State v. Stepherson

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State v. Stepherson

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BAKARI STEPHERSON
(AC 47603)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-3 (4)), serious physical injury is defined as ‘‘physi-
cal injury . . . which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of
health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.’’

Convicted of assault in the second degree and other crimes as a result of
an altercation at a gas station, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of assault in the second
degree because the evidence introduced by the state at trial was insufficient
to establish that the victim, M, had sustained a serious physical injury, as
defined in § 53a-3 (4), when he was struck in the leg by the open passenger
door of the defendant’s vehicle as the defendant drove away from the
scene. Held:

The jury lacked sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that M sustained
a serious physical injury on the basis of his having sustained a serious
physical disfigurement to his leg, as neither M nor a medical professional
testified at trial, the state did not submit evidence of a scar or other marking
that existed following the injury, and, as the only evidence before the jury
was M’s medical records and photographs of his leg that were taken at the
time of the injury, any conclusion by the jury regarding whether M’s injury
resulted in a serious disfigurement would have required speculation or
conjecture.

The evidence was insufficient to reasonably establish that the injury to M’s
leg resulted in a serious impairment of his health, as the jury was left to
make that determination without seeing or hearing about the outcome of
the injury over time or hearing from M or a medical professional about how
the injury impacted M’s health or standard of living.

The state did not present sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to
conclude that M suffered a serious impairment of a bodily organ, namely,
his skin, as the jury, in the absence of testimony from M or a medical
professional, lacked an evidentiary basis from which it could conclude that
the laceration to M’s leg seriously impacted the functioning of his skin.
Argued September 2, 2025—officially released January 6, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of assault in the second
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State v. Stepherson

degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree,
and with one count each of the crimes of larceny in
the sixth degree, robbery in the first degree and robbery
in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the jury
before Kwak, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of two
counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree and
one count each of larceny in the sixth degree and assault
in the second degree, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Gary A. Mastronardi, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (defendant).
Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, special deputy assistant
state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen
Platt, state’s attorney, and Thai Chhay, deputy assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Bakari Stepherson,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
lowing a jury trial, of assault in the second degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3).1 The
defendant claims that the evidence, even when con-
strued in the light most favorable to sustaining the ver-
dict, was insufficient for the jury reasonably to find
that the victim, Issam Madineh, had suffered a serious
physical injury. We agree with the defendant and,
accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of conviction.2
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to the
1
The defendant also was convicted of larceny in the sixth degree and
two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The defendant is
not challenging his conviction of these offenses in the present appeal.
2
The defendant also claims on appeal that his assault conviction should be
overturned because his actions were not the proximate cause of Madineh’s
injuries. We do not reach the merits of this claim because our resolution
of whether the victim suffered a serious physical injury is dispositive.
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resolution of this appeal. On July 17, 2020, the defendant
drove to a gas station in Waterbury owned by Abid
Chouiki. He drove his vehicle, a silver PT Cruiser, to gas
pump number six and exited the vehicle. He removed
a panel from the side of the pump. Chouiki, who was
watching on a surveillance camera in his office inside
the gas station, believed the defendant was tampering
with the pump because it was not necessary to remove
any panel in order to pay for gasoline.

Chouiki and his manager, Madineh, approached the
defendant and confronted him about his attempt to
tamper with the gas pump. The defendant denied their
allegations and attempted to get into his vehicle and
leave the gas station. Chouiki, who already had called
the police, and Madineh attempted to detain the defen-
dant until the police arrived. The defendant resisted
their efforts, and Chouiki, Madineh and the defendant
became involved in a physical altercation. Chouiki and
Madineh unsuccessfully attempted to take the defen-
dant’s keys from him. At some point, Chouiki opened
the front passenger side door of the defendant’s PT
Cruiser to prevent the defendant from leaving the scene.
The passenger door remained open as the defendant
got into the vehicle, placed it in reverse, and began
backing away from the pump. Both Madineh and Chou-
iki were standing on the passenger side of the vehicle,
and the open passenger door knocked them aside, hit-
ting Madineh’s right leg. The defendant drove out of
the parking lot. Officers from the Waterbury Police
Department responded to the scene shortly thereafter.
Another patrol officer located the defendant and
detained him. Chouiki was taken to identify the defen-
dant, who was then arrested.

Madineh complained of right leg pain, and one of the
responding police officers observed a laceration on his
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State v. Stepherson

right calf. Another officer took a photograph of Madi-
neh’s calf. Madineh was transported to Waterbury Hos-
pital where he received treatment for a six centimeter
laceration to his right lower leg and was released.
The defendant was charged in an amended substitute
information with one count of larceny in the sixth
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b, one
count of robbery in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-136, one count of robbery in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134
(a) (1), one count of assault in the second degree in
violation of § 53a-60 (a) (3), one count of assault in the
second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2), and two
counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-63. He pleaded not
guilty to all charges and elected to have a jury trial. He
was represented at trial by Attorney Robert A. Serafi-
nowicz.
The court, Kwak, J., conducted a trial over three
days. Chouiki was the only witness called by the state
who testified regarding the nature and extent of Madi-
neh’s injury.3 In response to a question about whether
he had suffered any kind of pain or discomfort from
being hit by the passenger door, Chouiki testified that
his left side was ‘‘sore a little’’ but explained that ‘‘the
worse damage was my manager more than me because
he was bleeding and he ended up going to the hospital.
He—I think he lost a few days worth of work.’’ He
described Madineh’s injury as a ‘‘good sized cut on the
3
The state also called to testify Haley Padro and Michael Varone, two of
the Waterbury police officers who responded to the incident. Padro testified
that Madineh had injured his leg and was taken to the hospital. She was
not asked to describe the injury but identified the photograph of the injury
that an officer had taken at the scene, which was admitted into evidence
as a full exhibit. Varone testified that, when he first arrived on the scene,
an ambulance was present and a victim was being treated, but he was not
asked to identify the victim and gave no description of the injury being
treated.
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State v. Stepherson

calf’’ and testified that Madineh was in the hospital for a
couple of hours before he returned home. Additionally,
Chouiki testified that Madineh’s injury was sore for
‘‘some time.’’ He further testified that Madineh stayed
home for three days before he returned to work ‘‘four
or five’’ days later. He also testified that Madineh could
not walk straight ‘‘for some time’’ and that Madineh
had to ‘‘follow up with . . . [a] specialty doctor . . . .’’
At the end of Chouiki’s cross-examination, defense
counsel asked: ‘‘And again, it’s your testimony here
today you didn’t suffer serious physical injury, but you
believe your employee or former employee might have.’’
Chouiki responded: ‘‘Not I believe. I know he did.’’
Madineh was not called to testify, but the medical
records of his treatment at the hospital were admitted
into evidence by consent of the parties as a joint exhibit.
The medical records provided, in relevant part, that
Madineh had sustained a ‘‘[six centimeter] laceration
to [right] lower leg, subcutaneous tissue protruding out,
small amount of bleeding. . . . The skin was prepped
and draped in a sterile fashion. Lidocaine 2 [percent]
with epinephrine was administered to wound site for
local anesthesia. Open wound was closed with #8 3-0
Ethilon sutures. Excised subcutaneous fat. There was
minimal bleeding, which was controlled. CSM intact,
and dressing applied. Patient tolerated the procedure
well and there were no complications. Discussed stan-
dard post-procedure care, return precautions and indi-
cations, and all questions were addressed.’’ No emer-
gency department staff or medical expert was called
to testify regarding the nature of Madineh’s injury, his
treatment, or to explain the terminology used in the
medical records.
The defendant was the only witness called by the
defense to testify. He testified that he was not stealing
gas and did not want to remain on the scene to interact
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State v. Stepherson

with the police, which is why the altercation with Chou-
iki and Madineh had occurred.
The prosecutor addressed Madineh’s injury during
closing argument to the jury. The prosecutor argued
that ‘‘[h]is leg’s not broken in half, he’s not dead. What-
ever the case is. But it’s a serious injury. . . . You saw
what the injury looked like. It’s approximately a three
inch open laceration. . . . You’re going to have medi-
cal documentation regarding it.’’ The prosecutor argued
that the ‘‘skin is the largest bodily organ you have
. . . .’’ The prosecutor further argued that the skin
keeps you dry and ‘‘keeps things from going into your
system and really—having it is a very important piece.
That—his skin, his organ, was severely compromised
by the injury. You can see . . . the fatty tissue. The
ugly fatty tissue in the skin, okay, when you look at the
picture. . . . That’s not a normal injury.’’ The prosecu-
tor further argued that the laceration ‘‘seriously impairs
the bodily function of that particular organ. . . . That’s
a serious injury.’’4
During his closing argument, defense counsel argued
that ‘‘[t]he state wants you to convict my client and say
he inflicted serious physical injury upon an individual
that could not even be bothered to come and sit before
you and tell his story. Does that sound right to you?
Does that sound like beyond a reasonable doubt where
you have an allegation, but then the person who’s sub-
ject of the allegation is not even there to testify? It’s
absolutely ridiculous.’’ Defense counsel further argued
that ‘‘[Madineh], upon admission [to the emergency
department] . . . said his pain level was 2. On page 9
of the medical records, he says his primary pain was
4
At trial, the prosecutor primarily argued that the victim’s injury was a
serious physical injury because it caused a serious impairment to a bodily
organ—the skin. In its brief to this court, however, the state focuses its
argument on serious physical disfigurement and serious impairment of
health as the bases supporting a finding of a serious physical injury.
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State v. Stepherson

0. The severe distress designation was labeled a no.
Then on page 11, they refer to [Madineh] as having
a six centimeter cut. Now does a six centimeter cut,
pursuant to the medical records, sound like [a] serious
physical injury to you?’’
The prosecutor, in his rebuttal, argued: ‘‘You also
heard . . . argument about serious physical injury.
And injury, like I said, it’s not the worst injury. It could
have been much worse. Six centimeters, it’s actually
closer to three inches if you do that math; 2.2 centime-
ters is an inch.5 That’s an open wound. You can see the
bubbly, sort of fatty tissue. It looked like little white
bubbles. That’s a serious impairment to the skin, which
is a very important body organ . . . . Legally, that’s a
serious physical injury.’’ (Footnote added.)
At the conclusion of closing arguments, the trial court
gave the following instruction to the jury regarding seri-
ous physical injury: ‘‘Serious physical injury is some-
thing more serious than mere physical injury, which is
defined as impairment of physical condition or pain. It
is more than a minor or superficial injury. It is defined
by statute as physical injury which creates a substantial
risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement,
serious impairment of health or serious loss or impair-
ment of the function of any bodily organ.’’6
5
We note that an inch is 2.54 centimeters, and, therefore, a six centimeter
laceration is approximately 2.36 inches in length.
6
Although the prosecutor, in his closing argument, contended that the
victim had suffered a serious physical injury on the basis of a serious
impairment of a bodily organ, the trial court’s instruction to the jury defined
serious physical injury as a physical injury that involves a substantial risk
of death, serious physical disfigurement, serious impairment of health or
serious impairment of a bodily organ. Because no evidence was presented
that would have supported a finding that Madineh’s injury created a substan-
tial risk of death; see footnote 7 of this opinion; the jury properly could
have found that the victim had suffered a serious physical injury only under
any of the last three prongs of that definition, which, in considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, necessitates our independent consideration of
each of those three prongs.
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State v. Stepherson

The jury found the defendant guilty of larceny in the
sixth degree, one count of assault in the second degree
as to Madineh and two counts of reckless endangerment
in the first degree. The jury found the defendant not
guilty with respect to the two robbery counts and the
count of assault in the second degree pertaining to
Chouiki. The trial court accepted the verdict and later
sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of ten
years and 364 days of incarceration, execution sus-
pended after five years and 364 days, followed by five
years of probation. This appeal followed.
The defendant argues that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to prove his guilt of assault in the second degree
under § 53a-60 (a) (3). Specifically, he claims that the
evidence introduced by the state at trial was insufficient
to establish that Madineh had suffered a serious physi-
cal injury as required under the statute. The state claims,
in response, that the jury reasonably could have found
that a serious physical injury had occurred on the basis
of either a serious impairment of a bodily organ, a serious
disfigurement, or a serious impairment of health. We
agree with the defendant and, therefore, reverse the
judgment of conviction with respect to the charge of
assault in the second degree pertaining to Madineh.
We begin by setting forth applicable principles of law
and our standard of review. ‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency
of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test. First,
we construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether
upon the facts so construed and the inferences reason-
ably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have
concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luciano,
204 Conn. App. 388, 396, 253 A.3d 1005, cert. denied,
337 Conn. 903, 252 A.3d 362 (2021). ‘‘As we previously
have explained, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does
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State v. Stepherson

not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor
does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require accep-
tance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the
defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder
of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On
appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that would support a reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there
is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the
[fact finder’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Fisher, 342 Conn. 239, 249, 269
A.3d 104 (2022).
To obtain a conviction of assault in the second degree
under § 53a-60 (a) (3), the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that ‘‘the actor recklessly cause[d]
serious physical injury to another person by means of
a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . . . .’’
General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3). Our statutes define
serious physical injury as ‘‘physical injury which creates
a substantial risk of death,7 or which causes serious
disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ
. . . .’’ (Footnote added.) General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).
As our Supreme Court has noted, the legislature clearly
intended for there to be a material difference between
a physical injury and a serious physical injury due to
the difference in the severity of punishment imposed
for each. See State v. Petion, 332 Conn. 472, 481, 211
A.3d 991 (2019). ‘‘Assault resulting in physical injury,
unless inflicted by discharge of a firearm, carries a
maximum term of imprisonment of five years, whereas
assault resulting in serious physical injury carries a
7
Whether Madineh suffered a physical injury that created a substantial
risk of death was not raised or presented by the state as a basis for the
charge of assault in the second degree, nor was any evidence presented to
the jury that would have supported a finding that Madineh’s injury created
a substantial risk of death. Accordingly, we need not discuss this as a
possible basis for the jury’s verdict.
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State v. Stepherson

maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years. . . .
Thus, [a]lthough it may often be difficult to distinguish
between the two, such a distinction must be drawn
. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. With these principles in
mind, we now address whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Madi-
neh suffered a serious physical injury.
I
First, the defendant argues that the evidence, con-
strued in the light most favorable to sustaining the ver-
dict, was insufficient to establish that Madineh had suf-
fered a serious physical injury on the basis of a serious
disfigurement. We agree.
In State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 472, our Supreme
Court discussed the line between physical injury and
serious physical injury as those terms relate to disfig-
urement. The court concluded its analysis on serious
physical disfigurement by presenting a multifactor test
to consider in determining whether a jury reasonably
could decide that a victim has suffered a serious physi-
cal disfigurement. The court stated: ‘‘ ‘Disfigurement’
means impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry
or appearance of a person that renders the person
unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, or deforms the per-
son in some manner, or otherwise causes a detrimental
change in the external form of the person. ‘Serious
disfigurement’ is an impairment of or injury to the beauty,
symmetry or appearance of a person of a magnitude
that substantially detracts from the person’s appear-
ance from the perspective of an objective observer. In
assessing whether an impairment or injury constitutes
serious disfigurement, factors that may be considered
include the duration of the disfigurement, as well as its
location, size, and overall appearance. Serious disfig-
urement does not necessarily have to be permanent or
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State v. Stepherson

in a location that is readily visible to others. The jury
is not bound by any strict formula in weighing these
factors, as a highly prominent scar in a less visible
location may constitute serious disfigurement, just as a
less prominent scar in a more visible location, especially
one’s face, may constitute serious disfigurement.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 491–92.
Relying on this test, the court in Petion determined
that a jury could not reasonably conclude that the injur-
ies sustained by one of the victims in that case consti-
tuted a serious physical disfigurement. See id., 495. The
victim had two lacerations on her forearm, one measur-
ing 0.30 inches and the other 1.57 inches. Id., 493. The
smaller laceration was closed with a single suture, but
the larger wound was closed with ten sutures and left
a scar after healing. Id., 493–94. Although the state did
not have the victim display her scar to the jury, the
victim testified about her injury, as did her treating
physician. Id., 493. Moreover, photographs of the scar
revealed that, by the time of trial, the lacerations had
left scars that were roughly the same length, and the
scar tissue was slightly lighter in tone than the sur-
rounding skin.8 Id., 494. On the basis of this information,
the jury found that the victim had sustained a disfigure-
ment due to the permanence of the scar. State v. Petion,
172 Conn. App. 668, 677–78, 161 A.3d 618 (2017). Addi-
tionally, the location of the scar made it probable that
it would be seen if the victim wore anything shorter
than a three-quarter sleeve top. State v. Petion, supra,
332 Conn. 494. Our Supreme Court, however, reversed
this court’s judgment in part; id., 507; and determined
that, although the scar constituted a disfigurement, it
did not rise to the level of a serious physical disfigure-
ment. See id., 495. The court stated that ‘‘[t]he scar is
8
At trial, two sets of photographs were admitted into evidence. One set
was taken shortly after medical treatment was rendered, and the other set
was taken at the time of trial. State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 493.
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State v. Stepherson

not . . . in a prominent location such as her face or
neck. It is relatively small in size, uniform in shape (a
straight line), and otherwise unremarkable in its general
appearance. Although the scar is visible if one looks
for it, in the photograph that appears to have been
taken from a distance of normal social interaction, its
appearance is not such that one’s eye naturally would
be drawn to it.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 494. The court
further stated that ‘‘[s]erious disfigurement requires
something more than visibility, as it must be visible to
mar one’s appearance and, hence, meet the threshold
for disfigurement.’’ Id. The Supreme Court in Petion
placed an emphasis on the visibility of the victim’s scar,
stating that it was ‘‘not such that one’s eye naturally
would be drawn to it.’’ Id. The parallels and distinctions
between Petion and the case at hand are illuminating.
In the present case, the state did not call Madineh
to testify; nor did it submit evidence of the existence
of a scar or other marking that existed following the
injury. Other than Chouiki’s testimony, the only evi-
dence submitted to the jury regarding Madineh’s injur-
ies was the medical records from Madineh’s time in the
hospital’s emergency department and the photographs
that were taken of his leg at the time of the incident.
This evidence reveals that, although the injury to Madi-
neh was slightly larger than those at issue in Petion,
Madineh’s injury was not located in any more of a promi-
nent position than the victim’s injury in Petion. In the
absence of some evidence of the nature of Madineh’s
injury after the date that it occurred, any conclusion
reached by the jury regarding whether the injury
resulted in a disfigurement to which ‘‘one’s eye naturally
would be drawn,’’ so as to distinguish this case from
Petion, would require engaging in impermissible specu-
lation. See, e.g., State v. Little, 194 Conn. 665, 673, 485
A.2d 913 (1984) (although it is within province of jury to
draw reasonable and logical inferences, such inferences
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State v. Stepherson

must be founded on evidence, and jury may not resort
to speculation and conjecture).
The application of the factors discussed in Petion
require consideration of not only the nature of the injury
at the time of the event, but also how it appeared follow-
ing the injury. See State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 493,
497. To make a reasonable finding regarding disfigure-
ment, the jury in the present case required some evi-
dence, be it a photograph, testimony by the victim or
a medical expert regarding whether the injury had
caused a detrimental change to the appearance of Madi-
neh’s leg. The jury had none of that. Even when the
evidence is construed in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict, the jury did not have sufficient
evidence to reasonably conclude that Madineh had suf-
fered a serious physical injury on the basis of a serious
physical disfigurement.
II
Next, the defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that Madineh had suffered a seri-
ous physical injury on the basis of a serious impairment
of his health. After construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude
that the state failed to present sufficient evidence for
a jury to reasonably conclude that the victim had suf-
fered a serious impairment of health.
This court previously has addressed what constitutes
a ‘‘serious impairment of health.’’ See State v. Irizarry,
190 Conn. App. 40, 44–49, 209 A.3d 679, cert. denied,
333 Conn. 913, 215 A.3d 1210 (2019); State v. Dickson,
10 Conn. App. 462, 465, 523 A.2d 935 (1987). This court
concluded in Irizarry that a victim, whose injuries had
not fully healed by the time of trial, had suffered a
serious impairment of health. See State v. Irizarry,
supra, 44, 49. The victim’s treating physician testified
that ‘‘the victim sustained injuries to his left cheek, left
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State v. Stepherson

jaw, right forearm and chest wall. . . . [W]hen the vic-
tim presented at the hospital emergency department,
his arm was tender and swollen, with a visible contusion
and skin avulsion, in addition to a contusion on the left
side of the face. A computerized axial tomography scan
revealed a nondisplaced fracture of the victim’s lower
jaw. Three sutures were necessary to close the wound
on the victim’s face.’’ Id., 43. Furthermore, the victim
was restricted to a liquid puree diet and instructed to
follow up at a maxillofacial clinic regarding his jaw
injury, which had not fully healed by the time of the
trial. Id., 44. Given this evidence, we explained that,
‘‘[a]lthough permanency is not a requirement of ‘serious
physical injury,’ under the present circumstances, the
lasting effects of the injuries on the victim are certainly
relevant when considering the defendant’s claim. . . .
[T]he victim’s injuries had a lasting effect on the func-
tioning of his jaw and resulted in a material modification
to his diet for a period after the attack.’’ Id., 48. As
such, we concluded that the jury could have reasonably
concluded in Irizarry that the ‘‘victim suffered physical
injury that caused serious impairment of health, such
that he suffered serious physical injury . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 49.
In Dickson, we held that a jury reasonably could have
found that a shooting victim had suffered a serious
impairment of health on the basis of evidence that the
victim fell unconscious, was unable to walk, required
hospitalization and surgery to remove a shell fragment
from the base of her breastbone, which was an inch to
two inches away from her heart and liver, and walked
with a limp for about six weeks. See State v. Dickson,
supra, 10 Conn. App. 465. Our conclusion that the evi-
dence was sufficient to establish that the victim had
suffered a serious impairment of health was supported
by the victim’s testimony and the testimony of medical
experts who provided an analysis of what constitutes
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an impairment of health. See id., 466. This court
acknowledged that ‘‘ ‘[i]mpair’ is defined as ‘to make
worse; diminish in quantity, value, excellence or
strength . . . damage, lessen . . . .’ ’’ Id., 465–66,
quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
The court additionally stated that the victim’s full reha-
bilitation did not ‘‘preclude a jury’s finding that the
victim’s health was seriously impaired.’’ Id., 466. We
held that ‘‘the testimony of the victim and the expert
medical testimony were sufficient to support a finding
that the injuries constituted a ‘serious impairment of
health.’ ’’ Id., 465.
In the present case, the state directs our attention to
a physician’s recommendation in Madineh’s medical
records that Madineh have ‘‘[m]obility support items
readily available’’ while he recovers and, relying on
Dickson, argues that this is sufficient evidence of a
serious impairment of health. We disagree. The victim
in Dickson suffered far more substantial injuries to
establish a serious impairment of health. State v. Dick-
son, supra, 10 Conn. App. 465. Additionally, testimony
from both the victim and medical experts was presented
in Dickson to establish the seriousness of the impair-
ments to the victim’s health. Id., 466. In the present
case, the state did not call Madineh to testify about the
extent of his injuries or their long-term and short-term
effects on his health. Although Chouiki testified that
Madineh was unable to work for a period of ‘‘four or
five’’ days, this short absence from work is antithetical
to the six weeks of walking with a limp that the victim
experienced in Dickson as well as the victim’s pro-
tracted pain from her wounds. See State v. Dickson,
supra, 465.
As stated previously, the state offered no testimony
from a medical professional regarding Madineh’s injury.
Although Connecticut does not require expert medical
testimony in every case to prove serious physical injury,
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in many cases in which courts have concluded that a
jury had reasonably found that an injury caused a seri-
ous impairment to the victim’s health, both expert medi-
cal testimony and victim testimony was presented. See,
e.g., State v. Ovechka, 292 Conn. 533, 542, 975 A.2d
1 (2009) (testimony by victim and physician helped
establish that chemical burns to victim’s face, neck and
chest, temporary blindness and eye irritation consti-
tuted serious impairment of health); State v. Almeda,
211 Conn. 441, 450, 560 A.2d 389 (1989) (serious impair-
ment of health was established by testimony from vic-
tim and medical expert that victim was ‘‘ ‘laid up’ ’’ for
roughly one year and still felt ‘‘ ‘lousy’ ’’ eight years after
shooting that left shattered bullet lodged in victim’s
neck); State v. Leveille, 232 Conn. App. 687, 695–99,
337 A.3d 797 (2025) (testimony by victim and physician
that victim suffered lacerations to chin, forehead,
cheeks, and major damage to ear helped establish seri-
ous impairment of health); State v. Kenneth B., 223
Conn. App. 270, 273, 275–76, 308 A.3d 82 (medical testi-
mony established that victim suffered lacerations to
forehead and lips, was in severe pain, missing tooth,
and lost consciousness resulting in serious impairment
of health), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1038
(2024); State v. Irizarry, supra, 190 Conn. App. 43–44
(victim and treating physician testified that victim lost
consciousness, sustained injuries to left cheek and jaw,
right forearm and chest wall, and was required to
restrict diet to liquid puree, which constituted serious
impairment of health).
Because neither Madineh nor a medical expert testi-
fied at trial in the present case, the jury was left to
determine whether Madineh’s injury caused a serious
impairment to his health without seeing or hearing
about the outcome of the injury over time or hearing
from Madineh or a medical expert about how the injury
had impacted his health or standard of living. On the
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basis of our review of the evidence admitted in the
present case, we conclude that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to reasonably establish for the jury that the victim
had suffered a serious impairment of health.
III
Finally, the defendant argues that there was insuffi-
cient evidence from which the jury reasonably could
have found that Madineh had suffered a serious impair-
ment of his skin, a bodily organ. Even if we assume,
without deciding, that it is within the general knowledge
of the ordinary juror that the skin is a bodily organ,9
we agree that, when the evidence is construed in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the state
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the
laceration that Madineh suffered constituted a serious
impairment to the function of the skin.
As previously stated, our Supreme Court in Petion
highlighted that the legislature chose to make a clear
delineation between a physical injury and a serious
physical injury, significantly increasing the punishment
for an assault that resulted in the latter. The term ‘‘seri-
ous impairment of a bodily organ’’ is not defined by
statute. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
defines ‘‘organ’’ as ‘‘bodily parts performing a function
or cooperating in an activity.’’ Merriam-Webster’s Colle-
giate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 1120. The court in
Ovechka determined that a victim who, as a result of
being sprayed with pepper spray, had burns on his face,
neck and chest, and suffered from temporary blindness
and eye irritation, had suffered a serious impairment
of a bodily organ. See State v. Ovechka, supra, 292 Conn.
9
During his summation, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the lacera-
tion to Madineh’s right calf was a serious impairment of his skin, an important
bodily organ. It goes without saying, however, that counsel’s representations
and arguments are not evidence on which a jury may rely. See, e.g., Baker
v. Baker, 95 Conn. App. 826, 832, 898 A.2d 253 (2006) (‘‘ ‘representations of
counsel are not evidence’ ’’).
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542. Specifically, the court concluded that ‘‘temporary
blindness, chemical conjunctivitis and chemical burns
suffered by [the victim] constituted sufficient evidence
of [s]erious physical injury under § 53a-3 (4); (internal
quotation marks omitted) id., 547; and that ‘‘[t]he jury
reasonably could have found that a loss of vision in
both his eyes . . . constituted a loss or serious impair-
ment of the function of any bodily organ.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 542.
Recently, a victim who received a laceration through
nearly the entire structure of his ear was found to have
suffered a serious impairment of a bodily organ. See
State v. Leveille, supra, 232 Conn. App. 696–97. This
court in Leveille concluded that the evidence was suffi-
cient to support a jury’s conclusion that the victim had
suffered a serious impairment of a bodily organ, stating:
‘‘On the basis of the foregoing testimony, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have found that the defendant caused
the victim physical injuries that caused the serious loss
or impairment of the function of a bodily organ, specifi-
cally, his skin and ear.’’ Id.
Although, as illustrated in our case law, it is possible
for a jury to find a serious impairment of a bodily organ
without the benefit of expert testimony, the majority
of such cases involved a victim that had lost conscious-
ness. See, e.g., State v. Kenneth B., supra, 223 Conn.
App. 277 (evidence of victim’s loss of consciousness
supported finding of serious impairment of bodily
organ); State v. Morlo M., 206 Conn. App. 660, 673–74,
261 A.3d 68 (in addition to severe bruising on scalp,
face, chest, back, legs, arms, and left side, victim’s loss
of consciousness supported finding of serious impair-
ment of bodily organ), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 910, 261
A.3d 745 (2021). We do not doubt that it is within the
knowledge of the ordinary juror that the loss of con-
sciousness reflects a serious impairment of the function
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of a person’s brain. We are not convinced, however,
that, without more evidence than what was offered in
the present case, a jury reasonably could find that the
type of laceration to the skin suffered by Madineh was
so significant an injury as to qualify as a serious impair-
ment of a bodily organ.

The defendant, relying on precedent from Massachu-
setts,10 argues that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence that the function of Madineh’s skin had been
seriously impaired. The defendant argues that whether
an organ was seriously impaired should depend on
whether ‘‘damage to the structure of the organ is signifi-
cant enough to compromise its ability to perform its
function . . . .’’ Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355,
359, 982 N.E.2d 1166 (2013). The state attempts to distin-
guish Scott by arguing that, unlike the evidence in Scott,
‘‘the evidence presented at trial . . . did not require
the jury to engage in speculation.’’ We disagree with
the state.

As we previously discussed, although expert medical
testimony is not required in every case involving a seri-
ous physical injury, it generally will be needed when-
ever jurors are required to find facts normally outside
10
Massachusetts’ assault statute similarly defines a ‘‘serious bodily injury’’
as including an injury that results in ‘‘loss or impairment of a bodily function,
limb or organ . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commonwealth
v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 356 and n.1, 982 N.E.2d 1166 (2013), quoting Mass.
Ann. Laws c. 265, § 13A (c). In Scott, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts determined that a jury could not conclude, in the absence of expert
medical testimony, whether a laceration of the victim’s liver was a serious
bodily injury without resorting to speculation. See id., 360–61. Significantly,
the court stated: ‘‘The jury [is] permitted to draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence; [it is] not permitted to engage in speculation or conjecture
as to the meaning of unexplained technical phrases and notations’’ in medical
records. Id., 362. Although medical records were admitted into evidence in
Scott, the lack of expert testimony to explain the content of those records
necessarily required the jury to rely on conjecture and speculation to deci-
pher the meaning of the records. Id., 360.
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of their common knowledge. Here, neither expert testi-
mony nor victim testimony was presented to provide
the jury with an evidentiary basis from which it could
conclude that the laceration to Madineh’s calf, although
undoubtedly injuring the skin, also seriously impacted
the function of the skin as an organ of the body. For
many of the same reasons previously stated with
respect to whether Madineh’s injury involved a serious
impairment of health, we conclude that, when the evi-
dence is construed in the light most favorable to sus-
taining the verdict, the state did not present sufficient
evidence for a jury reasonably to conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Madineh had suffered a serious
impairment of a bodily organ.
The judgment is reversed only as to the defendant’s
conviction of assault in the second degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3), the defendant’s
sentence is vacated and the case is remanded with
direction to render judgment of acquittal as to the
charge of assault in the second degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3) and to resentence the
defendant on the remaining charges of which he was
convicted.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.