Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

GREGORY SARGENT v. ZONING BOARD OF
APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF FAIRFIELD
(AC 47532)
Clark, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court’s judgment dis-
missing his appeal from the decision of the defendant town zoning board,
which upheld the issuance of a certificate of zoning compliance by its zoning
enforcement officer to the intervening defendants, abutting property owners.
The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that a
variance that had been granted to the intervening defendants in 2011 properly
was considered in calculating the maximum building height of the interven-
ing defendants’ proposed residence. Held:
The trial court properly determined that there were no conditions attached
to the variance, as the line designated for conditions on the certificate of
variance issued by the board and filed in the land records was left blank,
and this court could discern no ambiguities in the certificate of variance
because it contained no language that reasonably could be construed as
imposing a condition.
The zoning board properly considered the 2011 variance in calculating the
maximum building height of the intervening defendants’ proposed residence,
as the variance was not rendered moot by a subsequent amendment to the
town’s zoning regulations, the plaintiff having cited no authority to support
the proposition that a variance may be rendered moot by a subsequent
amendment, and, pursuant to the statute (§ 8-6) governing a zoning board’s
authority to grant a variance, a variance runs with the land and is not
personal to the recipient of the variance.
Argued April 16—officially released November 11, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant affirming
the decision of its zoning enforcement officer upholding
the issuance of a certificate of zoning compliance,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Fairfield, where Barbara Bertozzi Castelli and Jose
Meller, as trustees of the BBC Revocable Trust, inter-
vened as party defendants; thereafter, the case was
transferred to the judicial district of New Britain; subse-
quently, the case was transferred to the judicial district
of Hartford, Land Use Docket; thereafter, the case was
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

tried to the court, O’Hanlan, J.; judgment dismissing
the appeal, from which the plaintiff, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Nicholas R. Bamonte, with whom was Jason D.
Kaplan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Joel Z. Green, with whom, on the brief, was Linda
Pesce Laske, for the appellees (intervening defendants).
James T. Baldwin, for the appellee (named defen-
dant).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The plaintiff, Gregory Sargent, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his
appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Zoning
Board of Appeals of the Town of Fairfield (board),
which upheld the issuance of a certificate of zoning
compliance by the town’s zoning enforcement officer
to the intervening defendants, Barbara Bertozzi Castelli
and Jose Meller, as trustees of the BBC Revocable Trust.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly
concluded that a variance that had been granted to the
intervening defendants in 2011 properly was considered
in calculating the maximum building height of the
intervening defendants’ proposed residence.1 We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
1
In the ‘‘Statement of Issues’’ of his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff
identifies the issues raised on appeal as follows: (1) ‘‘[w]hether the trial
court erred in finding that the maximum height variance granted to the
intervening defendants in 2011 also applied to a proposal which they submit-
ted for zoning approval in 2020,’’ and (2) ‘‘[w]hether the trial court erred in
finding that the [board’s] denial of the plaintiff’s appeal was supported by
substantial evidence on the record.’’
For purposes of clarity, we have divided the arguments raised in support
of the first issue into two distinct claims, namely, (1) whether there were
conditions attached to the variance that had not been satisfied, and (2)
whether the variance was rendered moot by a subsequent amendment to
the pertinent regulations.
With respect to the second issue identified in the plaintiff’s statement of
issues—whether the court erred in finding that the board’s decision was
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. In May, 2011, the intervening
defendants applied for a variance from the thirty foot
building height restriction set forth in § 11.7 of the Fair-
field Zoning Regulations (regulations) to construct a
single-family residence with a height of 31.33 feet on
beachfront property located at 1623 Fairfield Beach
Road in Fairfield. The proposed residence had a con-
temporary design including a flat roof, with a limited
128 square foot area that would exceed the maximum
building height by 1.33 feet.2

The plaintiff, who owns abutting property at 1609
Fairfield Beach Road, received notice of the intervening
defendants’ application and had no objection to the
variance. After a hearing, the board unanimously voted
supported by substantial evidence in the record—the plaintiff raises various
overlapping claims of error regarding the court’s reliance on testimony from
James Wendt, the town’s planning director. The plaintiff contends that the
court disregarded the documentary evidence before the board and relied
instead on testimony from Wendt, who ‘‘effectively stepped into the shoes
of a party to the appeal, namely, the [zoning enforcement officer],’’ and
whose testimony consisted of ‘‘legal conclusions’’ which were not entitled
to any deference. It is clear from our review of the court’s decision that it
appropriately conducted its own independent analysis of the questions of
law at issue and properly reviewed the record in concluding that the record
contained substantial evidence. See Cockerham v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
146 Conn. App. 355, 370, 77 A.3d 204 (2013) (although board considered
and credited current and past zoning enforcement officers’ application of
regulatory language, it reached independent decision and did not simply
defer to officer’s interpretation), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 919, 85 A.3d 653
(2014), and cert. denied, 311 Conn. 919, 85 A.3d 654 (2014). Accordingly,
we reject the plaintiff’s second claim.
2
In their application for the 2011 variance, the intervening defendants
stated that they were ‘‘requesting a variance of [§] 11.7 [of the regulations]
to permit an increase in height from 30 feet to 31.33 feet . . . . The height
variance request is due to the nature of the proposed construction and the
proposed [roofline]. The new home will be a contemporary design which
will incorporate a flat roof. As shown [in] the architectural plans, the area
which exceeds the height limitation of 30 feet is very limited in size. . . .
This area of exceedance is essentially a room at the top of the stairs utilized
to access the proposed [rooftop] deck.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

to grant the requested variance. The variance was
recorded on the land records on July 19, 2011.
The intervening defendants did not begin construc-
tion of the proposed residence due to Hurricane Irene
in August, 2011, Hurricane Sandy in October, 2012, and
subsequent changes to the zoning regulations. In 2013,
the regulations were amended to require that dwellings
be built from a certain minimum height, or base flood
elevation (BFE), in the beach district and the coastal
high hazard zones, where the proposed residence was
located.3 In addition, § 11.7 of the regulations was
amended to permit an increased maximum building
height; specifically, in addition to the thirty feet already
permitted, ‘‘one foot of additional height shall be permit-
ted for every two (2) feet of vertical distance between
existing average grade and the base flood elevation.’’
In 2019, the intervening defendants modified the
design for the proposed residence. A new survey dem-
onstrated that 2000 square feet of the property had
been lost and, therefore, the residence had to be made
smaller. The modified plans included a pitched roof
design rather than a flat roof design, and the size of
the area that exceeded the height restriction set forth
in § 11.7 of the regulations increased from 128 square
feet to 456 square feet.
In January, 2020, the intervening defendants submit-
ted their materials to the town for approval. The town’s
3
Specifically, § 32.5 of the Fairfield Zoning Regulations provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘In the coastal high hazard zones, designated as VE, the following
provisions shall additionally apply . . . (c) All new construction and sub-
stantial improvements shall be elevated on adequately anchored pilings or
columns, and securely anchored to such piles, and columns so that the
lowest structural member of the lowest floor, excluding piles or columns,
is elevated to or above the base flood level. . . .’’
Section 32.8 (d) of the Fairfield Zoning Regulations defines BFE as ‘‘the
elevation of the crest of the base flood or 100-year flood. The height in
relation to mean sea level expected to be reached by the waters of the base
flood at pertinent points in the floodplains of coastal and riverine areas.’’
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

zoning enforcement officer endorsed the modified plan
and the new survey, in effect issuing a certificate of
zoning compliance. The zoning enforcement officer
noted that he approved the proposed residence with a
height of 34 feet, 1.625 inches, which took into account
the 1.33 feet from the 2011 variance.4 The plaintiff first
became aware of the certificate of zoning compliance
in February, 2020. In March, 2020, he appealed to the
board from the decision of the zoning enforcement offi-
cer.
On May 21, 2020, the board held a public hearing on
the plaintiff’s appeal from the issuance of the certificate
of zoning compliance. At the hearing, the plaintiff argued
that the intervening defendants should have been
required to obtain a new variance due to the changes
set forth in the modified design. Specifically, he argued
that the intervening defendants had obtained the 2011
variance based on the flat roof design of the proposed
residence and the ‘‘very limited’’ size of the area that
would exceed the maximum building height set forth in
the regulations, which was reflected in the intervening
defendants’ application for the 2011 variance and the
plans submitted in support thereof. The plaintiff explained
that the flat roof design was ‘‘part of their hardship,’’5
as they needed a small room at the top of the stairs to
access the rooftop deck. The plaintiff argued that, under
the modified plan for the proposed residence, the flat
4
Specifically, on the modified plan, the zoning enforcement officer wrote:
‘‘Approved for zoning compliance for: const. of a el. two sty. one fam. D.
w/ vehicle parking beneath & mech. attic; O.A. dims. 37’-7’’ X 51’-5’’ X 34’-
1 5/8’’ H. The lowest horizontal structural member & all mechs. including
the bot. of all duct wk. & wiring shall be const. above el. 16.1 N.A.V.D.; 51%
of gd. level walls to remain open; proposed 1st fl. el. 18.0’+.’’
5
The plaintiff further argued: ‘‘[T]he hardship that they claim is one they
created. . . . [Y]ou cannot create your hardship to then claim to ask for a
variance.’’ As set forth previously, however, the plaintiff had no objection
to the granting of the variance in 2011, and the board’s decision to grant
the 2011 variance in the first instance is not at issue in this appeal.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

roof design was now a pitched roof design, and the
area that ‘‘was a small room utilized to access the roof-
top deck has turned into an almost [twenty-four] foot by
[nineteen] foot floor, approximately 450 square feet.’’
James Wendt, the town’s planning director, spoke at
the hearing. He stated in relevant part: ‘‘I agree that
there has been a change in the plan, there are two
different architects, it’s a different roof design. We have
no quarrel with those facts as they were laid out by
[the plaintiff]. Our position on this is the height relative
to what the variance was granted has not changed. What
has changed in the intervening nine years is the flood
map has changed that requires a higher starting eleva-
tion . . . for the first floor which raised the house in
absolute terms by a couple of feet. But in terms of the
calculation of the midpoint of the height, the difference
between what the permitted height is and what the
variance was granted has not changed. So, the magni-
tude of the height variance that the board had granted,
which was the variance that was approved in . . . how-
ever many years ago it was, nine or eleven years ago
now, has remained the same. The design has changed,
but the . . . magnitude of the difference in what the
permitted height would be versus what the variance
that was granted has not changed, even though . . .
there was a change in the design of the style of the
house. . . .
‘‘[W]e did recognize that there are some changes to
the plan as pointed out by [the plaintiff], but in our view
we didn’t think it was of a magnitude that warranted
a new application to [the board]. That’s really the long
and short of it. . . . [T]he [regulation] changed that
pushed the starting point of the house up a little bit,
and they get credit for that under the regulations, but
how height is calculated under the revised plan, the
ultimate measurement of that height does not exceed
the scope of the variance that had been previously
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

granted. It may be modestly larger in terms of the foot-
print of that third floor attic space that that variance
applies to, but I don’t argue with that part of the presen-
tation. But we didn’t think that changed the scope of
the variance that was ultimately approved. So, that is
why we went forward with the . . . issuance of that
permit because we didn’t believe it changed the scope
of the . . . variance that was first approved.’’
The board also heard from Castelli, one of the
intervening defendants, about the modifications to the
design of the proposed residence. Castelli explained
that she and Meller postponed construction of the pro-
posed residence because the changes to the zoning
regulations implemented after Hurricanes Irene and
Sandy resulted in a long period of uncertainty about
whether the design of the house had to be changed.
Castelli further explained that they had to remove a
deck from the design of the house because the house
now needed to be built on stilts. In addition, because
they lost 2000 square feet of the property, they rede-
signed the house to make it smaller, reducing each floor
of the three-story house by approximately 100 square
feet. The plaintiff agreed with Castelli that the footprint
of the house was smaller, but he argued that the removal
of the deck was then ‘‘padded . . . into [the] house.’’
Following the hearing, a majority of the board voted
to deny the plaintiff’s appeal. The board did not provide
a formal, collective statement of reasons for its action.
The plaintiff appealed from the board’s decision to the
trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8.
In his appeal to the trial court, the plaintiff claimed
that the board’s decision upholding the issuance of the
certificate of zoning compliance was illegal, arbitrary
and an abuse of its discretion, and it was not supported
by substantial evidence in the record. The intervening
defendants subsequently intervened in the plaintiff’s
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

appeal. The parties submitted briefs and supporting
documentation, including, inter alia, the intervening
defendants’ application for the 2011 variance; the certif-
icate of variance for the 2011 variance;6 the minutes
from the board’s July 7, 2011 meeting,7 at which it con-
sidered the intervening defendants’ application for the
2011 variance; copies of the original and modified
designs of the proposed residence; the transcript and
minutes from the board’s May 21, 2020 meeting, at
which it considered the plaintiff’s appeal from the issu-
ance of the certificate of zoning compliance; and a copy
of the regulations that were in effect at the time the
certificate of zoning compliance was approved. The
parties presented oral argument to the trial court,
O’Hanlan, J., on October 20, 2022, and June 29, 2023.
In a memorandum of decision dated January 3, 2024,
the court concluded that the board properly upheld the
issuance of the certificate of zoning compliance.8 At
the outset, the court determined that the maximum
building height of the residence was 34.48 feet—which
included 33.15 feet pursuant to § 11.7 of the regulations9
6
In the present case, the document issued by the board and filed in the
land records, certifying that a variance was granted, is labeled as a ‘‘notice
of filing.’’ The parties refer to this document as the certificate of variance,
which is consistent with our case law. Accordingly, for ease of reference,
we refer in this opinion to the notice of filing as the certificate of variance.
7
The record does not contain a transcript from the board’s July 7, 2011
meeting.
8
The court noted that ‘‘[i]t is undisputed that [the intervening] defendants’
dwelling has been built as per the plans subject to this appeal.’’
9
Because § 11.7 of the regulations permitted a maximum building height
of thirty feet plus ‘‘one foot of additional height . . . for every two (2) feet
of vertical distance between the existing average grade and the base flood
elevation,’’ the court concluded that the intervening defendants were entitled
to 3.15 feet of additional height pursuant to that regulation. The court reached
this figure using a starting elevation of sixteen feet, with a BFE of fifteen
feet plus one foot pursuant to the Connecticut State Building Code. Pursuant
to the calculation set forth in § 11.7 of the regulations, the court determined
that the distance between the existing average grade (9.7 feet) and the
starting elevation (sixteen feet) was 6.3 feet, then divided that figure by two.
The plaintiff had raised numerous arguments before the trial court chal-
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

and 1.33 feet from the 2011 variance—and, therefore,
the height of the proposed residence conformed to the
regulations.10 In concluding that the board properly took
into account the 1.33 feet from the 2011 variance, the
court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that (1) the vari-
ance was conditioned on the original flat roof design
and the limited area that would exceed the maximum
building height set forth in § 11.7 of the regulations,
and (2) the variance was rendered moot by the amend-
ment to § 11.7 of the regulations providing for an
increased maximum building height. Finally, the court
concluded that the board’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence in the record, specifically, Wendt’s
testimony11 explaining that the magnitude of the height
variance had not changed. Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the plaintiff’s appeal. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the 1.33 feet from
the 2011 variance should not have been considered in
the calculation of the maximum building height because
(1) the conditions attached to that variance had not
been satisfied, and (2) the variance was rendered moot
by the 2013 amendment to § 11.7 of the regulations.
Before considering these claims, we recite certain
well established principles. ‘‘A zoning enforcement offi-
cer acting on an application for a zoning permit has a
lenging the calculation of the maximum building height under § 11.7 of the
regulations, including that § 11.7 does not recognize ‘‘fractional feet,’’ and
that the one extra foot from the Connecticut State Building Code should
not be taken into consideration. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff does
not challenge the trial court’s application of the Connecticut State Building
Code or its calculation of the maximum building height aside from its
inclusion of the 1.33 feet from the 2011 variance.
10
As set forth previously, the zoning enforcement officer approved the
proposed residence with a height of 34 feet, 1.625 inches.
11
‘‘Our decisional law commonly refers to the ‘testimony’ offered at the
public hearings of municipal land use agencies in this state without regard
to whether it was offered under oath.’’ Parker v. Zoning Commission, 209
Conn. App. 631, 669 n.38, 269 A.3d 157, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 908, 273
A.3d 694 (2022).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

purely ministerial function. . . . If the application con-
forms to the requirements of the regulations, he has no
discretion but to issue a permit. . . .
‘‘[F]ollowing an appeal from the action of a zoning
enforcement officer to a zoning board of appeals, a
court reviewing the decision of the zoning board of
appeals must focus, not on the decision of the zoning
enforcement officer, but on the decision of the board
and the record before the board. . . . [T]he zoning
board of appeals makes a de novo determination of the
issue before it, without deference to the actions of the
zoning enforcement officer. . . .
‘‘[T]he board is endowed with liberal discretion and
. . . its actions are subject to review by the courts only
to determine whether they are unreasonable, arbitrary
or illegal. . . . The burden of proof to demonstrate that
the board acted improperly is upon the party seeking
to overturn the board’s decision. . . . It is the board’s
responsibility, pursuant to the statutorily required hear-
ing, to find the facts and to apply the pertinent zoning
regulations to those facts. . . . Upon an appeal from
the board, the court must focus on the decision of the
board and the record before it. . . .
‘‘In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a
reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence
rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by [the
board] must be upheld by the trial court if they are
reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of
the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact
are matters solely within the province of the [board].
. . . The question is not whether the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion, but whether the
record before the [board] supports the decision
reached. . . . If the trial court finds that there is sub-
stantial evidence to support a zoning board’s findings,
it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

. . . If there is conflicting evidence in support of the
zoning [board’s] stated rationale, the reviewing court
. . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of
the evidence for that of the commission. . . . The
agency’s decision must be sustained if an examination
of the record discloses evidence that supports any one
of the reasons given. . . . Where, as here, the board
does not state formally the reasons for its decision, the
trial court must search the record for a basis for the
board’s decision.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Watson v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
189 Conn. App. 367, 381–82, 207 A.3d 1067 (2019).
‘‘At the same time, when a question of law is pre-
sented, such as the proper interpretation of a zoning
regulation, our review is plenary.’’ Parker v. Zoning
Commission, 209 Conn. App. 631, 653, 269 A.3d 157,
cert. denied, 343 Conn. 908, 273 A.3d 694 (2022). When
our review is plenary, ‘‘we must decide whether [the
court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct
and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Villages, LLC v.
Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn.
App. 448, 456, 89 A.3d 405 (2014), appeals dismissed,
320 Conn. 89, 127 A.3d 998 (2015).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
determined that no conditions were attached to the
2011 variance. Specifically, he contends that a review
of the entire record demonstrates that the flat roof
design and the ‘‘small area of height exceedance’’ were
implied conditions attached to the 2011 variance. He
further argues that, because the modified design sub-
mitted by the intervening defendants did not satisfy
those conditions, the 1.33 feet from the 2011 variance
should not have been considered by the zoning enforce-
ment officer in issuing the certificate of zoning compli-
ance. In response, the intervening defendants contend
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

that the trial court correctly concluded that no condi-
tions were attached to the 2011 variance because, inter
alia, the certificate of variance issued by the board and
filed in the land records did not list any conditions.12
We agree with the intervening defendants.
The following additional legal principles are relevant
to our review of this claim. ‘‘[A] zoning board of appeals
may . . . attach reasonable conditions to the grant[ing]
of a variance. . . . Since variances allow uses forbid-
den by the regulations, the attachment of conditions to
the granting of a variance alleviates the harm which
might otherwise result. . . . Were it not for the condi-
tions imposed by a board . . . variances might not be
supportable as being in harmony with the general pur-
pose and intent of the zoning ordinance. . . . Thus the
variance and the attached conditions are inextricably
linked, the viability of the variance being contingent
upon the satisfaction of the conditions.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Anatra v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, 307 Conn. 728, 740–41, 59 A.3d 772 (2013).
‘‘Just as when we employ a plenary standard of review
over the Superior Court’s interpretation of local land
use regulations . . . we conclude that when a lower
court interprets the terms of a variance or its conditions,
our review likewise is plenary over that question of
law.’’ (Citation omitted.) R & R Pool & Patio, Inc. v.
Zoning Board of Appeals, 129 Conn. App. 275, 287, 19
A.3d 715 (2011); see also Anatra v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 738 (applying plenary review
to claim involving interpretation of variance).
In the present case, the court determined that no
conditions were attached to the 2011 variance. The
court explained that the certificate of variance ‘‘con-
tains a line labeled ‘conditions’ that was left blank.’’ In
addition, the 2011 plans were ‘‘conceptual’’ and labeled
12
The board agrees with the intervening defendants and has adopted their
brief in the present appeal.
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

‘‘not for construction.’’ Finally, the minutes from the
board’s July 7, 2011 meeting, at which it considered the
intervening defendants’ variance application, reflected
that it granted another zoning application and specifi-
cally noted that that application was ‘‘granted with con-
ditions,’’ and separately set forth the conditions in the
minutes. The board did not do the same with respect
to the intervening defendants’ variance.
The court also noted that our Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 307
Conn. 728, on which the plaintiff relied in support of
his argument, did not inform its decision on this issue
because our Supreme Court in that case did not address
whether the record should be consulted in order to
determine whether restrictions or conditions have been
attached to the granting of a variance ‘‘when there is
no indication in the variance that approval was granted
with conditions.’’ Id., 730 n.1.
On appeal, the plaintiff continues to rely on Anatra
v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 728.13 The
13
The plaintiff also argues, apart from his reliance on Anatra, that a ‘‘duty
to adhere to implied conditions is codified and extended by the Fairfield
Zoning Regulations,’’ specifically § 2.37 of the regulations, which provides
in relevant part that ‘‘[c]ompliance with any maps, documents, statements
and stipulations submitted to and approved by the Commission or the Board
of Appeals in connection with a . . . Variance . . . and any condition of
such approval attached by the Commission or Board, shall be conditions
for the issuance of a Certificate of Zoning Compliance by the Zoning Enforce-
ment Officer.’’ He contends that the zoning enforcement officer was required
to ‘‘actively [search] for conditions’’ in the record pursuant to this provision.
We decline to consider this issue, which was not distinctly raised before
the trial court. See, e.g., United Concrete Products, Inc. v. NJR Construction,
LLC, 207 Conn. App. 551, 579, 263 A.3d 823 (2021) (‘‘Our appellate courts,
as a general practice, will not review claims made for the first time on
appeal. . . . [A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim
that is not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is
limited to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided
by the trial court. . . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly
means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the
precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

plaintiff contends that, pursuant to Anatra, the court
was required to consider ‘‘the entirety of the public
record,’’ including the intervening defendants’ applica-
tion for the 2011 variance, the accompanying plans, and
the minutes from the board’s July 7, 2011 meeting at
which it considered the application, to determine
whether any conditions were attached to the variance.
He argues that these materials demonstrate that the flat
roof design of the proposed residence and the limited
size of the area that would exceed the maximum build-
ing height were conditions attached to the 2011 vari-
ance, and those conditions had not been satisfied by
the modified plans submitted to the zoning enforcement
officer. We are not persuaded.

In Anatra, our Supreme Court concluded that condi-
tions attached to a variance ‘‘should be construed not
only by examining the language contained in the certifi-
cate of variance, but by considering the entire public
record, including the variance application, the accom-
panying plans and exhibits, the minutes or hearing tran-
script, and the record of decision.’’ Anatra v. Zoning
Board of Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 747. In that case,
however, unlike in the present case, the certificate of
variance indicated that the variance was granted with
conditions. Our Supreme Court explained: ‘‘Although
the certificate of variance did not contain an express
restriction on the addition of a conforming deck, the
certificate provided that the building coverage and front
and side yard variances had been granted ‘to permit
[the] existing structure to be replaced in the same loca-
tion within 50 [feet] of the critical coastal resources as
presented at the hearing and as shown on the plans
and the survey submitted.’ . . . Accordingly, the vari-
ance was subject to a condition that, by its very terms,
could not be construed on the basis of the language
in the certificate alone but required a review of the
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

administrative record to determine whether the pro-
posed deck complied with the plans and survey submit-
ted with the variance application in 2001.’’ (Emphasis
altered; footnote omitted.) Id., 753.
Our Supreme Court made clear that it was reviewing
the administrative record to determine the full scope
and details of the conditions imposed, rather than to
determine whether a condition was attached to the
variance in the first instance. See id., 747 (‘‘it makes
more sense to treat a certificate of variance, which
refers to conditions having been attached, as a notice
to all those searching the land records that further inves-
tigation should be undertaken by reviewing the adminis-
trative file’’ (emphasis added)); id., 749 (‘‘[t]his conclu-
sion is in accord with the principle that, when the land
records indicate that conditions have been attached to
a variance, due diligence requires a potential buyer of
the property or other interested persons to investigate
the public record in order to obtain a full understanding
of the scope of the variance’’ (emphasis added)); see
also id., 744 (looking to courts in other jurisdictions
that have considered public record in ‘‘construing con-
ditions’’ attached to variance). Our Supreme Court
explicitly noted: ‘‘We do not address the issue of
whether the record should be consulted in order to
determine whether restrictions or conditions have been
attached to the granting of a variance when there is no
indication in the variance that approval was granted
with conditions.’’ Id., 730 n.1. Accordingly, Anatra does
not control the issue raised in the present case, and its
holding does not directly support the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the record must be consulted to determine
whether the variance in the present case was granted
with conditions.
In considering whether to consult the entire record
to determine whether restrictions or conditions have
been attached to the granting of the variance in the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

present case, we are guided by the legal principles set
forth in R & R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, supra, 129 Conn. App. 275.14 In that case, this
court held that the interpretation of a variance and its
conditions should be interpreted in a manner consistent
with statutory construction. Id., 286–87. ‘‘In matters of
statutory interpretation, we are guided by General Stat-
utes § 1-2z, which directs us first to consider the text
of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such rela-
tionship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambig-
uous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall
not be considered. A statute is ambiguous if it is suscep-
tible to more than one plausible interpretation.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Stamford v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, Office of Public
Hearings, 351 Conn. 298, 306, 330 A.3d 102 (2025).
In R & R Pool & Patio, Inc., the trial court sought
to define the phrase ‘‘fine furniture,’’ as that term was
set forth in a variance pertaining to the plaintiffs’ prop-
erty but was not defined in the town’s zoning regulations
or in the certificate of variance. R & R Pool & Patio,
Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 129 Conn. App.
276, 288. This court concluded that, ‘‘[i]f the undefined
14
In Anatra, our Supreme Court noted that this court’s holding in R & R
Pool & Patio, Inc., was ‘‘more limited’’ than this court’s approach in previous
decisions. Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 744. Specifi-
cally, in L & G Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 40 Conn. App.
784, 787–88, 673 A.2d 1146 (1996), and Fleet National Bank v. Zoning Board
of Appeals, 54 Conn. App. 135, 137, 140–41, 734 A.2d 592, cert. denied, 250
Conn. 930, 738 A.2d 656 (1999), this court examined the entire public record,
including the variance applications and board meeting minutes, to determine
the scope of the variances. It is unclear from the facts and reasoning of
those decisions, however, whether the certificates of variance in those cases
referred to any conditions. See L & G Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, supra, 787–88; Fleet National Bank v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
supra, 137, 140–41; see also Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 742–
43.
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

words or terms are clear and unambiguous on their face,
the interpretation of their meaning poses a question of
law, which requires nothing more than looking to the
certificate itself . . . .’’ Id., 287. In contrast, when ‘‘the
undefined words or phrases [in a certificate of variance]
are ambiguous or reasonably susceptible to multiple
interpretations, a search for the intent of the board at
the time it approved the variance is necessary to resolve
that question . . . .’’ Id., 287–88. After noting that the
phrase ‘‘fine furniture’’ contained ambiguity; id., 290;
this court reviewed the record in that case, including
the original application for a variance, the testimony at
the hearing and the zoning board’s deliberations, to
define the meaning of that term. Id., 291–93, 296.
Applying those principles to the present case, we first
turn our attention to the certificate of variance itself.
In the section of the certificate entitled ‘‘Nature of Appli-
cation,’’ the certificate states in relevant part: ‘‘Section
11.7 to increase the dwelling height from 30 feet, propos-
ing 31.33 feet, and Section 11.1.1 to permit to construct
two dwellings on one parcel. Permission to remove two
existing dwellings and construct two new dwellings.’’
(Emphasis omitted.) On a line labeled ‘‘Plans Entitled,’’
the certificate states: ‘‘Prepared by The Huntington
Company, LLC, dated 2-2-10.’’ The next line, labeled
‘‘Conditions,’’ was left blank.
We conclude that, because the line designated for
conditions was left blank and there is no other indica-
tion in the certificate of variance that approval was
granted with conditions, the trial court properly con-
cluded that no conditions were attached to the 2011
variance. We discern no ambiguities in the certificate
of variance because it contains no language that reason-
ably could be construed as imposing a condition. The
question of whether conditions were attached to the
variance, therefore, ‘‘requires nothing more than look-
ing to the certificate itself’’; R & R Pool & Patio, Inc.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 129 Conn. App. 287;
and a review of the other materials in the administrative
record, such as the variance application and the plans
submitted in support thereof, is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, Office of Public Hearings, supra, 351 Conn.
306 (in applying principles of statutory construction,
if text of statute is clear and unambiguous, resort to
extratextual evidence shall not be considered). Accord-
ingly, the board properly considered the 2011 variance,
even though the modified designs submitted by the
intervening defendants did not have a flat roof design
or a limited 128 square foot area that would exceed
the maximum building height, because those were not
conditions attached to the variance.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the 1.33 feet from the
2011 variance should not have been considered in calcu-
lating the maximum building height because the 2011
variance was rendered moot by the 2013 amendment
to § 11.7 of the regulations. Specifically, the plaintiff
contends that the 2011 variance ‘‘no longer had any
legal effect, as the height permitted under the 2011
variance was now allowed as of right.’’ We are not
persuaded.
At the outset, we briefly note that this claim presents
a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See
Parker v. Zoning Commission, supra, 209 Conn. App.
653; see also International Investors v. Town Plan &
Zoning Commission, 344 Conn. 46, 59, 277 A.3d 750
(2022) (whether special permit was rendered void was
question of law subject to plenary review); Santarsiero
v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 165 Conn. App.
761, 772, 140 A.3d 336 (2016) (‘‘[b]ecause the court . . .
made conclusions of law in its memorandum of decision
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

[in this case], our review is plenary’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In the present case, the trial court rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that the amendment to § 11.7 of the
regulations rendered the 2011 variance moot, explaining
that the plaintiff’s argument ‘‘is not only contradicted
by the plain language of General Statutes § 8-6 (b), but
is also not supported by any statutory or regulatory
authority that requires a renewal or the extinguishment
of a variance based on amendments to regulations. The
court cannot read language into the regulations or . . .
§ 8-6 (b). . . . Indeed, it would yield an unworkable
result for property owners and municipalities if a land-
owner with a variance had to reapply to ‘renew’ vari-
ances each time a municipality’s regulations were
amended or each time a property owner reconstructed
or remodeled the structure for which a variance
applied.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)
We agree with the trial court. The plaintiff cites no
authority, and we have found none, to support the prop-
osition that a variance may be rendered moot by a
subsequent amendment to the regulations.15 Section 8-
6, which governs a zoning board’s authority to grant a
variance, does not describe any limitations or restric-
tions placed on a variance once it is granted and
recorded in the land records. Indeed, it provides in
relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny variance granted by a zoning
board of appeals shall run with the land and shall not
be personal in nature to the person who applied for
and received the variance. A variance shall not be extin-
guished solely because of the transfer of title to the
15
In addition to the lack of legal support for the plaintiff’s argument, we
also note that an amendment to the regulations does not necessarily alleviate
the hardship for which the variance was sought. For instance, in the present
case, although the maximum building height increased pursuant to the 2013
amendment to § 11.7 of the regulations, that increase simply accounted for
the new base flood elevation that also went into effect in 2013. See Fairfield
Zoning Regs., § 11.7.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

property or the invalidity of any condition attached to
the variance that would affect the transfer of the prop-
erty from the person who initially applied for and
received the variance.’’ General Statutes § 8-6 (b); see
also Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn.
App. 726, 737, 129 A.3d 743 (2015) (‘‘[t]he granting of
a variance is no insignificant matter, as it runs with the
land in perpetuity’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The plaintiff’s argument that the amendment to the
regulations effectively extinguished the 2011 variance
ignores the language in § 8-6, which provides that vari-
ances run with the land. As aptly noted by the trial
court in the present case, ‘‘it would yield an unworkable
result for property owners and municipalities if a land-
owner with a variance had to reapply to renew variances
each time a municipality’s regulations were amended
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Thus, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 2011
variance was rendered moot, or no longer had any legal
effect, by virtue of the amendment to § 11.7 of the regu-
lations.16 Accordingly, the 2011 variance properly was
16
A similar issue has been addressed in the context of the justiciability
of an appeal. In Protect Hamden/North Haven from Excessive Traffic &
Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 527, 600
A.2d 757 (1991), our Supreme Court concluded that subsequent regulatory
changes did not render a zoning appeal moot because, pursuant to General
Statutes § 8-2h (a), a zoning application must be considered under the zoning
regulations in effect on the date it was filed. Id., 540–41. Our Supreme
Court explained that § 8-2h (a) legislatively overruled this court’s decision
in Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 2 Conn. App. 24, 475 A.2d 339, cert.
denied, 194 Conn. 806, 482 A.2d 711 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066, 105
S. Ct. 2141, 85 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1985), which held that a zoning appeal had
become moot by virtue of subsequent regulatory amendments. Protect Ham-
den/North Haven from Excessive Traffic & Pollution, Inc. v. Planning &
Zoning Commission, supra, 540–41; see Johnson v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, supra, 2 Conn. App. 26–27 (An appeal to the trial court ‘‘was
properly dismissed as moot since the zoning variance has been superseded
by a subsequent amendment to the zoning regulations which permit the use
as of right. When present regulations permit the use, the plaintiff gains
nothing by his action to set aside the granting of a variance which the
landowner no longer needs. In a zoning appeal the court is to take the law
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sargent v. Zoning Board of Appeals

considered in calculating the maximum building height
of the intervening defendants’ proposed residence. The
court, therefore, properly dismissed the plaintiff’s
appeal from the board’s decision denying the plaintiff’s
appeal from the issuance of the certificate of zoning
compliance by the town’s zoning enforcement officer.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

as it exists at the time of the review of the zoning decision complained of.
. . . There is no practical relief which could follow were the plaintiff’s
appeal of the zoning variance to be sustained.’’ (Citation omitted.)); see also
Michel v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 28 Conn. App. 314, 318, 612
A.2d 778 (explaining that § 8-2h (a) ‘‘legislatively overruled’’ Johnson, and ‘‘a
challenge to commission action no longer is rendered moot by a subsequent
change in the applicable zoning laws or regulations’’), cert. denied, 223
Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 824 (1992). Given that an appeal from the granting of
a variance is not rendered moot by virtue of subsequent regulatory amend-
ments, and a reviewing court may still afford practical relief related to that
variance, it follows that subsequent regulatory amendments do not render
a variance moot for purposes of its future use.