Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v.Vaccaro

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
v. ENRICO VACCARO
(AC 47336)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, appealed from the
trial court’s judgment ordering certain funds to be disbursed to the respon-
dent attorney from a clients’ fund account he established pursuant to rule
1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (IOLTA account) following an
audit of that account by the Statewide Grievance Committee. The petitioner
claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in determining that there was suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support its conclusion that the funds at issue
were fees earned by the respondent and should be returned to him. Held:

The trial court erred in ordering that the funds at issue in the respondent
attorney’s IOLTA account were fees earned by the respondent, as the record
was devoid of any such evidence, and, therefore, the respondent failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating that he was entitled to those funds, the
court having relied on certain testimony that amounted to speculation,
leaving this court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had
been made.

The trial court erred when it rejected the petitioner’s argument that the
funds at issue should escheat to the state pursuant to the statute (§ 3-61a)
governing abandoned property held by a fiduciary, as there was no evidence
presented to prove that the funds belonged to the respondent attorney, and,
thus, they were presumed to belong to the respondent’s clients or third
parties and necessarily were held in a fiduciary capacity pursuant to rule
1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Argued September 3—officially released October 28, 2025

Procedural History

Presentment by the petitioner for the alleged profes-
sional misconduct of the respondent, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven
and tried to the court, Abrams, J.; judgment suspending
the respondent from the practice of law for ninety days
and ordering the appointment of a trustee; thereafter,
the court, Hon. Brian T. Fischer, judge trial referee,
ordered the disbursement of certain funds to the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

respondent, and the petitioner appealed to this court.
Reversed; judgment directed.
Leanne M. Larson, first assistant chief disciplinary
counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. In this presentment action, the peti-
tioner, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court ordering certain
funds to be disbursed to the respondent attorney,
Enrico Vaccaro, from his interest on lawyers’ trust
account (IOLTA account) following an audit of that
account by the Statewide Grievance Committee (griev-
ance committee). On appeal, the petitioner claims that
the court erred in (1) determining that there was suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support its conclusion
that the funds at issue were fees earned by the respon-
dent and should be returned to him, and (2) concluding
that it failed to prove that the funds at issue should
escheat to the State of Connecticut, Office of the Trea-
surer’s Unclaimed Property Division. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the claims on appeal. On
December 27, 2018, a grievance complaint was filed
against the respondent. On April 15, 2019, the Grievance
Panel for the Judicial District of New Haven, geographi-
cal area number seven, and the towns of Branford, East
Haven, Guilford, Madison and North Branford found
probable cause that the respondent had violated rules
1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 (a) (2) through (4) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and referred the matter to the
grievance committee and the petitioner for further pro-
ceedings. A reviewing committee of the grievance com-
mittee subsequently conducted a hearing on the matter.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

On January 21, 2022, the reviewing committee issued
a decision finding by clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent had violated rules 1.3 and 1.4 (a)
(2) through (4), and directing the petitioner to file a
presentment against the respondent in the Superior
Court.1 A presentment hearing was scheduled during
which the respondent was represented by counsel. Fol-
lowing the presentment hearing, the trial court,
Abrams, J., rendered a written decision on August 29,
2022, ordering, among other things, that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days,
effective immediately, and that a trustee be appointed
to protect the interests of the respondent’s clients. The
court further ordered the respondent not to disburse
or transfer any funds from ‘‘any clients’ funds, IOLTA,
or fiduciary accounts.’’2

Shortly thereafter, the respondent, in violation of the
court’s August 29, 2022 order, issued numerous checks
from his IOLTA account payable to himself. As a result,
1
The reviewing committee indicated, inter alia: ‘‘We would have ordered
the respondent reprimanded for his conduct in this matter, but we are
mandated to present him to the court based on his prior disciplinary history.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47 (d), because the Statewide Grievance
Committee and the court have disciplined the respondent more than three
times in complaints filed in the five year period prior to the filing of this
grievance complaint (December 27, 2013–December 27, 2018), we direct the
disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the
Superior Court for the imposition of whatever discipline is deemed appro-
priate.’’
2
On September 1, 2022, the respondent appealed, and this court affirmed
the decision. See Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro, 226 Conn.
App. 75, 317 A.3d 785, cert. granted, 350 Conn. 907, 323 A.3d 1092 (2024).
The respondent filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the Supreme
Court granted as to the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly
conclude that the respondent’s failure to appeal from the decisions of the
reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee and the State-
wide Grievance Committee precluded him from raising, upon his present-
ment to the trial court, his claim that delays in the underlying grievance
proceedings resulted in a denial of due process?’’ Office of Chief Disciplin-
ary Counsel v. Vaccaro, 350 Conn. 907, 323 A.3d 1092 (2024).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

on September 28, 2022, the court, Abrams, J., ordered
the grievance committee to conduct an audit of the
respondent’s IOLTA account for the period from Janu-
ary 1 through September 28, 2022, and ordered the
respondent to fully cooperate with the audit. In
response to the court’s September 28, 2022 order, the
respondent hired a certified bookkeeper, Alice Logan,
to assist him in providing the grievance committee with
the documents needed to complete the audit. Due to
the state of the respondent’s records, he was slow in
providing the grievance committee with the documenta-
tion necessary to complete the audit, thereby necessi-
tating numerous hearings regarding the audit. During
one such hearing held on April 19, 2023, Logan was
called as a witness by the respondent and testified
before the court. Significantly, Logan testified that her
accounting revealed a balance of $226,121.96 held in
the respondent’s IOLTA account that had been held in
the account since before 2017 and could not be allo-
cated to any client file or the respondent as fees earned
or costs incurred.
On June 8, 2023, the court, B. Fischer, J., ordered,
among other things, that the balance of the funds total-
ing $226,121.96 held in the respondent’s IOLTA account
be placed in escrow and that the parties submit briefs
addressing the proper distribution of the funds.3 In its
brief, the petitioner urged the court to order that the
funds escheat to the state pursuant to General Statutes
§ 3-61a,4 because the owner of the funds could not be
3
The court found that the respondent violated rule 3.4 (3) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct ‘‘in that he knowingly disobeyed a court order in
disbursing checks when ordered not to on [August 29, 2022].’’ The court
further found that the respondent violated rules 1.15 (b) and (j) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct ‘‘in that he failed to maintain current and proper
financial records and failed to hold funds of clients or third parties separate
from his own funds.’’ The court reprimanded the respondent for those
violations.
4
General Statutes § 3-61a provides: ‘‘All property and any income or incre-
ment thereon held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person
is presumed abandoned unless the owner has, within seven years after
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

ascertained. The respondent argued that the funds
should be returned to him because they were contingent
fees earned and costs incurred by him over his nearly
fifty years of practice.
On January 22, 2024, after the parties filed their briefs,
the court issued a memorandum of decision wherein
it ordered that the funds at issue be returned to the
respondent. The court rejected the petitioner’s argu-
ment that there is a presumption under rule 1.15 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that funds held in an
IOLTA account belong to clients. The court noted that
the clear and unambiguous language of the rule pro-
vides that funds held in an IOLTA account may be
owned by clients, third persons, the attorney, or a com-
bination thereof. The court reasoned that, if the drafters
of the rule had intended to create a presumption that
funds held in an IOLTA account belong to clients only,
they could have done so explicitly, would not have
included third persons as a category of individuals
whose property may be held by an attorney in such an
account and would not have included language permit-
ting attorneys to deposit their own funds into the
account to the extent necessary to avoid paying service
charges.
The court further found that the petitioner did not
satisfy its burden of establishing a prima facie case that
the funds at issue are abandoned property that should
escheat to the state’s Unclaimed Property Division in
accordance with § 3-61a. The court noted that, under
the statute, a party must establish (1) the existence and
amount of the unclaimed property that is being held in
a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another and (2)
that the owner of such property has not taken certain
it became payable or distributable, increased or decreased the principal,
accepted payment of principal or income, corresponded in writing with the
fiduciary concerning the property or otherwise indicated an interest as
evidenced by a memorandum on file with the fiduciary.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

actions within seven years of the property becoming
payable or distributable. The court found that, although
there was no dispute as to the existence of the funds
and they had been held in the respondent’s IOLTA
account for more than seven years without any action
being taken that would overcome the presumption of
abandonment, the petitioner had not demonstrated that
the funds in the IOLTA account had been held by the
respondent in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
another person. The court further found that, even if
the petitioner had established a prima facie case, there
was sufficient evidence for the respondent to rebut the
presumption that the funds were abandoned in that
there was credible testimony from a certified book-
keeper that the funds had been in the respondent’s
IOLTA account since 2017, the funds could not be allo-
cated to any client file, and her accounting revealed no
improper use of the funds. The court also noted that
the respondent has been an attorney licensed to prac-
tice law in this state since 1976 and that no client of
his had ever asserted that any amount due was not
paid. This appeal followed.
I
The petitioner first claims that the court erred in
determining that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support its conclusion that the funds at issue
were fees earned by the respondent and should be
returned to him. Specifically, the petitioner argues that
it presented sufficient evidence to establish that the
owner of the funds cannot be identified. The petitioner
further argues that the respondent failed to provide
any evidence that those funds were his earned fees.
We agree.
We begin by noting that ‘‘[t]he clearly erroneous stan-
dard . . . is the preferable standard of review in attor-
ney grievance appeals. . . . The clearly erroneous
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

standard of review provides that [a] court’s determina-
tion is clearly erroneous only in cases in which the
record contains no evidence to support it, or in cases
in which there is evidence, but the reviewing court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Zelotes, 152 Conn. App.
380, 386, 98 A.3d 852, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 944, 102
A.3d 1116 (2014).
The following additional legal principles are relevant
to this claim. Rule 1.15 (a) (5) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provides: ‘‘ ‘IOLTA account’ ’’ means an
interest- or dividend-bearing account established by a
lawyer or law firm for clients’ funds at an eligible institu-
tion from which funds may be withdrawn upon request
by the depositor without delay. An IOLTA account shall
include only client or third person funds . . . .’’ The
commentary to rule 1.15 notes that ‘‘[a] lawyer should
hold property of others with the care required of a
professional fiduciary.’’ To that end, the rules pertaining
to the maintenance of IOLTA accounts, wherein such
property is kept, are comprehensive. For instance, rule
1.15 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
‘‘A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons
that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own prop-
erty. Funds shall be kept in a separate account main-
tained in the state where the lawyer’s office is situated
or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third
person. Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of seven
years after termination of the representation.’’ Rule 1.15
(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct permits a law-
yer to deposit the lawyer’s own funds in an IOLTA
account for the sole purpose of paying bank service
charges on that account, but only in an amount neces-
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

sary for those purposes. Rule 1.15 (j) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct requires that lawyers maintain
client trust account records, including the physical or
electronic equivalent of all checkbook registers, bank
statements, records of deposit, and canceled checks
for at least seven years after the termination of the
representation of each client.5 ‘‘Practice Book § 2-27
5
Specifically, rule 1.15 (j) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
‘‘A lawyer who practices in this jurisdiction shall maintain current financial
records as provided in this Rule and shall retain the following records for
a period of seven years after termination of the representation:
‘‘(1) receipt and disbursement journals containing a record of deposits
to and withdrawals from client trust accounts, specifically identifying the
date, source, and description of each item deposited, as well as the date,
payee and purpose of each disbursement;
‘‘(2) ledger records for all client trust accounts showing, for each separate
trust client or beneficiary, the source of all funds deposited, the names of
all persons for whom the funds are or were held, the amount of such funds,
the descriptions and amounts of charges or withdrawals, and the names of
all persons or entities to whom such funds were disbursed;
‘‘(3) copies of retainer and compensation agreements with clients as
required by Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct;
‘‘(4) copies of accountings to clients or third persons showing the disburse-
ment of funds to them or on their behalf;
‘‘(5) copies of bills for legal fees and expenses rendered to clients;
‘‘(6) copies of records showing disbursements on behalf of clients;
‘‘(7) the physical or electronic equivalents of all checkbook registers,
bank statements, records of deposit, prenumbered canceled checks, and
substitute checks provided by a financial institution;
‘‘(8) records of all electronic transfers from client trust accounts, including
the name of the person authorizing transfer, the date of transfer, the name
of the recipient and confirmation from the financial institution of the trust
account number from which money was withdrawn and the date and the
time the transfer was completed;
‘‘(9) copies of monthly trial balances and at least quarterly reconciliations
of the client trust accounts maintained by the lawyer; and
‘‘(10) copies of those portions of client files that are reasonably related
to client trust account transactions.’’
Although rule 1.15 (j) (9) recommends quarterly reconciliation of IOLTA
accounts, the commentary notes that monthly reconciliation is preferred.
See Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15, commentary.
The commentary also explains: ‘‘In some situations, documentation in
addition to that listed in subdivisions (1) through (9) of subsection [(j)] is
necessary for a complete understanding of a trust account transaction.
The type of document that a lawyer must retain under subdivision (10) of
subsection [(j)] because it is ‘reasonably related’ to a client trust transaction
will vary depending on the nature of the transaction and the significance
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

(c) complements [these] rule[s] by requiring that the
records of a client trust account be available for audit
by the Statewide Grievance Committee or disciplinary
counsel ‘[u]pon the filing of a grievance complaint or
a finding of probable cause . . . .’ ’’ Disciplinary
Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343, 358, 123 A.3d
69 (2015).6
Neither party has cited any authority explicitly
addressing which party bears the burden of proof in
the audit of a client trust account. Although there is no
appellate case law expressly addressing this burden of
proof, we note with approval the decision of the trial
court in Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (December 3, 2019) (noting with
respect to attorney’s irregularities with IOLTA account
of the document in shedding light on the transaction. Examples of documents
that typically must be retained under this subdivision include correspon-
dence between the client and lawyer relating to a disagreement over fees or
costs or the distribution of proceeds, settlement agreements contemplating
payment of funds, settlement statements issued to the client, documentation
relating to sharing litigation costs and attorney’s fees for subrogated claims,
agreements for division of fees between lawyers, guarantees of payment to
third parties out of proceeds recovered on behalf of a client, and copies of
bills, receipts or correspondence related to any payments to third parties
on behalf of a client (whether made from the client’s funds or from the
lawyer’s funds advanced for the benefit of the client).’’ Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.15, commentary.
6
Relatedly, Practice Book § 2-27 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Consistent
with the requirement of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
each attorney or law firm shall maintain, separate from the attorney’s or
the firm’s personal funds, one or more accounts accurately reflecting the
status of funds handled by the attorney or firm as fiduciary or attorney, and
shall not use such funds for any unauthorized purpose.
‘‘(b) Each attorney or law firm maintaining one or more trust accounts
as defined in Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Section
2-28 (b) shall keep records of the maintenance and disposition of all funds
of clients or of third persons held by the attorney or firm in a fiduciary
capacity from the time of receipt to the time of final distribution. Each
attorney or law firm shall retain the records required by Rule 1.15 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct for a period of seven years after termination
of the representation. . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

that ‘‘[a]n attorney handling client funds acts as a fidu-
ciary; as a fiduciary, the attorney has an ongoing respon-
sibility to make a full accounting and provide all infor-
mation necessary for a full and definite understanding
of the state of the funds he holds in trust’’).
Similarly, in Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v.
Sebadduka, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 2, 2018), the court
explained: ‘‘An attorney handling IOLTA funds acts as
a fiduciary; as a fiduciary, the attorney has an ongoing
responsibility to make a full accounting and provide all
information necessary for a full and definite under-
standing of the state of the funds he holds in trust.
The IOLTA random audit requirement is designed to
encourage lawyers to continuously maintain accurate
IOLTA records and routinely comply with all IOLTA
trust account rules and regulations, in order to foster
client confidence in the IOLTA system. That purpose
is completely defeated if the lawyer is given a four
month grace period to bring the account into compli-
ance.’’ Id. That purpose is likewise defeated if the funds
are disbursed to the lawyer despite the absence of
records demonstrating that he is entitled to those funds.
Moreover, common sense dictates that the party who
exercises dominion and control over the account—the
lawyer who is holding the account—is in the superior,
and likely exclusive, position to demonstrate the origin
of the funds in the account. Indeed, the trial court recog-
nized this notion in ruling on the petitioner’s motion
for appellate stay. The court acknowledged that ‘‘plac-
ing the burden of proof on the petitioner in a case with
factual circumstances such as those presented here may
be specious. Decisive evidence that may assist the peti-
tioner in carrying the burden of proof in a case such
as the present would include an attorney’s accounting
records; however, when such records do not exist or
are not adequately maintained by an attorney, then any
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

actual harm may be concealed, and as a result, would
be impossible for the petitioner to prove. Placing the
burden on the petitioner would, therefore, create a
legally permissible avenue for a respondent to finan-
cially benefit from having engaged in misconduct in
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.’’
The foregoing is consistent with the testimony of the
first assistant bar counsel to the grievance committee,
Attorney Elizabeth Rowe, who conducted the audit on
behalf of the grievance committee and testified at one
of the hearings concerning the audit. Rowe explained:
‘‘So when we look at an audit, the burden . . . in our
opinion from my office, the burden is on the attorney
to demonstrate any money that they take out of . . .
the client’s funds account has been substantiated as
theirs. If they take the money without knowing whether
or not it was substantiated, then that’s considered mis-
appropriation. They don’t have the proper authorization
to move that money. So, without substantiation, you
cannot take money out of your IOLTA account. And if
you do that without authorization, then that would meet
the standard for misappropriation.’’ Although the
respondent has not been accused of misappropriation,
he does seek to have the funds at issue returned to his
control for disbursement primarily to himself. In order
to do so, it necessarily stands to reason that he bears
the burden to prove his entitlement to those funds.
Indeed, as discussed previously, the grievance commit-
tee would have no basis upon which to ascertain the
ownership of the funds in the absence of the records
of the account that are maintained by the lawyer.
Here, the respondent failed to present any evidence
proving that the funds at issue were fees that he had
earned but had not yet paid to himself.7 The respondent
7
The respondent’s brief to this court contains statements that reflect
either a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the record, the most
notable of which being that ‘‘Logan determined that of the $226,121.96 in
funds, all but $5666.50 could be positively traced to specific clients or to
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

did not offer any documentary evidence in support of
his claim, nor did he testify as to which cases generated
his claimed fees. In ordering that the funds at issue
be returned to the respondent, the trial court relied
exclusively upon Logan’s testimony. Logan testified that
the funds had been in the respondent’s IOLTA account
since prior to 2017. She opined that those funds were
fees that the respondent had earned but had not yet
paid to himself. She testified that she did not have any
evidence to support this opinion, but that her opinion
was based on a ‘‘gut feeling.’’ She testified that that
‘‘gut feeling’’ was based in part on her opinion that the
respondent had a practice of paying his clients and
their medical providers before paying himself. On cross-
examination, however, Logan acknowledged that,
although it may have been the respondent’s practice to
pay his clients and their medical providers before pay-
ing himself, there were various files where that did
not occur. Logan acknowledged that there were funds
remaining in the respondent’s IOLTA account, dating
back to as early as 2012, that should have been paid
to his clients or their medical providers. Logan’s ‘‘gut
feeling’’ also was based on the fact that she was not
aware of any complaints by any client or medical pro-
vider that they had not been paid. Logan acknowledged,
however, that she did not contact the respondent’s cli-
ents, their medical providers, or any other lienholders
to confirm that they had been paid and they would not
contact her if they had not been paid.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that
Logan’s testimony that the $226,121.96 at issue belonged
to the respondent as fees that he previously had earned
was pure speculation and the trial court’s reliance on
the respondent.’’ As noted herein, Logan testified that she was not provided
with any documentation from which she could ascertain to whom any of
the $226,121.96 belonged.
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

that speculation leaves us with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made in finding that
those funds were fees earned by the respondent and
ordering that they be returned to him. Mindful that
‘‘[d]isciplinary proceedings not only concern the rights
of the lawyer and the client, but also the rights of the
public and the rights of the judiciary to ensure that
lawyers uphold their unique position as officers and
commissioners of the court’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339
Conn. 503, 516, 261 A.3d 722 (2021); we reject specula-
tion as an evidentiary basis in a matter as serious as
an attorney’s maintenance of a client trust account.
To countenance such a reliance would encourage and
reward the failure to maintain proper records pertaining
to those funds.8 The record is devoid of any evidence
that the funds at issue were fees earned by the respon-
dent and, therefore, he has failed to meet his burden
of demonstrating that he is entitled to those funds.
Because it cannot reasonably be disputed that the funds
at issue here do not constitute a de minimis amount
intended to cover bank fees, they necessarily must
8
Rowe explained: ‘‘[F]or us, on an IOLTA account, we do not want to
see that there’s too much money in the bank. Because one, we see the
problem that we have here today, which is that we now have a six figure
unknown funds and we don’t know how to distribute them. But . . . the
other reason for that is that the account is supposed to be a trust account
holding client’s funds only. And . . . if attorneys commingle their personal
funds in the account, one, they’re more likely to mistakenly or intentionally
take too much money that they’re not entitled to. But . . . the other reason
is they ought to be reporting their income on a regular basis. And when
you leave funds in an IOLTA account, you don’t have a distribution to
yourself that triggers a reporting requirement for tax purposes. And then
also, creditors are not able to attach funds in [the] IOLTA account because
. . . the Social Security number, the tax ID is not connected to the attorney
personally. So, it’s also a concern that the attorney may be hiding money
from creditors . . . or other people of interest. But we want the money to
be moved—so there’s sort of a nefarious reason for it. But just in general,
in order to have good accounting and good books, you need to take that
money out and keep it separate.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

belong to clients or third parties. We therefore conclude
that the court erred in ordering that those funds were
fees earned by the respondent.

II

The petitioner also claims that the court erred when
it rejected its argument that the funds at issue should
escheat to the state. We agree.

As the trial court aptly noted, to establish a claim of
escheat under § 3-61a, one must prove that the funds
at issue are held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit
of another person and that person has not taken certain
actions with respect to those funds within seven years
of them becoming payable, thereby rendering them
abandoned. The court explained: ‘‘[T]here is no dispute
as to the existence of the unknown funds. Moreover,
there is no dispute that the unknown funds have been
held in the respondent’s IOLTA [account] for over seven
years, or that any of the actions prescribed under § 3-
61a, which would overcome a presumption of abandon-
ment have occurred in the last seven years. Instead,
the dispute in the present case primarily centers on
whether the unknown funds belong to the respondent
or other persons, namely his clients. If the unknown
funds belong to the respondent, then he could not have
been holding those funds ‘in a fiduciary capacity for
the benefit of another person’ as is required under § 3-
61a.’’ The court found that the petitioner failed to dem-
onstrate that the funds at issue had been held by the
respondent in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
another person. Because we have concluded that there
was no evidence presented to prove that those funds
belonged to the respondent, they are presumed to
belong to the respondent’s clients or third parties and
necessarily were held in a fiduciary capacity. We there-
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

fore agree with the petitioner that the court erred in
finding to the contrary.9
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment for the petitioner.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

9
The respondent contends that ‘‘the petitioner does not have the power
to prosecute an action for escheat’’ and ‘‘[e]scheat to the state in the absence
of the legal requirements would violate the constitution.’’ Because the
respondent has failed to adequately brief these arguments, we decline to
address them. See Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 690–91, 325
A.3d 1127 (2024) (‘‘[When] a claim . . . receives only cursory attention in
the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and
efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).