State v. Kenneth K.

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 657
State v. Kenneth K.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH K.*
(AC 46579)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Westbrook, Js.**

Syllabus

Convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal violation of a protective order,
the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that
the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to join for trial the
information charging him with violation of a protective order with a separate
information charging him with breach of the peace. Held:

This court declined to address whether the trial court abused its discretion
in granting the state’s motion for joinder because the defendant failed to
show that he was substantially prejudiced or harmed by the joinder.

The trial court abused its discretion in requiring the defendant to comply
with family court orders as a condition of his probation because the condition
was overly broad such that it lacked a reasonable connection to the defen-
dant’s reformation and rehabilitation.

This court could not conclude, on the basis of the information the trial court
appropriately considered before sentencing the defendant, that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing a forty year standing criminal protec-
tive order that prohibited the defendant from coming within 100 yards of
his former wife and prohibited contact with her.
Argued November 21, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime
of criminal violation of a protective order, brought to
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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State v. Kenneth K.

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, geographical area number one, and tried to
the jury before Blawie, J.; verdict and judgment of
guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Allison M. Near, for the appellant (defendant).
Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek, state’s attorney,
and Michael C. Bivona, assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (state).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, Kenneth K., appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of violation of a protective order in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-223. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the
state’s motion for joinder for trial of the information
charging the defendant with a violation of a protective
order with a separate information charging the defen-
dant with two counts of breach of the peace, (2) ordered
the defendant to comply with any family court orders
as a condition of probation, and (3) imposed a forty
year standing criminal protective order that prohibited
the defendant from coming within 100 yards of his for-
mer wife, L, and from contacting her. We conclude
that only the trial court’s condition of probation was
improper and, therefore, reverse in part the judgment
of the trial court.
The jury heard evidence of the following facts. The
defendant and L married in 1997 and have three children
together. In 2014, L initiated divorce proceedings, and
the defendant and L agreed to a visitation schedule for
their children, which provided that the defendant would
pick up the children at L’s residence. In April, 2015,
when the defendant arrived at L’s home to pick up
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State v. Kenneth K.

two of their children, an argument ensued between the
defendant and L. L warned the defendant that their
custody arrangement would not work if his outbursts
continued. The defendant then began yelling and swear-
ing at L, calling her a ‘‘bitch’’ and, at one point,
approached her and told her that he was going to ‘‘bash
[her] fucking brains in and [that L was] not going to be
able to stop [him].’’ L called the police and reported a
nonphysical domestic altercation. The state ultimately
charged the defendant with two counts of breach of
the peace in the second degree1 in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (3), and the trial court issued a
protective order in November, 2015, which precluded
the defendant from contacting L in any manner, includ-
ing by written, electronic, or telephonic contact, except
for parenting exchanges, emergencies, or scheduling
regarding their minor children (protective order).2
In January, 2016, a few months after the protective
order was issued, a hearing took place in the defendant
and L’s divorce case. Later that day, the defendant
texted L about the hearing, mocking her and her attor-
ney.3 Three days later, L reported the defendant’s text
message to an advocate at the Domestic Violence Crisis
Center and to the police. The state subsequently
charged the defendant with violation of a protective
order for texting L.
1
The state charged the defendant with intentional breach of the peace in
the second degree and, alternatively, with reckless breach of the peace in
the second degree.
2
The protective order contained an exception to effectuate parenting
exchanges via curbside pickup only and to allow the defendant to contact
L regarding ‘‘emergency or scheduling matters as they pertain to their
minor children.’’
3
The text message read: ‘‘You just got slaughtered in court. Your attorney
is a retard and has not paid any attention to your case. I know he is sick
of you and only cares about being paid [That’s] what he tells [the defendant’s
divorce attorney] anyway. [L]oved the part when [L’s divorce attorney] is
questioning me about clothing donations ha how comical! I can’t wait for
the [judge’s] decision!’’
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State v. Kenneth K.

On March 3, 2023, the trial court in the defendant’s
criminal case granted the state’s motion to join for trial
the breach of the peace charges and the violation of a
protective order charge. Following a jury trial, Blawie,
J., presiding, the jury found the defendant not guilty of
the breach of the peace charges but found him guilty
of violating the protective order. The defendant was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years, exe-
cution fully suspended, and five years of probation.
As a condition of his probation, the court ordered the
defendant to comply with any orders issued in family
court. The court additionally imposed a standing crimi-
nal protective order for forty years that prohibited the
defendant from coming within 100 yards of L and from
contacting her.
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
granted the state’s motion for joinder. We need not
address whether the court erred in granting the motion
for joinder because the defendant was not harmed or
prejudiced by the joinder.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. In February, 2023, the state
filed a motion to join the two informations pending
against the defendant. The state argued in its motion
that the evidence in both cases was cross admissible
because evidence in the breach of the peace case was
‘‘relevant to show motive, intent, and ongoing animus
of the parties’’ in the protective order case and because
the admission of the evidence was more probative than
prejudicial. It additionally argued that, even if the evi-
dence in each case was not cross admissible, the state
nevertheless satisfied the factors set forth in State v.
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State v. Kenneth K.

Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987).4 The
defendant filed an opposition to the state’s motion for
joinder, arguing that the two incidents were factually
dissimilar and should not be joined.
On March 3, 2023, the trial court heard arguments
from the parties regarding the state’s joinder motion.
The prosecutor argued that evidence was cross admissi-
ble because ‘‘the breach of [the] peace and the violation
of protective order all stem from conflict from the
divorce for childcare and visitation issues and then for
things that happened in court, which the mocking text
was sent for.’’ The prosecutor further argued that the
charges also ‘‘clearly fit the Boscarino factors [because]
they are discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenar-
ios. One is an in person conflict in 2015, one is a text
message in 2016. Neither of the crimes are violent in
nature and shocking to the conscience that would preju-
dice the jury against the defendant because they are
both joined together. And by joining them . . . we have
essentially added one extra witness who would be a
police officer because the complaining witness will be
testifying in either matter either way . . . .’’ In
response, defense counsel argued that, although the
charges were interrelated, there was not a logical con-
nection between the two charges because the fact that
there was a confrontation nine months before the defen-
dant sent the text message would not ‘‘help a jury make
In State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 714, our Supreme Court ‘‘identi-
4

fied several factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether
a severance or [denial of joinder] may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice
resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial. These factors
include: (1) whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable
factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or con-
cerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the
duration and complexity of the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors
are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s jury
instructions cured any prejudice that might have occurred.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253, 280, 277 A.3d 839,
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 910, 283 A.3d 980 (2022).
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State v. Kenneth K.

a determination [as to] whether or not that text violated
a protective order.’’ Defense counsel also claimed that,
regarding the Boscarino factors, ‘‘given the [l]ack of
time between the cases, the dissimilar nature of the
two offenses and the fact that [their effect on] the issue
of judicial economy is not really significant . . . they
are both very short trials that the state has not met its
[burden] beyond the preponderance of the evidence
that there should be a joint trial . . . .’’
After hearing from the parties, the trial court granted
the state’s motion for joinder on the record, concluding
that the evidence would be cross admissible because
‘‘the protective order has its roots in the breach of [the]
peace allegation, and so I do think that joinder is in the
interest of justice . . . .’’ The court also stated that
it would ‘‘specifically instruct the jury to separately
consider the charges against the defendant to alleviate
any potential prejudice from the joinder and [it] will be
instructed as to how to apply the evidence to each of
the separate charges.’’ On March 14, 2023, the defendant
filed a motion for articulation of the court’s decision
granting the state’s motion for joinder. Before the trial
began on March 15, 2023, the court granted the motion
for articulation on the record and stated that it would
issue a written decision in the event of a conviction
because ‘‘if there’s an acquittal there [would] be no
need for articulation.’’
On March 20, 2023, in its final charge, the trial court
instructed the jury regarding the consolidation of multi-
ple charges for trial in accordance with the defendant’s
written request to charge. Specifically, the court
instructed the jury that ‘‘the defendant is entitled to
and must be given by you a separate and independent
determination of whether he is guilty or not guilty as
to each count. Each count charged in the information
is a separate offense and recall that the state is required
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State v. Kenneth K.

to prove every element in each count beyond a reason-
able doubt. The total number of counts charged does
not add to the strength of the state’s case.
‘‘You may find that some evidence applies to more
than one count. The evidence, however, must be consid-
ered separately as to each element in each count
because each count is a separate entity. This means that
you may reach opposite verdicts on different counts.
A decision on one count does not bind your decision
on another count.’’
After sentencing the defendant on May 1, 2023, on
the violation of protective order conviction, the trial
court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for artic-
ulation on May 25, 2023. At that hearing, the court issued
its articulation on the record, stating that ‘‘a preponder-
ance of the evidence showed that the evidence in this
case was cross admissible because the defendant was
convicted [by] a jury [of] violating a protective order
which arose out of his initial arrest . . . . I don’t have
to get into the Boscarino factors, because I did find it
to be cross admissible pursuant to [§ 4-5 of] the [Con-
necticut] Code of Evidence . . . . [T]he charges were
linked and dependent on the same evidence, and joining
them did bolster important policy considerations with-
out identifiable cost or prejudice to the defendant.’’
This appeal followed.
Before considering the defendant’s claim, we set
forth the standard of review and legal principles regard-
ing joinder. ‘‘The principles that govern our review of
a trial court’s ruling on a motion for joinder . . . are
well established. Practice Book § 41-19 provides that
[t]he judicial authority may, upon its own motion or
the motion of any party, order that two or more informa-
tions, whether against the same defendant or different
defendants, be tried together. . . . In deciding whether
to [join informations] for trial, the trial court enjoys
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State v. Kenneth K.

broad discretion, which, in the absence of manifest
abuse, an appellate court may not disturb. . . . The
defendant bears a heavy burden of showing that [join-
der] resulted in substantial injustice, and that any
resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of
the court’s instructions. . . .
‘‘A long line of cases establishes that the paramount
concern [when joining informations] is whether the
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be impaired. There-
fore, in considering whether joinder is proper, this court
has recognized that, [when] evidence of one incident
would be admissible at the trial of the other incident,
separate trials would provide the defendant no signifi-
cant benefit. . . . Under such circumstances, the
defendant would not ordinarily be substantially preju-
diced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial. . . .
Accordingly, we have found joinder to be proper [when]
the evidence of other crimes or uncharged misconduct
[was] cross admissible at separate trials. . . . [When]
evidence is cross admissible, therefore, our inquiry
ends.
‘‘Substantial prejudice does not necessarily result
from [joinder] even [if the] evidence of one offense
would not have been admissible at a separate trial
involving the second offense. . . . Consolidation
under such circumstances, however, may expose the
defendant to potential prejudice for three reasons: First,
when several charges have been made against the defen-
dant, the jury may consider that a person charged with
doing so many things is a bad [person] who must have
done something, and may cumulate evidence against
him . . . . Second, the jury may have used the evi-
dence of one case to convict the defendant in another
case even though that evidence would have been inad-
missible at a separate trial. . . . [Third] joinder of
cases that are factually similar but legally unconnected
. . . present[s] the . . . danger that a defendant will
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State v. Kenneth K.

be subjected to the omnipresent risk . . . that
although so much [of the evidence] as would be admissi-
ble upon any one of the charges might not [persuade
the jurors] of the accused’s guilt, the sum of it will
convince them as to all.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253, 278–80,
277 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 910, 283 A.3d
980 (2022).
‘‘On appeal, the burden rests with the defendant to
show that joinder was improper by proving substantial
prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court’s
instructions to the jury. . . . [A]lthough a curative
instruction is not inevitably sufficient to overcome the
prejudicial impact of [inadmissible other crimes] evi-
dence . . . [when] the likelihood of prejudice is not
overwhelming, such curative instructions may tip the
balance in favor of a finding that the defendant’s right
to a fair trial has been preserved.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 283.
In the present case, the defendant argues that the
evidence pertaining to the breach of the peace charges
would not have been admissible at a trial for his alleged
violation of a protective order because such evidence
was irrelevant to the state’s burden to prove the defen-
dant violated the protective order. He contends that
the state only needed to demonstrate that he had the
‘‘general intent’’ to engage in conduct that violated the
protective order, such that the state’s explanation for
the joinder—that is, to demonstrate that the defendant
had the ‘‘specific intent’’ to violate the criminal protec-
tive order—was without merit and carried no probative
value relative to the state’s burden of proof. In response,
the state argues that the evidence was cross admissible
because the two incidents were ‘‘necessarily interre-
lated, told parts of the same story, and were committed
against the same victim.’’ The state also contends that
the defendant did not establish that the jury instructions
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State v. Kenneth K.

failed to cure any prejudice and that any error was
harmless.
We need not address whether the court abused its
discretion in joining the two cases because the defen-
dant has failed to show that he was substantially preju-
diced or harmed by the joinder.5 First, the court’s
instructions were sufficient to cure any prejudice that
the defendant might have suffered as a result of the
joinder. The court instructed the jury to consider each
charge separately. It further instructed the jury that the
violation of a protective order charge required the state
to prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: the
existence of a protective order and the intentional viola-
tion of a condition of that protective order. It then
detailed the differences between general intent and spe-
cific intent, explaining that the state had to prove only
the defendant’s general intent to send the text message
for the violation of a protective order charge: ‘‘The
law recognizes two types of intent: general intent and
specific intent. General intent is the intent to—engage
in conduct. Thus, in this case, it is not necessary for
the state to prove that the defendant intended the pre-
cise harm or the precise result, which eventuated.
Rather, the state is required to prove that the defendant
intentionally and not inadvertently or accidentally
engaged in his actions. . . . Note [that] general intent
is a different legal concept than specific intent. The
concept of specific intent applies to . . . breach of
[the] peace in the second degree, while this concept of
general intent applies only to . . . criminal violation
of a protective order.’’ Given the charges in this case,
by delineating the differences in the intent required,
the court eliminated the chance of any prejudice. See,
e.g., State v. McKethan, 184 Conn. App. 187, 200, 194
5
Accordingly, we need not consider whether the trial court erred in grant-
ing the state’s motion for joinder or whether it erred in not applying the
Boscarino factors.
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State v. Kenneth K.

A.3d 293 (‘‘the court’s jury instructions cured the risk
of substantial prejudice to the defendant and, therefore,
preserved the jury’s ability to fairly and impartially con-
sider the offenses charged in the jointly tried cases’’),
cert. denied, 330 Conn. 931, 194 A.3d 779 (2018); see
also State v. Parrott, 262 Conn. 276, 294, 811 A.2d 705
(2003) (‘‘[b]arring contrary evidence, we must presume
that juries follow the instructions given them by the
trial judge’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, there was no dispute at trial that the
defendant had the requisite general intent to send the
text message that was the basis of the violation of a
protective order charge. The only question the jury had
to resolve as to that charge was whether the language
of the text message violated the terms of the protective
order. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
the jury’s resolution of this question was in any way
affected by the joinder of the breach of the peace
charges. To the contrary, all the jury had to do was
compare the language of the text message to the lan-
guage of the protective order to determine if there was
a violation.
Finally, it is evident that the jury followed the court’s
instructions and treated each offense separately
because it found the defendant not guilty on the breach
of the peace charges but convicted the defendant on
the violation of a protective order charge. See, e.g.,
State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 766, 670 A.2d 276
(1996) (‘‘by returning a verdict of not guilty on the
charge of possession of a weapon in a correctional
institution, which also stemmed from [an] escape inci-
dent, the jury evidently was able to separate the two
cases and did not blindly condemn the defendant on
his participation in the murder’’); State v. Gerald A.,
183 Conn. App. 82, 123 n.21, 191 A.3d 1003 (‘‘[w]e con-
clude that acquittal of the charges related to [separate]
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State v. Kenneth K.

allegations demonstrates that the jury properly consid-
ered each information separately’’), cert. denied, 330
Conn. 914, 193 A.3d 1210 (2018). Accordingly, because
the defendant was not prejudiced or harmed by the
joinder of the two informations, his claim fails.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court lacked
a reasonable basis to impose a condition of probation
requiring the defendant to comply with orders in the
family court. We conclude that the court abused its
discretion because the condition was overly broad such
that it lacked a reasonable connection to the defen-
dant’s rehabilitation.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. During the defendant’s sen-
tencing on May 1, 2023, the court sentenced the defen-
dant to five years of imprisonment, execution fully sus-
pended, with five years of probation. One of the
conditions of probation was that the defendant must
‘‘comply with any court orders issued in family court,
or noncompliance will constitute grounds for violating
your probation.’’ After imposing that condition, the
court stated: ‘‘I believe I have the authority to do that,
I’m trying to choose my words carefully. Your lawyer
can appeal this, but I see this as part and parcel of a
very nasty divorce where you are now convicted of
violating an order of this court with taunting words and
threats directly tied to that. . . . A violation of proba-
tion would not lie from a motion filed by your ex-wife
for contempt. It would be a finding by a court, of this
Superior Court, that you have violated one of their
orders. The state would then be free to bring a violation
of probation [charge] against you. . . . I’m talking
about for the next five years of probation, which is until
2028, any violations found by a family court, whether
at the trial court or [the] appellate court level, would
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State v. Kenneth K.

be grounds for the state to seek a violation of probation
[charge]. If I have no authority to do that the higher
courts will tell me . . . . You have no discretion in
obeying an order of the court, and you have an extra
inducement now to obey any court orders because you
have five years hanging over your head . . . . I’m basi-
cally putting [the defendant] on notice . . . that a viola-
tion of a family court order is grounds to violate his
probation here. Whether I have the authority to do that,
you’re free to appeal that specific issue but I think it’s
fully warranted by the facts and circumstances I heard
about both during this trial and today at this sentencing
proceeding.’’
Defense counsel objected to the condition, stating:
‘‘I respectfully object to the court setting that condition,
you know, complying with court orders in the family
court . . . . I don’t think the court, respectfully, has
jurisdiction to do that. . . . If there’s an order and one
doesn’t [follow] it, one has the right to appeal that
particular decision; it’s not a final decision. . . . [I]t’s
final in the sense of the trial court but it could be . . .
the wrong decision.’’ Defense counsel also objected on
the basis that the condition was ‘‘imposing a potential
criminal sanction . . . for violation of a civil order.’’
In response, the court offered to stay that portion of
its sentence if the defendant wanted to appeal. The
defendant then filed a motion for a partial stay of execu-
tion, specifically to ‘‘stay the execution of that condition
of [his] probation that he must abide by any orders of
the family court and that a failure to do so could result in
a violation of probation,’’ which the trial court granted.
The following legal principles guide our analysis. ‘‘On
appeal, the standard of review of an order of probation
is whether the trial court abused its discretion. If it
appears that the trial court reasonably was satisfied
that the terms of probation had a beneficial purpose
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State v. Kenneth K.

consistent with the defendant’s reformation and reha-
bilitation, then the order must stand. . . . In reviewing
the issue of discretion, we do so according it every
reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s
ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thorp, 57 Conn. App. 112, 116, 747 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 253 Conn. 913, 754 A.2d 162 (2000).

Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-30 (a) (17), ‘‘[w]hen
imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge,
the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order
that the defendant . . . satisfy any other conditions
reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation.’’
Indeed, a ‘‘sentencing court must have the discretion
to fashion those conditions of probation it deems neces-
sary to ensure that the individual successfully com-
pletes the terms of probation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Pieger, 240 Conn. 639, 647, 692
A.2d 1273 (1997).

‘‘Probation conditions serve two primary purposes.
[They] are meant to assure that the probation serves
as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the com-
munity is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.
. . . Because probation is part of a criminal sentence,
probation conditions often restrict the liberty rights
of a probationer by imposing serious restraints on a
probationer’s [lifestyle], associations, movements and
activities. . . . Nevertheless, a condition of probation
may diminish a probationer’s liberty rights only to the
extent necessary for his reformation and rehabilita-
tion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Graham, 33 Conn. App. 432, 448, 636 A.2d
852, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 906, 640 A.2d 117 (1994);
see, e.g., State v. Thornton, 55 Conn. App. 28, 33–34, 739
A.2d 271 (1999) (trial court erred in including probation
condition that required defendant to pay money into
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State v. Kenneth K.

fund to reimburse victim for any treatment or counsel-
ing because it was ‘‘too remote to be considered reason-
ably related to the offense’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. Graham, supra, 448 (‘‘[w]e conclude
that the conditions regarding cleanliness of the home
and care and cleanliness of the children do not serve
to rehabilitate or to reform the defendant because they
do not relate to the defendant’s behavior involved in
her convictions for larceny and drug crimes’’); cf. State
v. Pieger, 42 Conn. App. 460, 468, 680 A.2d 1001 (1996)
(‘‘[p]ayment of a charitable contribution to the hospital
in which the defendant’s victim received her treatment
is a condition that is reasonably related to the defen-
dant’s rehabilitation’’), aff’d, 240 Conn. 639, 692 A.2d
1273 (1997).
On appeal, the defendant argues that the probation
condition that he not violate orders of the family court
is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation because
the condition was too remote from the conduct of his
conviction.6 In response, the state argues that the chal-
lenged condition was appropriate and reasonably
6
The defendant additionally argues that the trial court lacked both the
authority and the jurisdiction to impose the condition. First, the defendant
argues that the trial court lacked the authority to impose the condition
because there is no apparent authority for the criminal court to impose a
condition that requires compliance with the orders of a civil court. We are
not persuaded. Section 53a-30 (a), which governs the conditions of probation
that a trial court can order, affords trial courts wide discretion to determine
what conditions of probation to order as long as they are reasonably related
to the defendant’s rehabilitation, including conditions that do not rise to
the level of criminal activity on their own but would do so if the defendant
were to violate them. Second, the defendant relies on General Statutes
§§ 46b-1 and 46b-2 to argue that the court lacks the jurisdiction to impose
such a condition because, ‘‘if a matter concerns the family court and orders
of that court, it should first be placed on that docket and only referred to
another court if the family court judge deems it ‘more suitable for the
disposition of the case.’ ’’ Those statutes address the disposition of ‘‘family
relations matters,’’ not the consequences that a party may face for disobeying
a court’s order in such matters. Consequently, we reject the defendant’s
arguments.
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State v. Kenneth K.

related to the defendant’s rehabilitation because the
trial court considered reliable information of the defen-
dant’s past failures to comply with family court orders.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
when it imposed the probation condition because the
condition, as it stands, is overly broad such that it is
not reasonably related to the defendant’s reformation
and rehabilitation. First, the condition is violated if the
defendant is found to have violated a court order rather
than if he is found in contempt. This distinction is signifi-
cant because, ‘‘[t]o constitute contempt, it is not enough
that a party has merely violated a court order; the viola-
tion must be wilful.’’ (Emphasis added.) Puff v. Puff,
334 Conn. 341, 365, 222 A.3d 493 (2020). Thus, the defen-
dant may face up to five years of incarceration if he in
good faith disputes a motion filed by L claiming that
he has violated an order of the family court. It is not
unusual for litigants in civil proceedings, especially con-
tentious divorce cases, to have reasonable disagree-
ments regarding the meaning of orders previously
issued by the court. For this reason, the Supreme Court
has held that a court may issue a remedial order even
when it finds that the defendant is not in contempt. See
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 99, 161 A.3d 1236
(2017) (‘‘Unlike contempt penalties, a remedial award
does not require a finding of contempt. Rather, [i]n a
contempt proceeding, even in the absence of a finding
of contempt, a trial court has broad discretion to make
whole any party who has suffered as a result of another
party’s failure to comply with a court order.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). Exposing the defendant to
a violation of probation charge simply because he
unsuccessfully opposes a motion filed by L accusing
him of violating a court order is not reasonably related
to the rehabilitation goal of assuring the defendant does
not, in the future, wilfully ignore court orders. Instead,
it could have a chilling effect on his right to, in good
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State v. Kenneth K.

faith, present arguments and claims before the family
court.
Second, the condition of probation imposed by the
trial court is overbroad because it is violated upon a
court’s finding that the defendant failed to comply with
a court order, without regard to the defendant’s right
to challenge such a finding on appeal. See Bryant v.
Bryant, 228 Conn. 630, 636, 637 A.2d 1111 (1994) (hold-
ing that civil contempt findings are appealable final
orders). As the condition currently stands, the defen-
dant could be found in violation of his probation and
sentenced to a period of incarceration for violating a
court order, only to have the violation of the court order
reversed on appeal. In that circumstance, the defendant
will have been incarcerated when he should not have
been and before he could fully exercise his rights to
challenge the ruling in the family court. Thus, although
we recognize that the defendant’s compliance with
court orders is reasonably related to the offense that
he was convicted of, the condition imposed in the pres-
ent case exceeds that which is necessary for the defen-
dant’s rehabilitation. Accordingly, this condition of pro-
bation, as imposed by the court, cannot stand. Given
our conclusion, a remand is necessary for the court to
consider whether a different, more limited condition is
necessary for the defendant’s rehabilitation.
III
We last turn to the question of whether the trial court
erred in imposing a forty year criminal protective order
that prohibited the defendant from coming within 100
yards of L and prohibited contact with L. We conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
the standing criminal protective order.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary to our resolution of this claim. During
the defendant’s sentencing, the trial court heard from
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State v. Kenneth K.

defense counsel, the prosecutor, and L. Defense counsel
asked for a probationary sentence, arguing that the
defendant had no previous convictions and that his text
to L was not ‘‘a threat to harm or injure anyone at all.
It was a[n] unfortunate comment about the proceedings
in the court.’’ The prosecutor detailed the defendant’s
other pending cases,7 and L gave a statement regarding
the defendant’s conduct, his failure to comply with
court-ordered alimony and child support payments, and
his failure to undergo a court-ordered neuropsychologi-
cal exam.8 L additionally read statements from herself
and the defendant’s daughter, each of which described
the defendant’s verbal abuse toward them.

At the conclusion of the sentencing, the trial court
issued a standing criminal protective order stating that
the defendant had to stay 100 yards away from L and
could not contact her for the next forty years.9 In June,
2023, the defendant filed a motion to modify the stand-
ing criminal protective order, requesting that the order
be modified to ‘‘permit the defendant to have electronic
7
The defendant at the time of sentencing had three pending cases. The
defendant had two additional charges of violation of a protective order and
a case charging him with assault in the second degree and intimidation
connected to a road rage incident. He ultimately pleaded guilty to assault
in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and breach of
the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181.
He was sentenced to one year of incarceration, execution suspended, and
two years of probation.
8
L stated: ‘‘From 2014 to just this past week, [the defendant] has threatened
me and the children with physical violence, intimidated us physically and
verbally; he has done these things to my family and friends, to officers of
the court who have even filed sanctions, police officers, and even his own
family. . . . I carry mace everywhere; I have cameras; I’ve had to leave my
house on more than one occasion because someone told us he was enraged
and on his way over. The children and I have left the house because we
knew something that was said or done would enrage him. For days after
he was found guilty here, I was on the edge, looking over my shoulder.’’
9
The defendant was also ordered to surrender or transfer all firearms
and ammunition.
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State v. Kenneth K.

communication through Our Family Wizard10 with [L]
necessary to arrange and effect visitation with their
child . . . and to allow the defendant to do pickup and
drop-off at the end of the driveway to [L’s] residence
. . . .’’ (Footnote added.) The trial court granted the
motion in part and issued a new protective order, which,
in addition to permitting electronic communications
through Our Family Wizard, allowed the defendant to
pick up and drop off their child at the end of L’s drive-
way, ‘‘if so ordered [by the] family court,’’ and permitted
him to attend court if a matter was pending in family
court.
On appeal, the defendant argues that imposing a
standing criminal protective order of such significant
length was not necessary because this was the defen-
dant’s first conviction, there was no history of abuse
or threats between the defendant and L, and the conduct
underlying the conviction occurred five years before
the sentence was imposed. In response, the state claims
that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion as to the terms of the order
because the trial court’s modifications demonstrate that
the court ‘‘responded to and alleviated the concerns
raised by the defendant’’ and because the nature and
circumstances of the defendant’s criminal conduct justi-
fied the trial court’s imposition of the order.11 We agree
with the state.
10
‘‘Our Family Wizard is a website offering web and mobile solutions for
divorced or separated parents to communicate, reduce conflict, and reach
resolutions on everyday coparenting matters . . . .’’ Buehler v. Buehler,
211 Conn. App. 357, 361 n.3, 272 A.3d 736, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 917, 274
A.3d 869 (2022).
11
The state additionally argues that any challenge to the protective order’s
duration is unpreserved for appellate review because the defendant only
contested the terms of the standing criminal protective order during trial,
not its duration. Even if unpreserved, however, we exercise our discretion
to consider the merits of the claim because the state would not be prejudiced
by our decision to do so.
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State v. Kenneth K.

General Statutes § 53a-40e (a) provides that a trial
court may issue a standing criminal protective order
‘‘if the court is of the opinion that the history and charac-
ter and the nature and circumstances of the criminal
conduct of such offender indicate that a standing crimi-
nal protective order will best serve the interest of the
victim and the public . . . .’’12 We review a trial court’s
imposition of a standing criminal protective order for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Mieles, 221 Conn.
App. 164, 173, 301 A.3d 1063 (2023), rev’d on other
grounds, 351 Conn. 765, A.3d (2025).
In the present case, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing the standing
criminal protective order. The defendant argues that
the court did not consider the fact that this was his
first conviction, that there was no history of abuse or
threats, or that the conduct that was the basis for his
conviction occurred five years before the sentence was
imposed because, had it done so, it would have deter-
mined that an order of such length was not necessary.
We are not persuaded, as the record does not reflect
that the court did not consider such factors when it
determined whether to impose the standing criminal
protective order. Indeed, although the court heard from
the defendant and his counsel before imposing its sen-
tence, it also heard from the prosecutor, L, and the
defendant’s child regarding the defendant’s outstanding
criminal charges and his conduct toward L and his
children, including his actions in the week before the
sentencing hearing. On the basis of the severity and
continuing nature of the defendant’s conduct toward L
and their children, the trial court ultimately determined
12
The trial court may only impose a standing criminal protective order if
a defendant is ‘‘convicted of . . . (1) a violation of . . . section 53a-223
. . . or (2) any crime that the court determines constitutes a family violence
crime, as defined in section 46b-38a, or attempt or conspiracy to commit
any such crime . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-40e (a). It is undisputed that
the defendant was convicted of one of the qualifying offenses.
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State v. Kenneth K.

that a standing criminal protective order of this duration
best served the interests of L, their children, and the
public.13 On the basis of the information the court appro-
priately considered before sentencing the defendant,
we cannot conclude that the court abused its broad
discretion when it imposed the standing criminal pro-
tective order.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the condi-
tion of the defendant’s probation requiring that he not
violate any family court order and the case is remanded
for resentencing with direction to delete or modify that
condition; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

13
The trial court stated: ‘‘I’m very familiar with the trauma, the emotional
harm, that contentious family matters can bring upon not just the adults
but the children. And sir, when the elephants fight it’s the grasses that get
trampled and I can see that your relationship with your children, if it still
exists, has been virtually destroyed by this case.’’