McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

MCHENRY SOLAR, LLC v. TOWN OF HAMPTON
(AC 47636)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying its motion
for summary judgment in its underlying tax appeal against the defendant
on its claim that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that certain
personal property that it used to generate electricity was exempt from
taxation pursuant to statute (§ 12-81 (76)). The plaintiff claimed that the
court incorrectly concluded that it was not entitled to the exemption because
the generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of
§ 12-81 (76). Held:

The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
as, considering the legislative history of the statute and the construction
of the statutory scheme as a whole, the generation of electricity is not
manufacturing within the meaning of § 12-81 (76) and, thus, legislative intent
renders businesses engaged in the generation of electricity ineligible for the
manufacturing exemption from the property tax.
Argued June 3—officially released September 23, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s tax asses-
sor denying the plaintiff’s request for an exemption from
taxation on certain of the plaintiff’s personal property,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Windham and transferred to the judicial district of New
Britain, where the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge
trial referee, denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Thomas Melone, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael C. Collins, with whom was Thomas A. Plot-
kin, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. In this tax appeal, the plaintiff,
McHenry Solar, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

denial of its motion for summary judgment in which it
argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on its claim that certain personal property that it
uses to generate electricity is exempt from taxation
pursuant to General Statutes § 12-81 (76),1 which pro-
vides for the exemption of machinery and equipment
used for manufacturing.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims
that the court incorrectly concluded that it was not
entitled to the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76)
because the generation of electricity is not manufactur-
ing within the meaning of the exemption. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3
The following facts, which either were found by the
trial court or are undisputed in the record, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our disposition of this
appeal. The plaintiff is the owner of certain personal
1
General Statutes § 12-81 (76) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Effective for
assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011, machinery and
equipment, including machinery and equipment used in connection with
biotechnology [shall be exempt from taxation]. For purposes of this subdivi-
sion, ‘machinery’ and ‘equipment’, and ‘biotechnology’ have the same mean-
ings as provided in subdivision (72) of this section. . . .’’
2
‘‘Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an
appealable [final] judgment.’’ Factor King, LLC v. Housing Authority, 197
Conn. App. 459, 475, 231 A.3d 1186, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 927, 234 A.3d
979 (2020). In the present case, on January 19, 2024, the plaintiff moved
the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-4 (a), to make a written
determination that the issues related to the manufacturing property tax
exemption resolved by the trial court’s summary judgment ruling were of
such significance to the determination of the outcome of the case that the
delay incident to the appeal would be justified. The trial court granted the
motion on March 28, 2024. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the plaintiff filed a
preappeal motion with this court asking that the Chief Judge of the Appellate
Court concur with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff be allowed
to immediately appeal from the summary judgment ruling pursuant to Prac-
tice Book § 61-4 (a). On May 9, 2024, then Chief Judge Bright granted the
plaintiff’s motion.
3
In its complaint, the plaintiff also challenged the defendant’s assessment
of its property as excessive. That claim is unaffected by the summary judg-
ment proceedings and remains pending.
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property (property) located at its ‘‘solar facility’’ in
Hampton. The property consists of various equipment4
used by the plaintiff to generate solar electricity, which
the plaintiff then sells to Connecticut Light & Power
Company.
On September 30, 2022, the plaintiff, pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 12-119,5 commenced the underlying tax
appeal against the defendant, the town of Hampton,
challenging the defendant’s tax assessment on its prop-
erty. The plaintiff claimed that the tax had been wrong-
fully assessed because its property is used for the ‘‘man-
ufacture of electricity’’ and, therefore, is exempt from
taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (76). In the alternative, the
plaintiff claimed that the tax assessed on its property
was ‘‘manifestly excessive and could not have been
arrived at except by disregarding the statutes for
determining the valuation of the personal property.’’
On April 18, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of the tax exemption,
claiming there was no genuine issue of material fact
that its property constituted machinery and equipment
used for manufacturing, thereby ‘‘entitl[ing] the plaintiff
to the manufacturing exemption pursuant to . . . § 12-
81 (76).’’ On June 16, 2023, the defendant filed an objec-
tion to the plaintiff’s motion, disputing that the genera-
tion of electricity constitutes manufacturing for pur-
poses of the exemption under § 12-81 (76).
4
Specifically, the property is comprised of ‘‘modules, inverters, racking
[system], [Distribution Automation Systems] controls, camera [system],
weather monitoring system, transformer, revenue meter, switchboard, wir-
ing and switch enclosures.’’
5
General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed
that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town . . . in whose
tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed
on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly exces-
sive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions
of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner
thereof . . . may . . . make application for relief to the superior court for
the judicial district in which such town . . . is situated. . . .’’
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On January 2, 2024, the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn,
judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision
denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The court first noted that § 12-81 (76) exempts from
personal property taxes ‘‘machinery and equipment’’
and provides that those terms shall have the same mean-
ing as provided in subsection (72).6 Section 12-81 (72)
(A) (i), in turn, provides in relevant part that ‘‘[m]achin-
ery and equipment means tangible personal property
which is installed in a manufacturing facility7 . . . and
the predominant use of which is for manufacturing,
processing8 or fabricating9 . . . .’’ (Footnotes added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Section 12-81 (72)
(A) (iii) defines manufacturing as ‘‘the activity of con-
verting or conditioning tangible personal property by
changing the form, composition, quality or character
of the property for ultimate sale at retail or use in the
manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at
retail. . . .’’
In construing the provisions at issue, the court noted
that ‘‘neither party argues that the language of the stat-
ute is plain or unambiguous’’ and, therefore, considered
‘‘extratextual evidence to the extent it is useful.’’ The
6
We note that both § 12-81 (72) and (76) provide exemptions for machinery
and equipment used for manufacturing. Subsection (72), however, ‘‘is effec-
tive for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2002, but prior
to assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011,’’ whereas
subsection (76) is ‘‘[e]ffective for assessment years commencing on or after
October 1, 2011.’’ Because the plaintiff challenges the tax assessed on its
property for the assessment year commencing October 1, 2022, it claims
the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76).
7
‘‘Manufacturing facility’’ means ‘‘that portion of a plant, building or other
real property improvement used for manufacturing, processing or fabricating
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (ii).
8
‘‘Processing’’ means ‘‘the physical application of the materials and labor
in a manufacturing process necessary to modify or change the characteristics
of tangible personal property.’’ General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (v).
9
‘‘Fabricating’’ means ‘‘to make, build, create, produce or assemble compo-
nents or tangible personal property work in a new or different manner
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (iv).
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court first observed that the legislature had added the
current definition of manufacturing to § 12-81 (72) in
1992; see Public Acts 1992, No. 92-193, § 1 (Public Act
92-193); and that, prior to the enactment of Public Act
92-193, our Supreme Court, in United Illuminating Co.
v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992),
had held that the generation of electricity is not manu-
facturing within the meaning of the Sales and Use Taxes
Act, General Statutes § 12-406 et seq. The court further
observed that ‘‘Public Act 92-193 unified the definition
of ‘manufacturing’ for property tax exemptions and
sales tax exemptions.’’ The court explained: ‘‘Public Act
92-193 made the definition of ‘manufacturing’ the same
for purposes of the Sales and Use Taxes Act . . . and
the personal property tax exemption under § 12-81. The
legislature is presumed to [have been] aware of [our
Supreme Court’s] interpretation of the Sales and Use
Taxes Act [when it adopted Public Act 92-193] . . .
and [it] took no action to change the definition of ‘manu-
facturing’ after United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo,
supra, 749, held that the generation of electricity is
not manufacturing under the Sales and Use Taxes Act.
Reading the statutes together, because the definition
of manufacturing is the same under both the Sales and
Use Taxes Act and § 12-81 (72) and (76), the generation
of electricity is not considered manufacturing under
§ 12-81 (76) for the plaintiff to be entitled to the tax
exemption.’’ (Citations omitted.) The plaintiff subse-
quently filed a motion for reargument and reconsidera-
tion, which the court summarily denied. This appeal
followed.
The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on
summary judgment is well established. ‘‘Practice Book
§ 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
[deny] the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is plenary. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether
the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are
legally and logically correct and whether they find sup-
port in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision
of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Marrero v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 220 Conn. App.
649, 658–59, 298 A.3d 1265 (2023).
Both parties agree that the dispositive issue in this
appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded
that the generation of electricity is not manufacturing
within the meaning of the property tax exemption under
§ 12-81 (76). The plaintiff’s claim, therefore, presents
an issue of statutory construction. ‘‘When we are called
upon to construe a statute that is implicated by a sum-
mary judgment motion, our review is plenary. . . . In
determining the meaning of a statute, we look first to
the text of the statute and its relationship to other
statutes. General Statutes § 1-2z. If the text of the stat-
ute is not plain and unambiguous, we may consider
extratextual sources of information such as the statute’s
legislative history and circumstances surrounding its
enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
and [common-law] principles governing the same gen-
eral subject matter . . . . Our fundamental objective is
to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Doe v. West Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 181–82, 177 A.3d
1128 (2018). ‘‘Moreover, in interpreting tax exemptions,
we employ three overlapping presumptions. First, stat-
utes that provide exemptions from taxation are a matter
of legislative grace that must be strictly construed
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

against the taxpayer. Second, any ambiguity in the statu-
tory formulation of an exemption must be resolved
against the taxpayer. Third, the taxpayer must bear the
burden of proving the error in an adverse assessment
concerning an exemption.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of
Revenue Services, 297 Conn. 540, 547, 1 A.3d 1033
(2010).

The plaintiff argues that its process of generating
solar electricity fits squarely within the plain and unam-
biguous definition of manufacturing contained in § 12-
81 (72) (A) (iii), ‘‘the activity of converting or condition-
ing tangible personal property by changing the form,
composition, quality or character of the property for
ultimate sale at retail or use in the manufacturing of a
product to be ultimately sold at retail.’’ Specifically, the
plaintiff argues that its property performs ‘‘at least three
transformations of tangible personal property . . .
during the manufacturing process,’’ each of which, the
plaintiff alleges, is sufficient to satisfy the definition of
manufacturing set forth in § 12-81 (72). The plaintiff
explains that its property first ‘‘transforms the atoms
in the semiconductor material in the solar modules by
knocking loose electrons allowing electrical current to
be captured . . . result[ing] in what is known as direct
electrical energy. The [property] then . . . transforms
the electricity by converting it from direct current to
alternating current electrical energy and then further
transforms the electricity to a different (higher) voltage
so that it is compatible with [the electric grid].’’ We
disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that the ‘‘transfor-
mations’’ described by the plaintiff clearly constitute
the ‘‘converting or conditioning of tangible personal
property.’’ The definition of manufacturing does not
mention atoms, electrons, energy or electricity. It is
neither clear nor obvious that the ‘‘transformation’’ of
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

such matter would fall into the definition of manufactur-
ing set forth in § 12-81 (72).10
The rule of strict construction for exemptions to taxa-
tion also militates against an interpretation that the
statute unambiguously includes the generation of elec-
tricity within the meaning of manufacturing. See, e.g.,
William W. Backus Hospital v. Stonington, 349 Conn.
713, 725, 321 A.3d 1117 (2024) (concluding that statutory
terms governing property tax exemption, although defi-
nitionally broad enough to encompass plaintiff’s prop-
erty, were ambiguous ‘‘given the low bar of reasonable-
ness necessary to establish statutory ambiguity for
purposes of § 1-2z’’). It is well established that ‘‘[o]ur
role is to interpret statutes as they are written. . . .
[We] cannot, by [judicial] construction, read into stat-
utes provisions [that] are not clearly stated . . . [and]
[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that
the legislature may have chosen to omit . . . .’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rain-
bow Housing Corp. v. Cromwell, 340 Conn. 501, 520,
264 A.3d 532 (2021). Had the legislature intended for
the manufacturing exemption under § 12-81 (76) to
plainly and unambiguously apply to machinery and
equipment used for the generation of electricity, it easily
could have done so. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 219,
38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it is a well settled principle of statutory
construction that the legislature knows how to convey
its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting
terms when it chooses to do so’’ (citation omitted)),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 940, 133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d
10
Although the plaintiff primarily argues on appeal that § 12-81 (72) is
unambiguous on the basis that the generation of electricity satisfies the
statutory definition of manufacturing, the plaintiff also advances cursory
arguments that the generation of electricity satisfies the statutory definitions
for ‘‘processing’’ and ‘‘fabricating.’’ See footnotes 8 and 9 of this opinion.
For the same reasons set forth herein, we conclude that those terms are
ambiguous as to whether the generation of electricity is included.
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

255 (2012). Indeed, several provisions of § 12-81 that
govern other exemptions from the property tax
expressly provide that personal property used for the
generation of electricity falls within those particular
exemptions. See General Statutes § 12-81 (57) (A) (pro-
viding exemption for ‘‘any Class I renewable energy
source . . . or hydropower facility . . . installed for
the generation of electricity’’ (emphasis added)); Gen-
eral Statutes § 12-81 (63) (b) (providing exemption for
‘‘cogeneration systems’’ and defining that term to
include ‘‘equipment which is designed, operated and
installed as a system which produces, in the same pro-
cess, electricity’’ (emphasis added)).11 We decline to
read into § 12-81 (72) an exemption for the generation of
electricity that was not clearly stated by the legislature.

The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he fact that electricity
involves manufacturing is embedded in various Con-
necticut legislation.’’ In so arguing, the plaintiff cites to
various statutes relating to municipal electric plants.
Any reference in those statutes to electricity being
‘‘manufactured,’’ however, underscores the ambiguity
in the definition of manufacturing at issue in § 12-81
(72), which does not mention electricity. In other words,
11
The plaintiff contends that ‘‘the . . . legislature has expressly included
electricity within the definition of ‘tangible personal property’ in other tax
statutes. The Sales and Use Taxes Act, for example, defines ‘tangible personal
property’ broadly as ‘personal property that may be seen, weighed, measured,
felt or touched or that is in any other manner perceptible to the senses.’
General Statutes § 12-407 (a) (13). Electricity clearly meets these criteria.
Addressing the question directly, the [Sales and Use Taxes] Act further
provides: ‘Tangible personal property’ includes: (A) digital goods, (B) canned
or prewritten computer software, including canned or prewritten software
that is electronically accessed or transferred, other than when purchased
by a business for use by such business, and any additional content related
to such software, and (C) the distribution, generation or transmission of
electricity.’’ General Statutes § 12-407 (a) (13). This definition does not
resolve the ambiguity in the definition of manufacturing contained in § 12-
81 (76). It also does not seem relevant to that definition in light of the
purpose of the manufacturing exemption as discussed herein.
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the reference in other statutes to the manufacturing of
electricity and the absence of such a reference in § 12-
81 (72) demonstrates a deliberate choice by the legisla-
ture to not include it as a manufacturing exemption in
§ 12-81 (72). It is well settled that, ‘‘[w]here a statute,
with reference to one subject contains a given provi-
sion, the omission of such provision from a similar
statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant
to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn.
412, 431, 927 A.2d 843 (2007). In the absence of any
language relating to the generation of electricity in § 12-
81 (72), we reject the plaintiff’s contention that the
definition of manufacturing unambiguously includes its
generation of solar electricity.
The plaintiff contends that ‘‘[w]hat this appeal is
about is that the trial court was stuck in the past on
the case of United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, [supra,
220 Conn. 749], and an old, superseded statute and not
on the present new statute that was enacted after the
Groppo case.’’ We disagree.
In Groppo, our Supreme Court addressed whether
periodic maintenance services to machinery and equip-
ment on the plaintiff’s electricity generating power
plants were exempt from the statutory sales tax
imposed on ‘‘services to industrial . . . real property.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminat-
ing Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 750–51. The regula-
tions promulgated under the Sales and Use Taxes Act
provided in relevant part that ‘‘[s]ervices rendered to
machinery and production equipment [at an industrial
plant] are not taxable . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 754. For purposes of
the exemption, the regulations defined ‘‘an industrial
plant’’ as a ‘‘manufacturing facility at which a manufac-
turing production process is occurring.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id. The regulations further
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

defined ‘‘manufacturing’’ as ‘‘the performance as a busi-
ness of an integrated series of operations which places
personal property in a form, composition or character
different from that in which it was acquired for sale in
the regular course of business by the manufacturer.
. . . Manufacturing is an activity which shall occur
solely at an industrial plant.’’12 (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 754 n.5. On appeal, the plaintiff ‘‘con-
tend[ed] that services rendered to the components of
its electricity generating facilities [were] exempt from
the sales tax because the generation of electricity is
manufacturing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 754–55.
In resolving the plaintiff’s claim, our Supreme Court
first concluded that ‘‘[t]he regulatory definition of man-
ufacturing [was] ambiguous as to whether the genera-
tion of electricity [was] included.’’13 (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 756. The court therefore turned for
interpretive guidance to other sections of the Sales and
Use Taxes Act that contained similar language to the
statute at issue and to the legislative history of the act
as a whole. See United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo,
supra, 220 Conn. 756–62. After reviewing that extratex-
tual material, the court held that, ‘‘[w]hile the generation
12
The regulations defined ‘‘manufacturing production process’’ as ‘‘any
one of a series of production activities, beginning with the movement of
the raw materials after their receipt . . . and ending with the completion
of the finished product . . . for its sale to the ultimate consumer. . . .
Manufacturing production process shall occur solely at an industrial plant.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo,
supra, 220 Conn. 754 n.6.
13
As discussed further herein, the definition of ‘‘manufacturing’’ in § 12-
426-11b (10) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, since
repealed, had defined manufacturing in substantively similar terms as § 12-
81 (72). Our conclusion that the definition set forth in § 12-81 (72) is ambigu-
ous is consistent with our Supreme Court’s determination that the definition
of manufacturing in § 12-426-11b (10) of the regulations was ‘‘ambiguous as
to whether the generation of electricity is included.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 756.
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of electricity may in some sense be a manufacturing
process, we conclude that the legislature did not intend
to exempt businesses engaged in the generation of elec-
tricity for public consumption from the [statutory] tax
on services rendered to machinery and production
equipment . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 755. Specifically, the court con-
cluded that the legislative history of the Sales and Use
Taxes Act revealed that the elimination of the sales
tax for manufacturers was ‘‘intended to encourage the
growth and development of ‘true’ manufacturing indus-
tries in Connecticut.’’ Id., 761. In other words, ‘‘the man-
ufacturing industries exempted from taxes on . . . ser-
vices rendered [to machinery and equipment] were
intended to be such as might go elsewhere . . . not
those, like a public power utility, that would ordinarily
be expected to remain in this state.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 762. The court
therefore concluded that manufacturing exemptions
from the sales tax, including the regulatory exemption
claimed by the plaintiff, ‘‘[did] not apply to businesses
engaged in the generation of electricity.’’ Id.
The plaintiff contends that Groppo is no longer good
law because the decision was ‘‘overruled’’ by the legisla-
ture’s subsequent enactment of Public Act 92-193.14 Sec-
tion 1 of Public Act 92-193 amended § 12-81 (72) by, inter
alia, adding the current definition of ‘‘manufacturing,’’15
and § 6 of Public Act 92-193 made the same definition
of ‘‘manufacturing’’ applicable with respect to the Sales
14
United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 749, was officially
released on January 7, 1992. The legislature enacted Public Act 92-193 on
July 1, 1992.
15
Prior to Public Act 92-193, General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 12-81 (72),
like the current revision of the statute, defined machinery and equipment
in relevant part as ‘‘tangible personal property which is . . . installed in a
manufacturing facility . . . and the predominant use of which is for . . .
manufacturing’’; it did not, however, define the term ‘‘manufacturing.’’ See
also Public Acts 1990, No. 90-270, § 28; Public Act 92-193, § 1.
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McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton

and Use Taxes Act.16 The plaintiff thus argues that Pub-
lic Act 92-193, by changing the definition of ‘‘manufac-
turing’’ for purposes of exemptions to the sales tax,
effectively abrogated the holding of Groppo, and, more-
over, that ‘‘the intention [of the legislature in adopting
Public Act 92-193] was to broaden the [definition of
manufacturing] to cover processes that were not con-
sidered the industrial plant type manufacturing of days
gone by that were the focus of Groppo.’’ (Emphasis in
original.) The plaintiff contends that the ‘‘[p]roduction
and transformation of electricity from the plaintiff’s
solar facility is one of those broadened processes.’’ In
so arguing, the plaintiff does not address the similarity
between the definitions of manufacturing at issue in
Groppo and this case. Our Supreme Court examined
those definitions in Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue Services, supra, 297 Conn. 558.
In Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Reve-
nue Services, supra, 297 Conn. 563, our Supreme Court
compared the definition of manufacturing set forth in
the regulations promulgated under the Sales and Use
Taxes Act prior to 1992, which was the definition at
issue in Groppo, to the definition of manufacturing
enacted in 1992, which, as stated previously, was identi-
cal under the Sales and Use Taxes Act and the property
tax statute at issue in this case.17 In Groppo, the regula-
tion at issue defined manufacturing as ‘‘the performance
16
The plaintiff cursorily asserts in its brief to this court that Public Act
92-193 did not make ‘‘the definitions of manufacturing . . . identical under
the property tax statutes and the sales and use tax statute.’’ This argument
is without merit. Public Act 92-193 amended both § 12-81 (72) and the Sales
and Use Taxes Act, neither of which had defined the term ‘‘manufacturing,’’
by, inter alia, providing that ‘‘manufacturing means the activity of converting
or conditioning tangible personal property by changing the form, composi-
tion, quality or character of the property for ultimate sale at retail or use
in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Public Acts 1992, No. 92-193, §§ 1, 6.
17
Although Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,
supra, 297 Conn. 540, involved the definition of manufacturing in the Sales
and Use Taxes Act, versus the property tax statute at issue in this case,
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. . . of an integrated series of operations which places
personal property in a form, composition or character
different from that in which it was acquired for sale
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illu-
minating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 754 n.5. The
definition enacted by Public Act 92-193 provides in rele-
vant part that manufacturing means ‘‘the activity of
converting or conditioning tangible personal property
by changing the form, composition, quality or character
of the property for ultimate sale at retail . . . .’’ In
examining those definitions, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that ‘‘[t]he minor differences in language appear
inconsequential. Both the statutory and the regulatory
definitions provide that manufacturing involves chang-
ing the form, composition or character of personal prop-
erty for purposes of sale. Put simply, both definitions
describe the actual process involved in making a prod-
uct and relate to activities that occur directly on an
assembly line or on the production floor.’’18 (Footnote
omitted.) Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of
Revenue Services, supra, 558. The court further
explained: ‘‘One would expect, [based on the legislative
history of Public Act 92-193], that the definition of man-
ufacturing [therein] would reflect [an] intent to broaden
the scope of tax exemptions allowed to manufacturers.
. . . [H]owever . . . [t]he change alluded to in the leg-
islative history is not literally in the definition itself
. . . . [Rather] [t]hat change reflects the legislature’s
understanding that manufacturing in high technology
industries involves a much more complicated, nuanced
and did not pertain to the generation of electricity, the 1992 definition under
both statutes is identical and the court’s analysis of the change in the
legislature’s language is relevant to our resolution to the plaintiff’s claim in
this case.
18
In addition, the court noted that, like the term manufacturing in Public
Act 92-193, ‘‘[t]he closely related concepts of fabricating and processing
also are defined in very traditional terms . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,
supra, 297 Conn. 558 n.14.
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and interconnected process . . . .’’ Id., 563. The court,
therefore, concluded that Public Act 92-193 did not
‘‘[signify] an intended change in the actual definition
of manufacturing.’’ Id., 558. The plaintiff’s claim that
the legislature overruled Groppo when it enacted Public
Act 92-193 therefore is not supported by any meaningful
change in the language of the definition of manufactur-
ing.
Rather than examine the language used by the legisla-
ture in defining manufacturing, the plaintiff relies pri-
marily on a bill analysis of Public Act 92-193 prepared
by the Office of Legislative Research (OLR), which
states in relevant part that ‘‘[t]his bill extends the [prop-
erty tax exemption for manufacturing machinery and
equipment] by . . . using . . . broader definitions of
manufacturing and machinery . . . .’’19 Office of Legis-
lative Research, Amended Bill Analysis for Substitute
House Bill No. 5708, as amended by House Amendments
A, B, and C, p. 4, available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/
ps92/ba/1992HB-05708-R00-BA.htm (last visited Sep-
tember 11, 2025). Although the OLR report states the
purpose of Public Act 92-193 was to broaden the defini-
tion of manufacturing, it does not mention anything
about the generation of electricity. More importantly,
however, the plaintiff’s reliance on that summary disre-
gards the legislative history of Public Act 92-193.
We agree with the defendant’s assertion that the legis-
lative history of § 12-81 ‘‘reveals a kindred purpose
behind the [property tax] exemption [for manufacturing
machinery and equipment] to that found’’ by our
Supreme Court in Groppo with respect to the sales
tax exemption for services rendered to machinery and
equipment at manufacturing facilities. The legislature
19
‘‘Although the comments of the [OLR] are not, in and of themselves,
evidence of legislative intent, they properly may bear on the legislature’s
knowledge of interpretive problems that could arise from a bill.’’ Harpaz
v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102, 124 n.15, 942 A.2d 396 (2008).
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added machinery and equipment used for manufactur-
ing to the list of property tax exemptions, codified at
§ 12-81 (72),20 in 1990. See Public Acts 1990, No. 90-
270, § 28. The enacting bill was intended to create ‘‘an
integrated and sensible attitude toward a retention of
our manufacturing base.’’ (Emphasis added.) 33 S.
Proc., Pt. 10, 1990 Sess., p. 3140, remarks of Senator
Kevin B. Sullivan. Senator Sullivan urged that unani-
mous approval of the legislation ‘‘would be a true mani-
festation of the fact that Connecticut wishes to retain
its manufacturing base . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.,
p. 3139. Another purpose of the exemption was to
attract new manufacturing industries to the state. Rep-
resentative William J. Cibes, Jr., remarked that ‘‘[t]he
bill, as amended . . . addresses one of the main prob-
lems that businesses and especially manufacturing has
confronted in recent years in this state. . . . [A] study
. . . found that one of the major disincentives for busi-
ness to expand or to locate into Connecticut in the first
place, was the impact of the personal property tax on
manufacturing equipment. The bill as amended
addresses that problem head on . . . .’’ 33 H.R. Proc.,
Pt. 26, 1990 Sess., pp. 9381–82.
Similarly, during the legislative discussion of Public
Act 92-193, it became clear not only that any broadening
of the term ‘‘manufacturing’’ was intended only to bring
‘‘high technology manufacturing processes’’ within the
20
The manufacturing exemption for machinery and equipment claimed
by the plaintiff, § 12-81 (76), was added in 2006. See Public Acts 2006, No.
06-83, § 9. As stated herein, the only material difference between subsections
(72) and (76) is the assessment years for which each provision is effective.
See footnote 6 of this opinion; see also 49 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 2006 Sess., pp.
3370–72, remarks of Representative Cameron C. Staples (‘‘[Public Act 06-83]
references existing [statutory] definitions [for manufacturing and machinery
and equipment], and there is no change to those definitions as to what is
covered under the machinery and equipment portions of the [statute]. . . .
[The] bill, in no way, changes what is covered under this exemption. It just
matches the present exemption statutes.’’).
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meaning of that term, but also that the underlying pur-
pose of the manufacturing exemptions—to benefit
those industries that might go elsewhere—remained the
same. Representative Lenny T. Winkler remarked that
‘‘this [bill] will certainly allow us to be more competitive
and will definitely bring in more jobs to the state that
we desperately need.’’ (Emphasis added.) 35 H.R. Proc.,
Pt. 19, 1992 Sess., p. 6401; see also id., p. 6405, remarks
of Representative Glenn Arthur (stating that modern-
ized definition of manufacturing ‘‘will build a business
atmosphere that will attract new manufacturing and
high technology jobs to our state’’ (emphasis added)).
Representative Thomas S. Luby remarked that ‘‘what
this bill does is it modernizes the definition [of manufac-
turing] and, in a sense, takes . . . higher technological
applications in manufacturing that may not be
directly connected to the manufacturing equipment and
. . . brings them within . . . certain tax exemptions
or breaks.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 6391. In other
words, ‘‘the bill modernize[d] the definition of manufac-
turing equipment and machinery so that it includes
those kinds of equipment and machinery . . . that
are used in high technology manufacturing processes.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., p. 6405, remarks of Representa-
tive Arthur. The legislative history of Public Act 92-193
discloses no evidence to support the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the legislature intended for the newly prom-
ulgated definition of manufacturing contained therein
to include the generation of electricity. Rather, the legis-
lative history makes clear that the property tax exemp-
tion for manufacturing machinery and equipment, as
enacted, was intended to benefit manufacturing indus-
tries that ‘‘might go elsewhere . . . not those, like a
. . . power utility, that would ordinarily be expected
to remain in this state.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v.
Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 762.
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On the basis of the foregoing, we therefore agree
with the defendant’s contention that, although Public
Act 92-193 changed the definition of manufacturing,
‘‘the initial legislative intent behind the manufacturing
exemption—the retention of Connecticut’s manufactur-
ing base’’ remained the same, and, to the extent that
Public Act 92-193 was intended to broaden the defini-
tion of manufacturing, its purpose was only to bring
‘‘high technology’’ manufacturing, such as the develop-
ment of computer programming, within the ambit of
the manufacturing exception, not the generation of elec-
tricity.

Moreover, ‘‘it is a well-recognized rule of statutory
construction that the legislature is presumed to know
all the existing statutes, the judicial interpretation of
them, and the effect that its action or nonaction will
have on them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Booker v. Jarjura, 120 Conn. App. 1, 20, 990 A.2d 894,
cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 636 (2010). ‘‘This
presumption is strengthened when the legislature has
affirmatively reenacted the statute after the interpreta-
tion in question.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 158 Conn.
App. 565, 573, 119 A.3d 1229 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn.
528, 153 A.3d 636 (2017). ‘‘Because the legislature is
presumed to be aware of the judicial construction
placed on its enactments . . . its failure to correct or
undermine what we stated in those cases is evidence
that the legislature has validated our interpretation.’’
(Citation omitted.) Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Com-
mission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn.
681, 693, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). Thus, because the legisla-
tive history of Public Act 92-193 demonstrates that the
legislature did not intend for the newly promulgated
definition of manufacturing, which it made applicable
to the Sales and Use Taxes Act, to include the generation
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of electricity, Public Act 92-193 may be viewed as evi-
dence of the legislature’s validation of our Supreme
Court’s interpretation that manufacturing exemptions
to the sales tax are intended to benefit only those indus-
tries that might go elsewhere and, therefore, do not
apply to ‘‘businesses engaged in the generation of elec-
tricity.’’ United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220
Conn. 762.21
On the basis of the foregoing, we are not persuaded by
the plaintiff’s argument that Public Act 92-193 overruled
the holding of Groppo by broadening the definition of
manufacturing to include the generation of electricity.22
21
We further note that Public Act 92-193 added a provision to § 12-81 (72)
allowing a municipality to retroactively recoup tax revenue on property that
had been exempt under that subsection if the claimant subsequently ‘‘moves
its manufacturing operations entirely out of this state.’’ (Emphasis added.)
We view the addition of this provision as evidence of the legislature’s affirma-
tion that the same legislative purpose the court in United Illuminating Co.
v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 749, relied on in constructing manufacturing
exemptions to the sales tax underlies the manufacturing exemption from
the personal property tax pursuant to § 12-81 (72). Public Act 92-193 added
the following provision to § 12-81 (72): ‘‘The . . . municipality . . . shall
hold a security interest . . . in any machinery or equipment which is exempt
from taxation pursuant to this subdivision, in an amount equal to the tax
revenue reimbursed or lost . . . . Such security interest shall be enforce-
able against the claimant for a period of four years after the last assessment
year in which such exemption was received in any case in which said
manufacturer ceases all manufacturing operations or moves its manufactur-
ing operations entirely out of this state.’’ Public Acts 1992, No. 92-193, § 1.
22
Indeed, in a recent decision from our Supreme Court, Justice Ecker
confirmed, in dicta, that United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220
Conn. 749, not only remains good law but that its holding extends to cases
where, as here, a taxpayer claims an exemption for property used for the
generation of electricity pursuant to § 12-81 (72) and (76). See Wind Cole-
brook South, LLC v. Colebrook, 344 Conn. 150, 182 n.4, 278 A.3d 442 (2022)
(Ecker, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Ecker explained in his concur-
rence: ‘‘This court has held that the generation of electricity does not consti-
tute ‘manufacturing’ in the cognate exemption for sales and use taxes; see
United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, [220 Conn. 755]; and, thus, the
wind turbines in the present case evidently would not qualify under the
existing exemptions for machinery used in designated manufacturing opera-
tions. See General Statutes § 12-81 (60), (70), (72), (76), and (78). Presumably,
this explains why the plaintiff [in the present case] has not claimed the
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Accordingly, our Supreme Court’s decision in United
Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 749,
although interpreting the meaning of ‘‘manufacturing’’
relative to an exemption from the sales tax, is highly
relevant to our interpretation of ‘‘manufacturing’’ within
the meaning of the property tax exemption claimed by
the plaintiff.23

‘‘It is axiomatic that, when interpreting the terms of
one statute, we are guided by the principle that the
legislature is always presumed to have created a harmo-
nious and consistent body of law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629, 638, 148
A.3d 1052 (2016). ‘‘[J]ust as the legislature is presumed
to enact legislation that renders the body of the law
coherent and consistent, rather than contradictory and
benefit of any such exemption.’’ Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Colebrook,
supra, 183 n.4. ‘‘Although dicta is not binding precedent . . . we may look
to dicta as persuasive authority . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Voris v. Molinaro,
302 Conn. 791, 797 n.6, 31 A.3d 363 (2011).
23
The plaintiff argues that this court previously has suggested that deci-
sions interpreting the term ‘‘manufacturing’’ prior to the enactment of Public
Act 92-193 have ‘‘no precedential value.’’ The plaintiff relies on Kobyluck
Bros., LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. App. 383, 400,
142 A.3d 1236, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 935, 151 A.3d 383 (2016), which the
plaintiff characterizes as holding that Connecticut Water Co. v. Barbato,
206 Conn. 337, 537 A.2d 490 (1988), in which our Supreme Court interpreted
the same, since repealed regulatory definition at issue in United Illuminat-
ing Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 749, ‘‘was not useful for determining what
the terms manufacturing and processing . . . [currently] meant . . . .’’ The
plaintiff’s reliance on Kobyluck Bros., LLC, is misplaced. In that case, this
court found Connecticut Water Co. to be of limited precedential value
because of the ‘‘critical distinction between . . . statutory construction
principles’’ in a tax assessment appeal and a zoning appeal. Kobyluck Bros.,
LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 399.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has expressly rejected the plaintiff’s argu-
ment. See Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,
supra, 297 Conn. 555 n.11 (‘‘[a]lthough Connecticut Water Co. relied on
[the repealed regulatory definition], our reasoning in that case still applies
because [that regulatory] definition of manufacturing . . . is not substan-
tially distinct from the definition of manufacturing in [Public Act 92-193]’’
(citations omitted)).
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inconsistent . . . courts must discharge their responsi-
bility, in case by case adjudication, to [ensure] that the
body of law . . . remains coherent and consistent.
. . . Thus, we are required to read statutes together
when they [relate] to the same subject matter.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 709, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The
law prefers rational and prudent statutory construction,
and we seek to avoid interpretations of statutes that
produce odd or illogical outcomes.’’ State v. George J.,
280 Conn. 551, 574–75, 910 A.2d 931 (2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1326, 127 S. Ct. 1919, 167 L. Ed. 2d 573 (2007).
‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes
. . . do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that
lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results. . . .
Consequently, [i]n construing a statute, common sense
must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable
and rational result was intended . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courch-
esne, supra, 710.
Mindful of these legal principles, we conclude that
it would make little sense and yield a bizarre result if
the generation of electricity is manufacturing for pur-
poses of the manufacturing exemptions from the per-
sonal property tax but not the sales tax. As stated pre-
viously, the legislature, by enacting Public Act 92-193,
made the definition of manufacturing the same for both
sets of exemptions. And, as we conclude herein, the
manufacturing exemptions from the sales tax and the
manufacturing exemptions from the property tax pursu-
ant to § 12-81 (72) and (76) were created by the legisla-
ture to serve the same purpose, namely, to retain manu-
facturing industries that might go elsewhere, and,
therefore, are intended to benefit the same manufactur-
ing industries. Because, pursuant to United Illuminat-
ing Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 762, that legislative
intent renders ‘‘businesses engaged in the generation
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of electricity’’ ineligible for manufacturing exemptions
from the sales tax, it would be illogical to conclude
that the legislature intended for the same businesses
to be eligible for the manufacturing exemption from
the property tax pursuant to § 12-81 (76). See Rainbow
Housing Corp. v. Cromwell, supra, 340 Conn. 520
(‘‘[W]e [must] construe a statute in a manner that will
not thwart its intended purpose or lead to absurd
results. . . . We must avoid a construction that fails
to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly
on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)).
We therefore conclude that the generation of electric-
ity is not manufacturing within the meaning of § 12-81
(72) and (76),24 and thus that the court properly denied
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

24
Our conclusion that machinery and equipment used for the generation
of electricity is ineligible for the manufacturing exemption pursuant to § 12-
81 (76), therefore, is dispositive of the plaintiff’s arguments; see footnote
10 of this opinion; that its electricity generating property qualifies for the
exemption on the alternative bases that the generation of electricity is
‘‘processing’’ or ‘‘fabricating,’’ as those terms are defined by § 12-81 (72).
See United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 220 Conn. 755 (rather than
‘‘undertak[ing] a scientific discussion of the nature of electricity or its genera-
tion by mechanical means [to determine whether such use falls within the
statutory terms]’’ relying on ‘‘the legislative history and construction of the
[statutory scheme] as a whole’’ for its conclusion that plaintiff did not qualify
for claimed manufacturing exemption’’).