Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau

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Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau

SERAMONTE CT, LLC v. GRETA BLAU ET AL.
(AC 47955)
Elgo, Moll and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant tenants appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying
their motion for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to the statute (§ 42-150bb)
governing the successful prosecution or defense by a consumer of an action
based on a lease entered into with a commercial entity. They claimed that
they were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees after the trial court found
in their favor on the summary process action brought against them by the
plaintiff landlord. Held:

The trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees
filed pursuant to § 42-150bb, as the plaintiff’s notice to quit and summary
process action, which alleged serious nuisance, were not based on a breach
of the parties’ lease, and, therefore, § 42-150bb was inapplicable.
Argued April 17—officially released December 23, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing
Session, and tried to the court, Spader, J.; judgment
for the defendants; thereafter, the court, Spader, J.,
denied the defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees, and
the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Shelley A. White, for the appellants (defendants).
Ian G. Gottlieb, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The defendants, Greta Blau and Paul Bou-
dreau, appeal from the judgment of the trial court deny-
ing their motion for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to
General Statutes § 42-150bb. The dispositive issue in
this appeal is whether the court improperly concluded
that the attorney’s fees sought by the defendants were
not authorized by § 42-150bb because the serious nui-
sances alleged in the underlying summary process
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Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau

action were not based on the defendants’ residential
lease with the plaintiff, Seramonte CT, LLC. We con-
clude that the trial court properly determined that recip-
rocal attorney’s fees were not available to the defen-
dants pursuant to § 42-150bb under the facts and
circumstances of this case.1 Accordingly, the court
properly denied the defendants’ motion for attorney’s
fees.

The record reveals the following procedural history
and facts found by the court. On or about March 1,
2022, the plaintiff entered into a one year lease with
the defendants for the premises known as 63 Kaye View
Drive, Apartment B, in Hamden. At that time, the defen-
dants took possession of the premises. Several months
later, Blau engaged in threatening conduct toward
agents of the plaintiff on two separate occasions in
June, 2022.

The first occasion of Blau’s threatening conduct
involved the plaintiff’s attorney in a courthouse. Blau
interrupted a separate summary process matter involv-
ing the plaintiff’s attorney. Blau ‘‘aggressively approached
the plaintiff’s attorney in the hallway and caused her
to nearly fall and injure herself, but for her being
‘caught’ by her cocounsel.’’ The second occasion of
Blau’s threatening conduct involved the employees of
a towing company that the plaintiff utilized to enforce
its parking policies at the premises. Specifically, Blau
used ‘‘her vehicle to block the two truck drivers called
to the premises and she screamed vulgarities and used
obscene gestures towards the plaintiff’s contractors.
She accused the owner of the tow truck company of
1
As a result of our conclusion, we need not address the defendants’
additional claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the language
of the attorney’s fees provision in the parties’ lease precluded an award of
such fees to the defendants under § 42-150bb.
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being a racist and pedophile and harassed him through
phone calls and disparaging behavior. . . . [The court
commented that her] behavior is well beyond her self-
described term of ‘immature’ and is not to be con-
doned.’’
As a result of these incidents, the plaintiff served
the defendants with a notice to quit possession of the
premises on July 13, 2022.2 The notice to quit stated that
Blau had committed a serious nuisance by ‘‘inflicting
bodily harm upon the [plaintiff’s] agents or threatening
to inflict such harm with the present ability to affect
such harm under the circumstances which would lead
a reasonable person to believe that such threat will
be carried out’’ as a result of her conduct toward the
employees of the towing company and the plaintiff’s
attorney. Furthermore, the notice to quit indicated that
Boudreau had committed a serious nuisance by vio-
lating General Statutes § 47a-11 (g) ‘‘by failing to require
other persons [namely, Blau] living in the premises with
[his] consent to conduct themselves in a manner that
will not constitute serious nuisance . . . .’’
The defendants did not vacate the premises, and the
plaintiff commenced a summary process action.3 The
2
A notice to quit terminates a lease and provides the jurisdictional basis
for a summary process action if the tenant does not vacate the premises
within the designated time. See Towers v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 840,
238 A.3d 732, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020); see also
Prime Management, LLC v. Arthur, 217 Conn. App. 737, 749, 290 A.3d 401
(2023); Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377,
cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988).
3
‘‘[S]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide
an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of
leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which,
under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrong-
fully holding over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a
prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relat-
ing to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209 Conn.
App. 569, 575, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022);
see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728,
733, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
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plaintiff asserted four counts in its complaint: two
counts of serious nuisance as to Blau, one count of
serious nuisance as to Boudreau, and one count of no
right or privilege to occupy the premises as to Bou-
dreau. The court granted a motion to strike the last
count of the summary process complaint, and a trial
was held on the three remaining counts on April 12,
2024. Ten days later, the court, Spader, J., issued a
memorandum of decision. It concluded that Blau’s con-
duct with respect to the towing company employees
and the attorney employed by the plaintiff would have
constituted a serious nuisance had it been done to
employees of the plaintiff or another tenant.4 Neverthe-
less, pursuant to the statutory language, a serious nui-
sance requires that the actions complained of be
directed at another tenant or the landlord. The court
further explained that, although Blau’s conduct was
‘‘indefensible . . . the incidents do not fit within the
statutory ‘serious nuisance’ framework.’’ The court,
therefore, did not address the third count of the sum-
mary process complaint directed at Boudreau, which
alleged that he had failed to require that Blau conduct
herself in a manner that did not constitute a serious
nuisance, or the defendants’ special defenses. It ren-
dered judgment in favor of the defendants.
4
Our Supreme Court has instructed that, to meet the statutory definition
of serious nuisance, the conduct at issue must be shown to be immediate
and serious. See Cardinal Realty Investors, LLC v. Bernasconi, 287 Conn.
136, 140, 946 A.2d 1242 (2008). We also note that decisions of the Superior
Court have stood for the proposition that a party alleging a serious nuisance
bears a ‘‘heavy burden’’ of demonstrating more than a mere nuisance or
material noncompliance with the duties of a tenant. Ansonia Acquisitions
I, LLC v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 29, 2023); see also Marion v. Fusco, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(March 18, 2021); Bates Woods Apartments v. Whitehead-Swain, Superior
Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July
18, 2007).
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On May 21, 2024, the defendants moved for attorney’s
fees in the amount of $31,195 pursuant to § 42-150bb.5
In the attached memorandum of law, the defendants
argued that, as the prevailing parties, they were entitled
to such fees because paragraph 19 of the parties’ lease
provided that, if the plaintiff brought proceedings to
evict the defendants from the premises, it would be
entitled to ‘‘any attorney’s fees or other fees and costs
associated with the removal of [the defendants] . . . .’’
The defendants attached an affidavit of attorney’s fees
and a copy of the parties’ lease to their motion. The
defendants further asserted that, having demonstrated
their entitlement to attorney’s fees, the court had ‘‘no
latitude’’ to deny this motion.
On May 31, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. It argued
therein that the notice to quit, and the subsequent sum-
mary process action, were based on serious nuisance
and not a breach of the lease. Specifically, it asserted
that courts ‘‘have consistently recognized the indepen-
dent nature of a serious nuisance cause of action as
one that is borne out of statutory creation and exists
independently rather than as a product of the contrac-
tual relationship . . . .’’ It further argued that this statu-
tory basis for summary process existed even if the lease
were not valid, or if a lease did not exist at all. On June
17, 2024, the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s
5
The defendants were represented by attorneys from New Haven Legal
Assistance Association, Inc. (NHLLA). In the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees, they asserted that NHLLA is a nonprofit organization that provides
free legal services to its clients. This court has recognized that, as a general
matter, such organizations are entitled to awards of attorney’s fees under
the appropriate circumstances. See generally Benavides v. Benavides, 11
Conn. App. 150, 152–56, 526 A.2d 536 (1987). We note that the plaintiff has
not challenged or disputed that NHLLA was eligible for an award of attorney’s
fees on the basis of its nonprofit status. Additionally, the trial court remarked
in its memorandum of decision that it ‘‘has regularly found that legal aid
societies are able to claim legal fees for the provision of their services.’’
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objection. They countered that the summary process
action was based on the parties’ lease.
On August 19, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision denying the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees. After reviewing § 42-150bb, and noting that
the lease had not been presented as an exhibit at the
summary process trial, the court determined that the
defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees because
the summary process action was not based on the con-
tract, i.e., the lease, between the parties. Additionally,
the court concluded that, on the basis of the language
used in paragraph 19 of the lease, the plaintiff would
not have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed,
and, therefore, there was no reciprocal basis to award
the defendants such fees. Accordingly, it denied the
defendants’ motion. This appeal followed. Additional
facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly denied their motion for attorney’s fees when
it concluded that (1) this summary process action was
outside of the scope of § 42-150bb and (2) the language
of the attorney’s fees provision in paragraph 19 of the
parties’ lease would not have supported an award of
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff had it prevailed in the
summary process action, and therefore no reciprocal
basis existed to award such fees to the defendants. The
plaintiff counters that the court’s conclusions regarding
the denial of the attorney’s fees were proper. We con-
clude that, in the present case, the trial court properly
determined that the notice to quit and the summary
process action filed by the plaintiff alleging serious
nuisance were not based on the lease between the par-
ties and, therefore, § 42-150bb does not apply in this
instance.6 Accordingly, the court properly denied the
defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees.
6
As a result of this conclusion, we need not reach the defendants’ second
claim that the trial court improperly determined that they were not entitled
to attorney’s fees due to the specific language in the parties’ lease.
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The defendants’ claim requires us to interpret § 42-
150bb and determine its applicability to the present
matter. Accordingly, we employ the plenary standard
of review. See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valen-
cia, 145 Conn. App. 682, 687, 76 A.3d 694 (2013); see
also Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta, 161 Conn.
App. 668, 673, 129 A.3d 730 (2015); Athena Holdings,
LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470, 475, 125 A.3d 290,
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 908, 128 A.3d 952 (2015).7 We
follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 1-2z when construing statutes to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. See
Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway
Associates, LLC, 340 Conn. 115, 126, 263 A.3d 87 (2021).
‘‘In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned
manner, the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question
of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In
seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Hous-
ing Finance Authority v. Alfaro, 328 Conn. 134, 141–42,
176 A.3d 1146 (2018).
We begin our analysis with the statutory language.
Section 42-150bb provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever
any contract or lease entered into on or after October
1, 1979, to which a consumer is a party, provides for
the attorney’s fee of the commercial party to be paid
by the consumer, an attorney’s fee shall be awarded
7
We disagree with the plaintiff’s contention in its appellate brief that the
abuse of discretion standard applies to the claims advanced by the defen-
dants in this appeal.
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as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully
prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim
based upon the contract or lease. . . . For the purposes
of this section, ‘commercial party’ means the seller,
creditor, lessor or assignee of any of them, and ‘con-
sumer’ means the buyer, debtor, lessee or personal rep-
resentative of any of them. The provisions of this section
shall apply only to contracts or leases in which the
money, property or service which is the subject of the
transaction is primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes.’’ (Emphasis added.) This court expressly
has recognized that a tenant who has prevailed against
a landlord in a summary process action may be entitled
to attorney’s fees pursuant to § 42-150bb. Centrix Man-
agement Co., LLC v. Valencia, supra, 145 Conn. App.
689–92; see also Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn. App.
278, 281, 109 A.3d 543 (2015).
Next, we consider the relevant appellate decisions
of this state that have addressed § 42-150bb. Section 42-
150bb is ‘‘in derogation of the common law. Specifically,
[t]he general rule of law known as the American rule
is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and bur-
dens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party
absent a contractual or statutory exception. . . . Con-
necticut adheres to the American rule. . . . Section
42-150bb is, however, one of [the] exceptions to the
common-law rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Athena Holdings, LLC v. Marcus, supra, 160 Conn. App.
476; see also Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn.
58, 72–73, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997); Trugreen Landcare,
LLC v. Elm City Development & Construction Services,
LLC, 101 Conn. App. 11, 14–15, 919 A.2d 1077 (2007).
Additionally, we have explained that the purpose of
this statute is to bring parity between commercial enti-
ties and consumers who successfully defend an action
on a contract prepared by such an entity. Athena Hold-
ings, LLC v. Marcus, supra, 160 Conn. App. 476; see
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also Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg, 349
Conn. 765, 777–79, 322 A.3d 317 (2024) (discussing equi-
table purpose of § 42-150bb); Aaron Manor, Inc. v.
Irving, 307 Conn. 608, 617–18, 57 A.3d 342 (2013)
(same). ‘‘Stated differently, when a commercial entity
enters into a consumer contract that provides the com-
mercial entity with the contractual right to recover
attorney’s fees, § 42-150bb provides consumers with a
reciprocal statutory right to recover attorney’s fees if
he or she successfully prosecutes or defends an action
or counterclaim.’’ Athena Holdings, LLC v. Marcus,
supra, 476.
Next, we set forth the relevant legal principles regard-
ing summary process and serious nuisance. ‘‘The ulti-
mate issue in a summary process action is the right to
possession. Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App.
439, 443, 473 A.2d 318 (1984). Summary process is a
statutory proceeding that is intended to be summary
and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to
the landlord seeking possession.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta,
supra, 161 Conn. App. 673; see also Housing Authority
v. DeRoche, 112 Conn. App. 355, 361, 962 A.2d 904
(2009). General Statutes § 47a-15 provides that, except
for those situations specifically excluded, a landlord
must deliver a pretermination notice to the tenant speci-
fying the alleged violations before proceeding with a
summary process action. See Housing Authority v. Ste-
vens, 209 Conn. App. 569, 575, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied,
343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022). The pretermination
notice affords the tenant the opportunity to remedy the
violation and avoid a summary eviction. See id.
Situations involving a serious nuisance are among
those specifically excluded from the pretermination
notice requirement. ‘‘When a landlord elects . . . to
evict based on . . . conduct by the tenant which con-
stitutes a serious nuisance; General Statutes § 47a-15;
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however, a pretermination notice is not required.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 575–76; see also
Towers v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 837, 238 A.3d 732,
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020); see
generally Bridgestone Realty Corp. v. Mendoza, 50
Conn. Supp. 125, 128, 918 A.2d 1064 (2006) (§ 47a-15
exempts landlords from serving pretermination notice
where tenant commits serious nuisance).
A serious nuisance under this statutory scheme may
occur in one of four ways. See Suburban Greater Hart-
ford Realty Management Corp. v. Edwards, 123 Conn.
App. 295, 300, 1 A.3d 1138 (2010). As provided in § 47a-
15, serious nuisance means ‘‘[1] inflicting bodily harm
upon another tenant or the landlord or threatening to
inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the
harm and under circumstances which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that such threat will be
carried out, [2] substantial and wilful destruction of
part of the dwelling unit or premises, [3] conduct which
presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety
of other tenants or the landlord, or [4] using the prem-
ises or allowing the premises to be used for prostitution
or the illegal sale of drugs or, in the case of a housing
authority, using any area within fifteen hundred feet
of any housing authority property in which the tenant
resides for the illegal sale of drugs.’’
In the present case, the plaintiff claimed that Blau’s
conduct toward the plaintiff’s attorney and its towing
contractor constituted a serious nuisance and that Bou-
dreau, in failing to require Blau to conduct herself in
a manner that did not constitute a serious nuisance,
committed a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-11
(g).8 The plaintiff’s attempt to regain possession of the
8
General Statutes § 47a-11 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] tenant shall
. . . (g) conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with
his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his
neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute . . . a serious
nuisance, as defined in section 47a-15 . . . .’’
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premises, therefore, was not based on the terms or
language of the lease but, rather, on the provisions of
§§ 47a-11 (g) and 47a-15, which provide a remedy to
the landlord on the basis of acts alleged to be a serious
nuisance.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Lati-
mer Point Management Corp., 208 Conn. 256, 545 A.2d
525 (1988), provides helpful guidance in the present
matter. In that case, the plaintiff, a resident of Latimer
Point, Stonington, commenced an equitable action
against the defendant, a nonstock corporation created
to lease, sublease, maintain and improve the Latimer
Point peninsula, and fourteen present and past directors
of said corporation. Id., 257–59. The basis for the action
was the denial by the defendant corporation of the
plaintiff’s request to add a second story to his dwelling.
Id., 260. In that action, the plaintiff sought an injunction
that restrained the defendants from interfering with his
proposed use of the leased property in a number of
respects. Id. He also requested, among other things,
attorney’s fees. Id., 259. The defendants, in turn, filed a
counterclaim in which they sought an injunction against
the plaintiff with respect to the use of the property.
Id., 265.
In ruling on the plaintiff’s complaint, the trial court
found some issues in favor of the plaintiff and some
in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the trial court
enjoined the defendants from ‘‘(1) interfering with the
plaintiff’s maintenance of certain shrubs, trees and
other vegetation; (2) interfering with the plaintiff’s
membership in [the defendant corporation] upon his
payment of certain past due assessments; (3) pursuing
the collection or levy of past fines from the plaintiff;
and (4) pursuing a contemplated eviction of the plain-
tiff.’’ Id., 258. The court did not, however, grant an
injunction restraining the defendant corporation’s inter-
ference with his proposed second story addition to this
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cottage; it also concluded that the plaintiff should pay
a portion of past due assessments, and refused to award
attorney’s fees. Id., 258–59. With respect to the defen-
dants’ counterclaim, the court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff. Id., 265. It did so on the basis of inadequate
bylaws that were ‘‘impermissibly vague and without
standards.’’ Id., 260.
On appeal in Anderson, the plaintiff challenged, inter
alia, the trial court’s refusal to award him attorney’s
fees pursuant to § 42-150bb. ‘‘The trial court found that
the sublease here in issue, which provided for attorneys’
fees to the [defendant corporation], fell within this stat-
utory definition of a ‘lease’ but declined to award coun-
sel fees for the reason that the plaintiff had not success-
fully prosecuted a claim under the lease.’’ Id., 265. In
agreeing with the trial court’s reasoning, our Supreme
Court explained that the orders regarding ‘‘vegetation,
assessments, [corporation] membership and eviction
were all based on inadequacies found by the court in
the [corporation] bylaws and not in [considerations
involving] the sublease. Thus, the court was correct
in concluding that the plaintiff had not successfully
prosecuted his action under the lease.’’ Id. In other
words, to the extent that the plaintiff in Anderson had
prevailed, it was due to the inadequate bylaws and not
on considerations involving the sublease. Id., 266; see
also Retained Realty, Inc. v. Spitzer, 643 F. Supp. 2d
228, 236 (D. Conn. 2009) (explaining that attorney’s fees
under § 42-150bb are not available when party prevails
on claim for reasons other than opposing party’s breach
of contract).
Similarly, in Gardner Heights Health Care Center,
Inc. v. Korolyshun, 117 Conn. App. 745, 746–47, 982
A.2d 186 (2009), this court concluded that § 42-150bb
did not apply when the underlying action was a tort,
rather than a contract claim. In that case, the plaintiff
filed an action against the defendant alleging a breach
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of fiduciary duty as a conservator. The defendant pre-
vailed and sought attorney’s fees. In affirming the judg-
ment denying the motion for such fees, we stated: ‘‘The
underlying action here, however, was not a contract
claim but was a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, which
is a tort claim. . . . Accordingly, because § 42-150bb is
not applicable to the action at hand, the court properly
denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.’’
(Citation omitted.) Id., 747.
In the present case, the plaintiff’s notice to quit and
summary process action were not based on a breach
of the parties’ lease but, rather, on Blau’s conduct that
was alleged to constitute a serious nuisance as defined
in our summary process statutes. As specifically stated
in the notice to quit, the plaintiff set forth a claim that
Blau had committed a serious nuisance by inflicting
bodily harm upon the plaintiff’s agents, or threatened
to inflict such harm under circumstances that would
lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat
would be carried out when Blau (1) threatened the
plaintiff’s towing agent and (2) assaulted the plaintiff’s
attorney. The plaintiff also asserted these claims in
counts one and two of its summary process complaint.
With respect to Boudreau, the plaintiff alleged in the
notice to quit and count three of its summary process
complaint that he had committed a serious nuisance
by violating § 47a-11 (g) by failing to require Blau to
conduct herself in a manner that would not constitute
a serious nuisance. The plaintiff sought to regain pos-
session of the premises on a statutory basis, as opposed
to a specific violation of the contract between the par-
ties.
Section 42-150bb expressly requires that the con-
sumer successfully prosecute or defend an action based
on the contract in order to be entitled to attorney’s fees
when there is a unilateral fee provision. See, e.g., Rizzo
Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, supra, 240 Conn. 71. Our
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Supreme Court recently interpreted the phrase ‘‘ ‘based
. . . upon’ ’’ in § 42-150bb with respect to the amount
of the attorney’s fees awarded to a consumer. Centrix
Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg, supra, 349 Conn.
767. Specifically, it explained that this phrase was not
defined in the statutory language, and that the meanings
in various dictionaries in print at the time of the statute’s
enactment ‘‘all share a core principle: to base something
on another thing means to use the base as the founda-
tion.’’ Id., 772. The parties’ lease was neither the founda-
tion of the plaintiff’s summary process action nor the
reason that the defendants prevailed in that matter. See
Retained Realty, Inc. v. Spitzer, supra, 643 F. Supp.
2d 236. As we have explained, the plaintiff’s summary
process action was based on the plaintiff’s allegations
of conduct constituting a serious nuisance, which in
turn is premised on our statutes. Furthermore, the
defendants prevailed in the summary process action
not as a result of the parties’ lease, but because the
allegations against them were outside the statutory lan-
guage of § 47a-15 (a). The trial court specifically
explained that ‘‘the incidents were directed at indepen-
dent contractors of the plaintiff and do not fit the strict
confines of the serious nuisance statute.’’ (Emphasis
added.) For these reasons, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees filed pursuant to § 42a-150bb.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.