpreted
the meaning and the finality of the underlying decision by a hearing officer for
the department, which had ordered the department to explore appropriate
residential care for the child, who previously had been committed to the
care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies. Held:

The trial court properly denied the respondents’ application for a declaratory
judgment and a writ of mandamus, as the hearing officer’s decision contained
no language expressly requiring the department to place the child in a
residential treatment program but, rather, ordered the department to revise
its existing treatment plan for the child and to explore the possibility of
placing her in a residential treatment program, if such a placement was
appropriate to achieving her reunification with the respondents.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the extraordi-
nary remedy of mandamus was inappropriate under the circumstances at
issue, as the hearing officer’s decision did not create a clear right in the
respondents to the remedy they sought but, rather, granted them the right
to have the department devise a new treatment plan and to continue to look
into the possibility of residential placement for the child, after which the
respondents could pursue further relief from the department if they remained
unsatisfied with its efforts.

Argued January 15—officially released March 24, 2025***

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
*** March 24, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Isabella S.

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families
to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child neglected,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Litchfield, Juvenile Matters at Torrington, where the
court, Aaron, J., rendered judgment adjudicating the
minor child uncared for and committed her to the cus-
tody of the petitioner; thereafter, the court, Lobo, J.,
denied the respondents’ application for a writ of manda-
mus to compel the petitioner to place the minor child
in a residential treatment setting, and the respondents
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Lisa M. Vincent, with whom was Ani A. Desilets, for
the appellants (respondents).
Nisa J. Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Eric J. Palladino, for the minor child.
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this child protection matter, the
respondent parents, Billie Jean S. and Panyiotis S.,
appeal from the denial of their application for a writ
of mandamus, in which they argued that the Department
of Children and Families (department) was not provid-
ing their minor child, Isabella S., with appropriate men-
tal health care.1 They sought an order requiring the
department to place Isabella in an appropriate residen-
tial treatment setting in accordance with a March 15,
2024 decision issued by a department hearing officer.
1
Our Supreme Court has held that a ruling on an application for a writ
of mandamus is an immediately appealable final judgment irrespective of
whether the application is brought as an independent action or in the course
of ongoing litigation. See Wardell v. Killingly, 96 Conn. 718, 115 A. 539
(1921) (relying in part on General Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 6065, now General
Statutes § 52-493).
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The respondents claim on appeal that the court (1)
misinterpreted the meaning and the finality of the March
15, 2024 decision and (2) improperly concluded that a
writ of mandamus was not the proper mechanism for
seeking enforcement of the hearing officer’s decision.2
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of
the court.3
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history. Isabella was adopted by the respondents in
2012 at the age of eighteen months following the termi-
nation of her biological parents’ parental rights. Isabella
has a history of significant mental health issues that
include diagnoses of reactive attachment disorder, dis-
ruptive mood dysregulation disorder, oppositional defi-
ant disorder, conduct disorder, traumatic stress disorder,
developmental trauma, unspecified anxiety disorder and
depressive disorder. She has exhibited serious disrup-
tive behaviors including escalating anger, destruction
of property, and physical and verbal aggression toward
family members, particularly the respondent mother.
The respondents have sought various treatments and
services for Isabella. Due to her having repeatedly
engaged in disruptive and violent behavior, she has
required hospitalization on a number of occasions.
In April, 2023, Isabella, then twelve years old, was
hospitalized overnight after she threatened to harm the
2
In accordance with Practice Book § 67-13, the attorney for the minor
child filed a statement adopting the brief of the petitioner, the Commissioner
of Children and Families.
3
We note that the respondents filed a motion to strike portions of the
brief and accompanying appendix of the petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, specifically, ‘‘all references to the status of the child,
her treatment, and the parents’ role in that treatment that postdate the [May
29, 2024] decision being appealed on grounds that the material is irrelevant,
improper and prejudicial to the interests of the child and [the respondents].’’
We conclude that no action is necessary on the motion because we have
not relied on the disputed materials in resolving the issues on appeal, and,
to the extent that the brief or appendix contains ‘‘improper matter’’; see
Practice Book § 60-2 (3); the panel has not considered it.
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In re Isabella S.

respondent mother. When the hospital contacted the
respondents to inform them that Isabella could return
home, they refused to take her home. The department
was contacted and invoked a ninety-six hour hold pur-
suant to General Statutes § 17a-101g (f). The court,
Lobo, J., thereafter granted a motion filed by the peti-
tioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, for
an order of temporary custody and placed Isabella in
the petitioner’s care and custody. In April, 2023, the
petitioner filed a neglect petition in the Superior Court,
and, in August, 2023, the court, Aaron, J., adjudicated
Isabella as uncared for.

Following her commitment to the custody of the peti-
tioner, Isabella again required hospitalization and was
placed in multiple foster homes, none of which proved
to be a viable option. The respondents and the depart-
ment met in July, 2023, to discuss potential residential
placements for Isabella. In November, 2023, the respon-
dents filed with the court a ‘‘motion for emergency
relief,’’ in which they argued that the department was
denying Isabella access to appropriate mental health
care.4 The court denied the respondents’ motion, noting
on the papers: ‘‘exhaust administrative remedies first.’’

On December 1, 2023, the respondents requested a
treatment plan hearing with the department’s adminis-
trative hearings unit in accordance with General Stat-
4
Specifically, the respondents stated in their motion: ‘‘Isabella is currently
endangered in the department’s care, as she is being denied access to the
level of mental health care that has been recommended for her, she is unable
to maintain stability and has been through over ten foster placements since
May, 2023, and the [department] has no plan in place for what to do next,
as [Isabella] was denied admittance to [Solnit South, a state administered
psychiatric facility for children with residential treatment facilities] as of
October 18, 2023, because her needs are too complex. The parents seek an
order that [the department] immediately identify a treatment plan that meets
[Isabella’s] needs and further seek court oversight of the child’s treatment
until her needs are met.’’
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utes § 17a-15 (c). They sought an order that the depart-
5

ment ‘‘take immediate steps to place the child into an
attachment focused residential treatment setting.’’ The
hearing officer, Attorney Mary Elizabeth Satran, con-
ducted hearings via videoconference on January 5, 12,
19 and 26, and February 23, 2024. On March 15, 2024,
the hearing officer issued a decision in which she found
that the department’s current service plan failed to meet
Isabella’s needs and directed the department to ‘‘explore
appropriate residential care that is directly aimed at
addressing the child’s primary disability, reactive
attachment disorder, as well as her other diagnoses and
behavioral struggles, and provide an appropriate plan
and placement directed at the permanency plan of
reunification.’’ The hearing officer directed the depart-
ment to first focus on in-state placements and programs
and then to consider out-of-state options if there was
no appropriate in-state option. The hearing officer con-
cluded that ‘‘the department’s case plan is not appro-
priate to meet the child’s needs and shall be revised as
5
General Statutes § 17a-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The commis-
sioner shall prepare and maintain a written case plan for care, treatment and
permanent placement of every child under the commissioner’s supervision,
which shall include, but not be limited to, a diagnosis of the problems of
each child, the proposed plan of treatment services and temporary placement
and a goal for permanent placement of the child . . . . The child’s health
and safety shall be the paramount concern in formulating the plan.
‘‘(b) The commissioner shall at least every six months, review the written
case plan of each child under the commissioner’s supervision for the purpose
of determining whether such plan is appropriate and make any appropriate
modifications to such plan. . . .
‘‘(c) Any child or the parent or guardian of such child aggrieved by any
provision of a plan prepared under subsection (a) of this section, or by the
commissioner’s decision upon review under subsection (b) of this section,
or any child or the parent or guardian of such child aggrieved by a refusal
of any other service from the commissioner to which the child is entitled,
shall be provided a hearing within thirty days following a written request
for the same directed to the commissioner. . . .
‘‘(e) Any hearing held pursuant to a request made under subsection (c)
. . . shall be conducted as a contested case in accordance with [the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.] . . . .’’
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set forth in this decision to provide for placement and
services addressing the child’s significant attachment
issues and which is directed toward the goal of reunifi-
cation, consistent with the permanency plan.’’ The hear-
ing officer’s decision did not direct the department to
place Isabella into a residential treatment setting or
require that it do so as sought by the respondents.
On May 8, 2024, the respondents filed the application
for a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief that is
the subject of the present appeal. In the application,
the respondents alleged in relevant part that they had
‘‘exercised their administrative procedural rights as it
pertained to the care and treatment of their minor child,
and they have secured an administrative treatment deci-
sion in their favor’’; since the hearing, they did not
believe the department was ‘‘taking steps to secure
appropriate treatment for [Isabella],’’ and ‘‘[the depart-
ment’s] current efforts do not run toward placement of
[Isabella] but rather run toward keeping [her] out of
the residential treatment program that was ordered’’;
‘‘without consulting the family or the family therapist,
[the department] has conducted [its] own new assess-
ment of [Isabella] and concluded that [she] does not
qualify for a congregate care placement’’; the depart-
ment’s ‘‘actions and inactions . . . threaten, interfere
with and impair the legal rights of [Isabella] to receive
proper care and treatment’’ and ‘‘the legal rights of the
[respondents] to have reasonable efforts made to return
their child to their own care and custody’’; the depart-
ment failed to appeal from the hearing officer’s decision
or ask for reconsideration; ‘‘the action of placing the
child into an appropriate treatment facility is a ministe-
rial act, requiring no exercise of a public officer’s judg-
ment or discretion, as the discretionary question has
already been decided upon a full evidentiary record’’;
and the respondents ‘‘have no other means to secure
their legal rights and those of their minor child than to
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turn to [the Superior Court] for orders of enforcement of
the administrative hearing decision.’’ The respondents
asked the court to issue an order directing the depart-
ment to place Isabella ‘‘into an appropriate treatment
facility for her primary mental health condition in accor-
dance with the March 15, 2024 administrative hearing
decision and to declare that the provision of this treat-
ment for this child is not discretionary.’’
The petitioner filed a response to the respondents’
application, arguing that the court should deny the
application. According to the petitioner, the respon-
dents were not entitled to a declaratory judgment
because they had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies with the department pursuant to the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166
et seq.6 Moreover, the petitioner asserted that the
department had been complying with the March 15,
2024 decision by exploring in-state placements and pro-
grams, including ‘‘timely preparing a Commissioner
Memo to request consideration of a residential treat-
ment program (QRTP) and submitting a Child and Ado-
lescent Needs (CANS) to Carelon Behavioral Health to
6
Although the petitioner did not identify in her pleading what additional
administrative remedies were available to the respondents, the petitioner’s
counsel indicated, at the hearing on the mandamus application and in the
petitioner’s brief on appeal, that, if the respondents believe that the depart-
ment is not following the directions of the hearing officer by altering its
case plan and exploring whether there are appropriate in-state or out-of-
state residential treatment options for Isabella, the respondents could seek
another case plan hearing under § 17a-15, which contains no express limita-
tions on the number of such hearings a parent may request. Moreover, to
the extent that the respondents seek specific declaratory relief requiring
the department to place Isabella in a residential treatment program, the
petitioner contends that the respondents can follow the procedures set forth
in General Statutes § 4-176 and request such relief from the department.
If they are aggrieved following either procedure, they could then file an
administrative appeal with the Superior Court. See General Statutes §§ 4-
176 (h) and 17a-15 (e). Because, in resolving whether the court properly
denied the application for a writ of mandamus, we do not reach the issue
of whether the respondents have other legal remedies available to them,
we do not opine on the propriety or adequacy of such procedures.
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In re Isabella S.

determine the level of care based on medical neces-
sity.’’7 The department purportedly also had ‘‘reach[ed]
out to Wellspring, an in-state residential treatment pro-
gram that is not contracted with [the department], to
determine the suitability of Isabella for their program.’’
The petitioner stated that, on April 10, 2024, the depart-
ment was ‘‘informed [that] the CANS for Isabella was
not approved for a higher level of care, including thera-
peutic group homes or any congregate care placement
based on her current assessment of needs and function-
ing.’’ The petitioner also stated that, contrary to the
respondents’ representations in their pleading, the
department had ‘‘shared information with [the respon-
dents’] counsel about the steps [the department] has
taken to explore in-state placements and programs that
[are] aimed at addressing the child’s needs.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) Finally, the petitioner argued that placing a
child into an appropriate treatment facility is not a
ministerial act, as alleged by the respondents, but
requires the department to exercise its discretion ‘‘to
ethically explore a treatment facility that will address
the child’s disability, diagnoses, current level of need,
and is in her best interests.’’
On May 29, 2024, following a hearing on the applica-
tion, the court, Lobo, J., issued an oral decision denying
the application for a writ of mandamus.8 According
7
According to the petitioner, Carelon Behavioral Health’s role is to match
a child to an appropriate in-state QRTP treatment program.
8
The court’s oral ruling provides in relevant part: ‘‘The way . . . the court
sees it, I think there’s a couple of things that are going on, okay. One is,
there’s the decision itself. The administrative hearings officer . . . didn’t
specifically commit to any placement in the decision . . . that language
being to explore. . . .
‘‘As I read this [decision] . . . it doesn’t direct any specific placement.
The child needs to have appropriate care, but the way the decision is written,
I think . . . the hearings officer was very appropriate—was very careful,
shall I say, and not directing that but is ordering the department to explore
other avenues because the current [plan] was not appropriate. . . .
‘‘The court doesn’t feel that the writ is the appropriate vehicle to challenge
what you perceive as the department not meeting the child’s needs. If it
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In re Isabella S.

to the court, it did not interpret the hearing officer’s
decision as requiring the department to identify a resi-
dential treatment facility and to place Isabella therein
but, rather, as ordering the department to explore
options for such a placement, and the court found that
the department was complying with its obligations
under the hearing officer’s decision. The court also
stated that it lacked jurisdiction to order any specific
placement and concluded that the writ of mandamus
was an inappropriate procedural vehicle for the respon-
dents to pursue the relief they sought. Although the
court further stated that it did not know the proper
legal mechanism for the respondents to employ, it noted
the possibility of seeking another administrative hear-
ing before the department. This appeal followed.9
were . . . if the writ were to be ordered pursuant to the administrative
decision, it would just be to make sure that the department is exploring all
these other options. . . .
‘‘So, the court is going to deny the application for the writ of mandamus.’’
(Emphasis added.)
9
The petitioner in her appellee’s brief and the respondents in their reply
brief raise potential jurisdictional issues that we briefly address and reject.
See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Fritzell, 185 Conn. App. 777, 782,
198 A.3d 642 (2018) (this court ordinarily is required to address jurisdictional
issues before considering merits of appeal), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 963,
199 A.3d 1080 (2019). The petitioner argues in her appellee’s brief that this
court lacks jurisdiction over the present appeal because the respondents
purportedly failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing
their application for a writ of mandamus with the trial court. The petitioner’s
argument, however, appears to conflate the subject matter jurisdiction of
the trial court with the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. ‘‘It is a
settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative
remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain
jurisdiction to act in the matter. . . . [E]xhaustion of remedies serves dual
functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened
with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency’s role
in administering its statutory responsibilities.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fair-
child Heights, Inc., 310 Conn. 797, 808, 82 A.3d 602 (2014). ‘‘Questions
related to a trial court’s jurisdiction over a case, [however], normally can,
and should, be treated as analytically distinct from questions related to
appellate jurisdiction. . . . They spring from different sources and, in most
contexts, are not coterminous. Generally, the Appellate Court has jurisdic-
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In re Isabella S.

The respondents raise two claims on appeal. First,
they claim that the court misinterpreted ‘‘the meaning
and the finality’’ of the hearing officer’s March 15, 2024
decision. Second, they claim that the court improperly
concluded that a writ of mandamus was not the proper
mechanism for seeking enforcement of the hearing offi-
cer’s decision. Because our resolution of the first claim
tion to review final judgments of the Superior Court . . . even when the
question at issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction.’’ (Citations omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 375 n.9, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021). Moreover, the
matter underlying this appeal was not an administrative appeal but an appli-
cation for a writ of mandamus. Although the availability of other remedies—
administrative or otherwise—is a consideration for a court determining
whether to grant or deny an application for a writ of mandamus; see Cooke
v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 807, 827, 222 A.3d 1000
(2019) (granting of writ is proper only if, inter alia, no other specific, adequate
remedy is available), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 911, 228 A.3d 1041 (2020);
that inquiry is substantively different from the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine. The present appeal meets all prerequisites for appellate
jurisdiction in accordance with General Statutes § 52-263—the respondents
petitioned for the writ of mandamus in the trial court, received a final
disposition of their application by virtue of the trial court’s denial, and are
aggrieved by that denial for purposes of appeal.
We also reject any suggestion that the present appeal should be dismissed
as moot. In their reply brief, the respondents reference the petitioner’s
argument in her appellee’s brief that the trial court properly denied the
application for a writ of mandamus because the hearing officer’s March 15,
2024 decision was based on information about the child that is now ‘‘stale.’’
The respondents construe this argument as a mootness challenge. It is
axiomatic ‘‘that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to
decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or
from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An
actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but
also throughout the pendency of the appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education, 346 Conn. 1, 12,
287 A.3d 557 (2023). The petitioner’s stale information argument is directed,
however, to the propriety of the trial court’s decision and not to whether
this court can grant the respondents practical relief by deciding this appeal
in their favor. If this court were to agree with the respondents, it necessarily
would reject the petitioner’s stale information argument and determine that
the respondents are entitled to enforcement of the hearing officer’s March
15, 2024 decision against the department via a writ of mandamus, thus
providing the respondents with practical relief. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the present appeal is moot.
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In re Isabella S.

is also dispositive of the second claim, we will address
them together.
We begin with applicable principles of law, including
our standard of review. ‘‘The requirements for the issu-
ance of a writ of mandamus are well settled. Mandamus
is an extraordinary remedy, available in limited circum-
stances for limited purposes. . . . It is fundamental
that the issuance of the writ rests in the discretion of
the court, not an arbitrary discretion exercised as a
result of caprice but a sound discretion exercised in
accordance with recognized principles of law. . . .
That discretion will be exercised in favor of issuing the
writ only [if the party seeking the writ] has a clear legal
right to have done that which he seeks. . . . The writ
is proper only when (1) the law imposes on the party
against whom the writ would run a duty the perfor-
mance of which is mandatory and not discretionary;
(2) the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right
to have the duty performed; and (3) there is no other
specific adequate remedy.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cooke v. Commissioner of Correction, 194
Conn. App. 807, 827, 222 A.3d 1000 (2019), cert. denied,
335 Conn. 911, 228 A.3d 1041 (2020).
The proponent of the writ must ensure that all three
prongs of this test are satisfied, and the failure to satisfy
any one of them will be dispositive. See Greenfield v.
Reynolds, 122 Conn. App. 465, 473, 1 A.3d 125, cert.
denied, 298 Conn. 922, 4 A.3d 1226 (2010). ‘‘Even satis-
faction of this demanding [three-pronged] test does not,
however, automatically compel issuance of the
requested writ of mandamus. . . . In deciding the pro-
priety of a writ of mandamus, the trial court exercises
discretion rooted in the principles of equity. . . . We
review the trial court’s decision, therefore, to determine
whether it abused its discretion in denying the writ.
. . . In determining whether the trial court abused its
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In re Isabella S.

discretion, this court must make every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of its action. . . . Nevertheless, this
court will overturn a lower court’s judgment if it has
committed a clear error or misconceived the law.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cooke
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 194 Conn.
App. 827–28.
Because our review of the respondents’ claims
requires us to review the trial court’s interpretation of
the hearing officer’s decision, we note that, like the
construction of any judgment, this presents a question
of law over which our review is plenary. See Cunning-
ham v. Cunningham, 204 Conn. App. 366, 373, 254 A.3d
330 (2021). ‘‘As a general rule, judgments are to be
construed in the same fashion as other written instru-
ments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention
of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment.
. . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the
circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment.
. . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly
implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The
judgment should admit of a consistent construction as
a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The respondents’ first claim is that, in rejecting their
application for a writ of mandamus, the court misinter-
preted the meaning and the finality of the hearing offi-
cer’s March 15, 2024 decision. The respondents argue
in their brief that the issue before the hearing officer
was ‘‘whether [Isabella] required a residential place-
ment to meet her complex needs’’ and that ‘‘[t]he pur-
pose of the hearing itself and the purpose of the written
final decision was to resolve that question with finality.’’
Thus, according to the respondents, it follows that the
only reasonable interpretation of the hearing officer’s
decision was that it legally obligated the department
both to identify an appropriate residential placement
for Isabella and, once such a placement was identified,
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In re Isabella S.

to actually place her into that appropriate care facility.
We disagree with the respondents’ interpretation of the
hearing officer’s March 15, 2024 decision.
We conclude that, reading the decision as a whole,
the hearing officer’s March 15, 2024 decision cannot
reasonably be construed as an order requiring the
department to place Isabella into a residential treatment
program. The hearing officer clearly agreed with the
respondents that the department’s existing case plan
was not adequately meeting Isabella’s needs. Neverthe-
less, the decision contains no language expressly direct-
ing the department to place Isabella into a residential
treatment facility. Instead, the hearing officer ordered
the department to revise the existing treatment plan and
to ‘‘explore appropriate residential care that is directly
aimed at addressing the child’s primary disability, reac-
tive attachment disorder, as well as her other diagnoses
and behavioral struggles, and provide an appropriate
plan and placement directed at the permanency plan
of reunification.’’ (Emphasis added.) In interpreting a
written instrument, judgment, or order, we will afford
the language used its ordinary and plain meaning. Here,
the hearing officer’s direction to the department was
to ‘‘explore’’ residential treatment options for Isabella.
Consistent with our interpretation of this directive, Mer-
riam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the word
‘‘explore’’ as meaning ‘‘to investigate, study, or analyze:
look into.’’ Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th Ed. 2014) p. 441. We agree with the trial court’s
assessment that, if the hearing officer’s decision reason-
ably can be construed as mandating any particular
action by the department, it is that the department
revise its treatment plan, including by further investigat-
ing the possibility of placing Isabella in a residential
treatment program if the department determined that
such a placement was appropriate to achieving reunifi-
cation with the respondents.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
In re Isabella S.

Our construction of the hearing officer’s decision is
also dispositive of the respondents’ second claim on
appeal, namely, that the court improperly concluded
that a writ of mandamus was not the proper mechanism
for seeking enforcement of the hearing officer’s deci-
sion. Under the second prong of the three-pronged test
for determining if a writ of mandamus will lie, the party
applying for the writ must establish that he or she has
‘‘a clear legal right’’ to the performance of a mandatory
duty. The respondents suggest that the hearing officer’s
decision established this ‘‘clear legal right.’’ Given our
interpretation of the hearing officer’s decision, how-
ever, the respondents cannot satisfy prong two because,
as we have explained, the March 15, 2024 decision does
not mandate that the department place Isabella into
a residential treatment program or any other specific
placement. At most, the hearing officer’s decision
granted the respondents the right to have the depart-
ment devise a new treatment plan and continue to look
into the possibility of a residential placement, a duty
that the court found the department was meeting.
Stated succinctly, the hearing officer’s decision did not
create a ‘‘clear legal right’’ in the respondents to the
remedy they sought by way of mandamus. Accordingly,
we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
when it concluded that the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus was inappropriate under the circumstances
before it.10 If the respondents remain unsatisfied with
the department’s efforts, they are not precluded from
pursuing further relief from the department. See foot-
note 6 of this opinion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

10
Because we conclude that the respondents have not satisfied the second
prong of the applicable test, we do not decide whether the requirements of
prongs one and three of the test are met in the present case or whether other
equitable considerations would militate against issuing a writ of mandamus.