Bordiere v. Chandler

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Bordiere v. Chandler

PATRICIA K. BORDIERE v. PATRANI J.
CHANDLER ET AL.
(AC 48113)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant
on her special defense of promissory estoppel in the plaintiff’s mortgage
foreclosure action. After the note had matured but there was still an outstand-
ing balance due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into
an oral agreement that the defendant would pay the outstanding property
taxes that the plaintiff had failed to pay as required by the terms of the
mortgage, and, in return, the plaintiff would release her from further pay-
ments on the outstanding debt and send her the deed to the property. The
plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding for the defendant
on her special defense of promissory estoppel. Held:

The trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s action was barred
by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the court was within its province
to determine that the defendant’s testimony regarding her agreement with
the plaintiff was credible and persuasive and was corroborated by her
payment of the delinquent taxes and by the testimony of an attorney for
the city where the property was located.

This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that her agreement with
the defendant was unenforceable under the statute of frauds (§ 52-550 (a))
because it was not in writing, as the plaintiff failed to preserve that claim
in the trial court.
Argued September 8—officially released November 11, 2025

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain, and tried to the court, Hon. Joseph M.
Shortall, judge trial referee; judgment for the named
defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Jon C. Leary, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Sarah Poriss, for the appellee (named defendant).
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Bordiere v. Chandler

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. In this mortgage foreclosure action,
the plaintiff, Patricia K. Bordiere, appeals from the judg-
ment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant
Patrani J. Chandler.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the court erred in (1) finding in favor of the defendant
on her special defense of promissory estoppel and (2)
not finding that the oral agreement on which the defen-
dant relied in discontinuing her payments on the mort-
gage was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.2
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution
of the claims on appeal. ‘‘In 1996, the defendant . . .
executed a note payable to the plaintiff . . . and her
now deceased husband Marcus Bordiere3 in the amount
of $78,000. That note was secured by a mortgage on
property [located] at 5 Cider Mill Court in New Britain
[(property)], the property that is the subject of this
foreclosure action. Monthly payments in the amount of
$627.61 were to be made over a ten year period. If there
was still a balance due as of February 1, 2006, [the
defendant] was to make a ‘balloon payment’ of the
entire balance due at that time. . . . Among the ‘Uni-
form Covenants’ in the mortgage securing that note was
one that obligated the lenders, the Bordieres, to pay
various ‘Escrow Items,’ including ‘taxes and assess-
ments.’ . . .
1
Although the city of New Britain also was named as a defendant in this
action, it has not participated in this appeal. Any reference to the defendant
in this decision therefore is to Patrani J. Chandler only.
2
The plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that her action
was barred by the doctrine of laches. Because we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that the plaintiff’s action was barred by promissory estoppel,
we need not address the plaintiff’s challenge to the trial court’s application
of the doctrine of laches.
3
Marcus Bordiere died in 2013.
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‘‘[I]n 2006, when the note matured and there was a
balance outstanding, Marcus Bordiere and [the defen-
dant] agreed that [the defendant] could continue to
make monthly payments on the debt, and she did so
until 2015. . . .
‘‘In 2015, [the defendant] learned that there were
unpaid real estate taxes on the property due to the city
of New Britain (city). She had a phone conversation
with [the plaintiff] on the subject of the unpaid taxes.
[The plaintiff] told [the defendant] that she wanted noth-
ing to do with the payment of the taxes. . . . [The
plaintiff] proposed that [the defendant] pay the taxes
due, and in return, [the plaintiff] would release her from
further payments on the outstanding debt and send her
the deed to the property. Acting in reliance on that
promise, [the defendant] agreed with the attorney repre-
senting the city, Albert Proulx, that she would pay off
the unpaid taxes in installments over the next year. She
did that. . . .4
‘‘After the taxes were paid off in 2016, [the defendant]
made no further payments on the note.5 She had one
4
It is undisputed that the defendant paid the delinquent taxes on the prop-
erty.
5
The trial court noted that the defendant ‘‘introduced into evidence a
copy of the warranty deed from 1996, when she purchased the property,
testifying that this was the deed sent to her by [the plaintiff] after [the
defendant] had paid the outstanding taxes.’’ The plaintiff argued at trial and
continues to argue before this court that she did not send the deed to the
defendant but that the deed had to have come from the city at the time the
deed was recorded in 1996 and that the defendant had it all along. The
court did not make an explicit finding as to how the defendant came into
possession of the deed. On the basis of the trial court’s decision as a whole,
we can infer that, at the very least, the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the defendant had the deed all along and misrepresented to
the trial court that she received it after she paid the delinquent taxes in
2016. The lack of a specific finding with respect to the possession of the
deed by the trial court reflects that it did not consider the question of how
the defendant came to be in possession of the deed to be relevant to its
decision that there was an oral agreement between the parties.
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phone conversation with Michael Bordiere6 about the
unpaid taxes and no other contact with [the plaintiff]
or anyone else on her behalf except for an unpleasant
confrontation with Michael Bordiere at the . . . prop-
erty that was resolved when the New Britain police
advised [Michael] Bordiere that it was time for him to
leave and that he should handle any dispute over the
property in civil court.’’7 (Citations omitted; footnotes
added; footnote omitted.)
In March, 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action
seeking to foreclose on the mortgage on the ground
that the defendant had failed to pay the principal and
interest due. The defendant left the plaintiff to her proof
as to the allegation of nonpayment and asserted several
special defenses. Relevant to this appeal, the defendant
asserted that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the
doctrine of promissory estoppel in that she stopped
making payments on the mortgage in reliance on the
plaintiff’s promise in 2015 that she would release her
from doing so if she paid the delinquent taxes on the
property.8
6
Michael Bordiere is the son of the plaintiff and Marcus Bordiere.
7
This incident occurred in October, 2022. The police report of the incident
reflects that the police received a telephone call from an ‘‘anonymous neigh-
bor’’ complaining that the defendant and another individual were on the
property inside the residence but that it was supposed to be vacant. When
the police arrived, the defendant answered the door and explained to the
officer that she owned the property. At that time, Michael Bordiere and the
‘‘anonymous neighbor’’ approached, and told the officer that the defendant
was ‘‘in foreclosure and they were the bank.’’
8
The defendant first asserted five special defenses: payment, statute of
limitations, accord and satisfaction, detrimental reliance and laches. In her
reply, the plaintiff denied the defendant’s special defenses. The defendant
later amended her special defenses to include four additional defenses:
breach of contract, unclean hands, equitable estoppel and promissory estop-
pel. In amending her special defenses, the defendant did not allege any new
facts. Her special defenses, at all times, were based on her allegation that
she stopped making payments on the mortgage due to the verbal agreement
between her and the plaintiff that she would be excused from doing so if
she paid the back taxes that were outstanding in 2015. The plaintiff did not
file a reply to the amended special defenses.
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On September 26, 2024, following a trial and the filing
of posttrial briefs by the parties, the court, Hon. Joseph
M. Shortall, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum
of decision wherein it rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant on her special defense of promissory
estoppel.9 This appeal followed. Additional facts will
be set forth as necessary.
I
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding
that her action was barred by the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. She argues that the defendant ‘‘failed to estab-
lish [that] a clear and definite promise existed and that
it was such a promise that would have been reasonable
for the plaintiff to expect reliance on.’’ We are not per-
suaded.
‘‘[U]nder the doctrine of promissory estoppel, [a]
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the prom-
isee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. . . . A fundamen-
tal element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the
existence of a clear and definite promise which a promi-
sor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance.
Thus, a promisor is not liable to a promisee who has
relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard,
he had no reason to expect any reliance at all. . . .
‘‘Additionally, the promise must reflect a present
intent to commit as distinguished from a mere state-
ment of intent to contract in the future. . . . [A] mere
expression of intention, hope, desire, or opinion, which
shows no real commitment, cannot be expected to
induce reliance . . . and, therefore, is not sufficiently
promissory. The requirements of clarity and definite-
9
See footnote 2 of this opinion.
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Bordiere v. Chandler

ness are the determinative factors in deciding whether
the statements are indeed expressions of commitment
as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or
opinion. . . . Finally, whether a representation rises
to the level of a promise is generally a question of fact,
to be determined in light of the circumstances under
which the representation was made.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) T & M Building Co. v. Hastings,
194 Conn. App. 532, 553–54, 221 A.3d 857 (2019), cert.
denied, 334 Conn. 926, 224 A.3d 162 (2020).
Here, the court found: ‘‘Although she now denies it
. . . [the plaintiff], faced with the problem of unpaid
taxes on the property on which she held a mortgage
and wanting nothing to do with the payment, made a
clear and definite promise to [the defendant] that, if
she solved that problem by paying those taxes, she
would be relieved of the obligation to make further
payments on the note and be given the deed to the
property. [The defendant] relying on that promise, paid
the taxes. . . . [I]njustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise made by [the plaintiff] in
2015. [The defendant] has met her burden of proving
the defense of promissory estoppel.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he defendant did not meet
her burden of proof in establishing the existence of
such an oral agreement and the trial court’s finding of
such was clear error.’’ She contends that ‘‘[t]he only
evidence that supported such a ruling was the self-
serving, unsupported testimony of the defendant that
the plaintiff promised to give [her] ‘the deed’ if [she] paid
the delinquent real estate taxes owed on the subject
real estate.’’ It is well established that, ‘‘[i]n a case tried
before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
specific testimony. . . . It is the privilege of the trial
court to adopt whatever testimony it reasonably
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believes to be credible, and it is not the function of this
court to retry the facts or pass on the credibility of a
witness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hallock v. Hallock, 228 Conn. App. 81, 104,
324 A.3d 193 (2024). Although the plaintiff describes
the defendant’s testimony as self-serving, the court was
within its province to determine, as reflected by its
decision, that her testimony was credible and persua-
sive.
The court also found that the defendant’s testimony
was corroborated by Proulx’ testimony and rejected
the plaintiff’s testimony to the contrary. The court
explained: ‘‘[The plaintiff] denied that she had any such
agreement with [the defendant]. Regrettably, the court
finds that [the plaintiff’s] testimony on this subject was
unreliable, not from any intent on her part to deceive
but because her memory has failed her on this subject.
For example, she denied having any conversation with
. . . Proulx or any other representative of the city
about taxes due the city, both in her testimony and in
her sworn responses to interrogatories. . . . Proulx, a
respected member of the New Britain bar, testified,
however, to his clear recollection of such a telephone
conversation. In that conversation [the plaintiff] told
him she wanted nothing to do with the payment of taxes
on the property, which corroborates [the defendant’s]
testimony as to [the plaintiff’s] statements to her on
the same subject. [The plaintiff] rejected . . . Proulx’
suggestion that she pay the taxes and add them on to
the debt due from [the defendant].’’ The court further
found that the defendant’s testimony was corroborated
by her payment of the delinquent taxes. The court noted
that ‘‘[n]o evidence was introduced as to any further
unpaid taxes, and the court must assume that [the
defendant] has been paying them, an expense she would
not have borne but for [the plaintiff’s] promise that the
property would be hers.’’ We therefore disagree with
the plaintiff’s argument that the court’s finding of the
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existence of an oral agreement between the parties was
erroneous.
The plaintiff further contends that any alleged agree-
ment by her to forgive the amount due on the mortgage
in exchange for the defendant’s payment of the delin-
quent taxes would not objectively induce reliance
because ‘‘the defendant was already obligated to pay
her own real estate taxes.’’ In so arguing, the plaintiff
ignores the term of the mortgage note that provided that
the defendant’s monthly payment included a portion to
be held in escrow by the Bordieres to pay the property
taxes to the city when they became due. That arrange-
ment continued pursuant to the verbal agreement
between the defendant and Marcus Bordiere following
the expiration of the term covered by the original note
in 2006. When the defendant agreed in 2015 to pay the
delinquent taxes, she effectively paid the property taxes
two times. Of course, the defendant would not agree
to do so without consideration. The plaintiff reasonably
should have expected the defendant to rely on her prom-
ise to release the defendant from any further payments
on the mortgage in exchange for requiring the defendant
to pay the property taxes a second time. Accordingly,
the plaintiff’s claim that the court erred in finding that
her action was barred by promissory estoppel must fail.
II
The plaintiff also claims that, even if there was an
oral agreement that provided for the plaintiff’s forgive-
ness of the debt on the mortgage in consideration of
the defendant’s payment of the delinquent taxes, that
agreement was unenforceable because it was not in
writing as required under the statute of frauds. See
General Statutes § 52-550 (a).10 ‘‘Under Connecticut law,
10
General Statutes § 52-550 (a) provides: ‘‘No civil action may be main-
tained in the following cases unless the agreement, or a memorandum of
the agreement, is made in writing and signed by the party, or the agent of
the party, to be charged: (1) Upon any agreement to charge any executor
or administrator, upon a special promise to answer damages out of his own
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Bordiere v. Chandler

the statute of frauds operates as a special defense to
a civil action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Konover Development Corp. v. Waterbury Omega, LLC,
214 Conn. App. 648, 676, 281 A.3d 1221, cert. denied,
345 Conn. 919, 284 A.3d 627 (2022). Under our common
law and rules of practice, special defenses must be
affirmatively pleaded by a party. See Silver Hill Hospi-
tal, Inc. v. Kessler, 200 Conn. App. 742, 750, 240 A.3d
740 (2020); see also Practice Book § 10-50.
Here, the plaintiff is seeking to invoke the statute of
frauds to defeat the defendant’s special defense that
she relied on a verbal agreement with the plaintiff in
discontinuing her payments on the mortgage. If the
plaintiff wanted to plead the statute of frauds, she
should have done so in reply to that special defense,
essentially stating that, even if there was such an agree-
ment, the failure to comply with the statute of frauds
would defeat the special defense. The plaintiff, how-
ever, did not do so. The plaintiff raised her statute
of frauds claim for the first time during her closing
argument to the court.11 In her posttrial brief, the plain-
tiff raised the statute of frauds, but only as to the defen-
dant’s special defenses of payment and breach of con-
tract, not as to the defendant’s special defense of
promissory estoppel. Because the plaintiff did not argue
to the trial court that the defendant’s special defense
of promissory estoppel failed under the statute of
frauds, she may not do so for the first time before this
property; (2) against any person upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another; (3) upon any agreement made
upon consideration of marriage; (4) upon any agreement for the sale of
real property or any interest in or concerning real property; (5) upon any
agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof; or (6) upon any agreement for a loan in an amount which exceeds
fifty thousand dollars.’’
11
During closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff argued: ‘‘[O]ur statute
of limitations requires that any agreement relating to land be in writing, and
there’s certainly nothing in writing relating to this alleged agreement to
forgive the debt and give a release of mortgage.’’ In response, counsel for
the defendant argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because the
parties performed their obligations under the agreement.
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court. See Graham v. Graham, 222 Conn. App. 560,
580, 306 A.3d 499 (2023).
Moreover, the trial court did not address the plain-
tiff’s statute of frauds argument, presumably because
that argument was briefed only as to the special
defenses of payment and breach of contract, not the
special defenses on which the defendant prevailed. To
the extent the plaintiff believed that her statute of frauds
claim had been properly raised and that the court had
failed to address it, the plaintiff could have, but failed, to
seek an articulation from the court. It was the plaintiff’s
responsibility to do so. See Practice Book § 61-10 (a)
(it is appellant’s responsibility to provide adequate
record for review). Because the plaintiff failed to pre-
serve her statute of frauds claim, we decline to review
that claim in this appeal. See Lucky 13 Industries, LLC
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App.
558, 566–67, 270 A.3d 188, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 905,
272 A.3d 1127 (2022).12
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
12
We further note that the statute of frauds generally does not apply when
a party demonstrates partial performance with contractual obligations. As
this court has explained, ‘‘[t]he doctrine of part performance . . . is an
exception to the statute of frauds. . . . This doctrine originated to prevent
the statute of frauds from becoming an engine of fraud. . . . [T]he elements
required for part performance are: (1) statements, acts or omissions that
lead a party to act to his detriment in reliance on the contract; (2) knowledge
or assent to the party’s actions in reliance on the contract; and (3) acts that
unmistakably point to the contract. . . . Under this test, two separate but
related criteria are met that warrant precluding a party from asserting the
statute of frauds. . . . First, part performance satisfies the evidentiary func-
tion of the statute of frauds by providing proof of the contract itself. . . .
Second, the inducement of reliance on the oral agreement implicates the
equitable principle underlying estoppel because repudiation of the contract
by the other party would amount to the perpetration of a fraud.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patrowicz v. Peloquin, 190
Conn. App. 124, 138–39, 209 A.3d 1233, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 915, 216 A.3d
651 (2019). As noted herein, the defendant performed her obligation under
the verbal agreement with the plaintiff when she paid the delinquent taxes
on the property. It therefore is unlikely that the agreement at issue would
be unenforceable under the statute of frauds.