State v. Sidiropoulos

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
State v. Sidiropoulos

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HARALAMBOS
SIDIROPOULOS
(AC 47230)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of statute
(§ 53a-181 (a) (5)) after an angry confrontation in a dental office, the defen-
dant appealed. The defendant, a white man, repeatedly and loudly yelled
“stupid nigger” at a multiracial dental assistant, M, while in an examination
room with M. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction because the words he uttered to M constituted pro-
tected speech under the first amendment to the United States constitution
and under article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution. Held:

This court concluded that the circumstances at issue warranted a finding that
the defendant’s language constituted fighting words that were not protected
under the first amendment and, thus, provided a sufficient basis to support
the defendant’s conviction, as they were likely to provoke an immediate
violent reaction from a reasonable person in M’s position.

The defendant’s unpreserved claim that his speech was protected under
article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the state constitution failed under State v.
Golding (213 Conn. 233), as this court applied the multifactor approach to
state constitutional interpretation under State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672)
and concluded that the Geisler factors did not support the defendant’s con-
tention that the broader protections for speech under the state constitution
extended to fighting words.

The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, this court having previously found
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, which the defendant did not
challenge on appeal, and the judicial gloss courts have applied to § 53a-181
(a) (5) limits its reach to unprotected fighting words so as to ensure that it
comports with constitutional requirements, which include fair notice of what
is prohibited; accordingly, the defendant failed to established the existence
of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding.

The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct, as a reasonable
person in his position would have anticipated that repeatedly and loudly
uttering “stupid nigger” in a confined space in which the speaker blocked the
only exit for the addressee as he repeatedly shouted the racial epithet would
be prohibited by the statute, and our Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Liebenguth (336 Conn. 685) provided adequate warning that referring to a
person by a racial slur can constitute fighting words; accordingly, because
the defendant did not demonstrate that he had inadequate notice of what
was prohibited under § 53a-181 (a) (5) or that he was the victim of arbitrary
State v. Sidiropoulos

and discriminatory enforcement of the statute, he failed to establish the
existence of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding.

Argued September 8, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of breach of the peace in the
second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the
court, Hernandez, J.; thereafter, the court denied the
defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; finding
of guilty; subsequently, the court vacated the guilty find-
ing as to one count of breach of the peace in the second
degree and rendered judgment of guilty of one count of
breach of the peace in the second degree, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Hope J. Estrella, for the appellant (defendant).
Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek,
state’s attorney, and Michael C. Bivona, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Haralambos Sidiropoulos,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
lowing a trial to the court, of one count of breach of the
peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-181 (a) (5).1 The defendant’s conviction stems from
an angry confrontation he had with a dental assistant
while at a dental office. On appeal, the defendant claims
that (1) the state failed to meet its burden of proof with
respect to the breach of the peace charge because his
1
General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to
cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof, such person . . . (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene
language or makes an obscene gesture . . . . For purposes of this sec-
tion, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or held out for use by
the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

speech was protected under (a) the first amendment to
the United States constitution and (b) article first, §§ 4,
5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution, and (2) § 53a-
181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague (a) on its face and
(b) as applied to the facts of the present case. We affirm
the judgment of conviction.
The following evidence was presented at trial. Natascha
Medina was employed as a per diem dental assistant at a
Columbia Dental, P.C., office (dental office) in Norwalk.
The dental office, which is located within a two-story
office building, is open to the public and accepts both
scheduled and walk-in emergency appointments. Several
businesses besides the dental office are located inside
the building.
Medina’s job functions as a dental assistant included
aiding a dentist during procedures, taking X-rays, and
disinfecting and preparing examination rooms between
patients. She was enrolled in school to become a dental
hygienist, where she was trained to de-escalate dentopho-
bia, also referred to as dental phobia.2 Medina testified
2
The Cleveland Clinic describes dentophobia as “a fear of den-
tists. Someone with dentophobia may have extreme anxiety at the
thought of going to the dentist or while in the dentist’s office.” Cleve-
land Clinic, “Dentophobia (Fear of Dentists),” available at https://
my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/22594-dentophobia-fear-of-
dentists (March 22, 2022) (last visited January 14, 2026).
Medina’s testimony regarding her training relative to dental phobia
was brief and occurred during cross-examination by defense counsel:
“Q. And . . . just a few more questions, okay. And you would agree
that going to the dentist’s office is a pretty nerve-wracking experience
for some people, right?
“A. Yeah, there’s such a thing as dental phobia.
“Q. Oh, I learned something new today. It’s a little tense environment
going into the dentist office, is that correct?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. Would you say it’s a little nerve-wracking for some people, correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You mentioned earlier that [you were] trained to utilize some of
the tools in the room. You mentioned to take X-rays, is that correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. To clean and sterilize the equipment.
“A. Yes.
“Q. To keep the space generally hygienic, that’s correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And have you received any training, or have you been aware of,
you know, de-escalating this sort of dental phobia as you called it?
“A. Uhm, yeah. Not as an assistant but as a hygienist, yeah.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

that she is “half Puerto Rican” and that her father is
“half Italian, half Black.”
On July 17, 2023, the defendant, a white man,3 went
to the dental office for an emergency appointment, com-
plaining of light pain and swelling after his dental crown
had fallen out. The receptionist, Meyely Claudio, asked
the defendant to fill out paperwork while he waited to be
seen. Before the defendant could complete the paperwork,
Medina asked him to come into an examination room so
she could perform X-rays.
Medina brought the defendant into a small examina-
tion room where he sat in a dental chair, completed the
paperwork and gave Medina his dental crown. The room,
measuring roughly ten feet by six feet, contains a single
door, an X-ray machine on a wall, a single window, a com-
puter with a stand, and a dental chair. Medina testified
that the space feels crowded when more than two people
are in the room. Medina did not feel confident in her
ability to take X-rays on her own, so she asked another
dental assistant for help, but the defendant did not want
X-rays4 to be taken.
The defendant then asked that Medina place his eye-
glasses in a safe place for the duration of the appoint-
ment. Medina placed the defendant’s eyeglasses on a
computer stand where patient belongings often were
kept. The defendant believed that this was an unhygienic
place for his glasses and demanded that Medina move
them. He was particularly upset because he felt that he
had been polite. Medina then placed the eyeglasses on a
piece of paper towel on a silver dentistry tray and assured
the defendant that the table was clean and that it would
not be used. Still believing this was an unhygienic place
for his glasses, the defendant jumped up from the dental
chair and began yelling at Medina. First, he angrily asked
Medina, “[w]hy did you put my glasses there?,” before
moving to the only doorway of the room. The defendant
3
See footnote 6 of this opinion.
4
In her testimony, Medina could not recall if X-rays were taken. The
defendant testified that he allowed the X-rays to be taken.
State v. Sidiropoulos

then stood in the doorway, blocking Medina’s exit, and
repeatedly yelled that Medina was a “stupid nigger.”5
Medina described the defendant’s voice as “loud” and
“intimidating . . . .” She testified that, at first, she was
“in shock” and that she was “really nervous” because the
defendant blocked the doorway and leaned toward her as
he yelled at her. Medina estimated that the defendant is
approximately six feet, three inches tall, whereas she is
five feet, nine inches tall. Medina asked that the defen-
dant stop repeating the phrase “stupid nigger,” but the
defendant continued to yell it. Medina cried in response.
At that point, another patient, who is Hispanic and
had been in the waiting room, came to the examination
room. Medina testified that the patient appeared angry
about the situation and told the defendant in a loud
tone of voice that he needed “to calm down and stop it.”
The patient then escorted Medina, who was still crying,
from the room.
Claudio testified that she heard the defendant repeat
the epithet “twice, probably,” from her receptionist’s
desk located approximately ten feet from the examina-
tion room and that he sounded “angry.” Thereafter, the
defendant left the doorway and entered the waiting room,
where he continued yelling. The defendant’s voice became
louder as he exited the examination room. He continued
yelling the “ ‘N’ word” at Medina approximately two
more times while he entered the waiting room. Other
patients exited their examination rooms in response to
5
At trial, Medina initially testified that the defendant had called her a
“fucking nigger” and that he repeated those words “ten or eleven times.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel refreshed Medina’s recollection
with respect to a written statement she had given to the police, in which
she stated that the defendant had called her a “stupid nigger” and
that he did so “over and over again.” Medina thereafter acknowledged
that, in her written statement, she used the words “stupid nigger”
and did not refer to a specific number of times that it was repeated by
the defendant. Defense counsel then requested that Medina’s written
statement be introduced into evidence, for substantive purposes, as a
prior inconsistent statement pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn.
743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93
L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). The court admitted Medina’s statement without
objection by the state.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the commotion caused by the defendant. One of those
patients confronted the defendant, stating, “[w]hat are
you doing?”
The defendant made his way back through the waiting
room while yelling, “[t]his place is bad,” and, “[l]eave
this place,” and making “threats.” He continued yelling
about Medina being “stupid” and asking why she would
put his glasses “there . . . .” Claudio testified that the
defendant then exited the front door of the dental office
after which another assistant locked the door because
“we were all shocked,” and “other patients in the other
[examination] rooms came out because they were, like,
shocked” and “couldn’t believe someone was yelling.”
After the defendant realized that he had left his crown
inside the then locked dental office, he knocked on the
door loudly to retrieve it. Unsuccessful, the defendant
then exited the office building and was standing on the
sidewalk in front of the building when the police arrived.
The responding police officer, Officer Paul Wargo of
the Norwalk Police Department, arrived at the building
in which the dental office was located after receiving a
call about an “unwanted guest.” Wargo first encountered
the defendant outside the building. A video recording
from Wargo’s body camera shows the defendant standing
on the sidewalk looking agitated. After Wargo inquired
about the situation, the defendant angrily responded that
he planned to sue the dental office. Wargo then asked if
the defendant knew why the officer was there, and the
defendant responded, “the Black girl,” before referring
to Medina as a dental assistant. The defendant claimed
that Medina put his glasses on the dentist’s tools, which
made him angry. Wargo thereafter entered the building
and spoke with Medina and Claudio. Wargo asked Medina
to fill out a statement form.
Wargo then exited the building to retrieve a statement
form from his police vehicle and encountered the defen-
dant a second time. Wargo informed the defendant that
he would be issuing a court summons for breach of the
State v. Sidiropoulos

peace due to his conduct inside the dental office.6 The
defendant stated that he called Medina a “stupid nigger”
because “the girl was stupid to me” and “she was playing
nerves.” After issuing the summons to the defendant,
Wargo went back inside the dental office to allow Medina
to complete the statement form. Wargo did not obtain
a statement from any other witnesses, nor did he speak
to any patients in the waiting room.
Subsequently, the defendant was charged in an infor-
mation dated November 1, 2023, with two counts of
breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of
§ 53a-181 (a) (5). Specifically, count one charged that
the defendant, “acting with the intent to cause inconve-
nience, annoyance, or alarm, used abusive language while
in a public place . . . .” Count two charged, alternatively,
that the defendant “recklessly created a risk of causing
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, by using abusive
language while in a public place . . . .” The defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and elected a trial to the
court, which took place on November 16, 2023.
In his case-in-chief, the prosecutor presented testimony
from Medina, Claudio, and Wargo. First, Medina’s testi-
mony recounted her shock and upset because of the defen-
dant’s conduct. Next, Claudio’s testimony recounted the
reactions that she and other patients in the dental office
had in response to the defendant’s conduct, including
that one patient had attempted to intervene. The last
witness for the prosecution was Wargo, who testified
about his encounter with the defendant and verified the
video footage from his body camera.
After the prosecutor rested his case, defense counsel
orally moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the state had not met its burden of demonstrating that
the defendant committed breach of the peace in the sec-
ond degree as charged in the information. Specifically,
defense counsel maintained that, although “nigger” is
a vile, reprehensible epithet to call another individual,
6
The summons that was issued to the defendant includes a “W” in the
box indicating his race.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the defendant’s speech was protected under the first
amendment to the federal constitution. The defendant’s
speech did not constitute “fighting words” because it was
not likely to trigger an imminent violent response by the
average person in Medina’s position and the defendant
did not make any threats or use language that was incit-
ing. In support of this argument, defense counsel asserted
that Medina, as a dental assistant, held an “authoritative
position” that required her “to exercise a higher degree
of restraint.” Defense counsel emphasized that neither
Medina nor anyone else who witnessed the incident
responded with violence to the defendant’s language.
Defense counsel made no argument as to whether the
defendant’s speech was protected under the Connecticut
constitution or whether the breach of the peace statute
was vague on its face or as applied to the facts of this case.
In response, the prosecutor, relying on State v.
Liebenguth, 336 Conn. 685, 250 A.3d 1 (2020), cert.
denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1394, 209 L. Ed. 2d 132
(2021), argued that the circumstances of the incident,
which occurred in a small room in a dental office and
involved the defendant’s repeated use, in a loud tone,
of the epithet, “stupid nigger,” as well as his continued
yelling in the waiting room causing other patients to
exit their examination rooms, removed the defendant’s
words from first amendment protection and constituted
“fighting words.” The prosecutor argued that the defen-
dant’s use of the words, “stupid nigger,” in a tight space
would likely cause a reasonable person to react with
violence, even though Medina did not actually do so.
Thereafter, the court briefly stated its decision orally
on the record. Specifically, the court agreed with the state
that the analysis in Liebenguth was the controlling law
in the present case, pointing out that the circumstances
at issue were “substantially more extreme” than those
presented in Liebenguth. Therefore, the court denied
the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal,
State v. Sidiropoulos

concluding that the defendant’s statements fell outside
the protection of the first amendment.
Subsequently, defense counsel called the defendant to
the witness stand as the only defense witness. The defen-
dant testified that he called Medina a “stupid nigger”
more than once because he was frustrated and that he
continued yelling when he left the examination room and
went to the receptionist’s area. Thereafter, the defense
rested, and the prosecutor and defense counsel made
their closing remarks. After a brief recess, the court
orally rendered its decision.7
The court first found the state’s witnesses credible and
the defendant unpersuasive. Applying Liebenguth, the
court found the defendant guilty of both counts of breach
of the peace in the second degree.8 The court initially
sentenced the defendant on both counts to six months of
incarceration, execution suspended, and eighteen months
7
The record contains a signed transcript of the court’s oral decision
in compliance with Practice Book § 64-1.
8
Specifically, the court stated: “I’ve had an opportunity to look at the
exhibits. I’ve reviewed my notes and reread the information and had
a chance to look over the holdings in the . . . cases provided by defense
counsel. [The defendant] is charged in a two count information with
breach of [the] peace in the second degree, both in violation of § 53a-181
(a) (5). The two counts are under different theories. One is that [the
defendant], acting with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, used abusive language while in a public place. Count two charges
him under the theory that the defendant recklessly created a risk of
causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by using abusive language
while in a public place in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . . The court had
an opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses and assess their
credibility. The court credits and accepts as credible the testimony of the
state’s witnesses. The court was unpersuaded by the testimony of [the
defendant], although, quite frankly, I don’t need to make a credibility
finding with respect to [the defendant] and as much as his testimony
substantially corroborates the testimony of the state’s witnesses. So,
I’ve had an opportunity to apply all of the standards set forth in . . .
Liebenguth and carefully consider them. I find that the state has proven
the elements of each of these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and
viewed through the prism of Liebenguth and the analysis as set forth
therein. The court finds [the defendant] guilty of count one as well as
guilty of count two. And, inasmuch as I believe he acted intentionally
. . . even if it was not intentional, it was clearly reckless.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

of probation with mental health evaluation and treat-
ment at the discretion of the Office of Adult Probation.9
The court, however, stated that it could not “impose a
sentence on two counts for what basically arises out of
the same criminal conduct. [The defendant] cannot be
doubly punished for offenses arising out of the same
conduct. Accordingly, the court is going to vacate the
sentence on count one . . . [a]nd the sentence is imposed
solely with respect to count two.” This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the state failed to
meet its burden of proof with respect to the breach of the
peace charge because his speech was protected under (1)
the first amendment to the United States constitution,
and (2) article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut
constitution. We address these claims in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his conviction of breach of the peace in
the second degree because the words he uttered to Medina
were protected speech under the first amendment to the
United States constitution and, thus, could not form
the basis for a violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5). We disagree
with the defendant.
We first set forth the legal principles that guide our
resolution of this claim. “Under . . . § 53a-181 (a) (5), a
person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree
when, with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm, he uses abusive language in a public place.
That broad statutory proscription, however, is limited
by the free speech provisions of the first amendment
to the United States constitution, which prohibit the
government from ‘restrict[ing] expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content’ . . .
9
Although the court also ordered the defendant to pay a $500 fine, it
remitted the fine after finding that he was unable to pay it.
State v. Sidiropoulos

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S.
564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2002);
thereby protecting speech ‘without regard . . . to the
truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
[that] are offered.’ National Assn. for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445,
83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963). These safeguards,
however, although expansive, are not absolute, and the
United States Supreme Court has long recognized a few
discrete categories of speech that may be prosecuted and
punished, including so-called ‘fighting words’—‘those
personally abusive epithets [that], when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.’ Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d
284 (1971).” (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 687–88.
Our Supreme Court has stated that, when, as in the
present case, “the defendant’s conviction is predicated on
his verbal statements, [a] determination of the sufficiency
of the state’s case necessarily depends on whether those
statements deserve the protection of the first amend-
ment, despite their patently offensive and objectionable
nature. If they do, they cannot serve as the basis for his
conviction, which would have to be reversed for eviden-
tiary insufficiency. The defendant having been charged
with violating § 53a-181 (a) (5) by use of allegedly ‘abusive
. . . language’ . . . we therefore must decide whether his
language, which was no doubt ‘abusive’ under the com-
monly understood meaning of that term, nonetheless
is entitled to constitutional protection. To make that
determination, we apply the judicial gloss necessary to
limit the reach of the breach of the peace statute to ensure
that it comports with constitutional requirements. See
State v. Baccala, [326 Conn. 232, 234, 251, 163 A.3d 1]
(placing gloss on § 53a-181 (a) (5) to avoid possibility of
conviction founded on constitutionally protected speech)
[cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1026, 138 S. Ct. 510, 199 L. Ed.
2d 408 (2017)]. For present purposes, ‘the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech requires that [§ 53a-181
State v. Sidiropoulos

(a) (5)] be confined to language [that], under the cir-
cumstances of its utterance, constitutes [unprotected]
fighting words—those [that] by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.’ . . . State v. Beckenbach, 1 Conn. App. 669, 678,
476 A.2d 591 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 198 Conn.
43, 501 A.2d 752 (1985). ‘Accordingly, to establish the
defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . in light of
its constitutional gloss, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s words
were likely to provoke an imminent violent response’
under the circumstances in which they were uttered. . .
. State v. Baccala, supra, 250–51.” (Citations omitted.)
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 697–98.
Our Supreme Court applies a two part test when “con-
sidering [a] defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support [his] conviction of breach of the
peace in the second degree in accordance with [his] first
amendment rights . . . .” State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 250. As the court in Baccala explained: “First . .
. we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict. See State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237,
254, 947 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970, 129 S.
Ct. 464, 172 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2008). Second, we determine
whether the trier of fact could have concluded from those
facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that the
cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. See id. Accordingly, to establish the
defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . in light of
its constitutional gloss, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s words
were likely to provoke an imminent violent response from
an average [person in the addressee’s] position. Cf. State
v. Krijger, [313 Conn. 434, 448, 97 A.3d 946 (2014)] (‘[t]o
establish the defendant’s violation of [General Statutes
(Rev. to 2007)] §§ 53a-62 [a] [3] and 53a-181 [a] [3] on the
basis of his statements to [the town attorney], the state
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
State v. Sidiropoulos

those statements represented a true threat’).” (Citation
omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 250–51.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has explained further
that, when, as in the present case, “the state’s case
against the defendant implicates his free speech rights,
several additional principles govern our review of the
issue presented. In certain cases, such as the present one,
in which ‘[the line between speech unconditionally guar-
anteed and speech that may be legitimately regulated]
must be drawn, the rule is that we examine for ourselves
the statements [at] issue and the circumstances under
which they were made to see if they are consistent with
the first amendment.’. . . Id., 251. In other words, ‘the
inquiry into the protected status of . . . speech is one of
law, not fact.’ . . . State v. Parnoff, [329 Conn. 386, 395,
186 A.3d 640 (2018)]. We therefore ‘apply a de novo
standard of review . . . .’ Id.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 698. “Accordingly, we have ‘an obligation to
make an independent examination of the whole record in
order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute
a forbidden intrusion [in] the field of free expression.’ .
. . [State v. Parnoff, supra] 395–96. ‘This independent
scrutiny, however, does not authorize us to make cred-
ibility determinations regarding disputed issues of fact.
Although we review de novo the trier of fact’s ultimate
determination that the statements at issue constituted
[fighting words], we accept all subsidiary credibility
determinations and findings that are not clearly errone-
ous.’ . . . Id., 396.” State v. Liebenguth, supra, 698–99.
The tenets underlying the fighting words doctrine
date to 1940, when the United States Supreme Court
stated: “When clear and present danger of riot, disor-
der, interference with traffic upon the public streets,
or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or pun-
ish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that a state may not
unduly suppress free communication of views, religious
or other, under the guise of conserving desirable condi-
tions.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60
State v. Sidiropoulos

S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The test for unpro-
tected fighting words was first set forth in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.
1031 (1942). In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness was
convicted after he stated to the complainant, “ ‘You are
a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents
of Fascists’ . . . .” Id., 569. The United States Supreme
Court stated that “[t]here are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any [c]onstitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 571–72. The court
explained that fighting words comprise “no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest” in maintaining order. Id., 572. The fighting
words doctrine has evolved over time to better suit cur-
rent social conventions, as courts have “continually
resorted to analyzing provocative expression contextu-
ally . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 238. “A proper contex-
tual analysis requires consideration of the actual cir-
cumstances as perceived by a reasonable speaker and
addressee to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation.” Id., 240.
In explaining the contextual approach in Liebenguth,
our Supreme Court stated: “It is by now well settled that
there are no per se fighting words because words that
are likely to provoke an immediate, violent response
when uttered under one set of circumstances may not
be likely to trigger such a response when spoken in the
context of a different factual scenario. See [id., 238].
Consequently, whether words are fighting words nec-
essarily will depend on the particular circumstances of
their utterance. See id., 239; see also State v. Hoskins,
State v. Sidiropoulos

35 Conn. Supp. 587, 591, 401 A.2d 619 (App. Sess.
1978) (‘The fighting words concept has two aspects. One
involves the quality of the words themselves. The other
concerns the circumstances under which the words are
used.’ . . .). This contextual approach is also ‘a logical
reflection of the way the meaning and impact of words
change over time.’ State v. Baccala, supra, [326 Conn.]
239; see also id. (‘[w]hile calling someone a racketeer or a
fascist might naturally have invoked a violent response
in the 1940s when Chaplinsky was decided, those same
words would be unlikely to even raise an eyebrow today’).
Indeed, due to changing social norms, public discourse
has become coarser in the years following Chaplinsky;
id., 298 (Eveleigh, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); such that, today, ‘there are fewer combinations
of words and circumstances that are likely to fit within
the fighting words exception.’ State v. Parnoff, supra,
329 Conn. 413 (Kahn, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also id. (‘[a]s certain language is acceptable in more
situations, the borders of the fighting words exception
contract’).” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 700–701.
Our Supreme Court has addressed the type of speech
that constitutes “fighting words” in a trio of decisions:
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 232, State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 386, and State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 685. We provide a brief overview of those
decisions, which inform our analysis in the present case.
In Baccala,10 the defendant was convicted of breach of
the peace in the second degree after engaging in a dispute
10
Prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in Baccala, its decision in
State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 678 A.2d 473 (1996), set the stage
for a more comprehensive totality of the circumstances analysis. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 237. In Szymkiewicz, our Supreme
Court used a totality of the circumstances test to determine that insults
and threats directed to a store detective constituted fighting words.
See State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 622. In Szymkiewicz, the defendant
was accused of shoplifting at a supermarket and yelled, “fuck you,”
several times along with, “[y]ou fucking bitch. I hope you burn in hell
for all eternity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 615–16. The
defendant in Szymkiewicz made those remarks while descending stairs
State v. Sidiropoulos

with the manager of a supermarket. State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 233–34. The defendant customer had
called the supermarket to inquire about a money transfer
but was informed by a store manager that the service desk
was closed for the day and that the transfer could not be
completed. Id., 235. “The defendant became belligerent,
responded that she ‘really didn’t give a shit,’ and called
[the manager] ‘[p]retty much every swear word you can
think of’ before the call was terminated.” Id. Shortly
thereafter, the defendant arrived at the supermarket,
where she loudly called the manager a “fat ugly bitch” and
a “cunt,” and yelled, “fuck you, you’re not a manager,”
while gesticulating with her cane. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 236. The manager simply responded,
“[h]ave a good night,” after which the defendant left the
supermarket. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In its ruling, the court in Baccala assessed whether
the defendant’s language constituted fighting words
under Chaplinsky.11 See id., 238. In doing so, the court
in the supermarket and in the view of customers, “caus[ing] a commo-
tion among those who were present at the bottom of the stairs.” Id.,
616. The court held that, “the words used by the defendant . . . and
the circumstances in which they were used classify them as ‘fighting
words’ that had the tendency to provoke imminent retaliation from the
store detective or violence from the store’s customers who heard them.”
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 620. It explained further that “[t]he combination
of the heated exchange between [the store detective] and the defendant
and the defendant’s threatening her, all of which occurred in front of
a number of store customers, provided ample impetus for a potentially
explosive situation.” Id., 623.
11
The court in Baccala noted that, “[a]lthough certain language in
Chaplinsky seemed to suggest that some words in and of themselves
might be inherently likely to provoke the average person to violent
retaliation, such as ‘God damned racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist’ . . .
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 569, 574; subsequent
case law eschewed the broad implications of such a per se approach. See
People v. Stephen, 153 Misc. 2d 382, 387, 581 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1992)
(‘[w]hile the original Chaplinsky formulation of “fighting words” may
have given some impression of establishing a category of words which
could be proscribed regardless of the context in which they were used,
developing [f]irst [a]mendment doctrine in the half century since Chap-
linsky was decided has continually resorted to analyzing provocative
expression contextually’); see also Texas v. Johnson, [491 U.S. 397,
409, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989)]; Gooding v. Wilson,
State v. Sidiropoulos

emphasized that a contextual approach is necessary to
a fighting words analysis because it is a “logical reflec-
tion of the way the meaning and impact of words change
over time.” Id., 239. “Accordingly, a proper contextual
analysis requires consideration of the actual circum-
stances, as perceived by both a reasonable speaker and
addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation. This necessarily includes the man-
ner in which the words were uttered, by whom and to
whom the words were uttered, and any other attendant
circumstances that were objectively apparent and bear
on the question of whether a violent response was likely.”
Id., 250. Our Supreme Court noted that it is critical to
consider not only the manner and circumstances in which
the words were spoken, but also the personal attributes
of the speaker and addressee that are reasonably appar-
ent. See id., 241. Thus, it may be appropriate to consider
“the age, gender, race, and status of the speaker. See
. . . In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 414–15, 480 S.E.2d
693 (1997) (holding that racial slur directed at African
American man by white man will cause ‘hurt and anger’
and ‘often provoke him to confront the white man and
retaliate’).” (Citations omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 242.
Moreover, “because the fighting words exception is
concerned with the likelihood of violent retaliation,
405 U.S. 518, 525, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972); Cohen v.
California, [supra, 403 U.S. 20, 23]; L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 12-10, pp. 850–51. Rather, ‘words may or may not be
“fighting words,” depending [on] the circumstances of their utterance.’
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 94 S. Ct. 970, 39 L. Ed. 2d
214 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result); see R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 432, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (‘[w]hether words are fighting words is
determined in part by their context’); Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d
237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) (first amendment requires ‘determination that
the words were used “under such circumstances” that they were likely
to arouse to immediate and violent anger the person to whom the words
were addressed’ . . .); State v. Szymkiewicz, [237 Conn. 613, 620, 678
A.2d 473 (1996)] (considering both ‘the words used by the defendant’
and ‘the circumstances in which they were used’) . . . .” (Citation omit-
ted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 238–39.
State v. Sidiropoulos

it properly distinguishes between the average citizen
and those addressees who are in a position that carries
with it an expectation of exercising a greater degree of
restraint.” Id., 243. Although our Supreme Court previ-
ously has adopted the principle that police officers may
be held to a higher standard of restraint than ordinary
citizens; see id., 244; the court in Baccala expanded
that to require that trial courts applying “the objective
aspect of the fighting words standard” “take into account
the circumstances of the addressee, e.g., occupation, in
considering whether” the addressee “is more or less likely
to respond with immediate violence.” Id., 247.
In holding that the defendant’s language did not consti-
tute fighting words, the court in Baccala relied on several
factors. See id., 252–54. First, the court determined
that it was significant that the defendant had begun her
verbal tirade when she first spoke to the manager on the
phone because it gave the manager notice of a potential
incident. See id., 252. Second, the manager’s responsi-
bilities included customer service duties, which led the
court to conclude that the phone call and the manager’s
customer service training weighed against a finding
that someone in the manager’s position would react with
imminent violence. See id., 252–53. Third, the court con-
cluded that the manager would have held a high degree
of control over the premises that afforded her several
lawful self-help options, which, along with the expecta-
tions attendant to her position, reduced the likelihood of
a violent response on her part. See id., 253. Finally, the
court concluded that, although not determinative, the
manager’s actual response to the defendant’s outburst
was probative of the likelihood of a violent response.
Id., 254. Specifically, the court agreed that, because the
manager simply bid the defendant good night, “[t]here
[was] no reason to believe that [the manager’s] reaction
was uncharacteristic of a reasonable professional in a
like situation.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that
“the defendant’s speech [did] not fall within the nar-
row category of unprotected fighting words”; id., 256;
because the defendant’s “vulgar insults” were not “likely
State v. Sidiropoulos

to provoke violent retaliation”; id.; by “an average store
manager” under similar circumstances. Id., 254.
Our Supreme Court again addressed the fighting words
doctrine in Parnoff, in which the defendant was convicted
of disorderly conduct after he had used threatening
language toward two water company employees who had
entered his property pursuant to an easement to service a
fire hydrant. See State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 388.
Wearing shorts but no shirt, and carrying a can to collect
worms in order to go fishing, the defendant approached
the two water company employees. Id., 391. The defen-
dant became enraged when the employees informed him
that they were on his property to service the fire hydrant
and had discovered that the hydrant’s cap was altered.
Id. The defendant said, “if you go into my shed, I’m going
to go into my house, get my gun and [fucking] kill you.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court in Parnoff was not persuaded that “the
defendant’s threatening words, unaccompanied by any
effectuating action, were likely to provoke an imminent
and violent reaction from the water company employees
at whom those words were directed.”12 Id., 397–98. The
12
The court analyzed the defendant’s words under the factors set
forth in Baccala, including whether the reasonably apparent personal
attributes of the addressees affected its analysis. See State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 395. Specifically, the court in Parnoff took note of the
water company employees’ job performances, including the high likeli-
hood that they might interact with confrontational property owners,
which would require them to model “appropriate, de-escalating behav-
ior.” Id., 400. The court explained that, unlike in Baccala, the water
company employees had “little control” over the defendant’s property,
but that difference did not “militate against any consideration of the
addressees’ job performance as part of the required contextual analy-
sis.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401.
Further, the court in Parnoff stated that its analysis did not attempt to
“equat[e]” the water company employees with the supermarket manager
in Baccala but, rather, acknowledged that, because the water company
employees were “tasked with entering strangers’ properties,” they would
be expected to exercise some higher degree of restraint. Id.
The court in Parnoff distinguished State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn.
613, 678 A.2d 473 (1996), stating, “[v]isible manifestations of anger,
however, coupled with the defendant’s threatening comments, do not,
State v. Sidiropoulos

court explained that, despite the threatening words,
the context in which they were spoken did not support a
finding that they were “likely to provoke an immediate
and violent reaction because the objectively apparent
circumstances did not indicate any immediate intent
or ability on the part of the defendant to carry out that
threat.” Id., 399. Notably, the court cited testimony
from one of the water company employees that, “not
only was he not frightened by the defendant’s words,
but, rather, they ‘bounced right off’ him, stating that,
‘I just stood there and was like, okay then, you know,
let’s see what happens.’ ” Id., 403. Further, when the
water company employee called the police to report the
incident, “he characterized the defendant as merely ‘a
little crabby’ and made no mention at all of the defen-
dant’s gun threat.” Id. Accordingly, our Supreme Court
affirmed this court’s judgment reversing the defendant’s
conviction on the ground that the defendant’s speech did
not constitute fighting words and, thus, was protected
by the first amendment. See id., 406.
Next, we address our Supreme Court’s most recent
decision on this issue in State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 685, which involved the following relevant facts.
“ ‘Michael McCargo, a parking enforcement officer for
the town of New Canaan, testified that he was patrolling
the [Morse] Court parking lot on the morning of August
28, 2014, when he noticed that the defendant’s vehicle
was parked in a metered space for which no payment had
been made. He first issued a [$15 parking] ticket for the
defendant’s vehicle, then walked to another vehicle to
issue a ticket, while his vehicle remained idling behind
the defendant’s vehicle. As McCargo was returning to his
vehicle, he was approached by the defendant, whom he
had never before seen or interacted with. The defendant
under these particular circumstances, meet the high threshold of immi-
nence required for the fighting words exception.” State v. Parnoff, supra,
329 Conn. 404. The court in Parnoff also noted that, because there was
no crowd present to enhance the probability of a violent reaction, the
defendant’s words did not rise to the same level of those in Szymkiewicz.
See id.; see footnote 10 of this opinion.
State v. Sidiropoulos

said to McCargo, “not only did you give me a ticket, but
you blocked me in.” Initially believing that the defendant
was calm, McCargo jokingly responded that he didn’t
want the defendant getting away. When the defendant
then attempted to explain why he had parked in the lot,
McCargo responded that his vehicle was in a metered
space for which payment was required, not in one of
the lot’s free parking spaces. McCargo testified that the
defendant’s demeanor then “escalated,” with the defen-
dant [having said] that the parking authority was “[fuck-
ing] [un]believable” and [having told] McCargo that he
had given him a parking ticket “because my car is white.
. . . [N]o, [you gave] me a ticket because I’m white.” As
the defendant, who is white, spoke with McCargo, who
is African-American, he “flared” his hands and added
special emphasis to the profanity he uttered. Even so,
according to McCargo, the defendant always remained
a “respectable” distance from him. Finally, as the defen-
dant was walking away from McCargo toward his own
vehicle, he spoke the words, “remember Ferguson.” ’. . .
“McCargo also testified that, ‘[a]fter both men had
returned to and reentered their vehicles, McCargo, whose
window was rolled down . . . thought he heard the defen-
dant say the words, “fucking niggers.” This caused him
to believe that the defendant’s prior comment about
Ferguson had been made in reference to the then recent
[and highly publicized] shooting of an African-American
man by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri [on
August 9, 2014, approximately three weeks earlier].
[McCargo] thus believed that the [defendant’s reference
to Ferguson was a “threat”] meant to imply that what
had happened in Ferguson “was going to happen” to him.
McCargo also believed that, by uttering the racial slur
and making reference to Ferguson, the defendant was
trying to rile him up and [to] escalate the situation [by
“taking it to a whole other level”]. That, however, did
not happen, for, although McCargo found the remark
offensive, and he had never before been the target of
such language while performing his duties, he remained
calm at all times and simply drove away to resume his
State v. Sidiropoulos

patrol.’ . . . McCargo further testified, however, that,
‘[s]hortly thereafter . . . as [McCargo] was driving away,
the defendant [cut through the parking lot in his vehicle,
approached McCargo, and then] drove past him.’ . . . As
the defendant was driving past McCargo, ‘the defendant
turned toward him, looked directly at him with an angry
expression on his face, and repeated the slur, “fucking
niggers.” McCargo [also] noted in his testimony that the
defendant said the slur louder the second time than he
had the first time.
“ ‘After the defendant drove out of the parking lot,
McCargo [who was shocked and personally offended by
the encounter] called his supervisor, who instructed
him to report the incident to the New Canaan police. In
his report, McCargo noted that there might have been
a witness to the interaction, whom he described as a
young, white female. The defendant later was arrested
in connection with the incident on the charge of breach
of the peace in the second degree.’ ” (Citations omitted.)
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 689–91. Follow-
ing a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty
of the charge and appealed to this court, which reversed
his conviction on the ground that his speech was consti-
tutionally protected. See id., 689.
The state, on the granting of certification, appealed to
our Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s judgment
in part and upheld the defendant’s conviction of breach of
the peace in the second degree, concluding that his words
constituted “unprotected fighting words,” especially in
light of the particular harm the word “nigger” has when
directed to a Black addressee by a white person. Id., 689,
703. The court explained that, in uttering those words,
the defendant, a white man, was asserting “his own per-
ceived racial dominance and superiority over McCargo
with the obvious intent of denigrating and stigmatizing
him. When used in that way, ‘[i]t is beyond question
that the use of the word “nigger” is highly offensive and
demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutal-
ity, and subordination.’ McGinest v. GTE Service Corp.,
State v. Sidiropoulos

360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). Not only is the word
‘nigger’ undoubtedly the most hateful and inflammatory
racial slur in the contemporary American lexicon; see
id.; but it is probably the single most offensive word in
the English language. See, e.g., Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie
Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (‘[The] epithet [“nigger”] has been labeled,
variously, a term that “sums up . . . all the bitter years
of insult and struggle in America,” [L. Hughes, The Big
Sea: An Autobiography (Hill and Wang 2d Ed. 1993) p.
269], “pure anathema to African-Americans,” Spriggs
v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir.
2001), and “probably the most offensive word in Eng-
lish.” [Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d
Rev. Ed. 2000) p. 894]. See generally [A. Haley, Roots:
The Saga of an American Family (Doubleday 1976)]; [H.
Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (J. B. Lippincott Co. 1960)].
. . . No other word in the English language so power-
fully or instantly calls to mind our country’s long and
brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination
against African-Americans.’ . . . R. Kennedy, ‘The David
C. Baum Lecture: “Nigger!” as a Problem in the Law,’
2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 935, 935 (although ‘[t]he American
language is (and has long been) rife with terms of ethnic,
racial, and national insult: kike, mick, wop, nip, gook,
honkie, wetback, chink, [etc.] . . . “nigger is now probably
the most offensive word in English” ’ . . .); Dictionary.
com, available at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
nigger?s=t (‘The term nigger is now probably the most
offensive word in English. Its degree of offensiveness
has increased markedly in recent years, although it has
been used in a derogatory manner since at least the Revo-
lutionary War.’).
“In fact, because of the racial prejudice and oppression
with which it is forever inextricably linked, the word
‘nigger,’ when used by a white person as an assertion of
the racial inferiority of an African-American person, ‘is
more than [a] mere offensive utterance . . . . No word .
. . is as odious or loaded with as terrible a history.’ . . .
Daso v. Grafton School, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 485, 493
State v. Sidiropoulos

(D. Md. 2002); see also In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424,
428, 36 P.3d 772 (App. 2001) (‘the term is generally
regarded as virtually taboo because of the legacy of racial
hatred that underlies the history of its use among whites’
. . .); In re Spivey, [supra, 345 N.C. 414] (‘[N]o fact is
more generally known than that a white man who calls
a black man a “nigger” within his hearing will hurt and
anger the black man and often provoke him to confront
the white man and retaliate. The trial court was free to
judicially note this fact.’). The word being ‘one of insult,
abuse and belittlement harking back to slavery days’ .
. . Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 510, 706 A.2d 685
(1998); it is uniquely ‘expressive of racial hatred and
bigotry’ . . . . For all these reasons, the word rightly has
been characterized as ‘the most provocative, emotionally-
charged and explosive term in the [English] language.’ ”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 703–705.
In Liebenguth, our Supreme Court found that, in addi-
tion to the use of the word “niggers,” “other language and
conduct by the defendant further inflamed the situation,
rendering it that much more likely to provoke a violent
reaction. First, the defendant used the profane adjective
‘fucking’—a word of emphasis meaning wretched, rotten
or accursed—to intensify the already highly offensive
and demeaning character of the word ‘niggers.’ ” (Foot-
note omitted.) Id., 705–706. Second, “the defendant,
having directed the term ‘fucking niggers’ at McCargo
upon entering his vehicle and learning that McCargo
had ticketed him, was not content just to leave and end
the confrontation. Instead, after McCargo had entered
his vehicle and was starting to drive out of the parking
lot, the defendant circled the lot twice, pulled up next
to McCargo and, while looking angrily at him, again
uttered the term ‘fucking niggers,’ this time more loudly
than before. The fact that the defendant repeated this
epithet only served to exacerbate the provocative and
hostile nature of the confrontation.” Id., 706. Third, “the
defendant employed additional, racially offensive, crude
and foreboding language during his interaction with
State v. Sidiropoulos

McCargo,” including when he said “ ‘fucking unbeliev-
able’ ” and “ ‘remember Ferguson.’ ” Id., 707. “Finally,
in addition to his offensive and intimidating utterances,
certain conduct by the defendant further manifested
his extreme anger and hostility toward McCargo.”13 Id.
Acknowledging that the case presented a rare circum-
stance in which the demanding fighting words standard
was met, the court elaborated, stating that, “[b]orn of
violence, the word ‘nigger,’ when uttered with the intent
to personally offend and demean, also engenders violence.
Indeed, such use of the word ‘nigger’ aptly has been
called ‘a classic case’ of speech likely to incite a violent
response. In re Spivey, supra, 345 N.C. 415; see also
State v. Hoshijo ex rel. White, 102 Haw. 307, 322, 76
P.3d 550 (2003) (‘The experience of being called “nig-
ger” . . . is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury
is instantaneous.’ . . .).” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 708. “[Further] [t]o whatever extent public
discourse in general may have coarsened over time; see,
e.g., State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 239; it has not
eroded to the point that the racial epithets used in the
present case are any less likely to provoke a violent reac-
tion today than they were in previous decades.” State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 709.
With this background in mind, we turn to the defen-
dant’s claim that his words are entitled to first amend-
ment protection. In support thereof, the defendant makes
a number of arguments, including that his language did
13
Specifically, the court stated: “As the two men were speaking outside
of their respective vehicles, the defendant stepped toward McCargo
while moving his hands and body in an aggressive and irate manner.
[A woman] witnessed the defendant’s conduct and testified that, even
from about seventy feet away, the hostility of the encounter made her
nervous and upset. Moreover, after entering his car, the defendant
drove through the parking lot twice before leaving, cutting through
empty parking spaces so he could pass by McCargo and again angrily
confront him. As [our Supreme Court] observed in Baccala, the fact
that the defendant’s words were accompanied by such aggressive and
menacing behavior increased the likelihood of a violent response. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 241.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 707–708.
State v. Sidiropoulos

not constitute fighting words because it was simply an
expression of his opinion about his fear of an unhygienic
dental office that was not likely to incite an immediate,
violent reaction, and that the present case is distinguish-
able from Liebenguth.14 We are not persuaded.
As our Supreme Court has instructed, the starting
point of our analysis of whether the language used by
the defendant rises to the level of “fighting words,” so
as not to be protected by the first amendment, begins
with “an examination of the words themselves and the
extent to which they are understood to be inflammatory
or inciting.” Id., 703. Specifically, “[a] proper contextual
analysis requires consideration of the actual circum-
stances, as perceived by both a reasonable speaker and
addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation. This necessarily includes the man-
ner in which the words were uttered, by whom and to
whom the words were uttered, and any other attendant
circumstances that were objectively apparent and bear
on the question of whether a violent response was likely.”
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 250. We also take into
consideration the “personal attributes of the speaker and
the addressee that are reasonably apparent”; id., 241;
which include “age, gender, [and] race . . . .” Id., 242.15
In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant,
a white man, uttered the words “stupid nigger” toward
14
The defendant also contends that, if this court were to conclude
that an average, multiracial dental assistant likely would react to the
defendant’s words with violence, we would be perpetuating the “angry
Black woman” stereotype. We find no merit to this contention. As our
Supreme Court has stated, “[a] proper contextual analysis requires con-
sideration of the actual circumstances, as perceived by both a reasonable
speaker and addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood of
violent retaliation”; State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 240; and, in
light of Liebenguth, it is not improper for an appellate court to take
into consideration the fact that the words uttered were directed to a
Black addressee by a white person. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 703; see also State v. Baccala, supra, 242–43 (proper to consider
age, gender and race of speaker and addressee).
15
As a result of the changing landscape of the fighting words doctrine,
first amendment scholars have compiled a list of five factors that lower
courts consider when evaluating whether speech constitutes fighting
State v. Sidiropoulos

Medina, a multiracial woman, in a public place while
Medina was performing her duties as a dental assistant.
Our Supreme Court made clear in Liebenguth that, when
the word nigger is used by a white person to assert “his
own perceived racial dominance and superiority over” a
Black person, which would necessarily include Medina,
it not only is “beyond question . . . highly offensive and
demeaning”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 703; but “is more than [a]
mere offensive utterance” in that it is “uniquely expres-
sive of racial hatred and bigotry . . . and [is] degrading
and humiliating in the extreme . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 705. For that reason, the word is
regarded as being “provocative, emotionally charged and
explosive . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Accordingly, the language used by the defendant was
undisputably offensive, degrading and inflammatory.
The primary issue in this appeal concerns the inciting
nature of the defendant’s language; that is, whether the
defendant’s words were likely to incite an imminent vio-
lent reaction in the average multiracial dental assistant
in Medina’s position. In this regard, we note that the
defendant’s words “stupid nigger” directed to Medina
created a “ ‘classic case’ ” of fighting words. Id., 708; see
also id. (“[i]ndeed, such use of the word ‘nigger’ aptly
words: “(1) [a]ggressive conduct accompanying speech; (2) the speech’s
volume with the guidepost being that ‘[t]he louder the speech, the more
likely that a court may use that fact to support a disorderly conduct
conviction based on the fighting words doctrine;’ (3) repetition of
words, with the maxim being that ‘the sheer number and intensity of
the profanities may cause a reviewing court to find that the intemperate
speech crosses the line into unprotected fighting words;’ (4) whether
the target was a police officer; and (5) whether there was a racial slur
and . . . whether it was the ‘N’ word.” (Footnotes omitted.) C. Calvert,
“Taking the Fight Out of Fighting Words on the Doctrine’s Eightieth
Anniversary: What ‘N’ Word Litigation Today Reveals About Assump-
tions, Flaws and Goals of a First Amendment Principle in Disarray,”
87 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 507 (2022). Together, these factors emphasize a
contextual approach to fighting words that pays special attention to
racial epithets. We agree that these five factors are appropriate factors
to consider in our contextual analysis, and, therefore, we take these
factors into consideration in our analysis.
State v. Sidiropoulos

has been called ‘a classic case’ of speech likely to incite
a violent response”). As our Supreme Court explained
in Liebenguth, there is a high likelihood of immediate
violence associated with a white person using the word
“ ‘nigger’ ” directed at a Black person. Id., 705. That was
magnified by the defendant’s use of the adjective “stupid”
in conjunction with “nigger,” suggesting that Medina
lacked intelligence by reason of her ethnic background,
which served only to intensify the highly offensive and
demeaning nature of his use of the word “nigger.” See,
e.g., id., 705–706 (by using “profane adjective ‘fuck-
ing,’ ” which court deemed an “additional measure of
contempt and disgust,” in conjunction with “epithet,
the defendant only amplified the assaultive nature of the
utterance, making it even more hateful and debasing”).
We next examine the circumstances in which the
inflammatory words were uttered by the defendant. First,
the record demonstrates that the defendant displayed
aggressive body language when he blocked Medina’s only
egress route from the tiny examination room while he
berated her, used his height to his advantage and leaned
toward her, yelling throughout the entire incident. In
Baccala, Parnoff and Liebenguth, none of the addressees
had his or her movement restricted in such a manner
because all three incidents in those cases occurred in
large, open spaces that allowed for retreat at any time.16
Indeed, even in Liebenguth, in which our Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant used fighting words, the
addressee was operating his vehicle or standing in a
sizeable parking lot. In the present case, we find it par-
ticularly compelling that Medina could not leave the
examination room for an unknown amount of time as
the defendant yelled at her, using a highly provocative
and degrading racial slur.
In addition to exhibiting aggressive body language, the
defendant repeated the inflammatory and denigrating
racial slur multiple times and yelled it loudly, causing
16
Our Supreme Court has not yet addressed the ability of an addressee
to remove himself or herself from a defendant’s verbal assault.
State v. Sidiropoulos

other patients to exit their examination rooms. Indeed,
the defendant conceded that he yelled from the time he
jumped up from the dental chair to the time he left the
dental office. The fact that the defendant’s loud yelling
of the highly inflammatory racial slur startled other
patients at the dental office and caused them to exit
their examination rooms increased the likelihood of an
immediate violent reaction by not only Medina, but also
by the startled patients as well, especially given that one
patient did confront the defendant near the examina-
tion room, asking, “[w]hat are you doing?” See State v.
Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 623, 678 A.2d 473 (1996)
(defendant’s language could have aroused violent reac-
tion from store detective, to whom it was addressed,
as well as customers). Moreover, as in Liebenguth, the
defendant repeated the racial slur to Medina, aggravating
the circumstances further. “The fact that the defendant
repeated this epithet only served to exacerbate the pro-
vocative and hostile nature of the confrontation. See
Landrum v. Sarratt, 352 S.C. 139, 145, 572 S.E.2d 476
(App. 2002) (whether epithets were uttered repeatedly
is factor to be considered in fighting words determina-
tion); see also State v. Szymkiewicz, [supra, 615–16,
623] (holding that certain epithets were fighting words
due, in part, to repeated nature of utterances).” State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 706.
Next, we examine whether Medina’s position as a den-
tal assistant required her to exercise a greater degree of
restraint, which would decrease the likelihood that a per-
son in a similar position would respond to the defendant’s
statements with violence. Compare State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 399–400 (employee’s job responsi-
bilities included interactions with public that required
employee to exercise greater degree of restraint), and
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 252–53 (same), with
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 710–11 (because
employee’s job responsibilities did not include interac-
tions with public involving racial slurs, employee was
not required to exercise greater degree of restraint).
We do not believe that Medina was in a “position that
State v. Sidiropoulos

carries with it an expectation of exercising a greater
degree of restraint”; State v. Baccala, supra, 243; when
the defendant verbally accosted her with racial slurs.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that
Medina had received any special training concerning how
to interact with patients who become irate or insulting
while receiving dental care.
The defendant also argues that Medina was required
to exercise a greater degree of restraint because she was
employed as a dental assistant, was trained to de-escalate
dental phobia, had control over the premises and had
lawful self-help tools at her disposal. We do not agree.
Although Medina testified that she had training about
interacting with patients who show symptoms of dental
phobia; see footnote 2 of this opinion; her testimony
about it was brief and did not describe in any detail the
type of training she received, and nothing in the record
reflects that she received any training about how to
interact with patients who become irate or insulting while
receiving dental care. Thus, it is highly unlikely that any
of Medina’s training, like that of the parking enforce-
ment officer in Liebenguth, would have prepared her to
be verbally accosted with racial slurs while performing
her duties as a dental assistant. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 710–11. We similarly reject the defen-
dant’s contention that, because Medina was “surrounded
by” coworkers and patients, she had a degree of control
over the premises that would warrant a higher degree
of restraint on her part in the face of the defendant’s
language. Indeed, the record shows that, even though
patients exited their examination rooms because of the
defendant’s loud yelling, Medina was unable to access
those individuals, as the defendant was standing in the
only doorway to the examination room as he berated her.
Moreover, unlike the supermarket manager in Baccala,
Medina did not have any management authority that
would have required her to exercise a higher degree of
restraint as a model to her subordinates. See State v.
Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 253 (“[i]ndeed, as the manager
in charge of a large supermarket, [the manager] would
State v. Sidiropoulos

be expected to model appropriate, responsive behavior,
aimed at de-escalating the situation, for her subordi-
nates, at least one of whom was observing the exchange”).
There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that
Medina was in a position that required her to exercise
greater restraint because she had lawful self-help options
at her disposal to rectify the situation. The record reflects
that Medina asked the defendant to stop repeating the
offensive racial slur but that he refused to do so. The
only successful use of self-help measures occurred when
another employee locked the door after the defendant
left the dental office. Besides Medina requesting that
the defendant cease his behavior, nothing in the record
shows that Medina had access to self-help measures or
to her coworkers and the patients who had exited their
examination rooms, as opposed to the circumstances in
Baccala, in which the supermarket manager had self-help
options included in her job responsibilities. See id. (“[A]s
a store manager, [she] would have had a degree of control
over the premises where the confrontation took place.
An average store manager would know as she approached
the defendant that, if the defendant became abusive,
the manager could demand that the defendant leave the
premises, threaten to have her arrested for trespassing if
she failed to comply, and make good on that threat if the
defendant still refused to leave. With such lawful self-
help tools at her disposal and the expectations attendant
to her position, it does not appear reasonably likely that
[the store manager] was at risk of losing control over the
confrontation.”). As addressed previously in this opinion,
Medina’s job responsibilities did not include managerial
duties. Therefore, her job performance and training, like
that of the parking enforcement officer in Liebenguth,
as well as her level of control over the premises and the
availability of self-help measures, did not support hold-
ing her to a higher degree of restraint in response to the
defendant’s words and actions.
Finally, the defendant attempts to distinguish the pres-
ent case from Liebenguth because he did not augment his
State v. Sidiropoulos

language with curse words, make any racial threats, or
engage in aggressive behavior, like circling a parking lot,
as the defendant in Liebenguth did. We agree that certain
circumstances in the present case differ from those in
Liebenguth; nevertheless, we do not agree that those
differences are significant enough to render Liebenguth
inapplicable to the present case. For example, although
the language in the present case differs from the language
used in Liebenguth, we are not persuaded that the defen-
dant’s use of the word “stupid” rather than “fucking,”
as occurred in Liebenguth, is sufficiently different to
distinguish the present case. Merriam-Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary defines “stupid,” in relevant part,
as “slow of mind,” “given to unintelligent decisions or
acts: acting in an unintelligent or careless manner,” and
“lacking intelligence or reason.” Merriam-Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 1565. By using the
word “stupid” in conjunction with the word “nigger,” the
defendant made an inflammatory statement about racial
superiority. He was not simply expressing his opinion
about an unhygienic dental office. See State v. Lieben-
guth, supra, 336 Conn. 703–704 (“With respect to the
language at issue . . . the defendant, who is white, uttered
the words ‘fucking niggers’ to McCargo, an African-
American person, thereby asserting his own perceived
racial dominance and superiority over McCargo with
the obvious intent of denigrating and stigmatizing him.
When used in that way, ‘[i]t is beyond question that the
use of the word “nigger” is highly offensive and demean-
ing, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and
subordination.’ ”). Furthermore, we find it persuasive
that at least one other state court has concluded that
the phrase “stupid nigger,” when combined with cer-
tain conduct, can constitute fighting words. See In re
A.R., 781 N.W.2d 644, 649–50 (N.D. 2010) (juvenile’s
speech constituted fighting words when juvenile repeat-
edly yelled “ ‘stupid nigger’ ” at victim while involved as
member of group that encircled victim).
Additionally, even though the defendant in the pres-
ent case did not make a reference to the killing of an
State v. Sidiropoulos

unarmed Black man, as was done by the defendant in
Liebenguth, that was but one factor considered by our
Supreme Court in Liebenguth. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 705–708. Indeed, our Supreme Court
in Liebenguth emphasized the harm that the word “nig-
ger” carries, especially when directed by a white person
to a Black person. Id., 703–704. Further, like the defen-
dant’s menacing conduct in Liebenguth in circling the
parking lot in his vehicle, pulling up next to McCargo’s
vehicle and again directing the words “fucking niggers”
to McCargo, the defendant in the present case blocked
the only exit to the small examination room in which
Medina was confined, while, in a loud and intimidating
way, yelling that she was a “stupid nigger.” He engaged
in aggressive conduct by yelling at Medina, using words
that were intended to demean and intimidate her, caus-
ing a commotion that disrupted the entire dental office
and prompted one patient to confront the defendant,
and stood in the only doorway to a small examination
room as he repeatedly used demeaning racial epithets.17
Despite the few differences between the present case
and Liebenguth, we conclude that the circumstances
of the present case similarly warrant a finding that the
defendant’s words constituted fighting words.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
defendant’s words were likely to provoke an immediate
violent reaction from a reasonable person under the
17
We note that the defendant contends that the current state of the
fighting words doctrine requires courts to make unlawful assump-
tions about addressees. As the defendant aptly notes, members of our
Supreme Court have expressed doubts about the continuing vitality of
the fighting words doctrine. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn.
736–37 (Ecker, J., concurring) (expressing concerns that “[t]he doc-
trine . . . confers or withdraws constitutional protection depending on
the demographic characteristics of the relevant individuals” and that
“part of the constitutional analysis is an assessment of the addressee’s
physical abilities and aggressive tendencies” (emphasis in original));
State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 411 (Kahn, J., concurring) (“[t]he
continuing vitality of the fighting words exception is dubious and the
successful invocation of that exception is so rare that it is practically
extinct”). Nevertheless, unless and until the doctrine is abandoned, we
must follow the test set forth by our Supreme Court.
State v. Sidiropoulos

circumstances in which the words were uttered.18 See
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 718. As a result,
they constituted fighting words that are not protected
by the first amendment and, thus, provided a sufficient
basis for his conviction of breach of the peace in the sec-
ond degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5).
B
The defendant also claims that his speech was protected
under article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut
constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that the
Connecticut constitution provides broader protection
for offensive speech and “should be read to protect such
‘offensive language’ and only criminalize true threats
and imminent lawless action, not fighting words.” We
disagree.
We first set forth the legal principles that guide our
resolution of this claim. To reiterate our standard of
review, “the inquiry into the protected status of . . .
speech is one of law, not fact. . . . We therefore apply a
de novo standard of review . . . . Accordingly, we have an
obligation to make an independent examination of the
whole record in order to make sure that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion [in] the field of
free expression. . . . This independent scrutiny, however,
does not authorize us to make credibility determinations
regarding disputed issues of fact. Although we review
18
Our conclusion is not undermined by the fact that Medina, despite
being shocked by the defendant’s outburst and use of demeaning and
inflammatory language and having been brought to tears, did not react
violently in the face of the defendant’s tirade. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 711 (“[even] [t]hough the fighting words standard is an
objective inquiry . . . examining the subjective reaction of an addressee,
although not dispositive, may be probative of the likelihood of a violent
reaction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in Liebenguth and cited State v. Hoshijo ex
rel. White, supra, 102 Haw. 322, for the following proposition: “ ‘[It] is
of no consequence . . . [that violence was not precipitated], as the proper
standard is whether the words were likely to provoke a violent response,
not whether violence occurred. Plainly, there is no requirement that
violence must occur, merely that there be a likelihood of violence.’”
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 711–12.
State v. Sidiropoulos

de novo the trier of fact’s ultimate determination that
the statements at issue constituted [fighting words], we
accept all subsidiary credibility determinations and find-
ings that are not clearly erroneous.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 698–99.
The defendant seeks review of this unpreserved state
constitutional claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188
(2015). “Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record
is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Benson, 235 Conn. App. 594, 603,
346 A.3d 55, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 928, 346 A.3d 511
(2025).
We conclude that the record is adequate for review of
the defendant’s claim that the Connecticut constitution
protects “ ‘offensive language’ ” and that the defendant
has presented a claim of constitutional magnitude. See
State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App. 1, 24 n.15, 287 A.3d
146 (2022) (“[t]he record is adequate for review, and
the claim, asserting a violation of the defendant’s right
to freedom of speech, is of constitutional magnitude”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 907, 288 A.3d 217 (2023). We thus proceed to
the third prong of Golding—whether the defendant has
demonstrated the existence of a constitutional violation.
“It is [well established] that federal constitutional and
statutory law establishes a minimum national standard
for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit
State v. Sidiropoulos

state governments from affording higher level[s] of pro-
tection for such rights. . . . In determining the contours
of the protections provided by our state constitution,
[appellate courts] employ a multifactor approach that
[our Supreme Court] first adopted in [State v. Geisler,
222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)]. The factors
that we consider are: (1) the text of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3)
persuasive federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents
of other state courts; (5) historical insights into the intent
of [the] constitutional [framers]; and (6) contemporary
understandings of applicable economic and sociological
norms.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319
Conn. 175, 191–92, 123 A.3d 1212 (2015). “These fac-
tors, [commonly referred to as the Geisler factors and]
which we consider in turn, inform our application of
the established state constitutional standards . . . to the
defendant’s [claim] in the present case.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378,
387–88, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019).19
1
We begin our analysis by reviewing the text of the
relevant constitutional provisions. The defendant con-
tends that, because our Supreme Court in Trusz v. UBS
Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 193, found that
the Connecticut constitution provides “more expressive
and forceful speech protection” than its federal counter-
part, we should construe article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of
19
We addressed the issue of whether § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitu-
tional under the state constitution in State v. Caracoglia, 78 Conn. App.
98, 826 A.2d 192, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d 65 (2003), in
which this court concluded that, “[a]lthough . . . an even greater degree
of scrutiny may be applied under our state constitution . . . § 53a-181
(a) (5) is not vague or overbroad under the Connecticut constitution
for the same reasons that it is not vague or overbroad under the federal
constitution. . . . ‘[A]busive language’ may be interpreted as ‘fight-
ing words,’ which are not protected by our state constitution.” Id.,
110–11. Although the issue in Caracoglia is different from the issue
in this appeal, our reasoning in Caracoglia informs our resolution of
the defendant’s claim.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the Connecticut constitution to protect fighting words.
The state, on the other hand, argues that, despite our
Supreme Court’s prior findings that the Connecticut
constitution affords more protection for certain speech,
the qualifying language in article first, § 4, permits the
state to punish fighting words in the interest of preserv-
ing public peace and safety. We agree with the state.
Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution pro-
vides that “[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty.” Article first, § 5, of the Con-
necticut constitution provides that “[n]o law shall ever
be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.” Finally, article first, § 14, of the Connecticut
constitution provides that “[t]he citizens have a right,
in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common
good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government, for redress of grievances, or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”
“[Our Supreme Court] previously has held that . . .
unlike the first amendment to the federal constitution: (1)
article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution includes
language protecting free speech ‘on all subjects’; (2)
article first, § 5, of the Connecticut constitution uses the
word ‘ever,’ thereby providing ‘additional emphasis to
the force of the provision’ . . . and (3) article first, § 14,
of the Connecticut constitution provides a right to seek
redress for grievances by way of ‘remonstrance,’ and
therefore ‘sets forth free speech rights more emphati-
cally than its federal counterpart’ . . . .” (Citations omit-
ted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319
Conn. 192–93. The court further explained that “these
textual differences warrant an interpretation separate
and distinct from that of the first amendment.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 193.
In the present case, the defendant argues that, because
the court in Trusz found that the Connecticut constitu-
tion protects “ ‘the widest possible range of topics’ ” and
“ ‘sets forth free speech rights more emphatically than its
State v. Sidiropoulos

federal counterpart’ ”; id., 192–93; we should conclude
that the state constitution protects fighting words. We
agree that the Connecticut constitution provides broader
protection for free speech rights than its federal coun-
terpart, but we do not construe the holding in Trusz to
protect fighting words under our state constitution. The
court in Trusz stated that the “language protecting free
speech on all subjects . . . support[ed] the conclusion that
the state constitution protects employee speech in the
public workplace on the widest possible range of topics,
as long as the speech does not undermine the employer’s
legitimate interest in maintaining discipline, harmony
and efficiency in the workplace.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis added.) Id. Notably, the court in Trusz acknowl-
edged the qualifying language in article first, § 4, of the
Connecticut constitution20 to preserve an employer’s
interest in maintaining a peaceful and collaborative
workplace. Id., 193. Thus, we do not construe Trusz as
extending protection to speech, such as fighting words,
that disrupts the public peace and safety.
We find guidance on this issue from the concurring
opinion in Baccala authored by Justice Eveleigh.21 In
Baccala, our Supreme Court was asked, but declined,
to examine whether the language of article first, §§ 4, 5
and 14, of the Connecticut constitution protects fight-
ing words. See State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 237.
Justice Eveleigh, nonetheless, analyzed that issue under
the Geisler factors in his concurring opinion. See id.,
20
The liberty to speak freely on all subjects pursuant to article first,
§ 4, of the Connecticut constitution is qualified by the plain terms of
that section, namely, by holding each citizen “responsible for the abuse
of that liberty.” In other words, this qualifying language operates as
a limitation on the broad protections afforded to expressive liberties
by holding a person responsible for abusing the liberty of free speech.
21
Justice Eveleigh authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in
Baccala. His Geisler analysis of this issue, in which he concludes that
the fighting words doctrine is not afforded greater protection under
our state constitution than under the federal constitution; see State
v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 270 (Eveleigh, J., concurring); is part of
his concurrence with that portion of the majority’s opinion upholding
the trial court’s judgment of conviction. For convenience, we refer to
Justice Eveleigh’s opinion as a concurring opinion.
State v. Sidiropoulos

269–300 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As Justice Eveleigh
noted, our Supreme Court “has observed that [article
first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution] operates as a
limitation on the broad protections otherwise afforded
by permitting the enforcement of laws regulating speech
that tended to cause a breach of the peace such as defama-
tion or sedition. . . . Therefore, [our Supreme Court] has
interpreted the text of § 4 to permit punishment, within
certain bounds, of abuse of the freedom of speech. Addi-
tionally, the text of §§ 4 and 5 in no way suggests that
the legislature’s authority to punish abuses of expressive
liberties was limited to then prevailing statutory crimi-
nal law. Thus, while the language of §§ 4 and 5 provides
for broader protection than afforded under the federal
constitution, the language of § 4 more directly pertains
to the state’s authority to punish the abuse of expressive
liberties.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 274;
see also Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48,
64 n.9, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); State v. McKee, 73 Conn.
18, 29, 46 A. 409 (1900). Justice Eveleigh concluded that
“the text of §§ 4 and 5 does not support [a] . . . position
that our state constitution defines the concept fighting
words more narrowly.” State v. Baccala, supra, 274–75
(Eveleigh, J., concurring). We agree that the Connecti-
cut constitution limits free speech when there has been
an “abuse of that liberty.” Conn. Const., art. I, § 4. We,
thus, conclude that the language of the relevant state
constitutional provisions supports the state’s argument
that fighting words are not protected under the Con-
necticut constitution.
2
We next address the second Geisler factor—related
Connecticut precedents. In the present case, the defen-
dant argues that the Connecticut constitution protects
fighting words because Connecticut courts “have con-
sistently held that the Connecticut constitution bestows
greater expressive rights on the public than the federal
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitution.”22 Although this has been true for certain
speech, the state points to both preconstitutional and
postconstitutional jurisprudence to support its position
that fighting words are not protected under our state
constitution. We disagree with the defendant.23
We begin with a review of Connecticut’s earliest related
precedents. As a colony, Connecticut adopted parts of
22
We reject the defendant’s argument that the Connecticut consti-
tution protects fighting words, given that at least two Connecticut
Supreme Court justices have expressed concerns about the vitality
of the fighting words doctrine. We acknowledge Justice Kahn’s and
Justice Ecker’s sentiments concerning the fighting words doctrine,
but we cannot conclude that Connecticut precedent supports the defen-
dant’s position. We address this argument further in our discussion of
Geisler’s public policy factor in part I B 6 of this opinion. See also State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 725 (Ecker, J., concurring); id., 719
(Kahn, J., concurring); State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 407 (Kahn,
J., concurring in the judgment).
23
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant contends that, because
our Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability and scope of the
fighting words doctrine under our state constitution, this court will be
writing “on a blank slate . . . .” We disagree with this contention for
reasons similar to those set forth by Justice Eveleigh in Baccala, in
which the defendant in that case made a similar argument.
First, Justice Eveleigh stated: “The defendant is incorrect that,
because of the absence of appellate case law discussing the scope of the
fighting words doctrine under the Connecticut constitution, this court
simply writes on a blank slate, unguided by state appellate precedents.
First, the absence of case law on the matter strongly suggests that this
factor does not support the defendant’s position. See State v. Skok,
318 Conn. 699, 709, 122 A.3d 608 (2015) (‘because Connecticut courts
have not yet considered whether article first, § 7, [of the Connecticut
constitution] provides greater protection than the federal constitu-
tion with respect to recording telephone conversations with only one
party’s consent, the second Geisler factor also does not support the
defendant’s claim’).
“Second, in Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn.
195–97, this court looked to appellate precedents not for controlling
authority on the precise legal issue at hand; rather, it looked to appellate
authority for broader principles that underpin this state’s expressive
rights jurisprudence to inform the analysis. In Trusz, this court looked
to State v. Linares, [232 Conn. 345, 386, 655 A.2d 737 (1995)], for the
state constitutional expressive rights principle of favoring flexible, case-
by-case analytic frameworks over rigid, categorical tests. See Trusz v.
UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 195. Additionally, [our Supreme
Court] looked to the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. DeFusco, 27
State v. Sidiropoulos

English common law to serve as a basis for its own law.24
See 1 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of
Connecticut (1795) p. 1 (“[t]he common law of England
is obligatory in this state by immemorial usage, and
consent, so far as it corresponds with our circumstances
and situation”); see also L. Meyer, “Connecticut’s Anti-
Originalist Constitutions and Its Independent Courts,”
40 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 501, 619 (2022) (“the early Con-
necticut jurists did not simply adopt or defer to English
common law, but carefully weighed its principles in
light of local applications and practices”). As a result,
early Connecticut jurisprudence consistently referenced
English common law. See State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266,
269 (1828) (adopting English common-law offense of
libel because no similar prosecutions had yet occurred
in Connecticut); see also State v. Warner, 34 Conn. 276,
279 (1867) (affirming adoption of English common-law
offense of libel because speech “was sufficiently scur-
rilous, abusive and indecent, and calculated to stir up
and provoke contention and strife, and so far to disturb
the peace”). “Indeed, the common law provides valuable
insight to inform our understanding of constitutional
principles. See E. Peters, ‘Common Law Antecedents
of Constitutional Law in Connecticut,’ 53 Alb. L. Rev.
259, 264 (1989) (‘In defining and enacting constitu-
tional bills of rights, state and national constituencies
would, of course, have drawn [on] the experience of the
Conn. App. 248, 256, 606 A.2d 1 (1992), aff’d, 224 Conn. 627, 620 A.2d
746 (1993), for the broad proposition that the Connecticut constitution
has tended to preserve civil liberty protections previously afforded by
the federal constitution but from which the United States Supreme
Court has retreated. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra,
196–97.” State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 278–79 n.19 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring).
24
The defendant, citing L. Meyer, “Connecticut’s Anti-Originalist
Constitutions and Its Independent Courts,” 40 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
501, 619 (2022), argues that English common law is “not persuasive
or even relevant, as early Connecticut jurists did not adopt or defer to
English common law.” For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we do
not agree with the defendant’s characterization of either early Con-
necticut precedent or the argument set forth by Professor Linda Ross
Meyer in her law review article.
State v. Sidiropoulos

common law. . . . Just as the precepts of the common
law influence the style of constitutional adjudication in
[common-law] courts, so common law case law itself is
part of our “usable past.” ’).” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 276 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
In 1828, our Supreme Court in Avery concluded that
“the sending of a letter to [another] party, filled with
abusive language, is an indictable offence, because it
tends to a breach of the peace.” State v. Avery, supra, 7
Conn. 269. As the court explained, although the sending
of such a letter to another might not support an action
for libel given that there is no publication, “the sending
of such a letter, without other publication, is clearly an
offence of a public nature, and punishable as such, as
it tends to create ill-blood, and cause a disturbance of
the public peace.” Id. “This common-law offense origi-
nated in England, where it was observed that sending
an ‘infamous’ letter to another person constituted an
‘offense to the King, and is a great motive to revenge,
and tends to the breaking of the peace . . . .’ Edwards
v. Wooton, 77 Eng. Rep. 1316, 1316–17 (K.B. 1655);
see also Hickes’s Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1240–41
(K.B. 1682). Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift included
the common-law offense of provocation to breach of the
peace in the second volume of his digest of the state’s
laws published in 1823. See 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the
Laws of the State of Connecticut (1823) pp. 340–41.
At the very least, Connecticut common law embraced
the principle that speech that tended to cause a breach
of the peace was illegitimate . . . .” (Footnote omitted.)
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 276–77 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring). This was further demonstrated in 1867,
when our Supreme Court upheld a conviction of breach
of the peace under a state statute that made “it a crime
‘to disturb or break the peace, or stir up and provoke
contention and strife, by following or mocking any per-
son with scurrilous or abusive or indecent language or
gestures or noise.’ ” State v. Warner, supra, 34 Conn. 276
(preliminary statement of facts and procedural history).
In Warner, the defendant directed a number of insults
State v. Sidiropoulos

and abusive language toward a contractor for repairing
highways, calling the contractor “ ‘a damned old sheep
thief,’ ‘a damned knave,’ ‘a Goddamned old scoundrel,’
‘a damned old rascal,’ and ‘an old gray-headed curse,’ and
charged him with having sold a broken-backed steer for
a sound one, and a sick hog that died, to a poor laboring
man, and asking him if it was not true that he stole a
ram, saying that folks said he did, and that he would rise
right up if he was bleated at.” Id., 276–77 (preliminary
statement of facts and procedural history). Our Supreme
Court observed that the defendant’s “language was suf-
ficiently scurrilous, abusive and indecent, and calculated
to stir up and provoke contention and strife, and so far
to disturb the peace,” and rejected the defendant’s claim
that there was no evidence of “following up or mocking
as the statute contemplates, or that contention and strife
were in fact stirred up by his conduct.” Id., 279. These
decisions demonstrate that early Connecticut law sought
to deter speech that disrupted the public peace.
In McKee, our Supreme Court addressed the state
constitution’s guarantee of free speech, holding that,
“[t]he liberty protected is not the right to perpetrate acts
of licentiousness, or any act inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the [s]tate. Freedom of speech and press does
not include the abuse of the power of tongue or pen, any
more than freedom of other action includes an injurious
use of one’s occupation, business, or property.” State v.
McKee, supra, 73 Conn. 29. Notably, the court in McKee
found that the state’s power to “punish acts as injurious
to the public health, safety or morals” is not “limited to
acts within the adjudicated scope of the common-law
offenses of nuisance and libel . . . .” Id., 23. The court,
after analyzing the provisions of our state constitution,
concluded that “[e]very citizen has an equal right to use
his mental endowments, as well as his property, in any
harmless occupation or manner; but he has no right to use
them so as to injure his fellow-citizens, or to endanger the
vital interests of society. Immunity in the mischievous
State v. Sidiropoulos

use is as inconsistent with civil liberty as prohibition of
the harmless use.” Id., 28.
Even though Connecticut courts have left the bounds
of free speech largely undefined, our courts consistently
have held that speech that tends to disturb the peace and
jeopardize public safety may be regulated. See, e.g., State
v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 105, 96 A. 313 (1916) (“[l]iberty
of speech and of the press is not license, not lawlessness,
but the right to fairly criticise and comment”); see also
Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn.
193 (employee speech is protected so long as it does not
undermine employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining
discipline, harmony and efficiency in workplace). Indeed,
in State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 A. 33 (1921), our
Supreme Court acknowledged the breadth of legislative
authority to regulate speech that may be harmful to
public peace, stating: “It may be admitted that the pub-
lication of matter concerning the form of the [f]ederal
[g]overnment, which is merely scurrilous or abusive,
is not necessarily a direct incitement of disobedience
to any other law, but it is not necessary to look outside
of the statute itself to find a legal basis for criminality,
because the [public] [a]ct itself is the declaration of the
General Assembly that the publication of the prohibited
forms of expression does endanger the public peace and
safety. This declaration it has power to make unless the
court can see that it is plainly unfounded.” Id., 609–10.
Our Supreme Court most recently addressed article
first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution in
the context of restrictions on speech that take place on
public property in State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 655
A.2d 737 (1995), and employee speech in Trusz v. UBS
Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 175. Notably,
in conducting a state constitutional analysis of Gen-
eral Statutes § 2-1d (a) (2) (C) and (E), which prohibits
interfering with the legislative process, pursuant to the
Geisler factors, our Supreme Court in Linares “decline[d]
to follow the modern, forum based approach currently
employed to resolve claims under the first amendment to
State v. Sidiropoulos

the United States constitution that concern abridgement
of speech on public property” and, instead, “adopt[ed]
the ‘compatibility’ test, as expressed in Grayned v. Rock-
ford, [408 U.S. 104, 116–17, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d
222 (1972)],25 for claims brought under the Connecticut
constitution that involve restrictions on speech on public
property.” (Footnote added.) State v. Linares, supra,
379. In doing so, the court in Linares noted that “our
state constitution is an instrument of progress, it is
intended to stand for a great length of time and should
not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that
it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of
our citizens.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
382. The court further stated that “our constitution’s
speech provisions reflect a unique historical experience
and a move toward enhanced civil liberties, particularly
those liberties designed to foster individuality. . . . This
historical background indicates that the framers of our
constitution contemplated vibrant public speech, and a
minimum of governmental interference, which would be
best fulfilled by the less intrusive Grayned model,” as it
“will best enable our courts to adapt the central tenets of
free speech jurisprudence to the ever changing nature of
public expression and communication in modern society.
. . . [T]his flexible approach prohibits the government
from unilaterally and unnecessarily limiting speech at
public locations; it avoids the grant of plenary power
[that] allows the government to tilt the dialogue heard
by the public, to exclude many, more marginal, voices.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 385–86.
Despite its adoption of the flexible framework for ana-
lyzing claims concerning the abridgement of speech on
25
The Grayned approach assesses “whether the manner of expression
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.” Grayned v. Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. 116. By
contrast, the more rigid federal forum analysis “affords the most rig-
orous protection of speech only at ‘traditional’ forums and narrowly
defines ‘traditional’ to exclude modern public gathering places often
otherwise compatible with public expression.” State v. Linares, supra,
232 Conn. 382.
State v. Sidiropoulos

public property, the court, nonetheless, rejected the
defendant’s overbreadth claim under the Connecticut
constitution, concluding that “the Grayned test requires
the government, under the Connecticut constitution,
to permit free speech and public expression on govern-
ment property up to the point when such free expression
becomes ‘basically incompatible with the normal activ-
ity of a particular place at a particular time. . . . [I]n
assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must
weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved;
the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
[s]tate’s legitimate interest.’ . . . This standard balances
the vital role of free expression in a democratic society
with the need for reasonably functional governmental
institutions and mechanisms. ‘The nature of a place, the
pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regu-
lations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’ ”
(Citation omitted.) Id., 386–87. Therefore, although, as
the defendant contends, the court in Linares recognized
broader free speech rights in the public forum context,
those free speech rights are limited to speech that is
compatible with the activity of the forum.
Subsequently, in Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC,
supra, 319 Conn. 175, our Supreme Court addressed
whether the Connecticut constitution affords employees
broader free speech protections than does the first amend-
ment. In Trusz, the plaintiff was terminated from his
position as a managing director of a real estate invest-
ment management services company after he raised con-
cerns about violations of securities laws. Id., 179, 181.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an action against
the company, alleging a violation of General Statutes
§ 31-51q because he had been subjected to discipline
“ ‘on account of the exercise . . . of rights guaranteed by
. . . [§§] 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the [c]onstitution of
Connecticut.’ ” Id., 181. The court in Trusz rejected the
more recent and restrictive federal standard for analyz-
ing claims concerning expressive rights of employees set
forth in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–20, 126
State v. Sidiropoulos

S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006),26 in favor of the
older, more flexible Connick/Pickering27 standard, which
balances the state constitutional right to speak freely
on all subjects with an employer’s interest in efficient
operations. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC,
supra, 210. Accordingly, the court in Trusz concluded
“that the weight of persuasive federal precedent favors a
broader reading of the free speech provisions of the state
constitution than of the first amendment.” (Emphasis
in original.) Id., 205.
The court in Trusz made clear, however, that
an employer does not infringe on an employee’s
26
Under the Garcetti test, “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for [f]irst [a]mendment purposes, and the [c]onstitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Garcetti
v. Ceballos, supra, [547 U.S. 421] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 185.
“The court in Garcetti reasoned that ‘[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created.’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra,
421–22. Accordingly, under Garcetti, a court will subject the employee’s
speech to the balancing test [set forth in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983), and Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1968)] only if it first determines that the employee was not speaking
pursuant to his or her official duties; if the employee was speaking as
an employee rather than as a citizen, the speech is not protected by the
first amendment.” Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 185;
see also footnote 27 of this opinion.
27
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed.
2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88
S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). The Connick/Pickering standard
involves a balancing of interests and “weighs an employee’s [f]irst
[a]mendment rights against the interests of the [s]tate as an employer
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Crandon v. State, 257 Kan. 727, 740, 897 P.2d 92 (1995),
cert. denied sub nom. Crandon v. Dunnick, 516 U.S. 1113, 116 S. Ct.
913, 133 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1996). The Connick/Pickering standard protects
employee speech that involves a matter of public concern, whereas, under
Garcetti, speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties is not
protected by the first amendment. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors,
LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 184–85.
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitutional rights when an employee is disciplined
for issues that are not a matter of public concern. See
id., 211. Therefore, while Trusz expanded speech rights
for employees under the state constitution, it reaffirmed
the concept that disruptive speech not regarding a mat-
ter of public concern is not protected by the Connecticut
constitution. See id. (“[i]n our view, Justice Souter’s
test [set forth in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 427] properly balances the
employer’s heightened interest in controlling employee
speech pursuant to official job duties—an interest that
[Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.
Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968)] did not specifically
address—and the important interests of the employee
and of the public in allowing employees to speak without
fear of retaliation about matters of particularly acute
public concern—interests that the Garcetti standard
fails to protect”).
In summary, as noted by Justice Eveleigh in Baccala,
both Linares and Trusz “show that Connecticut’s con-
stitution provides broader freedom of expression protec-
tions than the federal counterpart.” State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 279 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). They
also demonstrate, however, that those broader freedoms
are not without limitation.
The most recent Connecticut jurisprudence to address
free speech under the state constitution is Justice
Eveleigh’s concurrence in State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 269.28 In his Geisler analysis of this factor, Jus-
tice Eveleigh also examined “appellate case law ana-
lyzing state constitutional principles with respect to
content based regulation of speech” and determined that
it “embraces a philosophy that balances the expressive
liberties with the responsibility not to abuse such liber-
ties.” Id., 280. First, Justice Eveleigh noted that, in
State v. McKee, supra, 73 Conn. 18, in connection with
28
Justice Eveleigh was joined by then Chief Justice Rogers and then
Justice Espinosa in concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the
majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment. See State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 257, 309 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
State v. Sidiropoulos

a challenge to a statute punishing the publication of
“ ‘criminal news, police reports, or pictures and stories
of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime’ ”; State v. Baccala,
supra, 280–81 (Eveleigh, J., concurring); our Supreme
Court concluded that “[f]reedom of speech and press does
not include the abuse of the power of tongue or pen, any
more than freedom of other action includes an injurious
use of one’s occupation, business, or property,” and that
“the notion that the state constitution created a refuge
for those who sought to abuse expressive liberties to
the detriment of society belittle[d] the conception of
constitutional safeguards and implie[d] ignorance of
the essentials of civil liberty.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 281 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). Justice
Eveleigh concluded that “[t]hese principles of civil lib-
erty are interwoven into [our Supreme Court’s] reason-
ing in subsequent cases rejecting state constitutional
free speech challenges to statutes proscribing abuse of
expressive liberties.” Id., citing State v. Sinchuk, supra,
96 Conn. 616, and State v. Pape, supra, 90 Conn. 103.
Recognizing that “the narrow holdings of these early
twentieth century expressive rights cases would not
likely withstand modern constitutional scrutiny,” Justice
Eveleigh noted that the defendant in Baccala, none-
theless, was incorrect in his assertion that, “because
the cases provide no evidence of the scope of expressive
rights protection in 1818 [when the state constitution
was ratified] . . . they provide no meaningful insight to
[our Supreme Court’s] analysis.” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 283. Rather, as Justice Eveleigh explained,
“these cases evince a philosophy not dissimilar from
that prevailing in 1818—namely, the belief that citizens
should be free to express themselves but that they bear
responsibility for the abuse of that right.” Id.
Because Connecticut precedent has consistently
favored restrictions on speech that harms others or dis-
rupts business or the public peace, we conclude that this
State v. Sidiropoulos

factor weighs in favor of finding that the state constitu-
tion does not protect fighting words.
3
We next turn to the third Geisler factor, persuasive
federal precedents. As discussed in part I A of this opin-
ion, the federal constitution does not protect speech that
provokes an ordinary person to respond with immediate
violence. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011); R. A. V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed.
2d 305 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409,
109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522–23, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed.
2d 408 (1972); Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S. 20;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 574.
The defendant contends that the United States
Supreme Court has “already construed the fighting words
exception as being extremely narrow—effectively not
utilizing the doctrine at all since 1942.” On the other
hand, the state argues that the federal and state fight-
ing words doctrines are coextensive, as evidenced by
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296. We agree
with the state.
We begin with a discussion of Cantwell, Chaplinsky’s
antecedent. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S.
300, three Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested, charged
with and convicted of, inter alia, breach of the peace. The
charges stemmed from their conduct in going from house
to house in a neighborhood in New Haven, in which 90
percent of the residents were Roman Catholics, and, as
part of a pitch for the sale of books or to obtain donations,
playing a phonographic recording containing attacks on
the Catholic religion. Id., 301. Our Supreme Court upheld
the breach of the peace conviction of Jesse Cantwell,
one of the three defendants. See id., 300. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed Cantwell’s convic-
tion of breach of the peace, finding that his conduct in
trying to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to
State v. Sidiropoulos

make a donation did not constitute breach of the peace;
see id., 310; especially given that there was “no showing
that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing
or offensive.” Id., 308.
In his concurrence in Baccala, Justice Eveleigh noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell, nev-
ertheless, “acknowledged the state’s interest in preserv-
ing peace. . . . The court, in striking a balance between
the competing interests, acknowledged that in some
circumstances it is appropriate for the state to punish
certain speech that tends to provoke violence, noting as
follows: ‘One may, however, be guilty of the offense if he
commit[s] acts or make[s] statements likely to provoke
violence and disturbance of good order, even though no
such eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are
many, but examination discloses that, in practically all,
the provocative language which was held to amount to a
breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abu-
sive remarks directed to the person of the hearer. Resort
to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the [United States constitution], and its punishment
as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument.’ . . . Thus, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged Connecticut’s well established authority
to regulate speech that tends to provoke violence but
refined that authority to conform to federal free speech
principles by permitting regulation of only profane, inde-
cent, or [abusive] remarks likely to provoke violence. It
was this principle that would become the foundation of
the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky.” (Citations
omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 290–91
(Eveleigh, J., concurring).
As discussed in part I A of this opinion, in Chaplin-
sky, the United States Supreme Court fully recognized
the “fighting words” doctrine as an exception to first
amendment protections. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra, 315 U.S. 572. In defining the scope of the first
and fourteenth amendments, the court in Chaplinsky
State v. Sidiropoulos

concluded that, “[a]llowing the broadest scope to the
language and purpose of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment,
it is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libel-
ous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 571–72.
Despite its narrowing of the scope of the fighting words
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the strong interest of the state in preventing immi-
nent and likely breaches of the peace. See R. A. V. v. St.
Paul, supra, 505 U.S. 382–83 (“From 1791 to the present
. . . our society, like other free but civilized societies, has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a
few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.’ . . . We have recognized that the
‘freedom of speech’ referred to by the [f]irst [a]mendment
does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations. . . . Our decisions since the 1960’s have nar-
rowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions
for defamation . . . and for obscenity . . . but a limited
categorical approach has remained an important part of
our [f]irst [a]mendment jurisprudence.” (Citations omit-
ted.)). Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claims in
the present case, the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not affirmed a fighting words conviction since
1942 does not render the doctrine essentially extinct.
Indeed, in 2023 the court acknowledged that it “has not
upheld a conviction under the fighting-words doctrine
State v. Sidiropoulos

in [eighty] years” but, nevertheless, did not discard the
doctrine. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 77 n.4,
143 S. Ct. 2106, 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that federal
precedent does not support the defendant’s claim that
the fighting words doctrine is so exceedingly narrow that
it essentially has become extinct.
4
Next, we address precedents from our sister states.
The defendant asserts that “our sister states are moving
away from the fighting words doctrine” and cites recent
cases from Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon to support
his position. See People in the Interest of R.C., 411 P.3d
1105, 1110 (Colo. App. 2016), cert. denied, Docket No.
16SC987, 2017 WL 5664821 (Colo. November 20, 2017);
State v. Harrington, 67 Or. App. 608, 613–16, 680 P.2d
666, review denied, 297 Or. 547, 685 P.2d 998 (1984);
State v. Tracy, 200 Vt. 216, 237, 130 A.3d 196 (2015).
Of the defendant’s proffered precedent, only Oregon
courts do not follow the fighting words doctrine under
the state constitution. In its appellate brief, the state,
citing State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 285 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring), aptly notes that, with the exception of
Oregon, other jurisdictions continue to adhere to the
fighting words doctrine and that Oregon’s constitutional
approach is incompatible with Connecticut’s Geisler
analysis.29 We agree with the state that it is more per-
29
In particular, Justice Eveleigh explained: “The Oregon Supreme
Court has concluded that its constitutional expressive rights provision
forecloses the enactment of any law written in terms directed to the
substance of any opinion or any subject of communication, unless the
scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical excep-
tion that was well established when the first American guarantees of
freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in
1859 [when the Oregon Bill of Rights was adopted] demonstrably were
not intended to reach. State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 412, 649 P.2d
569 (1982). Applying this test, the Oregon Court of Appeals held a
harassment statute under which the defendant had been convicted for
calling another person a fucking nigger to be unconstitutional because
using abusive language was not a historical exception to speech rights
at the time of ratification of the Oregon constitution. . . . State v.
State v. Sidiropoulos

suasive that all but one of our sister states continue to
recognize the fighting words doctrine under their state
constitutions.
The defendant first points to a statement of the Ver-
mont Supreme Court that, “in this day and age, the
notion that any set of words are so provocative that
they can reasonably be expected to lead an average lis-
tener to immediately respond with physical violence is
highly problematic.” (Emphasis in original.) State v.
Tracy, supra, 200 Vt. 237. Despite expressing uneasiness
over the fighting words doctrine, the Supreme Court
of Vermont upheld the constitutionality of that state’s
disorderly conduct statute, noting that, “if [the statute]
has any continuing force, it is necessarily exceedingly
narrow in scope. The use of foul language and vulgar
insults is insufficient. A likelihood of arousing animosity
or inflaming anger is insufficient. The likelihood that the
listener will feel an impulse to respond angrily or even
forcefully is insufficient. The provision only reaches
speech that, in the context in which it is uttered, is so
inflammatory that it is akin to dropping a match into
a pool of gasoline.” Id. This sentiment is similar to the
one expressed by our Supreme Court in Liebenguth, in
which the court acknowledged the demanding standard
for fighting words but upheld the defendant’s conviction
of breach of the peace in the second degree because he
had used language “akin to dropping a match into a pool
of gasoline.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 708. Further, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court has previously determined that its
state constitution does not afford a more expansive free
speech right than the federal constitution. See State v.
Read, 165 Vt. 141, 156, 680 A.2d 944 (1996). Thus, we
Harrington, [supra, 67 Or. App. 610, 615–16]. Harrington concluded
that the Chaplinsky standard employed a balancing test to determine
whether speech was protected, whereas the Oregon constitution prohib-
ited restricting the right to speak freely on any subject whatever. . . .
Id., 614.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 284–85 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring).
State v. Sidiropoulos

find the defendant’s argument about Vermont precedent
unpersuasive.
We similarly find unavailing the defendant’s reliance
on Colorado precedent. In People in the Interest of R.C.,
supra, 411 P.3d 1107, a juvenile was charged with violat-
ing Colorado’s disorderly conduct statute after he used
the mobile application Snapchat to hand draw an ejacu-
lating penis on the photograph of another juvenile while
at school. Id., 1106. At trial, the juvenile argued that
his drawing constituted protected speech because only
fighting words are prohibited under the statute and the
altered photograph did not qualify as fighting words. Id.,
1107. The trial court found that the altered photograph
amounted to fighting words because “its display would
tend to make the subject of the photo feel humiliated
and ashamed” and it insinuated that the other juvenile
“was gay,” which, the court found, would likely provoke
the average person to respond with violence. Id., 1110.
The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding
that “the mere insinuation that a person is gay” does
not amount to fighting words; id.; and “that the sug-
gestion of homosexuality or homosexual conduct is [not]
so shameful and humiliating that it should be expected
to provoke a violent reaction from an ordinary person.”
Id. Accordingly, because “the circumstances surround-
ing [the juvenile’s] display of the photograph [did] not
support the finding that the display was likely to lead
to immediate violence,” the Court of Appeals reversed
his conviction. Id., 1111, 1113. Thus, as occurred in
Vermont, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the fighting words doctrine under its state
constitution, even though the doctrine did not apply
to the conduct in question. See id., 1111 (“[U]nder the
circumstances presented in this case, [the juvenile’s]
display of the photo did not amount to fighting words
because it was not likely to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. We certainly have not foreclosed the pos-
sibility that, under other circumstances, references to a
person’s sexual orientation might indeed rise to the level
of fighting words.”). Because Colorado still recognizes
State v. Sidiropoulos

the fighting words doctrine under its state constitution,
we find the defendant’s argument concerning Colorado
precedent unpersuasive.
Finally, we likewise find the defendant’s argument
related to Oregon precedent unpersuasive. In State v.
Harrington, supra, 67 Or. App. 615–16, the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the fighting words doctrine
was “not an historical exception that was well established
when first American guarantees of freedom of expression
were adopted” and, thus, was unconstitutional under
its state constitution. Specifically, the Oregon Court
of Appeals found that Oregon territorial legislation
enacted before its constitutional free speech provisions
were ratified lacked any indication that “fighting words”
would be prohibited. Id., 614. Oregon courts consistently
recognized invitations to fight as criminal but found that
“[t]he distinction between challenging another to fight a
duel with deadly weapons and publicly insulting another
by abusive or obscene words likely to provoke a violent
or disorderly response is the difference in the intent of
the actor.” Id. This led the Oregon Court of Appeals to
conclude that the requisite intent to “harass, annoy or
alarm” was unconstitutional because it was directed at
the speech itself, not toward preventing fights. Id., 615.
As Justice Eveleigh explained in his concurrence in
Baccala, “[t]he Oregon approach is inapposite to deter-
mining the protections afforded by the Connecticut con-
stitution because that state employs a different analytic
approach to delineating the scope of state constitutional
provisions. The Oregon approach is a mechanistic, single-
factor approach that focuses solely on statutory sub-
stantive criminal law extant contemporaneously with
ratification of its constitution. Connecticut, by relying
upon the Geisler factors, embraces a ‘structured and com-
prehensive approach to state constitutional interpreta-
tion’ . . . . Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education
Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 272 n.26, 990 A.2d
206 (2010). This multifactor approach provides a more
extensive [tool kit] to fashion appropriate, principled
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitutional rules. See also Honulik v. Greenwich,
293 Conn. 641, 648, 980 A.2d 845 (2009) (noting that
factors are ‘to be considered in construing the contours
of our state constitution so that we may reach reasoned
and principled results as to its meaning’).” State v. Bac-
cala, supra, 326 Conn. 284–85 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Moreover, whereas the Oregon constitutional analysis
seeks precise expressions of historical exceptions, Con-
necticut’s Geisler analysis favors a more contextual
approach that contemplates the historical constitutional
setting and the debates and values of the framers. See
State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 385–86. Because our
research indicates that all states, except for Oregon,
continue to recognize the fighting words doctrine, we
conclude that this factor weighs in favor of the state.
5
Next, we consider the fifth Geisler factor, historical
insights into the intent of the constitutional framers.
The defendant argues that the only preconstitutional
statutes that served as a basis for our modern breach
of the peace statute are “limited to speech that directly
challenges another to engage in a physical altercation or
lawless action” and “not mere name-calling.” The defen-
dant further contends that “the fighting words doctrine,
as developed in Chaplinsky, had no preconstitutional
counterpart in Connecticut prior to 1818,” as the pre-
1818 statutes limited only speech that was threatening
or defamatory, or that “directly called someone to com-
bat” or “called for God to take divine vengeance upon
someone.” As a result, the defendant argues, “this factor
weighs in favor of broader protection of free speech and
a finding that the Connecticut constitution provides
broader protection for offensive speech than the ‘fighting
words’ doctrine does, because the Connecticut constitu-
tion . . . criminalizes [only] true threats and imminent
lawless action.”
On the other hand, the state contends that our state
constitutional framers valued a balance between indi-
vidual freedoms, including free speech, against the order
State v. Sidiropoulos

afforded by government, as evidenced by the qualifying
language of article first, § 4, of the Connecticut consti-
tution. The state asserts that “Connecticut has always
employed an expressive liberties test that balances free-
dom of speech against its impact on the rights of other
members of society,” which is consistent with the fighting
words doctrine set forth in Chaplinsky. According to the
state, “[t]he qualified character of article first, §§ 4 and
5 [of the Connecticut constitution], and the framers’
refusal to afford complete immunity to the expression
of ‘opinions’ can be traced back to the similarly qualified
nature of the general liberties afforded to Connecticut’s
early colonial citizenry.” We agree with the state.
“[R]atification era constitutional law is not the sole
source of state constitutional principles. Indeed, the
common law provides valuable insight to inform our
understanding of constitutional principles. See E. Peters,
[supra, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 264] (‘In defining and enacting
constitutional bills of rights, state and national constitu-
encies would, of course, have drawn [on] the experience of
the common law. . . . Just as the precepts of the common
law influence the style of constitutional adjudication in
[common-law] courts, so common law case law itself is
part of our “usable past.” ’).” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 276 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As discussed
previously in this opinion, our state incorporated the
English common-law offense of libel because it “tends
to create ill-blood, and cause a disturbance of the public
peace.” State v. Avery, supra, 7 Conn. 269. Further,
“Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift included the common-
law offense of provocation to breach of the peace in the
second volume of his digest [of the state’s laws] published
in 1823. See 2 Z. Swift, [supra] pp. 340–41. At the very
least, Connecticut common law embraced the principle
that speech that tended to cause a breach of the peace was
illegitimate, even if it did not acknowledge such conduct
as a basis for criminal liability. Indeed, this very rationale
undergirds the fighting words doctrine. See Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 573 (noting that it
is within domain of state power to punish ‘words likely
State v. Sidiropoulos

to cause a breach of the peace’).” (Footnotes omitted.)
State v. Baccala, supra, 277 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Our framers ratified our first state constitution in 1818
after Chief Justice Swift led the call for a constitutional
convention to codify the freedoms that Connecticut
recognized across its statutes and common law. See W.
Horton, The Connecticut State Constitution (2d Ed.
2012) pp. 12, 24. Connecticut’s framers often refer-
enced the social compact theory,30 which “posits that
all individuals are born with certain natural rights and
that people, in freely consenting to be governed, enter a
social compact with their government by virtue of which
they relinquish certain individual liberties in exchange
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and
estates.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v.
Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 598, 660 A.2d 742 (1995).31
The text of much of Connecticut’s individual rights set
forth in article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution
was taken verbatim from the Mississippi constitution of
1817. W. Horton, supra, p. 54. The constitutional con-
vention debates reflect some hesitancy in including the
qualifying language, “being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty,” but this provision ultimately was included.
Id. The constitutional convention debates surrounding
30
Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All
men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges
from the community.”
Connecticut jurists used the state constitution as a vehicle to memorial-
ize “general statements of equal justice” and left many rights “scattered
among the statutes at appropriate places.” C. Collier, “The Connecticut
Declaration of Rights Before the Constitution of 1818: A Victim of
Revolutionary Redefinition,” 15 Conn. L. Rev. 87, 93–94 (1982). As
such, jurists viewed the common law as “more than judicial precedent
and case law; it included the natural law as well.” Id., 94.
31
Chief Justice Swift was a strong proponent of the social compact
theory. In his leading treatise on Connecticut’s founding, he wrote: “A
slight observation of human nature, will demonstrate that the remarks
which Tacitus, and Voltaire have made respecting the Romans, and the
English, are applicable to all nations. That they can neither bear total
servitude, or total liberty.” (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.)
1 Z. Swift, supra, p. 31.
State v. Sidiropoulos

free speech were limited, but perhaps the most insight-
ful remark came from William Bristol, a representative
from New Haven,32 when he stated: “Every citizen has
the liberty of speaking and writing his sentiments freely,
and it should not be taken away from him; there [is] a
very great distinction between taking away a privilege,
and punishing for an abuse of it—to take away the privi-
lege, is to prevent a citizen from speaking or writing his
sentiments—it is like appointing censors of the press,
who are to revise before publication—but in the other
case everything may go out, which the citizen chooses
to publish, though he shall be liable for what he does
publish.”33 (Emphasis in original.) Id. This statement
in particular is compelling evidence that our framers
valued a balance between individual liberties and order
under the social compact theory.
Despite the clear indication that the framers of our
state constitution valued public peace and criminalized
certain speech or acknowledged causes of action related
thereto, the defendant in the present case limits his
analysis to statutes that criminalize true threats and invi-
tations to fight. The defendant contends that, because
Connecticut courts have rejected originalist approaches
to our state constitution, the fighting words doctrine is
unconstitutional under the preferred approach. Despite
this, the defendant reads early Connecticut statutes
with a focus on the specific language used rather than
the framers’ overall values and intentions. See Palka
v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 123–24, 198 A. 265 (1938)
(focusing analysis on framers’ intent in drafting indi-
vidual rights provisions of Connecticut constitution).
According to the defendant, there are no historical
32
See Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates
Convened at Hartford, August 26, 1818 (1901) p. 8.
33
Our Supreme Court noted in Cologne that “[a] broader proposal which
prohibited the molestation of any person for his opinions on any subject
whatsoever was considered at the [1818 constitutional] convention but
rejected.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 64 n.9.
State v. Sidiropoulos

indicators that fighting words are not protected under
our state constitution.
The defendant points to the following three statutes
that preceded the adoption of the 1818 constitution,
which he claims served as the basis for our modern breach
of the peace statute, as evidence that the fighting words
doctrine had no counterpart in Connecticut prior to 1818:
(1) “An Act to prevent the practice of Duelling,”34 (2)
“An Act against breaking the Peace,”35 and (3) “An Act
against profane Swearing and Cursing.”36 According to
the defendant, this claim is supported by the fact that
these statutes limited only speech that was “threatening
. . . defamatory . . . directly called someone to combat or
. . . called for God to take divine vengeance upon some-
one,” but not “mere name-calling.” The defendant also
contends that “[a] review of these statutes underscores
that any state constitutional exception to free speech for
fighting words should be limited to speech that directly
challenges another to engage in a physical altercation
or lawless action.” We disagree with these contentions.
First, we are not persuaded that these statutes support
a determination that the fighting words doctrine has no
historical roots in Connecticut. As Justice Eveleigh noted
in his concurring opinion in Baccala, “the United States
Supreme Court [in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310
34
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. LIII, § 1,
p. 241, punished “challeng[ing] the person of another, or . . . accept[ing]
any such challenge to fight at sword, pistol, rap[i]er, or other danger-
ous weapons . . . .”
35
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. CXXV,
§ 1, p. 545, punished “disturb[ing], or break[ing] the peace, by tumul-
tuous and offensive carriages, threatening, traducing, quarrelling,
challenging, assaulting, beating, or striking any other person . . . .”
To “traduce” is to “expose to shame or blame by means of falsehood
and misrepresentation.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,
supra, p. 1666.
36
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. CLVI,
§ 1, p. 639, punished “sinfully and wickedly curs[ing] any person . . . .”
The meaning of “curse” in 1808 was “to wish evil to another person, in
the sense of calling down divine wrath upon that person.” M. Margulies,
“Connecticut’s Free Speech Clauses: A Framework and an Agenda,” 65
Conn. B. J. 437, 442 (1991).
State v. Sidiropoulos

U.S. 296] acknowledged Connecticut’s well established
authority to regulate speech that tends to provoke vio-
lence but refined that authority to conform to federal
free speech principles by permitting regulation of only
profane, indecent, or abuse remarks likely to provoke
violence. It was this principle that would become the
foundation of the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky.”
(Emphasis added.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn.
290–91 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). We agree with Justice
Eveleigh that, “[a]t the very least, Connecticut common
law embraced the principle that speech that tended to
cause a breach of the peace was illegitimate, even if it
did not acknowledge such conduct as a basis for criminal
liability. Indeed, this very rationale undergirds the fight-
ing words doctrine. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra, 315 U.S. 573 (noting that it is within the domain
of state power to punish ‘words likely to cause a breach
of the peace’).” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Baccala,
supra, 277 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). Furthermore, the
fighting words doctrine does not apply only to “name-
calling,” as the defendant suggests, but embraces some
of the very types of speech against which these statutes
were designed to protect.
We are equally unpersuaded that our state constitution
should be construed as permitting criminal punishment
of fighting words only if a defendant directly invites a
fight or challenges another to a physical altercation. We
agree with Justice Eveleigh’s conclusion that, “under
[our] state constitution, speech directly challenging
the listener to a fight is not a necessary element of the
fighting words doctrine. Rather, the standard is whether
the speech at issue is so abusive that it would provoke an
ordinary person to respond with immediate violence.”
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 299 (Eveleigh, J.,
concurring).
For these reasons, and taking into account the context
of the social compact theory and the framers’ debates and
State v. Sidiropoulos

values, we conclude that the fifth Geisler factor weighs
in favor of the state.
6
Finally, we address the sixth Geisler factor, which
concerns “economic and sociological, or public policy,
considerations.” State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 379.
The defendant advances three arguments under this fac-
tor, namely, that (1) “ ‘evolving standards of decency’ ”
favor reworking the fighting words doctrine, as today’s
society presents more opportunities than ever to speak
one’s mind without fear of violence or retaliation, (2)
other avenues of relief, such as social consequences or
civil actions, remove the need for criminalizing fighting
words, and (3) the fighting words doctrine “creates a
special risk of being applied in a discriminatory manner
because the police, prosecutor, and court must engage
in stereotyping in order to convict.” The state counters
by arguing that the fighting words doctrine is limited to
preserving public peace.37 We address the defendant’s
arguments in turn.
In support of his contention that today’s society offers
more freedom to speak one’s mind without fear of vio-
lence, the defendant relies on a case concerning the West-
boro Baptist Church (Westboro), a religious congregation
“espousing the belief [that] God is punishing America
due to its sins, particularly its tolerance of homosexual-
ity.” Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir.
37
We note that the state argues that other “liberal democracies” that
give speech more restrictive treatment regularly have high rankings
of being the happiest and least corrupt countries, and that this demon-
strates that “a liberal democracy’s health and vibrancy are not inherently
dependent upon the adoption of libertarian free speech doctrine, thereby
alleviating concern about possible ramifications stemming from an
interpretation of our state constitution in the instant matter that merely
maintains the status quo regarding the ‘fighting words’ doctrine.” In
making this argument, however, the state recognizes that some of the
restrictions on speech in such countries “would plainly be struck down
as unconstitutional” in the United States and that “this court cannot
interpret our state constitution in such a manner that would clearly run
afoul of binding United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the
federal constitution.” We, therefore, find this argument unavailing.
State v. Sidiropoulos

2013). Westboro garnered attention when its members
began picketing in a peaceful manner near the funerals
of American soldiers. Id.; see Snyder v. Phelps, supra,
562 U.S. 448 (“The church frequently communicates
its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the
more than [twenty] years that the members of Westboro
. . . have publicized their message, they have picketed
nearly 600 funerals.”). During those pickets, Westboro’s
members displayed signs with vile messages such as,
“ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ” “ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ”
and “ ‘Priests Rape Boys’ . . . .” Phelps-Roper v. Koster,
supra, 946. No actual violence occurred as a result of
the picketers’ messages. As a result of the protests, the
legislature of the state of Missouri enacted a funeral
protest law that banned picketing and protest activities
within 300 feet of any location at which a funeral is held.
Id., 947. The plaintiff, Shirley Phelps-Roper, a Westboro
member, subsequently brought a declaratory judgment
action concerning the scope and constitutionality of the
new law, which the federal District Court found to be
unconstitutional. Id., 947 and n.2. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed,
concluding that Phelps-Roper’s speech was entitled to
constitutional protection because it was doubtful that her
words were “ ‘inherently likely to provoke violent reac-
tion . . . .’ ” Id., 948; see id. (“[i]n truth, there have been
few to no reported instances of violence associated with
Westboro’s 500 protests at military funerals, undercut-
ting the notion [that] Phelps-Roper’s protests are likely
to cause an average addressee to fight” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Specifically, the court stated that
it found the lack of violence at Westboro protests, the
lack of evidence indicating that Phelps-Roper intended to
incite violence, and that Westboro’s protests concerned
matters of public importance to be compelling evidence
that Phelps-Roper’s speech did not amount to fighting
words. See id. Notably, however, in its analysis the court
recognized the fighting words doctrine, stating that
“a [s]tate may punish those words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
State v. Sidiropoulos

breach of the peace.”38 (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. Phelps-Roper, therefore, does not advance the
defendant’s argument.
The defendant further contends that, “[r]egardless
of emotional and psychic harm, modern civility has
changed, and it is less likely for a person to respond with
violence now than in the past”; therefore, he contends
that this “antiquated” doctrine does not comport with
Connecticut’s constitutional free speech provisions.
(Emphasis omitted.) In support of this argument, the
defendant cites the majority opinion in Baccala, which
found that “public discourse has become more coarse. [I]n
this day and age, the notion that any set of words are so
provocative that they can reasonably be expected to lead
an average listener to immediately respond with physical
violence is highly problematic.” (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 239. Our Supreme Court later noted in
Liebenguth, however, that “[t]o whatever extent public
discourse in general may have coarsened over time . . . it
has not eroded to the point that the racial epithets used
in the present case are any less likely to provoke a vio-
lent reaction today than they were in previous decades.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn.
38
In fact, the court in Phelps-Roper noted that the broad prohibition
in Missouri’s statutes regulating “all ‘picketing and protest activities’
around funerals—not merely those pickets involving fighting words . . .
pose[d] significant problems because the statutes unquestionably reach
protected expression. See, e.g., [Houston v. Hill], 482 U.S. 451, 465,
107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987) (‘This . . . ordinance, however,
is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting
words[.]’); Gooding v. Wilson, [supra, 405 U.S. 523] (‘Our decisions since
Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state power constitutionally to
punish “fighting” words under carefully drawn statutes not also suscep-
tible of application to protected expression.’). For instance, Missouri’s
statutes are unlike that in Maryland, which specifically prohibits speech
‘that is likely to incite or produce an imminent breach of the peace,’
Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law, § 10-205 (b) (2011), or that in Virginia,
which prohibits disruptions of funerals with speech which ‘has a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person or persons at whom,
individually, the disruption is directed,’ Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415 (B)
(ii) (2006).” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Phelps-Roper v.
Koster, supra, 713 F.3d 948–49.
State v. Sidiropoulos

709. Thus, we find unavailing the defendant’s argument
that public discourse has become so coarse that listeners
are unlikely to respond to vile racial slurs with violence.
Next, the defendant contends that alternative avenues
for relief, such as social consequences and private law-
suits, eliminate the need to criminalize fighting words.
Specifically, the defendant argues that, because this
type of language carries heavy social consequences, such
as the ending of friendships and the loss of business
relationships, and a private person can initiate a civil
action, criminalization “should not be the first response
to offensive language.” We do not agree.
In Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held
that, despite ample evidence of the plaintiff’s emotional
distress to support his claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress resulting from picket signs held
by the defendants during his son’s funeral, he could
not recover tort damages from the defendants because
their speech, which involved a matter of public concern,
was protected under the first amendment. See Snyder
v. Phelps, supra, 562 U.S. 456 (“The record makes clear
that the applicable legal term—‘emotional distress’—
fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice
added to [the plaintiff’s] already incalculable grief. But
Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters
of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public
street. Such space occupies a ‘special position in terms
of [f]irst [a]mendment protection.’ ”).
We also disagree that creating a real likelihood of
immediate violence can be deterred solely through social
consequences or civil actions. The defendant does not
present any authority that social consequences can com-
pensate for the state’s strong interest in protecting public
peace and safety. Instead, the defendant argues that we
should find the fighting words doctrine unconstitutional
because it requires the court to stereotype speakers and
addressees, which is better handled outside of criminal
court. That claim notwithstanding, we cannot conclude
that this outweighs the government’s strong interest in
State v. Sidiropoulos

preserving public peace and safety, which has been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court. See State v.
Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 290 (Eveleigh, J., concurring)
(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 311).
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine strikes a proper
balance between “individual expressive liberties and the
responsibility not to abuse such liberties.” State v. Bac-
cala, supra, 279 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As the state
notes in its appellate brief, the fighting words doctrine
is already an extremely narrowly defined “regulation
on certain incendiary speech,” the “slight social value”
of which “is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Finally, the defendant argues that “the fighting words
doctrine creates a special risk of being applied in a dis-
criminatory manner because the police, prosecutor,
and court must engage in stereotyping to convict,” and
that the lack of clarity in the doctrine “creates an even
greater risk that people in minority communities may be
arrested, prosecuted, and convicted due to police, pros-
ecutors, and judges engaging in harmful stereotyping.”
This, the defendant asserts, is contrary to Connecticut’s
“significant interest in protecting minority communities
from harmful stereotyping.”
The defendant also relies on Justice Ecker’s concur-
rence in Liebenguth to support his position. Specifically,
Justice Ecker expressed concerns that the fighting words
“doctrine . . . confers or withdraws constitutional protec-
tion depending on the demographic characteristics of the
relevant individuals” and that “part of the constitutional
analysis is an assessment of the addressee’s physical
abilities and aggressive tendencies . . . .” (Emphasis in
original.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 736–
37 (Ecker, J., concurring). Justice Ecker found one of
the fundamental problems with the doctrine, as it has
been applied in Connecticut, to be that it “invites—even
requires—stereotyping on the basis of age, gender, race,
and whatever other demographic characteristic the adju-
dicator explicitly or implicitly relies to decide whether
State v. Sidiropoulos

a person is likely to respond to offensive language with
immediate violence”; id., 737; and, thus, “ ‘contains an
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement . . .
.’ ” Id., 743. These concerns are consistent with those
expressed by Justice Kahn in her separate concurrence in
Liebenguth, in which she stated that “[c]onsidering the
stereotypes associated with immutable characteristics
of the addressee . . . produces discriminatory results
‘because . . . application [of the fighting words doctrine]
depends on assumptions about how likely a listener is
to respond violently to speech’ ”; id., 723–24 (Kahn,
J., concurring); and “essentially requires courts to pro-
mulgate stereotypes on the basis of race, gender, age,
disability, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among
others, and has led to much of the scholarly criticism
of the fighting words exception.”39 Id., 724; see also C.
Calvert, “Taking the Fight Out of Fighting Words on
the Doctrine’s Eightieth Anniversary: What ‘N’ Word
Litigation Today Reveals About Assumptions, Flaws
and Goals of a First Amendment Principle in Disarray,”
87 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 537–41 (2022) (discussing concerns
raised by Justice Kahn and Justice Ecker in concurring
opinions in Liebenguth).
We, as well, are troubled by the stereotyping that
necessarily occurs when the fighting words doctrine,
as currently formulated by the United States Supreme
Court, is applied under the federal constitution, which
increases the potential for discriminatory enforcement.
And, although “we must adhere to the fighting words
doctrine until the United States Supreme Court says
otherwise” in the context of claims raised pursuant to
the federal constitution, these public policy concerns
bear on our determination of whether fighting words
are protected under our state constitution. See Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed.
2d 762 (1995) (“[t]here is a ‘significant state interest in
39
See, e.g., C. Carlson & T. Buchan, “Fighting Words: A Women’s
Issue?” 29 Comm. L. & Policy 129, 131 (2024) (addressing whether and
how gender influences court’s “analyses of the likelihood that a victim
of potential fighting words will respond with immediate violence”).
State v. Sidiropoulos

eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination’ ”);
Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260
Conn. 691, 706, 802 A.2d 731 (2002) (“there exists a
general public policy in [Connecticut] to eliminate all
forms of invidious discrimination”).
Aside from the concerns regarding stereotyping and
the potential for discriminatory enforcement, we agree
with Justice Eveleigh that deterring speech that con-
stitutes fighting words “does not limit the freedom of
expression but rather, the breach of the peace statute,
as limited by the fighting words doctrine, fosters free-
dom of expression. See State v. Weber, 6 Conn. App.
407, 416, 505 A.2d 1266 (‘[t]he public policy inherent
in [the breach of the peace] statute is not to prevent
the free expression of ideas, but to promote a peaceful
environment wherein all human endeavors, including
the free expression of ideas, may flourish’), cert. denied,
199 Conn. 810, 508 A.2d 771 (1986). . . . [T]he fight-
ing words doctrine strikes the appropriate balance. It
permits the state to regulate speech that is so abusive
and hurtful that it will provoke an immediate violent
response, while protecting harsh but less hurtful speech
that has cognizable expressive value.” (Citations omit-
ted; footnote omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 295–96 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As Justice
Eveleigh explained: “To begin with, abusive language
and epithets are not entirely harmless expression. Indeed,
there is certain speech that does more than just offend
sensibilities or merely cause someone to bristle. One
commentator has observed the following about abusive
language: ‘Often a speaker consciously sets out to wound
and humiliate a listener. He aims to make the other feel
degraded and hated, and chooses words to achieve that
effect. In what they accomplish, insults of this sort are
a form of psychic assault; they do not differ much from
physical assaults, like slaps or pinches, that cause no real
physical hurt. Usually, the speaker believes the listener
possesses the characteristics that are indicated by his
humiliating and wounding remarks, but the speaker
selects the most abusive form of expression to impose
State v. Sidiropoulos

the maximum hurt. His aim diminishes the expressive
importance of the words.’ . . . K. Greenawalt, ‘Insults
and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?’ 42 Rutgers
L. Rev. 287, 293 (1990); see also Taylor v. Metzger,
[supra, 152 N.J. 503] (‘ “The experience of being called
‘nigger,’ ‘spic,’ ‘Jap,’ or ‘kike’ is like receiving a slap in
the face. The injury is instantaneous.” ’). ‘It is precisely
because fighting words inflict injury that they tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. Fighting words
cause injury through visceral aggression and by attack-
ing the target’s rights. Individuals who are injured in
this way have a strong tendency to respond on the same
level, even though that response may itself be wrongful.’
. . . S. Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into
the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression,’
78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275, 1372 (1998).” State v. Baccala,
supra, 294–95 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Accordingly, we find that the public policy factor
weighs only in part in favor of the defendant’s posi-
tion that our state constitution should and does protect
fighting words.
7
To summarize, we conclude that the Geisler factors
do not support the defendant’s theory that the fighting
words doctrine is incompatible with the protections
afforded under the Connecticut constitution. Connecti-
cut has historically recognized a strong interest in keep-
ing public peace and safety. The language of article first,
§ 4, of the Connecticut constitution requires speakers
to bear responsibility for the abuse of free speech privi-
leges. Further, beginning with colonial precedent, Con-
necticut jurisprudence consistently has supported the
state’s strong interest in keeping public peace and safety.
Indeed, one of the earliest federal precedents related to
the fighting words doctrine came from Connecticut. The
defendant’s reliance on Oregon case law and recent state-
ments from our Supreme Court justices in concurring
opinions does not persuade us that the framers of our
state constitution intended to allow individuals to say
State v. Sidiropoulos

hurtful and vile things and take no legal responsibility
when those words are likely to incite an immediate vio-
lent reaction by an ordinary person. On the contrary, our
“state’s constitution expressly contemplates holding a
citizen responsible for the abuse of expressive liberty. See
Conn. Const., art. I, § 4. . . . [T]his state has historically
embraced a civil libertarian philosophy that is permis-
sive of government regulation of the abuse of expressive
liberties when such abuse tends toward a breach of the
peace.” State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 297 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring). “[T]he Connecticut constitution does not
demand that citizens should be forced to bear extreme
personal denigration—abuse that pushes a person to
the brink of violence—so that others may freely employ
wanton vilification as a form of expression.” Id., 299.
Furthermore, although public policy considerations
regarding stereotyping and the potential for discrimi-
natory enforcement under the fighting words doctrine
weigh in favor of the defendant’s position, we are not
convinced that those public policy concerns, when con-
sidered in connection with all of the Geisler factors, sup-
port a determination that the Connecticut constitution
protects fighting words. This is especially so in light
of the state’s strong interest in protecting peace and
public safety, long-standing Connecticut jurisprudence
punishing speech that amounts to fighting words, and
the recent application of the fighting words doctrine in
the first amendment context in Liebenguth. Therefore,
we conclude that the Geisler factors do not support the
defendant’s contention that the broader protections for
speech under the state constitution extend to fighting
words.
II
The defendant next claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is
unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to
the facts of this case. The defendant did not raise these
claims before the trial court and, therefore, seeks review
of his unpreserved claims pursuant to State v. Golding,
supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. As stated previously in this
State v. Sidiropoulos

opinion, “[u]nder Golding, a defendant can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record
is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Benson, supra, 235 Conn. App. 603.
We conclude that the record is adequate for review of
the defendant’s claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconsti-
tutionally vague on its face and as applied to this case;
see State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 800–801, 640
A.2d 986 (1994) (for record to be adequate for appellate
review of claim that statute is facially vague, record
must reflect that defendant was convicted under statute
in question, and with respect to claim that statute is
vague as applied, record must further reflect conduct
that formed basis of defendant’s conviction); and that
the claims are of constitutional magnitude. See State v.
Billings, supra, 217 Conn. App. 24 n.15 (claim “asserting
a violation of the defendant’s right to freedom of speech
. . . is of constitutional magnitude” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). We, thus, proceed to the third prong
of Golding—whether the defendant has demonstrated
the existence of a constitutional violation—keeping in
mind that, “[w]hen assessing the constitutionality of
a statute, we exercise de novo review and make every
presumption in favor of the statute’s validity. . . . We
are also mindful that legislative enactments carry with
them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and
that a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly
enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 26. Moreover,
we also “take into account any prior interpretations that
[our Supreme Court] [and this court] . . . have placed on
State v. Sidiropoulos

the statute,” and we “may also add interpretive gloss to
a challenged statute in order to render it constitutional.
In construing a statute, the court must search for an
effective and constitutional construction that reason-
ably accords with the legislature’s underlying intent.”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano, supra, 805–806.
A
The defendant first claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) “is
unconstitutionally vague on its face because the fighting
words doctrine no longer provides clear guidance as to
what conduct” is prohibited. Specifically, he contends
that “the fighting words doctrine has become increasingly
convoluted and case-specific,” as “[i]t does not provide a
fair warning of what is prohibited,” and that the test for
fighting words has become too subjective, rendering the
statute devoid of a core meaning. In other words, accord-
ing to the defendant, “a reasonable person would need to
guess at the meaning of the terms to understand what
kind of conduct the legislature intended to proscribe.”
We disagree.40
“A statute . . . [that] forbids or requires conduct in
terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process. . . . Laws
must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly. . . . A statute is not void for vagueness
unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional,
making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . .
[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central
precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a gov-
erning statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless
40
We note that the defendant has raised his vagueness challenge to
the statute pursuant to the federal constitution rather than our state
constitution. Accordingly, this court is “bound by applicable United
States Supreme Court precedents regarding the vagueness principle”
and is “not free to interpret the federal constitution so as to recognize
greater rights than the United States Supreme Court has specifically
refrained from recognizing.” State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 802.
State v. Sidiropoulos

law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be
fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness
since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vague-
ness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk
uncertainties. . . . References to judicial opinions involv-
ing the statute, the common law, legal dictionaries, or
treatises may be necessary to ascertain a statute’s mean-
ing to determine if it gives fair warning. . . . Thus, even
[a] facially vague law may . . . comport with due process
if prior judicial decisions have provided the necessary
fair warning and ascertainable enforcement standards.
State v. Ares, 345 Conn. 290, 303–304, 284 A.3d 967
(2022); see also State v. Charles L., 217 Conn. App. 380,
395–96, 288 A.3d 664, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 920, 291
A.3d 607 (2023).” (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Russo, 221 Conn. App. 729,
749 n.16, 303 A.3d 279 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024); see also State v. Caracoglia,
134 Conn. App. 175, 180, 38 A.3d 226 (2012) (“[A] penal
statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . .
. [I]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute
[must] afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited
. . . and must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
“A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a
person must inquire further as to the precise reach of
its prohibitions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Michael R., 346 Conn. 432, 457, 291 A.3d 567,
cert. denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 211, 217 L. Ed. 2d 89
(2023). “[O]ur case law makes clear that the statute at
issue need only give fair warning to those who are poten-
tially subject to it. . . . To that end, [t]he proscription of
the activity . . . need not be definite as to all aspects of
State v. Sidiropoulos

its scope.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219, 244, 177 A.3d
1113 (2018). “We examine the words of the statute and
prior judicial gloss put on it to determine whether the
statute gives proper notice of the conduct it proscribes so
that it does not impinge on free speech rights guaranteed
by the first amendment to the United States constitu-
tion.” State v. Caracoglia, supra, 134 Conn. App. 181.
Section 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A per-
son is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree
when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person .
. . (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language
or makes an obscene gesture . . . . For purposes of this
section, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or
held out for use by the public whether owned or oper-
ated by public or private interests.” (Emphasis added.)
As explained by our Supreme Court in Liebenguth, for
an appellate court to determine whether language that
is “no doubt ‘abusive’ under the commonly understood
meaning of that term . . . is entitled to constitutional
protection . . . we apply the judicial gloss necessary to
limit the reach of the breach of the peace statute to ensure
that it comports with constitutional requirements. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 234, 251 (placing
gloss on § 53a-181 (a) (5) to avoid possibility of conviction
founded on constitutionally protected speech). For pres-
ent purposes, ‘the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech requires that [§ 53a-181 (a) (5)] be confined to
language [that], under the circumstances of its utterance,
constitutes [unprotected] fighting words—those [that]
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.’ . . . ‘Accordingly,
to establish the defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a)
(5) . . . in light of its constitutional gloss, the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s words were likely to provoke an imminent
violent response’ under the circumstances in which they
State v. Sidiropoulos

were uttered.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 697–98.
This court previously rejected a vagueness challenge
to § 53a-181 (a) (5) in State v. Caracoglia, 78 Conn. App.
98, 826 A.2d 192, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d
65 (2003), in which the defendant raised a nearly identi-
cal claim as the one raised in the present case, namely,
that § 53a-181 (a) (5) “has become unconstitutionally
vague,” as the “ ‘fighting words’ ” judicial gloss “creates
an inherent ambiguity about the meaning of ‘the use of
abusive or obscene language in a public place’ . . . .” Id.,
105. The defendant in Caracoglia also asserted that “our
courts have introduced confusion into the definition of
fighting words under Connecticut’s breach of the peace
statute [in that it] fails to provide notice of what conduct
is proscribed under subdivision (a) (1) as opposed to (a)
(5) . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 108.
This court rejected those arguments and concluded, on
the basis of the language of the statute, that “the dis-
tinction that may be drawn between the ‘fighting words’
as contemplated under subdivision (1) and those under
subdivision (5) can be found ‘under the totality of the
circumstances,’ as expressed in [State v. Szymkiewicz,
supra, 237 Conn. 618–22],41 which gives rise to the use
of the words. Subdivision (1) proscribes fighting words
uttered in a violent, tumultuous or threatening manner
. . . whereas subdivision (5) proscribes fighting words
that tend to induce immediate violence by the person or
persons to whom the words are uttered because of their
raw effect. The core meaning of subdivision (5) remains
41
In Szymkiewicz, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
§ 53a-181 (a) (1), the subdivision of the breach of the peace statute that
applies to a person who “[e]ngages in fighting or in violent, tumultu-
ous or threatening behavior in a public place,” proscribes only physical
conduct or whether it also includes speech that constitutes fighting
words. State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 237 Conn. 614. The court concluded
that “[s]ubdivision (1) of § 53a-181 (a) proscribes speech that properly
can be characterized as fighting words when, under the totality of the
circumstances, that speech amounts to ‘violent, tumultuous or threat-
ening behavior’ that portends violence, while subdivision (5) proscribes
‘abusive or obscene language.’” Id., 622.
State v. Sidiropoulos

intact; fighting words may arise in different contexts not
confined to abusive or obscene language. We therefore
must conclude that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is not unconstitution-
ally vague.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote
added.) State v. Caracoglia, supra, 109–10.
In light of this court’s decision in State v. Caracoglia,
supra, 78 Conn. App. 109–10, we reject the defendant’s
facial vagueness challenge to § 53a-181 (a) (5). “[I]t is
axiomatic that one panel of this court cannot overrule
the precedent established by a previous panel’s holding .
. . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. White,
215 Conn. App. 273, 304–305, 283 A.3d 542 (2022),
cert. denied, 346 Conn. 918, 291 A.3d 108 (2023). This
court in Caracoglia specifically found that § 53a-181
(a) (5) has a core meaning and that the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Caracoglia, supra,
110–11. The defendant’s claims to the contrary, thus,
necessarily fail. Moreover, the defendant has not referred
to Caracoglia in his appellate briefs or made any attempt
to distinguish it.
Furthermore, the defendant’s facial vagueness chal-
lenge fails in light of the judicial gloss courts apply to
§ 53a-181 (a) (5), which necessarily limits “the reach of
the breach of the peace statute to ensure that it comports
with constitutional requirements.” State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 698. This court and our Supreme Court
have applied that judicial gloss numerous times since the
statute’s inception. It appears that the defendant would
like this court to conduct a new analysis and place a new
gloss on the statute, which we decline to do, as we are
bound to apply the fighting words doctrine as currently
formulated by the United States Supreme Court and as
applied by our Supreme Court.42 See footnote 17 of this
42
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant asserts that our
Supreme Court’s “latest decision in Liebenguth only served to further
confuse and tangle the already confusing doctrine by prohibiting the
words ‘fucking nigger’ by looking at the case-specific context and ‘a host
of factors’ that do not provide clear guidance.” He further contends
that “[a] defendant cannot be expected to make the same analysis as
the court did in Liebenguth in order to know whether or not his speech
State v. Sidiropoulos

opinion; see also State v. Liebenguth, supra, 725 (Ecker,
J., concurring).
We acknowledge that the defendant’s argument con-
cerning the fact-specific and subjective nature of the
fighting words doctrine and how that has the potential
to affect the adequacy of notice of what is prohibited
is not entirely without merit. Indeed, Justice Ecker
expressed similar concerns in his concurring opinion in
Liebenguth. Specifically, Justice Ecker found one of the
fundamental problems with the fighting words doctrine
to be “that such an intensely contextualized, fact-specific,
and inherently subjective analysis in the area of free
speech creates major constitutional concerns under due
process vagueness principles.”43 State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 743 (Ecker, J., concurring). Because
the defendant in Liebenguth did not challenge § 53a-181
(a) (5) on vagueness grounds, however, Justice Ecker
did not determine “whether the statute is saved by [our
Supreme Court’s] narrowing construction, which limits
its coverage to fighting words as [our Supreme Court has]
defined that term . . . .” Id., 744–45. He noted, however,
that the majority opinion in Liebenguth has “not made
that future task any easier”; id., 745; and, ultimately,
“agree[d] with the majority that, under our current first
amendment case law,” the words spoken by the defendant
in Liebenguth under the circumstances in that case “fit
is protected.” For the reasons stated in this opinion and because we are
bound by Liebenguth, we reject these arguments.
43
In light of what he described as the untenable nature of the fight-
ing words doctrine, Justice Ecker urged the United States Supreme
Court to adopt “a more sensible first amendment framework”; State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 725 (Ecker, J., concurring); observing
that our Supreme Court’s “own recent experience applying the fight-
ing words doctrine, as well as the many similar cases adjudicated by
state courts around the country, powerfully illustrates why the United
States Supreme Court should consider fashioning a more defensible
and administrable first amendment framework for deciding when the
government may criminalize the kind of hate speech uttered by the
defendant in the present case.” Id., 745–46.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the bill” as fighting words. (Emphasis added.) Id., 746
(Ecker, J., concurring).
Likewise, in the present case, in light of the judicial
gloss applied to § 53a-181 (a) (5), which our Supreme
Court in Liebenguth confirmed “limit[s] the reach of the
breach of the peace statute to ensure that it comports
with constitutional requirements”; id., 698; we cannot
conclude that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Although this precise issue was not before the court in
Liebenguth, its statements surrounding the judicial gloss
applied to § 53a-181 (a) (5) and its application of the gloss
to conclude that the speech at issue in that case consti-
tuted fighting words within the meaning of the statute,
lead us to conclude that the gloss sufficiently limits the
reach of the statute so as to be consistent with constitu-
tional requirements, which include fair notice of what
is prohibited. For that reason, we cannot conclude that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague when inter-
preted in the context of the judicial gloss as currently
formulated by the United States Supreme Court and as
applied by our Supreme Court. In light of our determi-
nation, the defendant has not established the existence
of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding with
respect to his facial vagueness claim. Accordingly, the
defendant’s unpreserved facial vagueness challenge to
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) fails.
B
We now turn to the defendant’s unpreserved claim that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the facts of this case. Specifically, the defendant claims
that (1) § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied because he did not have “fair warning to know
what is prohibited,” and (2) “the law does not provide
explicit standards to law enforcement officials, judges,
State v. Sidiropoulos

and juries so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
application . . . .”44 We disagree.
“The proper test for determining [whether] a statute
is vague as applied is whether a reasonable person would
have anticipated that the statute would apply to his or her
particular conduct. . . . The test is objectively applied to
the actor’s conduct and judged by a reasonable person’s
reading of the statute. . . . If the language of a statute
fails to provide definite notice of prohibited conduct,
fair warning can be provided by prior judicial opinions
involving the statute . . . or by an examination of whether
a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably know
what acts are permitted or prohibited by the use of his
common sense and ordinary understanding.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mansfield, 201 Conn.
App. 748, 758, 243 A.3d 822 (2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 910, 244 A.3d 561 (2021). “To demonstrate that
44
The defendant also claims that, if § 53a-181 (a) (5) is found to be
constitutional as applied, “it will create a ‘chilling’ effect that will
lead citizens to steer ‘far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’”
We conclude that the defendant has failed to brief this claim adequately
and, accordingly, decline to review it. “ ‘We repeatedly have stated
that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning
an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judi-
ciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the
parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.
. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing
the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited.’ . . . .
‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned and
not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately
briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no men-
tion of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record .
. . .’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Roberts, 227 Conn. App. 159, 185–86,
320 A.3d 989, cert. granted, 350 Conn. 915, 324 A.3d 792 (2024). The
defendant’s briefing for this claim consists of one short paragraph that
contains conclusory assertions about the alleged “chilling effect” on
“other people’s expression” resulting from his conviction in this case.
Aside from a single citation to a law review article for the proposition
that speech is a precious but fragile right, the defendant provides no
authority or legal analysis regarding this claim. Therefore, we decline
to address this claim.
State v. Sidiropoulos

[a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him,
the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what
was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 757–58.
In the present case, the defendant first argues that he
was not provided with fair warning that his use of racial
epithets toward a multiracial individual is prohibited by
§ 53a-181 (a) (5). The defendant correctly asserts that, as
the fighting words doctrine has evolved over the years,
our courts have recognized that public discussion has
become coarser. Indeed, public discussion has become
so coarse that our Supreme Court has found some of
the most vile insults not to be fighting words under the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 236, 256 (defendant’s reference to
store manager as “ ‘fat ugly bitch’ ” and “ ‘cunt’ ” did not
constitute fighting words); see also State v. Parnoff, 329
Conn. 412–13 (Kahn, J., concurring in the judgment).
Despite this evolution, in Liebenguth, which was decided
in 2020—nearly three years before the circumstances
underlying the present case—our Supreme Court stated
that “[t]o whatever extent public discourse in general may
have coarsened over time . . . it has not eroded to the point
that the racial epithets used in the present case are any
less likely to provoke a violent reaction today than they
were in previous decades.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 709. Significantly, the language at issue in
Liebenguth—“ ‘fucking niggers’ ”—is substantially simi-
lar to the words uttered by the defendant in the present
case, namely, “ ‘stupid nigger,’ ” which undermines the
defendant’s claim that he had no notice “that his speech
was not protected speech.”45
To be clear, our Supreme Court in Liebenguth did not
hold, nor are we holding in the present case, that the
45
We find unavailing the defendant’s contention that his speech
“was more akin to the protected speech in Baccala than the speech in
Liebenguth.” (Emphasis in original.)
State v. Sidiropoulos

mere utterance of the word “nigger” by itself, despite
its vile and reprehensible nature, is sufficient to fall
outside the protection of the first amendment. The words
at issue must be examined in the context in which they
were uttered for a court to determine whether they were
likely to provoke an imminent, violent reaction. Again,
the defendant takes issue with that standard, arguing
that it requires “a defendant to have a crystal ball to see
into the future in order to determine if his speech is likely
to produce a violent reaction.” For the reasons already
stated herein, we are not at liberty to change or discard
the standard. With respect to the present case, we con-
clude, in light of Liebenguth, that a reasonable person
in the defendant’s position would have anticipated that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) would prohibit the uttering of the words
“stupid nigger” to a multiracial person, repeatedly and
in a loud manner in a confined space in which the speaker
blocked the only exit for the addressee while shouting
the racial epithet. See State v. Mansfield, supra, 201
Conn. App. 758.
The defendant also suggests that this court should fol-
low a decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
“found that a city ordinance banning ‘indecent, insult-
ing, immoral or obscene conduct in any public place’
did not give adequate forewarning that referencing a
person by a racial slur . . . may rise to the level of fight-
ing words.” See People v. Barton, 253 Mich. App. 601,
607, 659 N.W.2d 654 (2002). This claim requires little
discussion. Connecticut Supreme Court precedent—
Liebenguth—construed the same statute at issue in
the present case, § 53a-181 (a) (5), to similar words and
concluded that the words “fucking niggers” were fight-
ing words under the circumstances in which they were
uttered. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 708.
That decision, in which our Supreme Court noted that
the word “ ‘nigger’ ” “has been characterized as ‘the most
provocative, emotionally-charged and explosive term in
the [English] language” in light of its inextricable link
to “ ‘racial hatred and bigotry’ ” and its “ ‘degrading and
humiliating’ ” nature; id., 705; governs our analysis and
State v. Sidiropoulos

resolution of this claim and provides adequate warning
that referring to a person with a racial slur can consti-
tute fighting words. With binding precedent from our
state’s highest court, we need not look to the courts of
other states for guidance concerning this issue.
The defendant next argues that the law does not pro-
vide explicit standards to law enforcement officials,
judges, and juries to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
application. To establish his claim that § 53a-181 (a) (5)
is unconstitutional as applied to him due to arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, the defendant must
demonstrate “that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mansfield, supra,
201 Conn. App. 758. In the present case, the defendant,
instead, discusses the general dangers inherent in the
statute’s vagueness, in that “judgment can vary widely
across different legal actors,” and, he speculates, without
any authority, that “it is entirely likely that [he] would
not have been arrested by a different police officer called
to the scene, would not have been prosecuted by a differ-
ent prosecutor in a different courthouse, and would not
have been convicted by a different judge.” Speculation
and conjecture are not sufficient to establish the existence
of a constitutional violation. See generally Breton v.
Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 470, 196
A.3d 789 (2018) (“mere speculation or conjecture . . .
will not suffice to establish a violation of the [e]x [p]ost
[f]acto [c]lause” of federal constitution (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Therefore, the defendant’s claim
that the statute is vague because it has been applied to
him in an arbitrary manner fails.
To establish his claim that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant
had to “demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that
[he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or
that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Mansfield, supra, 201 Conn. App. 757–58. On the
State v. Sidiropoulos

basis of our analysis, we conclude that the defendant
has failed to meet that burden. Accordingly, because
the defendant has not demonstrated that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, he has
failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional
violation for purposes of the third prong of Golding as
to this aspect of his vagueness claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
State v. Sidiropoulos

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HARALAMBOS
SIDIROPOULOS
(AC 47230)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of statute
(§ 53a-181 (a) (5)) after an angry confrontation in a dental office, the defen-
dant appealed. The defendant, a white man, repeatedly and loudly yelled
“stupid nigger” at a multiracial dental assistant, M, while in an examination
room with M. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction because the words he uttered to M constituted pro-
tected speech under the first amendment to the United States constitution
and under article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution. Held:

This court concluded that the circumstances at issue warranted a finding that
the defendant’s language constituted fighting words that were not protected
under the first amendment and, thus, provided a sufficient basis to support
the defendant’s conviction, as they were likely to provoke an immediate
violent reaction from a reasonable person in M’s position.

The defendant’s unpreserved claim that his speech was protected under
article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the state constitution failed under State v.
Golding (213 Conn. 233), as this court applied the multifactor approach to
state constitutional interpretation under State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672)
and concluded that the Geisler factors did not support the defendant’s con-
tention that the broader protections for speech under the state constitution
extended to fighting words.

The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, this court having previously found
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, which the defendant did not
challenge on appeal, and the judicial gloss courts have applied to § 53a-181
(a) (5) limits its reach to unprotected fighting words so as to ensure that it
comports with constitutional requirements, which include fair notice of what
is prohibited; accordingly, the defendant failed to established the existence
of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding.

The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct, as a reasonable
person in his position would have anticipated that repeatedly and loudly
uttering “stupid nigger” in a confined space in which the speaker blocked the
only exit for the addressee as he repeatedly shouted the racial epithet would
be prohibited by the statute, and our Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Liebenguth (336 Conn. 685) provided adequate warning that referring to a
person by a racial slur can constitute fighting words; accordingly, because
the defendant did not demonstrate that he had inadequate notice of what
was prohibited under § 53a-181 (a) (5) or that he was the victim of arbitrary
State v. Sidiropoulos

and discriminatory enforcement of the statute, he failed to establish the
existence of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding.

Argued September 8, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of breach of the peace in the
second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the
court, Hernandez, J.; thereafter, the court denied the
defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; finding
of guilty; subsequently, the court vacated the guilty find-
ing as to one count of breach of the peace in the second
degree and rendered judgment of guilty of one count of
breach of the peace in the second degree, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Hope J. Estrella, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek,
state’s attorney, and Michael C. Bivona, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Haralambos Sidiropoulos,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
lowing a trial to the court, of one count of breach of the
peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-181 (a) (5).1 The defendant’s conviction stems from
an angry confrontation he had with a dental assistant
while at a dental office. On appeal, the defendant claims
that (1) the state failed to meet its burden of proof with
1
General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to
cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof, such person . . . (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene
language or makes an obscene gesture . . . . For purposes of this sec-
tion, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or held out for use by
the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

respect to the breach of the peace charge because his
speech was protected under (a) the first amendment to
the United States constitution and (b) article first, §§ 4,
5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution, and (2) § 53a-
181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague (a) on its face and
(b) as applied to the facts of the present case. We affirm
the judgment of conviction.
The following evidence was presented at trial. Natascha
Medina was employed as a per diem dental assistant at a
Columbia Dental, P.C., office (dental office) in Norwalk.
The dental office, which is located within a two-story
office building, is open to the public and accepts both
scheduled and walk-in emergency appointments. Several
businesses besides the dental office are located inside
the building.
Medina’s job functions as a dental assistant included
aiding a dentist during procedures, taking X-rays, and
disinfecting and preparing examination rooms between
patients. She was enrolled in school to become a dental
hygienist, where she was trained to de-escalate dentopho-
bia, also referred to as dental phobia.2 Medina testified
2
The Cleveland Clinic describes dentophobia as “a fear of den-
tists. Someone with dentophobia may have extreme anxiety at the
thought of going to the dentist or while in the dentist’s office.” Cleve-
land Clinic, “Dentophobia (Fear of Dentists),” available at https://
my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/22594-dentophobia-fear-of-
dentists (March 22, 2022) (last visited January 14, 2026).
Medina’s testimony regarding her training relative to dental phobia
was brief and occurred during cross-examination by defense counsel:
“Q. And . . . just a few more questions, okay. And you would agree
that going to the dentist’s office is a pretty nerve-wracking experience
for some people, right?
“A. Yeah, there’s such a thing as dental phobia.
“Q. Oh, I learned something new today. It’s a little tense environment
going into the dentist office, is that correct?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. Would you say it’s a little nerve-wracking for some people, correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You mentioned earlier that [you were] trained to utilize some of
the tools in the room. You mentioned to take X-rays, is that correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. To clean and sterilize the equipment.
“A. Yes.
“Q. To keep the space generally hygienic, that’s correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And have you received any training, or have you been aware of,
you know, de-escalating this sort of dental phobia as you called it?
“A. Uhm, yeah. Not as an assistant but as a hygienist, yeah.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

that she is “half Puerto Rican” and that her father is
“half Italian, half Black.”
On July 17, 2023, the defendant, a white man,3 went
to the dental office for an emergency appointment, com-
plaining of light pain and swelling after his dental crown
had fallen out. The receptionist, Meyely Claudio, asked
the defendant to fill out paperwork while he waited to be
seen. Before the defendant could complete the paperwork,
Medina asked him to come into an examination room so
she could perform X-rays.
Medina brought the defendant into a small examina-
tion room where he sat in a dental chair, completed the
paperwork and gave Medina his dental crown. The room,
measuring roughly ten feet by six feet, contains a single
door, an X-ray machine on a wall, a single window, a com-
puter with a stand, and a dental chair. Medina testified
that the space feels crowded when more than two people
are in the room. Medina did not feel confident in her
ability to take X-rays on her own, so she asked another
dental assistant for help, but the defendant did not want
X-rays4 to be taken.
The defendant then asked that Medina place his eye-
glasses in a safe place for the duration of the appoint-
ment. Medina placed the defendant’s eyeglasses on a
computer stand where patient belongings often were
kept. The defendant believed that this was an unhygienic
place for his glasses and demanded that Medina move
them. He was particularly upset because he felt that he
had been polite. Medina then placed the eyeglasses on a
piece of paper towel on a silver dentistry tray and assured
the defendant that the table was clean and that it would
not be used. Still believing this was an unhygienic place
for his glasses, the defendant jumped up from the dental
chair and began yelling at Medina. First, he angrily asked
Medina, “[w]hy did you put my glasses there?,” before
moving to the only doorway of the room. The defendant
3
See footnote 6 of this opinion.
4
In her testimony, Medina could not recall if X-rays were taken. The
defendant testified that he allowed the X-rays to be taken.
State v. Sidiropoulos

then stood in the doorway, blocking Medina’s exit, and
repeatedly yelled that Medina was a “stupid nigger.”5
Medina described the defendant’s voice as “loud” and
“intimidating . . . .” She testified that, at first, she was
“in shock” and that she was “really nervous” because the
defendant blocked the doorway and leaned toward her as
he yelled at her. Medina estimated that the defendant is
approximately six feet, three inches tall, whereas she is
five feet, nine inches tall. Medina asked that the defen-
dant stop repeating the phrase “stupid nigger,” but the
defendant continued to yell it. Medina cried in response.
At that point, another patient, who is Hispanic and
had been in the waiting room, came to the examination
room. Medina testified that the patient appeared angry
about the situation and told the defendant in a loud
tone of voice that he needed “to calm down and stop it.”
The patient then escorted Medina, who was still crying,
from the room.
Claudio testified that she heard the defendant repeat
the epithet “twice, probably,” from her receptionist’s
desk located approximately ten feet from the examina-
tion room and that he sounded “angry.” Thereafter, the
defendant left the doorway and entered the waiting room,
where he continued yelling. The defendant’s voice became
louder as he exited the examination room. He continued
yelling the “ ‘N’ word” at Medina approximately two
more times while he entered the waiting room. Other
patients exited their examination rooms in response to
5
At trial, Medina initially testified that the defendant had called her a
“fucking nigger” and that he repeated those words “ten or eleven times.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel refreshed Medina’s recollection
with respect to a written statement she had given to the police, in which
she stated that the defendant had called her a “stupid nigger” and
that he did so “over and over again.” Medina thereafter acknowledged
that, in her written statement, she used the words “stupid nigger”
and did not refer to a specific number of times that it was repeated by
the defendant. Defense counsel then requested that Medina’s written
statement be introduced into evidence, for substantive purposes, as a
prior inconsistent statement pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn.
743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93
L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). The court admitted Medina’s statement without
objection by the state.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the commotion caused by the defendant. One of those
patients confronted the defendant, stating, “[w]hat are
you doing?”
The defendant made his way back through the waiting
room while yelling, “[t]his place is bad,” and, “[l]eave
this place,” and making “threats.” He continued yelling
about Medina being “stupid” and asking why she would
put his glasses “there . . . .” Claudio testified that the
defendant then exited the front door of the dental office
after which another assistant locked the door because
“we were all shocked,” and “other patients in the other
[examination] rooms came out because they were, like,
shocked” and “couldn’t believe someone was yelling.”
After the defendant realized that he had left his crown
inside the then locked dental office, he knocked on the
door loudly to retrieve it. Unsuccessful, the defendant
then exited the office building and was standing on the
sidewalk in front of the building when the police arrived.
The responding police officer, Officer Paul Wargo of
the Norwalk Police Department, arrived at the building
in which the dental office was located after receiving a
call about an “unwanted guest.” Wargo first encountered
the defendant outside the building. A video recording
from Wargo’s body camera shows the defendant standing
on the sidewalk looking agitated. After Wargo inquired
about the situation, the defendant angrily responded that
he planned to sue the dental office. Wargo then asked if
the defendant knew why the officer was there, and the
defendant responded, “the Black girl,” before referring
to Medina as a dental assistant. The defendant claimed
that Medina put his glasses on the dentist’s tools, which
made him angry. Wargo thereafter entered the building
and spoke with Medina and Claudio. Wargo asked Medina
to fill out a statement form.
Wargo then exited the building to retrieve a statement
form from his police vehicle and encountered the defen-
dant a second time. Wargo informed the defendant that
he would be issuing a court summons for breach of the
State v. Sidiropoulos

peace due to his conduct inside the dental office.6 The
defendant stated that he called Medina a “stupid nigger”
because “the girl was stupid to me” and “she was playing
nerves.” After issuing the summons to the defendant,
Wargo went back inside the dental office to allow Medina
to complete the statement form. Wargo did not obtain
a statement from any other witnesses, nor did he speak
to any patients in the waiting room.
Subsequently, the defendant was charged in an infor-
mation dated November 1, 2023, with two counts of
breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of
§ 53a-181 (a) (5). Specifically, count one charged that
the defendant, “acting with the intent to cause inconve-
nience, annoyance, or alarm, used abusive language while
in a public place . . . .” Count two charged, alternatively,
that the defendant “recklessly created a risk of causing
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, by using abusive
language while in a public place . . . .” The defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and elected a trial to the
court, which took place on November 16, 2023.
In his case-in-chief, the prosecutor presented testimony
from Medina, Claudio, and Wargo. First, Medina’s testi-
mony recounted her shock and upset because of the defen-
dant’s conduct. Next, Claudio’s testimony recounted the
reactions that she and other patients in the dental office
had in response to the defendant’s conduct, including
that one patient had attempted to intervene. The last
witness for the prosecution was Wargo, who testified
about his encounter with the defendant and verified the
video footage from his body camera.
After the prosecutor rested his case, defense counsel
orally moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the state had not met its burden of demonstrating that
the defendant committed breach of the peace in the sec-
ond degree as charged in the information. Specifically,
defense counsel maintained that, although “nigger” is
a vile, reprehensible epithet to call another individual,
6
The summons that was issued to the defendant includes a “W” in the
box indicating his race.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the defendant’s speech was protected under the first
amendment to the federal constitution. The defendant’s
speech did not constitute “fighting words” because it was
not likely to trigger an imminent violent response by the
average person in Medina’s position and the defendant
did not make any threats or use language that was incit-
ing. In support of this argument, defense counsel asserted
that Medina, as a dental assistant, held an “authoritative
position” that required her “to exercise a higher degree
of restraint.” Defense counsel emphasized that neither
Medina nor anyone else who witnessed the incident
responded with violence to the defendant’s language.
Defense counsel made no argument as to whether the
defendant’s speech was protected under the Connecticut
constitution or whether the breach of the peace statute
was vague on its face or as applied to the facts of this case.
In response, the prosecutor, relying on State v.
Liebenguth, 336 Conn. 685, 250 A.3d 1 (2020), cert.
denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1394, 209 L. Ed. 2d 132
(2021), argued that the circumstances of the incident,
which occurred in a small room in a dental office and
involved the defendant’s repeated use, in a loud tone,
of the epithet, “stupid nigger,” as well as his continued
yelling in the waiting room causing other patients to
exit their examination rooms, removed the defendant’s
words from first amendment protection and constituted
“fighting words.” The prosecutor argued that the defen-
dant’s use of the words, “stupid nigger,” in a tight space
would likely cause a reasonable person to react with
violence, even though Medina did not actually do so.
Thereafter, the court briefly stated its decision orally
on the record. Specifically, the court agreed with the state
that the analysis in Liebenguth was the controlling law
in the present case, pointing out that the circumstances
at issue were “substantially more extreme” than those
presented in Liebenguth. Therefore, the court denied
the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal,
State v. Sidiropoulos

concluding that the defendant’s statements fell outside
the protection of the first amendment.
Subsequently, defense counsel called the defendant to
the witness stand as the only defense witness. The defen-
dant testified that he called Medina a “stupid nigger”
more than once because he was frustrated and that he
continued yelling when he left the examination room and
went to the receptionist’s area. Thereafter, the defense
rested, and the prosecutor and defense counsel made
their closing remarks. After a brief recess, the court
orally rendered its decision.7
The court first found the state’s witnesses credible and
the defendant unpersuasive. Applying Liebenguth, the
court found the defendant guilty of both counts of breach
of the peace in the second degree.8 The court initially
sentenced the defendant on both counts to six months of
incarceration, execution suspended, and eighteen months
7
The record contains a signed transcript of the court’s oral decision
in compliance with Practice Book § 64-1.
8
Specifically, the court stated: “I’ve had an opportunity to look at the
exhibits. I’ve reviewed my notes and reread the information and had
a chance to look over the holdings in the . . . cases provided by defense
counsel. [The defendant] is charged in a two count information with
breach of [the] peace in the second degree, both in violation of § 53a-181
(a) (5). The two counts are under different theories. One is that [the
defendant], acting with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, used abusive language while in a public place. Count two charges
him under the theory that the defendant recklessly created a risk of
causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by using abusive language
while in a public place in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . . The court had
an opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses and assess their
credibility. The court credits and accepts as credible the testimony of the
state’s witnesses. The court was unpersuaded by the testimony of [the
defendant], although, quite frankly, I don’t need to make a credibility
finding with respect to [the defendant] and as much as his testimony
substantially corroborates the testimony of the state’s witnesses. So,
I’ve had an opportunity to apply all of the standards set forth in . . .
Liebenguth and carefully consider them. I find that the state has proven
the elements of each of these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and
viewed through the prism of Liebenguth and the analysis as set forth
therein. The court finds [the defendant] guilty of count one as well as
guilty of count two. And, inasmuch as I believe he acted intentionally
. . . even if it was not intentional, it was clearly reckless.”
State v. Sidiropoulos

of probation with mental health evaluation and treat-
ment at the discretion of the Office of Adult Probation.9
The court, however, stated that it could not “impose a
sentence on two counts for what basically arises out of
the same criminal conduct. [The defendant] cannot be
doubly punished for offenses arising out of the same
conduct. Accordingly, the court is going to vacate the
sentence on count one . . . [a]nd the sentence is imposed
solely with respect to count two.” This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the state failed to
meet its burden of proof with respect to the breach of the
peace charge because his speech was protected under (1)
the first amendment to the United States constitution,
and (2) article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut
constitution. We address these claims in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his conviction of breach of the peace in
the second degree because the words he uttered to Medina
were protected speech under the first amendment to the
United States constitution and, thus, could not form
the basis for a violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5). We disagree
with the defendant.
We first set forth the legal principles that guide our
resolution of this claim. “Under . . . § 53a-181 (a) (5), a
person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree
when, with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm, he uses abusive language in a public place.
That broad statutory proscription, however, is limited
by the free speech provisions of the first amendment
to the United States constitution, which prohibit the
government from ‘restrict[ing] expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content’ . . .
9
Although the court also ordered the defendant to pay a $500 fine, it
remitted the fine after finding that he was unable to pay it.
State v. Sidiropoulos

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S.
564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2002);
thereby protecting speech ‘without regard . . . to the
truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
[that] are offered.’ National Assn. for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445,
83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963). These safeguards,
however, although expansive, are not absolute, and the
United States Supreme Court has long recognized a few
discrete categories of speech that may be prosecuted and
punished, including so-called ‘fighting words’—‘those
personally abusive epithets [that], when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.’ Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d
284 (1971).” (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 687–88.
Our Supreme Court has stated that, when, as in the
present case, “the defendant’s conviction is predicated on
his verbal statements, [a] determination of the sufficiency
of the state’s case necessarily depends on whether those
statements deserve the protection of the first amend-
ment, despite their patently offensive and objectionable
nature. If they do, they cannot serve as the basis for his
conviction, which would have to be reversed for eviden-
tiary insufficiency. The defendant having been charged
with violating § 53a-181 (a) (5) by use of allegedly ‘abusive
. . . language’ . . . we therefore must decide whether his
language, which was no doubt ‘abusive’ under the com-
monly understood meaning of that term, nonetheless
is entitled to constitutional protection. To make that
determination, we apply the judicial gloss necessary to
limit the reach of the breach of the peace statute to ensure
that it comports with constitutional requirements. See
State v. Baccala, [326 Conn. 232, 234, 251, 163 A.3d 1]
(placing gloss on § 53a-181 (a) (5) to avoid possibility of
conviction founded on constitutionally protected speech)
[cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1026, 138 S. Ct. 510, 199 L. Ed.
2d 408 (2017)]. For present purposes, ‘the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech requires that [§ 53a-181
State v. Sidiropoulos

(a) (5)] be confined to language [that], under the cir-
cumstances of its utterance, constitutes [unprotected]
fighting words—those [that] by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.’ . . . State v. Beckenbach, 1 Conn. App. 669, 678,
476 A.2d 591 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 198 Conn.
43, 501 A.2d 752 (1985). ‘Accordingly, to establish the
defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . in light of
its constitutional gloss, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s words
were likely to provoke an imminent violent response’
under the circumstances in which they were uttered. . .
. State v. Baccala, supra, 250–51.” (Citations omitted.)
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 697–98.
Our Supreme Court applies a two part test when “con-
sidering [a] defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support [his] conviction of breach of the
peace in the second degree in accordance with [his] first
amendment rights . . . .” State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 250. As the court in Baccala explained: “First . .
. we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict. See State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237,
254, 947 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970, 129 S.
Ct. 464, 172 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2008). Second, we determine
whether the trier of fact could have concluded from those
facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that the
cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. See id. Accordingly, to establish the
defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5) . . . in light of
its constitutional gloss, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s words
were likely to provoke an imminent violent response from
an average [person in the addressee’s] position. Cf. State
v. Krijger, [313 Conn. 434, 448, 97 A.3d 946 (2014)] (‘[t]o
establish the defendant’s violation of [General Statutes
(Rev. to 2007)] §§ 53a-62 [a] [3] and 53a-181 [a] [3] on the
basis of his statements to [the town attorney], the state
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
State v. Sidiropoulos

those statements represented a true threat’).” (Citation
omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 250–51.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has explained further
that, when, as in the present case, “the state’s case
against the defendant implicates his free speech rights,
several additional principles govern our review of the
issue presented. In certain cases, such as the present one,
in which ‘[the line between speech unconditionally guar-
anteed and speech that may be legitimately regulated]
must be drawn, the rule is that we examine for ourselves
the statements [at] issue and the circumstances under
which they were made to see if they are consistent with
the first amendment.’. . . Id., 251. In other words, ‘the
inquiry into the protected status of . . . speech is one of
law, not fact.’ . . . State v. Parnoff, [329 Conn. 386, 395,
186 A.3d 640 (2018)]. We therefore ‘apply a de novo
standard of review . . . .’ Id.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 698. “Accordingly, we have ‘an obligation to
make an independent examination of the whole record in
order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute
a forbidden intrusion [in] the field of free expression.’ .
. . [State v. Parnoff, supra] 395–96. ‘This independent
scrutiny, however, does not authorize us to make cred-
ibility determinations regarding disputed issues of fact.
Although we review de novo the trier of fact’s ultimate
determination that the statements at issue constituted
[fighting words], we accept all subsidiary credibility
determinations and findings that are not clearly errone-
ous.’ . . . Id., 396.” State v. Liebenguth, supra, 698–99.
The tenets underlying the fighting words doctrine
date to 1940, when the United States Supreme Court
stated: “When clear and present danger of riot, disor-
der, interference with traffic upon the public streets,
or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or pun-
ish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that a state may not
unduly suppress free communication of views, religious
or other, under the guise of conserving desirable condi-
tions.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60
State v. Sidiropoulos

S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The test for unpro-
tected fighting words was first set forth in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.
1031 (1942). In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness was
convicted after he stated to the complainant, “ ‘You are
a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents
of Fascists’ . . . .” Id., 569. The United States Supreme
Court stated that “[t]here are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any [c]onstitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 571–72. The court
explained that fighting words comprise “no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest” in maintaining order. Id., 572. The fighting
words doctrine has evolved over time to better suit cur-
rent social conventions, as courts have “continually
resorted to analyzing provocative expression contextu-
ally . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 238. “A proper contex-
tual analysis requires consideration of the actual cir-
cumstances as perceived by a reasonable speaker and
addressee to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation.” Id., 240.
In explaining the contextual approach in Liebenguth,
our Supreme Court stated: “It is by now well settled that
there are no per se fighting words because words that
are likely to provoke an immediate, violent response
when uttered under one set of circumstances may not
be likely to trigger such a response when spoken in the
context of a different factual scenario. See [id., 238].
Consequently, whether words are fighting words nec-
essarily will depend on the particular circumstances of
their utterance. See id., 239; see also State v. Hoskins,
State v. Sidiropoulos

35 Conn. Supp. 587, 591, 401 A.2d 619 (App. Sess.
1978) (‘The fighting words concept has two aspects. One
involves the quality of the words themselves. The other
concerns the circumstances under which the words are
used.’ . . .). This contextual approach is also ‘a logical
reflection of the way the meaning and impact of words
change over time.’ State v. Baccala, supra, [326 Conn.]
239; see also id. (‘[w]hile calling someone a racketeer or a
fascist might naturally have invoked a violent response
in the 1940s when Chaplinsky was decided, those same
words would be unlikely to even raise an eyebrow today’).
Indeed, due to changing social norms, public discourse
has become coarser in the years following Chaplinsky;
id., 298 (Eveleigh, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); such that, today, ‘there are fewer combinations
of words and circumstances that are likely to fit within
the fighting words exception.’ State v. Parnoff, supra,
329 Conn. 413 (Kahn, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also id. (‘[a]s certain language is acceptable in more
situations, the borders of the fighting words exception
contract’).” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 700–701.
Our Supreme Court has addressed the type of speech
that constitutes “fighting words” in a trio of decisions:
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 232, State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 386, and State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 685. We provide a brief overview of those
decisions, which inform our analysis in the present case.
In Baccala,10 the defendant was convicted of breach of
the peace in the second degree after engaging in a dispute
10
Prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in Baccala, its decision in
State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 678 A.2d 473 (1996), set the stage
for a more comprehensive totality of the circumstances analysis. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 237. In Szymkiewicz, our Supreme
Court used a totality of the circumstances test to determine that insults
and threats directed to a store detective constituted fighting words.
See State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 622. In Szymkiewicz, the defendant
was accused of shoplifting at a supermarket and yelled, “fuck you,”
several times along with, “[y]ou fucking bitch. I hope you burn in hell
for all eternity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 615–16. The
defendant in Szymkiewicz made those remarks while descending stairs
State v. Sidiropoulos

with the manager of a supermarket. State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 233–34. The defendant customer had
called the supermarket to inquire about a money transfer
but was informed by a store manager that the service desk
was closed for the day and that the transfer could not be
completed. Id., 235. “The defendant became belligerent,
responded that she ‘really didn’t give a shit,’ and called
[the manager] ‘[p]retty much every swear word you can
think of’ before the call was terminated.” Id. Shortly
thereafter, the defendant arrived at the supermarket,
where she loudly called the manager a “fat ugly bitch” and
a “cunt,” and yelled, “fuck you, you’re not a manager,”
while gesticulating with her cane. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 236. The manager simply responded,
“[h]ave a good night,” after which the defendant left the
supermarket. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In its ruling, the court in Baccala assessed whether
the defendant’s language constituted fighting words
under Chaplinsky.11 See id., 238. In doing so, the court
in the supermarket and in the view of customers, “caus[ing] a commo-
tion among those who were present at the bottom of the stairs.” Id.,
616. The court held that, “the words used by the defendant . . . and
the circumstances in which they were used classify them as ‘fighting
words’ that had the tendency to provoke imminent retaliation from the
store detective or violence from the store’s customers who heard them.”
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 620. It explained further that “[t]he combination
of the heated exchange between [the store detective] and the defendant
and the defendant’s threatening her, all of which occurred in front of
a number of store customers, provided ample impetus for a potentially
explosive situation.” Id., 623.
11
The court in Baccala noted that, “[a]lthough certain language in
Chaplinsky seemed to suggest that some words in and of themselves
might be inherently likely to provoke the average person to violent
retaliation, such as ‘God damned racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist’ . . .
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 569, 574; subsequent
case law eschewed the broad implications of such a per se approach. See
People v. Stephen, 153 Misc. 2d 382, 387, 581 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1992)
(‘[w]hile the original Chaplinsky formulation of “fighting words” may
have given some impression of establishing a category of words which
could be proscribed regardless of the context in which they were used,
developing [f]irst [a]mendment doctrine in the half century since Chap-
linsky was decided has continually resorted to analyzing provocative
expression contextually’); see also Texas v. Johnson, [491 U.S. 397,
409, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989)]; Gooding v. Wilson,
State v. Sidiropoulos

emphasized that a contextual approach is necessary to
a fighting words analysis because it is a “logical reflec-
tion of the way the meaning and impact of words change
over time.” Id., 239. “Accordingly, a proper contextual
analysis requires consideration of the actual circum-
stances, as perceived by both a reasonable speaker and
addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation. This necessarily includes the man-
ner in which the words were uttered, by whom and to
whom the words were uttered, and any other attendant
circumstances that were objectively apparent and bear
on the question of whether a violent response was likely.”
Id., 250. Our Supreme Court noted that it is critical to
consider not only the manner and circumstances in which
the words were spoken, but also the personal attributes
of the speaker and addressee that are reasonably appar-
ent. See id., 241. Thus, it may be appropriate to consider
“the age, gender, race, and status of the speaker. See
. . . In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 414–15, 480 S.E.2d
693 (1997) (holding that racial slur directed at African
American man by white man will cause ‘hurt and anger’
and ‘often provoke him to confront the white man and
retaliate’).” (Citations omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 242.
Moreover, “because the fighting words exception is
concerned with the likelihood of violent retaliation,
405 U.S. 518, 525, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972); Cohen v.
California, [supra, 403 U.S. 20, 23]; L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 12-10, pp. 850–51. Rather, ‘words may or may not be
“fighting words,” depending [on] the circumstances of their utterance.’
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 94 S. Ct. 970, 39 L. Ed. 2d
214 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result); see R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 432, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (‘[w]hether words are fighting words is
determined in part by their context’); Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d
237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) (first amendment requires ‘determination that
the words were used “under such circumstances” that they were likely
to arouse to immediate and violent anger the person to whom the words
were addressed’ . . .); State v. Szymkiewicz, [237 Conn. 613, 620, 678
A.2d 473 (1996)] (considering both ‘the words used by the defendant’
and ‘the circumstances in which they were used’) . . . .” (Citation omit-
ted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 238–39.
State v. Sidiropoulos

it properly distinguishes between the average citizen
and those addressees who are in a position that carries
with it an expectation of exercising a greater degree of
restraint.” Id., 243. Although our Supreme Court previ-
ously has adopted the principle that police officers may
be held to a higher standard of restraint than ordinary
citizens; see id., 244; the court in Baccala expanded
that to require that trial courts applying “the objective
aspect of the fighting words standard” “take into account
the circumstances of the addressee, e.g., occupation, in
considering whether” the addressee “is more or less likely
to respond with immediate violence.” Id., 247.
In holding that the defendant’s language did not consti-
tute fighting words, the court in Baccala relied on several
factors. See id., 252–54. First, the court determined
that it was significant that the defendant had begun her
verbal tirade when she first spoke to the manager on the
phone because it gave the manager notice of a potential
incident. See id., 252. Second, the manager’s responsi-
bilities included customer service duties, which led the
court to conclude that the phone call and the manager’s
customer service training weighed against a finding
that someone in the manager’s position would react with
imminent violence. See id., 252–53. Third, the court con-
cluded that the manager would have held a high degree
of control over the premises that afforded her several
lawful self-help options, which, along with the expecta-
tions attendant to her position, reduced the likelihood of
a violent response on her part. See id., 253. Finally, the
court concluded that, although not determinative, the
manager’s actual response to the defendant’s outburst
was probative of the likelihood of a violent response.
Id., 254. Specifically, the court agreed that, because the
manager simply bid the defendant good night, “[t]here
[was] no reason to believe that [the manager’s] reaction
was uncharacteristic of a reasonable professional in a
like situation.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that
“the defendant’s speech [did] not fall within the nar-
row category of unprotected fighting words”; id., 256;
because the defendant’s “vulgar insults” were not “likely
State v. Sidiropoulos

to provoke violent retaliation”; id.; by “an average store
manager” under similar circumstances. Id., 254.
Our Supreme Court again addressed the fighting words
doctrine in Parnoff, in which the defendant was convicted
of disorderly conduct after he had used threatening
language toward two water company employees who had
entered his property pursuant to an easement to service a
fire hydrant. See State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 388.
Wearing shorts but no shirt, and carrying a can to collect
worms in order to go fishing, the defendant approached
the two water company employees. Id., 391. The defen-
dant became enraged when the employees informed him
that they were on his property to service the fire hydrant
and had discovered that the hydrant’s cap was altered.
Id. The defendant said, “if you go into my shed, I’m going
to go into my house, get my gun and [fucking] kill you.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court in Parnoff was not persuaded that “the
defendant’s threatening words, unaccompanied by any
effectuating action, were likely to provoke an imminent
and violent reaction from the water company employees
at whom those words were directed.”12 Id., 397–98. The
12
The court analyzed the defendant’s words under the factors set
forth in Baccala, including whether the reasonably apparent personal
attributes of the addressees affected its analysis. See State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 395. Specifically, the court in Parnoff took note of the
water company employees’ job performances, including the high likeli-
hood that they might interact with confrontational property owners,
which would require them to model “appropriate, de-escalating behav-
ior.” Id., 400. The court explained that, unlike in Baccala, the water
company employees had “little control” over the defendant’s property,
but that difference did not “militate against any consideration of the
addressees’ job performance as part of the required contextual analy-
sis.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401.
Further, the court in Parnoff stated that its analysis did not attempt to
“equat[e]” the water company employees with the supermarket manager
in Baccala but, rather, acknowledged that, because the water company
employees were “tasked with entering strangers’ properties,” they would
be expected to exercise some higher degree of restraint. Id.
The court in Parnoff distinguished State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn.
613, 678 A.2d 473 (1996), stating, “[v]isible manifestations of anger,
however, coupled with the defendant’s threatening comments, do not,
State v. Sidiropoulos

court explained that, despite the threatening words,
the context in which they were spoken did not support a
finding that they were “likely to provoke an immediate
and violent reaction because the objectively apparent
circumstances did not indicate any immediate intent
or ability on the part of the defendant to carry out that
threat.” Id., 399. Notably, the court cited testimony
from one of the water company employees that, “not
only was he not frightened by the defendant’s words,
but, rather, they ‘bounced right off’ him, stating that,
‘I just stood there and was like, okay then, you know,
let’s see what happens.’ ” Id., 403. Further, when the
water company employee called the police to report the
incident, “he characterized the defendant as merely ‘a
little crabby’ and made no mention at all of the defen-
dant’s gun threat.” Id. Accordingly, our Supreme Court
affirmed this court’s judgment reversing the defendant’s
conviction on the ground that the defendant’s speech did
not constitute fighting words and, thus, was protected
by the first amendment. See id., 406.
Next, we address our Supreme Court’s most recent
decision on this issue in State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 685, which involved the following relevant facts.
“ ‘Michael McCargo, a parking enforcement officer for
the town of New Canaan, testified that he was patrolling
the [Morse] Court parking lot on the morning of August
28, 2014, when he noticed that the defendant’s vehicle
was parked in a metered space for which no payment had
been made. He first issued a [$15 parking] ticket for the
defendant’s vehicle, then walked to another vehicle to
issue a ticket, while his vehicle remained idling behind
the defendant’s vehicle. As McCargo was returning to his
vehicle, he was approached by the defendant, whom he
had never before seen or interacted with. The defendant
under these particular circumstances, meet the high threshold of immi-
nence required for the fighting words exception.” State v. Parnoff, supra,
329 Conn. 404. The court in Parnoff also noted that, because there was
no crowd present to enhance the probability of a violent reaction, the
defendant’s words did not rise to the same level of those in Szymkiewicz.
See id.; see footnote 10 of this opinion.
State v. Sidiropoulos

said to McCargo, “not only did you give me a ticket, but
you blocked me in.” Initially believing that the defendant
was calm, McCargo jokingly responded that he didn’t
want the defendant getting away. When the defendant
then attempted to explain why he had parked in the lot,
McCargo responded that his vehicle was in a metered
space for which payment was required, not in one of
the lot’s free parking spaces. McCargo testified that the
defendant’s demeanor then “escalated,” with the defen-
dant [having said] that the parking authority was “[fuck-
ing] [un]believable” and [having told] McCargo that he
had given him a parking ticket “because my car is white.
. . . [N]o, [you gave] me a ticket because I’m white.” As
the defendant, who is white, spoke with McCargo, who
is African-American, he “flared” his hands and added
special emphasis to the profanity he uttered. Even so,
according to McCargo, the defendant always remained
a “respectable” distance from him. Finally, as the defen-
dant was walking away from McCargo toward his own
vehicle, he spoke the words, “remember Ferguson.” ’. . .
“McCargo also testified that, ‘[a]fter both men had
returned to and reentered their vehicles, McCargo, whose
window was rolled down . . . thought he heard the defen-
dant say the words, “fucking niggers.” This caused him
to believe that the defendant’s prior comment about
Ferguson had been made in reference to the then recent
[and highly publicized] shooting of an African-American
man by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri [on
August 9, 2014, approximately three weeks earlier].
[McCargo] thus believed that the [defendant’s reference
to Ferguson was a “threat”] meant to imply that what
had happened in Ferguson “was going to happen” to him.
McCargo also believed that, by uttering the racial slur
and making reference to Ferguson, the defendant was
trying to rile him up and [to] escalate the situation [by
“taking it to a whole other level”]. That, however, did
not happen, for, although McCargo found the remark
offensive, and he had never before been the target of
such language while performing his duties, he remained
calm at all times and simply drove away to resume his
State v. Sidiropoulos

patrol.’ . . . McCargo further testified, however, that,
‘[s]hortly thereafter . . . as [McCargo] was driving away,
the defendant [cut through the parking lot in his vehicle,
approached McCargo, and then] drove past him.’ . . . As
the defendant was driving past McCargo, ‘the defendant
turned toward him, looked directly at him with an angry
expression on his face, and repeated the slur, “fucking
niggers.” McCargo [also] noted in his testimony that the
defendant said the slur louder the second time than he
had the first time.
“ ‘After the defendant drove out of the parking lot,
McCargo [who was shocked and personally offended by
the encounter] called his supervisor, who instructed
him to report the incident to the New Canaan police. In
his report, McCargo noted that there might have been
a witness to the interaction, whom he described as a
young, white female. The defendant later was arrested
in connection with the incident on the charge of breach
of the peace in the second degree.’ ” (Citations omitted.)
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 689–91. Follow-
ing a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty
of the charge and appealed to this court, which reversed
his conviction on the ground that his speech was consti-
tutionally protected. See id., 689.
The state, on the granting of certification, appealed to
our Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s judgment
in part and upheld the defendant’s conviction of breach of
the peace in the second degree, concluding that his words
constituted “unprotected fighting words,” especially in
light of the particular harm the word “nigger” has when
directed to a Black addressee by a white person. Id., 689,
703. The court explained that, in uttering those words,
the defendant, a white man, was asserting “his own per-
ceived racial dominance and superiority over McCargo
with the obvious intent of denigrating and stigmatizing
him. When used in that way, ‘[i]t is beyond question
that the use of the word “nigger” is highly offensive and
demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutal-
ity, and subordination.’ McGinest v. GTE Service Corp.,
State v. Sidiropoulos

360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). Not only is the word
‘nigger’ undoubtedly the most hateful and inflammatory
racial slur in the contemporary American lexicon; see
id.; but it is probably the single most offensive word in
the English language. See, e.g., Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie
Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (‘[The] epithet [“nigger”] has been labeled,
variously, a term that “sums up . . . all the bitter years
of insult and struggle in America,” [L. Hughes, The Big
Sea: An Autobiography (Hill and Wang 2d Ed. 1993) p.
269], “pure anathema to African-Americans,” Spriggs
v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir.
2001), and “probably the most offensive word in Eng-
lish.” [Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d
Rev. Ed. 2000) p. 894]. See generally [A. Haley, Roots:
The Saga of an American Family (Doubleday 1976)]; [H.
Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (J. B. Lippincott Co. 1960)].
. . . No other word in the English language so power-
fully or instantly calls to mind our country’s long and
brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination
against African-Americans.’ . . . R. Kennedy, ‘The David
C. Baum Lecture: “Nigger!” as a Problem in the Law,’
2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 935, 935 (although ‘[t]he American
language is (and has long been) rife with terms of ethnic,
racial, and national insult: kike, mick, wop, nip, gook,
honkie, wetback, chink, [etc.] . . . “nigger is now probably
the most offensive word in English” ’ . . .); Dictionary.
com, available at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
nigger?s=t (‘The term nigger is now probably the most
offensive word in English. Its degree of offensiveness
has increased markedly in recent years, although it has
been used in a derogatory manner since at least the Revo-
lutionary War.’).
“In fact, because of the racial prejudice and oppression
with which it is forever inextricably linked, the word
‘nigger,’ when used by a white person as an assertion of
the racial inferiority of an African-American person, ‘is
more than [a] mere offensive utterance . . . . No word .
. . is as odious or loaded with as terrible a history.’ . . .
Daso v. Grafton School, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 485, 493
State v. Sidiropoulos

(D. Md. 2002); see also In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424,
428, 36 P.3d 772 (App. 2001) (‘the term is generally
regarded as virtually taboo because of the legacy of racial
hatred that underlies the history of its use among whites’
. . .); In re Spivey, [supra, 345 N.C. 414] (‘[N]o fact is
more generally known than that a white man who calls
a black man a “nigger” within his hearing will hurt and
anger the black man and often provoke him to confront
the white man and retaliate. The trial court was free to
judicially note this fact.’). The word being ‘one of insult,
abuse and belittlement harking back to slavery days’ .
. . Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 510, 706 A.2d 685
(1998); it is uniquely ‘expressive of racial hatred and
bigotry’ . . . . For all these reasons, the word rightly has
been characterized as ‘the most provocative, emotionally-
charged and explosive term in the [English] language.’ ”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 703–705.
In Liebenguth, our Supreme Court found that, in addi-
tion to the use of the word “niggers,” “other language and
conduct by the defendant further inflamed the situation,
rendering it that much more likely to provoke a violent
reaction. First, the defendant used the profane adjective
‘fucking’—a word of emphasis meaning wretched, rotten
or accursed—to intensify the already highly offensive
and demeaning character of the word ‘niggers.’ ” (Foot-
note omitted.) Id., 705–706. Second, “the defendant,
having directed the term ‘fucking niggers’ at McCargo
upon entering his vehicle and learning that McCargo
had ticketed him, was not content just to leave and end
the confrontation. Instead, after McCargo had entered
his vehicle and was starting to drive out of the parking
lot, the defendant circled the lot twice, pulled up next
to McCargo and, while looking angrily at him, again
uttered the term ‘fucking niggers,’ this time more loudly
than before. The fact that the defendant repeated this
epithet only served to exacerbate the provocative and
hostile nature of the confrontation.” Id., 706. Third, “the
defendant employed additional, racially offensive, crude
and foreboding language during his interaction with
State v. Sidiropoulos

McCargo,” including when he said “ ‘fucking unbeliev-
able’ ” and “ ‘remember Ferguson.’ ” Id., 707. “Finally,
in addition to his offensive and intimidating utterances,
certain conduct by the defendant further manifested
his extreme anger and hostility toward McCargo.”13 Id.
Acknowledging that the case presented a rare circum-
stance in which the demanding fighting words standard
was met, the court elaborated, stating that, “[b]orn of
violence, the word ‘nigger,’ when uttered with the intent
to personally offend and demean, also engenders violence.
Indeed, such use of the word ‘nigger’ aptly has been
called ‘a classic case’ of speech likely to incite a violent
response. In re Spivey, supra, 345 N.C. 415; see also
State v. Hoshijo ex rel. White, 102 Haw. 307, 322, 76
P.3d 550 (2003) (‘The experience of being called “nig-
ger” . . . is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury
is instantaneous.’ . . .).” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 708. “[Further] [t]o whatever extent public
discourse in general may have coarsened over time; see,
e.g., State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 239; it has not
eroded to the point that the racial epithets used in the
present case are any less likely to provoke a violent reac-
tion today than they were in previous decades.” State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 709.
With this background in mind, we turn to the defen-
dant’s claim that his words are entitled to first amend-
ment protection. In support thereof, the defendant makes
a number of arguments, including that his language did
13
Specifically, the court stated: “As the two men were speaking outside
of their respective vehicles, the defendant stepped toward McCargo
while moving his hands and body in an aggressive and irate manner.
[A woman] witnessed the defendant’s conduct and testified that, even
from about seventy feet away, the hostility of the encounter made her
nervous and upset. Moreover, after entering his car, the defendant
drove through the parking lot twice before leaving, cutting through
empty parking spaces so he could pass by McCargo and again angrily
confront him. As [our Supreme Court] observed in Baccala, the fact
that the defendant’s words were accompanied by such aggressive and
menacing behavior increased the likelihood of a violent response. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 241.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 707–708.
State v. Sidiropoulos

not constitute fighting words because it was simply an
expression of his opinion about his fear of an unhygienic
dental office that was not likely to incite an immediate,
violent reaction, and that the present case is distinguish-
able from Liebenguth.14 We are not persuaded.
As our Supreme Court has instructed, the starting
point of our analysis of whether the language used by
the defendant rises to the level of “fighting words,” so
as not to be protected by the first amendment, begins
with “an examination of the words themselves and the
extent to which they are understood to be inflammatory
or inciting.” Id., 703. Specifically, “[a] proper contextual
analysis requires consideration of the actual circum-
stances, as perceived by both a reasonable speaker and
addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood
of violent retaliation. This necessarily includes the man-
ner in which the words were uttered, by whom and to
whom the words were uttered, and any other attendant
circumstances that were objectively apparent and bear
on the question of whether a violent response was likely.”
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 250. We also take into
consideration the “personal attributes of the speaker and
the addressee that are reasonably apparent”; id., 241;
which include “age, gender, [and] race . . . .” Id., 242.15
In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant,
a white man, uttered the words “stupid nigger” toward
14
The defendant also contends that, if this court were to conclude
that an average, multiracial dental assistant likely would react to the
defendant’s words with violence, we would be perpetuating the “angry
Black woman” stereotype. We find no merit to this contention. As our
Supreme Court has stated, “[a] proper contextual analysis requires con-
sideration of the actual circumstances, as perceived by both a reasonable
speaker and addressee, to determine whether there was a likelihood of
violent retaliation”; State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 240; and, in
light of Liebenguth, it is not improper for an appellate court to take
into consideration the fact that the words uttered were directed to a
Black addressee by a white person. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336
Conn. 703; see also State v. Baccala, supra, 242–43 (proper to consider
age, gender and race of speaker and addressee).
15
As a result of the changing landscape of the fighting words doctrine,
first amendment scholars have compiled a list of five factors that lower
courts consider when evaluating whether speech constitutes fighting
State v. Sidiropoulos

Medina, a multiracial woman, in a public place while
Medina was performing her duties as a dental assistant.
Our Supreme Court made clear in Liebenguth that, when
the word nigger is used by a white person to assert “his
own perceived racial dominance and superiority over” a
Black person, which would necessarily include Medina,
it not only is “beyond question . . . highly offensive and
demeaning”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 703; but “is more than [a]
mere offensive utterance” in that it is “uniquely expres-
sive of racial hatred and bigotry . . . and [is] degrading
and humiliating in the extreme . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 705. For that reason, the word is
regarded as being “provocative, emotionally charged and
explosive . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Accordingly, the language used by the defendant was
undisputably offensive, degrading and inflammatory.
The primary issue in this appeal concerns the inciting
nature of the defendant’s language; that is, whether the
defendant’s words were likely to incite an imminent vio-
lent reaction in the average multiracial dental assistant
in Medina’s position. In this regard, we note that the
defendant’s words “stupid nigger” directed to Medina
created a “ ‘classic case’ ” of fighting words. Id., 708; see
also id. (“[i]ndeed, such use of the word ‘nigger’ aptly
words: “(1) [a]ggressive conduct accompanying speech; (2) the speech’s
volume with the guidepost being that ‘[t]he louder the speech, the more
likely that a court may use that fact to support a disorderly conduct
conviction based on the fighting words doctrine;’ (3) repetition of
words, with the maxim being that ‘the sheer number and intensity of
the profanities may cause a reviewing court to find that the intemperate
speech crosses the line into unprotected fighting words;’ (4) whether
the target was a police officer; and (5) whether there was a racial slur
and . . . whether it was the ‘N’ word.” (Footnotes omitted.) C. Calvert,
“Taking the Fight Out of Fighting Words on the Doctrine’s Eightieth
Anniversary: What ‘N’ Word Litigation Today Reveals About Assump-
tions, Flaws and Goals of a First Amendment Principle in Disarray,”
87 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 507 (2022). Together, these factors emphasize a
contextual approach to fighting words that pays special attention to
racial epithets. We agree that these five factors are appropriate factors
to consider in our contextual analysis, and, therefore, we take these
factors into consideration in our analysis.
State v. Sidiropoulos

has been called ‘a classic case’ of speech likely to incite
a violent response”). As our Supreme Court explained
in Liebenguth, there is a high likelihood of immediate
violence associated with a white person using the word
“ ‘nigger’ ” directed at a Black person. Id., 705. That was
magnified by the defendant’s use of the adjective “stupid”
in conjunction with “nigger,” suggesting that Medina
lacked intelligence by reason of her ethnic background,
which served only to intensify the highly offensive and
demeaning nature of his use of the word “nigger.” See,
e.g., id., 705–706 (by using “profane adjective ‘fuck-
ing,’ ” which court deemed an “additional measure of
contempt and disgust,” in conjunction with “epithet,
the defendant only amplified the assaultive nature of the
utterance, making it even more hateful and debasing”).
We next examine the circumstances in which the
inflammatory words were uttered by the defendant. First,
the record demonstrates that the defendant displayed
aggressive body language when he blocked Medina’s only
egress route from the tiny examination room while he
berated her, used his height to his advantage and leaned
toward her, yelling throughout the entire incident. In
Baccala, Parnoff and Liebenguth, none of the addressees
had his or her movement restricted in such a manner
because all three incidents in those cases occurred in
large, open spaces that allowed for retreat at any time.16
Indeed, even in Liebenguth, in which our Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant used fighting words, the
addressee was operating his vehicle or standing in a
sizeable parking lot. In the present case, we find it par-
ticularly compelling that Medina could not leave the
examination room for an unknown amount of time as
the defendant yelled at her, using a highly provocative
and degrading racial slur.
In addition to exhibiting aggressive body language, the
defendant repeated the inflammatory and denigrating
racial slur multiple times and yelled it loudly, causing
16
Our Supreme Court has not yet addressed the ability of an addressee
to remove himself or herself from a defendant’s verbal assault.
State v. Sidiropoulos

other patients to exit their examination rooms. Indeed,
the defendant conceded that he yelled from the time he
jumped up from the dental chair to the time he left the
dental office. The fact that the defendant’s loud yelling
of the highly inflammatory racial slur startled other
patients at the dental office and caused them to exit
their examination rooms increased the likelihood of an
immediate violent reaction by not only Medina, but also
by the startled patients as well, especially given that one
patient did confront the defendant near the examina-
tion room, asking, “[w]hat are you doing?” See State v.
Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 623, 678 A.2d 473 (1996)
(defendant’s language could have aroused violent reac-
tion from store detective, to whom it was addressed,
as well as customers). Moreover, as in Liebenguth, the
defendant repeated the racial slur to Medina, aggravating
the circumstances further. “The fact that the defendant
repeated this epithet only served to exacerbate the pro-
vocative and hostile nature of the confrontation. See
Landrum v. Sarratt, 352 S.C. 139, 145, 572 S.E.2d 476
(App. 2002) (whether epithets were uttered repeatedly
is factor to be considered in fighting words determina-
tion); see also State v. Szymkiewicz, [supra, 615–16,
623] (holding that certain epithets were fighting words
due, in part, to repeated nature of utterances).” State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 706.
Next, we examine whether Medina’s position as a den-
tal assistant required her to exercise a greater degree of
restraint, which would decrease the likelihood that a per-
son in a similar position would respond to the defendant’s
statements with violence. Compare State v. Parnoff,
supra, 329 Conn. 399–400 (employee’s job responsi-
bilities included interactions with public that required
employee to exercise greater degree of restraint), and
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 252–53 (same), with
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 710–11 (because
employee’s job responsibilities did not include interac-
tions with public involving racial slurs, employee was
not required to exercise greater degree of restraint).
We do not believe that Medina was in a “position that
State v. Sidiropoulos

carries with it an expectation of exercising a greater
degree of restraint”; State v. Baccala, supra, 243; when
the defendant verbally accosted her with racial slurs.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that
Medina had received any special training concerning how
to interact with patients who become irate or insulting
while receiving dental care.
The defendant also argues that Medina was required
to exercise a greater degree of restraint because she was
employed as a dental assistant, was trained to de-escalate
dental phobia, had control over the premises and had
lawful self-help tools at her disposal. We do not agree.
Although Medina testified that she had training about
interacting with patients who show symptoms of dental
phobia; see footnote 2 of this opinion; her testimony
about it was brief and did not describe in any detail the
type of training she received, and nothing in the record
reflects that she received any training about how to
interact with patients who become irate or insulting while
receiving dental care. Thus, it is highly unlikely that any
of Medina’s training, like that of the parking enforce-
ment officer in Liebenguth, would have prepared her to
be verbally accosted with racial slurs while performing
her duties as a dental assistant. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 710–11. We similarly reject the defen-
dant’s contention that, because Medina was “surrounded
by” coworkers and patients, she had a degree of control
over the premises that would warrant a higher degree
of restraint on her part in the face of the defendant’s
language. Indeed, the record shows that, even though
patients exited their examination rooms because of the
defendant’s loud yelling, Medina was unable to access
those individuals, as the defendant was standing in the
only doorway to the examination room as he berated her.
Moreover, unlike the supermarket manager in Baccala,
Medina did not have any management authority that
would have required her to exercise a higher degree of
restraint as a model to her subordinates. See State v.
Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 253 (“[i]ndeed, as the manager
in charge of a large supermarket, [the manager] would
State v. Sidiropoulos

be expected to model appropriate, responsive behavior,
aimed at de-escalating the situation, for her subordi-
nates, at least one of whom was observing the exchange”).
There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that
Medina was in a position that required her to exercise
greater restraint because she had lawful self-help options
at her disposal to rectify the situation. The record reflects
that Medina asked the defendant to stop repeating the
offensive racial slur but that he refused to do so. The
only successful use of self-help measures occurred when
another employee locked the door after the defendant
left the dental office. Besides Medina requesting that
the defendant cease his behavior, nothing in the record
shows that Medina had access to self-help measures or
to her coworkers and the patients who had exited their
examination rooms, as opposed to the circumstances in
Baccala, in which the supermarket manager had self-help
options included in her job responsibilities. See id. (“[A]s
a store manager, [she] would have had a degree of control
over the premises where the confrontation took place.
An average store manager would know as she approached
the defendant that, if the defendant became abusive,
the manager could demand that the defendant leave the
premises, threaten to have her arrested for trespassing if
she failed to comply, and make good on that threat if the
defendant still refused to leave. With such lawful self-
help tools at her disposal and the expectations attendant
to her position, it does not appear reasonably likely that
[the store manager] was at risk of losing control over the
confrontation.”). As addressed previously in this opinion,
Medina’s job responsibilities did not include managerial
duties. Therefore, her job performance and training, like
that of the parking enforcement officer in Liebenguth,
as well as her level of control over the premises and the
availability of self-help measures, did not support hold-
ing her to a higher degree of restraint in response to the
defendant’s words and actions.
Finally, the defendant attempts to distinguish the pres-
ent case from Liebenguth because he did not augment his
State v. Sidiropoulos

language with curse words, make any racial threats, or
engage in aggressive behavior, like circling a parking lot,
as the defendant in Liebenguth did. We agree that certain
circumstances in the present case differ from those in
Liebenguth; nevertheless, we do not agree that those
differences are significant enough to render Liebenguth
inapplicable to the present case. For example, although
the language in the present case differs from the language
used in Liebenguth, we are not persuaded that the defen-
dant’s use of the word “stupid” rather than “fucking,”
as occurred in Liebenguth, is sufficiently different to
distinguish the present case. Merriam-Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary defines “stupid,” in relevant part,
as “slow of mind,” “given to unintelligent decisions or
acts: acting in an unintelligent or careless manner,” and
“lacking intelligence or reason.” Merriam-Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 1565. By using the
word “stupid” in conjunction with the word “nigger,” the
defendant made an inflammatory statement about racial
superiority. He was not simply expressing his opinion
about an unhygienic dental office. See State v. Lieben-
guth, supra, 336 Conn. 703–704 (“With respect to the
language at issue . . . the defendant, who is white, uttered
the words ‘fucking niggers’ to McCargo, an African-
American person, thereby asserting his own perceived
racial dominance and superiority over McCargo with
the obvious intent of denigrating and stigmatizing him.
When used in that way, ‘[i]t is beyond question that the
use of the word “nigger” is highly offensive and demean-
ing, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and
subordination.’ ”). Furthermore, we find it persuasive
that at least one other state court has concluded that
the phrase “stupid nigger,” when combined with cer-
tain conduct, can constitute fighting words. See In re
A.R., 781 N.W.2d 644, 649–50 (N.D. 2010) (juvenile’s
speech constituted fighting words when juvenile repeat-
edly yelled “ ‘stupid nigger’ ” at victim while involved as
member of group that encircled victim).
Additionally, even though the defendant in the pres-
ent case did not make a reference to the killing of an
State v. Sidiropoulos

unarmed Black man, as was done by the defendant in
Liebenguth, that was but one factor considered by our
Supreme Court in Liebenguth. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 705–708. Indeed, our Supreme Court
in Liebenguth emphasized the harm that the word “nig-
ger” carries, especially when directed by a white person
to a Black person. Id., 703–704. Further, like the defen-
dant’s menacing conduct in Liebenguth in circling the
parking lot in his vehicle, pulling up next to McCargo’s
vehicle and again directing the words “fucking niggers”
to McCargo, the defendant in the present case blocked
the only exit to the small examination room in which
Medina was confined, while, in a loud and intimidating
way, yelling that she was a “stupid nigger.” He engaged
in aggressive conduct by yelling at Medina, using words
that were intended to demean and intimidate her, caus-
ing a commotion that disrupted the entire dental office
and prompted one patient to confront the defendant,
and stood in the only doorway to a small examination
room as he repeatedly used demeaning racial epithets.17
Despite the few differences between the present case
and Liebenguth, we conclude that the circumstances
of the present case similarly warrant a finding that the
defendant’s words constituted fighting words.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
defendant’s words were likely to provoke an immediate
violent reaction from a reasonable person under the
17
We note that the defendant contends that the current state of the
fighting words doctrine requires courts to make unlawful assump-
tions about addressees. As the defendant aptly notes, members of our
Supreme Court have expressed doubts about the continuing vitality of
the fighting words doctrine. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn.
736–37 (Ecker, J., concurring) (expressing concerns that “[t]he doc-
trine . . . confers or withdraws constitutional protection depending on
the demographic characteristics of the relevant individuals” and that
“part of the constitutional analysis is an assessment of the addressee’s
physical abilities and aggressive tendencies” (emphasis in original));
State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 411 (Kahn, J., concurring) (“[t]he
continuing vitality of the fighting words exception is dubious and the
successful invocation of that exception is so rare that it is practically
extinct”). Nevertheless, unless and until the doctrine is abandoned, we
must follow the test set forth by our Supreme Court.
State v. Sidiropoulos

circumstances in which the words were uttered.18 See
State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 718. As a result,
they constituted fighting words that are not protected
by the first amendment and, thus, provided a sufficient
basis for his conviction of breach of the peace in the sec-
ond degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5).
B
The defendant also claims that his speech was protected
under article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut
constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that the
Connecticut constitution provides broader protection
for offensive speech and “should be read to protect such
‘offensive language’ and only criminalize true threats
and imminent lawless action, not fighting words.” We
disagree.
We first set forth the legal principles that guide our
resolution of this claim. To reiterate our standard of
review, “the inquiry into the protected status of . . .
speech is one of law, not fact. . . . We therefore apply a
de novo standard of review . . . . Accordingly, we have an
obligation to make an independent examination of the
whole record in order to make sure that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion [in] the field of
free expression. . . . This independent scrutiny, however,
does not authorize us to make credibility determinations
regarding disputed issues of fact. Although we review
18
Our conclusion is not undermined by the fact that Medina, despite
being shocked by the defendant’s outburst and use of demeaning and
inflammatory language and having been brought to tears, did not react
violently in the face of the defendant’s tirade. See State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 711 (“[even] [t]hough the fighting words standard is an
objective inquiry . . . examining the subjective reaction of an addressee,
although not dispositive, may be probative of the likelihood of a violent
reaction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in Liebenguth and cited State v. Hoshijo ex
rel. White, supra, 102 Haw. 322, for the following proposition: “ ‘[It] is
of no consequence . . . [that violence was not precipitated], as the proper
standard is whether the words were likely to provoke a violent response,
not whether violence occurred. Plainly, there is no requirement that
violence must occur, merely that there be a likelihood of violence.’”
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 711–12.
State v. Sidiropoulos

de novo the trier of fact’s ultimate determination that
the statements at issue constituted [fighting words], we
accept all subsidiary credibility determinations and find-
ings that are not clearly erroneous.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 698–99.
The defendant seeks review of this unpreserved state
constitutional claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188
(2015). “Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record
is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Benson, 235 Conn. App. 594, 603,
346 A.3d 55, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 928, 346 A.3d 511
(2025).
We conclude that the record is adequate for review of
the defendant’s claim that the Connecticut constitution
protects “ ‘offensive language’ ” and that the defendant
has presented a claim of constitutional magnitude. See
State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App. 1, 24 n.15, 287 A.3d
146 (2022) (“[t]he record is adequate for review, and
the claim, asserting a violation of the defendant’s right
to freedom of speech, is of constitutional magnitude”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 907, 288 A.3d 217 (2023). We thus proceed to
the third prong of Golding—whether the defendant has
demonstrated the existence of a constitutional violation.
“It is [well established] that federal constitutional and
statutory law establishes a minimum national standard
for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit
State v. Sidiropoulos

state governments from affording higher level[s] of pro-
tection for such rights. . . . In determining the contours
of the protections provided by our state constitution,
[appellate courts] employ a multifactor approach that
[our Supreme Court] first adopted in [State v. Geisler,
222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)]. The factors
that we consider are: (1) the text of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3)
persuasive federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents
of other state courts; (5) historical insights into the intent
of [the] constitutional [framers]; and (6) contemporary
understandings of applicable economic and sociological
norms.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319
Conn. 175, 191–92, 123 A.3d 1212 (2015). “These fac-
tors, [commonly referred to as the Geisler factors and]
which we consider in turn, inform our application of
the established state constitutional standards . . . to the
defendant’s [claim] in the present case.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378,
387–88, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019).19
1
We begin our analysis by reviewing the text of the
relevant constitutional provisions. The defendant con-
tends that, because our Supreme Court in Trusz v. UBS
Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 193, found that
the Connecticut constitution provides “more expressive
and forceful speech protection” than its federal counter-
part, we should construe article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of
19
We addressed the issue of whether § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitu-
tional under the state constitution in State v. Caracoglia, 78 Conn. App.
98, 826 A.2d 192, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d 65 (2003), in
which this court concluded that, “[a]lthough . . . an even greater degree
of scrutiny may be applied under our state constitution . . . § 53a-181
(a) (5) is not vague or overbroad under the Connecticut constitution
for the same reasons that it is not vague or overbroad under the federal
constitution. . . . ‘[A]busive language’ may be interpreted as ‘fight-
ing words,’ which are not protected by our state constitution.” Id.,
110–11. Although the issue in Caracoglia is different from the issue
in this appeal, our reasoning in Caracoglia informs our resolution of
the defendant’s claim.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the Connecticut constitution to protect fighting words.
The state, on the other hand, argues that, despite our
Supreme Court’s prior findings that the Connecticut
constitution affords more protection for certain speech,
the qualifying language in article first, § 4, permits the
state to punish fighting words in the interest of preserv-
ing public peace and safety. We agree with the state.
Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution pro-
vides that “[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty.” Article first, § 5, of the Con-
necticut constitution provides that “[n]o law shall ever
be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.” Finally, article first, § 14, of the Connecticut
constitution provides that “[t]he citizens have a right,
in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common
good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government, for redress of grievances, or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”
“[Our Supreme Court] previously has held that . . .
unlike the first amendment to the federal constitution: (1)
article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution includes
language protecting free speech ‘on all subjects’; (2)
article first, § 5, of the Connecticut constitution uses the
word ‘ever,’ thereby providing ‘additional emphasis to
the force of the provision’ . . . and (3) article first, § 14,
of the Connecticut constitution provides a right to seek
redress for grievances by way of ‘remonstrance,’ and
therefore ‘sets forth free speech rights more emphati-
cally than its federal counterpart’ . . . .” (Citations omit-
ted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319
Conn. 192–93. The court further explained that “these
textual differences warrant an interpretation separate
and distinct from that of the first amendment.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 193.
In the present case, the defendant argues that, because
the court in Trusz found that the Connecticut constitu-
tion protects “ ‘the widest possible range of topics’ ” and
“ ‘sets forth free speech rights more emphatically than its
State v. Sidiropoulos

federal counterpart’ ”; id., 192–93; we should conclude
that the state constitution protects fighting words. We
agree that the Connecticut constitution provides broader
protection for free speech rights than its federal coun-
terpart, but we do not construe the holding in Trusz to
protect fighting words under our state constitution. The
court in Trusz stated that the “language protecting free
speech on all subjects . . . support[ed] the conclusion that
the state constitution protects employee speech in the
public workplace on the widest possible range of topics,
as long as the speech does not undermine the employer’s
legitimate interest in maintaining discipline, harmony
and efficiency in the workplace.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis added.) Id. Notably, the court in Trusz acknowl-
edged the qualifying language in article first, § 4, of the
Connecticut constitution20 to preserve an employer’s
interest in maintaining a peaceful and collaborative
workplace. Id., 193. Thus, we do not construe Trusz as
extending protection to speech, such as fighting words,
that disrupts the public peace and safety.
We find guidance on this issue from the concurring
opinion in Baccala authored by Justice Eveleigh.21 In
Baccala, our Supreme Court was asked, but declined,
to examine whether the language of article first, §§ 4, 5
and 14, of the Connecticut constitution protects fight-
ing words. See State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 237.
Justice Eveleigh, nonetheless, analyzed that issue under
the Geisler factors in his concurring opinion. See id.,
20
The liberty to speak freely on all subjects pursuant to article first,
§ 4, of the Connecticut constitution is qualified by the plain terms of
that section, namely, by holding each citizen “responsible for the abuse
of that liberty.” In other words, this qualifying language operates as
a limitation on the broad protections afforded to expressive liberties
by holding a person responsible for abusing the liberty of free speech.
21
Justice Eveleigh authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in
Baccala. His Geisler analysis of this issue, in which he concludes that
the fighting words doctrine is not afforded greater protection under
our state constitution than under the federal constitution; see State
v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 270 (Eveleigh, J., concurring); is part of
his concurrence with that portion of the majority’s opinion upholding
the trial court’s judgment of conviction. For convenience, we refer to
Justice Eveleigh’s opinion as a concurring opinion.
State v. Sidiropoulos

269–300 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As Justice Eveleigh
noted, our Supreme Court “has observed that [article
first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution] operates as a
limitation on the broad protections otherwise afforded
by permitting the enforcement of laws regulating speech
that tended to cause a breach of the peace such as defama-
tion or sedition. . . . Therefore, [our Supreme Court] has
interpreted the text of § 4 to permit punishment, within
certain bounds, of abuse of the freedom of speech. Addi-
tionally, the text of §§ 4 and 5 in no way suggests that
the legislature’s authority to punish abuses of expressive
liberties was limited to then prevailing statutory crimi-
nal law. Thus, while the language of §§ 4 and 5 provides
for broader protection than afforded under the federal
constitution, the language of § 4 more directly pertains
to the state’s authority to punish the abuse of expressive
liberties.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 274;
see also Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48,
64 n.9, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); State v. McKee, 73 Conn.
18, 29, 46 A. 409 (1900). Justice Eveleigh concluded that
“the text of §§ 4 and 5 does not support [a] . . . position
that our state constitution defines the concept fighting
words more narrowly.” State v. Baccala, supra, 274–75
(Eveleigh, J., concurring). We agree that the Connecti-
cut constitution limits free speech when there has been
an “abuse of that liberty.” Conn. Const., art. I, § 4. We,
thus, conclude that the language of the relevant state
constitutional provisions supports the state’s argument
that fighting words are not protected under the Con-
necticut constitution.
2
We next address the second Geisler factor—related
Connecticut precedents. In the present case, the defen-
dant argues that the Connecticut constitution protects
fighting words because Connecticut courts “have con-
sistently held that the Connecticut constitution bestows
greater expressive rights on the public than the federal
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitution.”22 Although this has been true for certain
speech, the state points to both preconstitutional and
postconstitutional jurisprudence to support its position
that fighting words are not protected under our state
constitution. We disagree with the defendant.23
We begin with a review of Connecticut’s earliest related
precedents. As a colony, Connecticut adopted parts of
22
We reject the defendant’s argument that the Connecticut consti-
tution protects fighting words, given that at least two Connecticut
Supreme Court justices have expressed concerns about the vitality
of the fighting words doctrine. We acknowledge Justice Kahn’s and
Justice Ecker’s sentiments concerning the fighting words doctrine,
but we cannot conclude that Connecticut precedent supports the defen-
dant’s position. We address this argument further in our discussion of
Geisler’s public policy factor in part I B 6 of this opinion. See also State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 725 (Ecker, J., concurring); id., 719
(Kahn, J., concurring); State v. Parnoff, supra, 329 Conn. 407 (Kahn,
J., concurring in the judgment).
23
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant contends that, because
our Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability and scope of the
fighting words doctrine under our state constitution, this court will be
writing “on a blank slate . . . .” We disagree with this contention for
reasons similar to those set forth by Justice Eveleigh in Baccala, in
which the defendant in that case made a similar argument.
First, Justice Eveleigh stated: “The defendant is incorrect that,
because of the absence of appellate case law discussing the scope of the
fighting words doctrine under the Connecticut constitution, this court
simply writes on a blank slate, unguided by state appellate precedents.
First, the absence of case law on the matter strongly suggests that this
factor does not support the defendant’s position. See State v. Skok,
318 Conn. 699, 709, 122 A.3d 608 (2015) (‘because Connecticut courts
have not yet considered whether article first, § 7, [of the Connecticut
constitution] provides greater protection than the federal constitu-
tion with respect to recording telephone conversations with only one
party’s consent, the second Geisler factor also does not support the
defendant’s claim’).
“Second, in Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn.
195–97, this court looked to appellate precedents not for controlling
authority on the precise legal issue at hand; rather, it looked to appellate
authority for broader principles that underpin this state’s expressive
rights jurisprudence to inform the analysis. In Trusz, this court looked
to State v. Linares, [232 Conn. 345, 386, 655 A.2d 737 (1995)], for the
state constitutional expressive rights principle of favoring flexible, case-
by-case analytic frameworks over rigid, categorical tests. See Trusz v.
UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 195. Additionally, [our Supreme
Court] looked to the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. DeFusco, 27
State v. Sidiropoulos

English common law to serve as a basis for its own law.24
See 1 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of
Connecticut (1795) p. 1 (“[t]he common law of England
is obligatory in this state by immemorial usage, and
consent, so far as it corresponds with our circumstances
and situation”); see also L. Meyer, “Connecticut’s Anti-
Originalist Constitutions and Its Independent Courts,”
40 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 501, 619 (2022) (“the early Con-
necticut jurists did not simply adopt or defer to English
common law, but carefully weighed its principles in
light of local applications and practices”). As a result,
early Connecticut jurisprudence consistently referenced
English common law. See State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266,
269 (1828) (adopting English common-law offense of
libel because no similar prosecutions had yet occurred
in Connecticut); see also State v. Warner, 34 Conn. 276,
279 (1867) (affirming adoption of English common-law
offense of libel because speech “was sufficiently scur-
rilous, abusive and indecent, and calculated to stir up
and provoke contention and strife, and so far to disturb
the peace”). “Indeed, the common law provides valuable
insight to inform our understanding of constitutional
principles. See E. Peters, ‘Common Law Antecedents
of Constitutional Law in Connecticut,’ 53 Alb. L. Rev.
259, 264 (1989) (‘In defining and enacting constitu-
tional bills of rights, state and national constituencies
would, of course, have drawn [on] the experience of the
Conn. App. 248, 256, 606 A.2d 1 (1992), aff’d, 224 Conn. 627, 620 A.2d
746 (1993), for the broad proposition that the Connecticut constitution
has tended to preserve civil liberty protections previously afforded by
the federal constitution but from which the United States Supreme
Court has retreated. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra,
196–97.” State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 278–79 n.19 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring).
24
The defendant, citing L. Meyer, “Connecticut’s Anti-Originalist
Constitutions and Its Independent Courts,” 40 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
501, 619 (2022), argues that English common law is “not persuasive
or even relevant, as early Connecticut jurists did not adopt or defer to
English common law.” For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we do
not agree with the defendant’s characterization of either early Con-
necticut precedent or the argument set forth by Professor Linda Ross
Meyer in her law review article.
State v. Sidiropoulos

common law. . . . Just as the precepts of the common
law influence the style of constitutional adjudication in
[common-law] courts, so common law case law itself is
part of our “usable past.” ’).” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 276 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
In 1828, our Supreme Court in Avery concluded that
“the sending of a letter to [another] party, filled with
abusive language, is an indictable offence, because it
tends to a breach of the peace.” State v. Avery, supra, 7
Conn. 269. As the court explained, although the sending
of such a letter to another might not support an action
for libel given that there is no publication, “the sending
of such a letter, without other publication, is clearly an
offence of a public nature, and punishable as such, as
it tends to create ill-blood, and cause a disturbance of
the public peace.” Id. “This common-law offense origi-
nated in England, where it was observed that sending
an ‘infamous’ letter to another person constituted an
‘offense to the King, and is a great motive to revenge,
and tends to the breaking of the peace . . . .’ Edwards
v. Wooton, 77 Eng. Rep. 1316, 1316–17 (K.B. 1655);
see also Hickes’s Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1240–41
(K.B. 1682). Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift included
the common-law offense of provocation to breach of the
peace in the second volume of his digest of the state’s
laws published in 1823. See 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the
Laws of the State of Connecticut (1823) pp. 340–41.
At the very least, Connecticut common law embraced
the principle that speech that tended to cause a breach
of the peace was illegitimate . . . .” (Footnote omitted.)
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 276–77 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring). This was further demonstrated in 1867,
when our Supreme Court upheld a conviction of breach
of the peace under a state statute that made “it a crime
‘to disturb or break the peace, or stir up and provoke
contention and strife, by following or mocking any per-
son with scurrilous or abusive or indecent language or
gestures or noise.’ ” State v. Warner, supra, 34 Conn. 276
(preliminary statement of facts and procedural history).
In Warner, the defendant directed a number of insults
State v. Sidiropoulos

and abusive language toward a contractor for repairing
highways, calling the contractor “ ‘a damned old sheep
thief,’ ‘a damned knave,’ ‘a Goddamned old scoundrel,’
‘a damned old rascal,’ and ‘an old gray-headed curse,’ and
charged him with having sold a broken-backed steer for
a sound one, and a sick hog that died, to a poor laboring
man, and asking him if it was not true that he stole a
ram, saying that folks said he did, and that he would rise
right up if he was bleated at.” Id., 276–77 (preliminary
statement of facts and procedural history). Our Supreme
Court observed that the defendant’s “language was suf-
ficiently scurrilous, abusive and indecent, and calculated
to stir up and provoke contention and strife, and so far
to disturb the peace,” and rejected the defendant’s claim
that there was no evidence of “following up or mocking
as the statute contemplates, or that contention and strife
were in fact stirred up by his conduct.” Id., 279. These
decisions demonstrate that early Connecticut law sought
to deter speech that disrupted the public peace.
In McKee, our Supreme Court addressed the state
constitution’s guarantee of free speech, holding that,
“[t]he liberty protected is not the right to perpetrate acts
of licentiousness, or any act inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the [s]tate. Freedom of speech and press does
not include the abuse of the power of tongue or pen, any
more than freedom of other action includes an injurious
use of one’s occupation, business, or property.” State v.
McKee, supra, 73 Conn. 29. Notably, the court in McKee
found that the state’s power to “punish acts as injurious
to the public health, safety or morals” is not “limited to
acts within the adjudicated scope of the common-law
offenses of nuisance and libel . . . .” Id., 23. The court,
after analyzing the provisions of our state constitution,
concluded that “[e]very citizen has an equal right to use
his mental endowments, as well as his property, in any
harmless occupation or manner; but he has no right to use
them so as to injure his fellow-citizens, or to endanger the
vital interests of society. Immunity in the mischievous
State v. Sidiropoulos

use is as inconsistent with civil liberty as prohibition of
the harmless use.” Id., 28.
Even though Connecticut courts have left the bounds
of free speech largely undefined, our courts consistently
have held that speech that tends to disturb the peace and
jeopardize public safety may be regulated. See, e.g., State
v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 105, 96 A. 313 (1916) (“[l]iberty
of speech and of the press is not license, not lawlessness,
but the right to fairly criticise and comment”); see also
Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn.
193 (employee speech is protected so long as it does not
undermine employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining
discipline, harmony and efficiency in workplace). Indeed,
in State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 A. 33 (1921), our
Supreme Court acknowledged the breadth of legislative
authority to regulate speech that may be harmful to
public peace, stating: “It may be admitted that the pub-
lication of matter concerning the form of the [f]ederal
[g]overnment, which is merely scurrilous or abusive,
is not necessarily a direct incitement of disobedience
to any other law, but it is not necessary to look outside
of the statute itself to find a legal basis for criminality,
because the [public] [a]ct itself is the declaration of the
General Assembly that the publication of the prohibited
forms of expression does endanger the public peace and
safety. This declaration it has power to make unless the
court can see that it is plainly unfounded.” Id., 609–10.
Our Supreme Court most recently addressed article
first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution in
the context of restrictions on speech that take place on
public property in State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 655
A.2d 737 (1995), and employee speech in Trusz v. UBS
Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 175. Notably,
in conducting a state constitutional analysis of Gen-
eral Statutes § 2-1d (a) (2) (C) and (E), which prohibits
interfering with the legislative process, pursuant to the
Geisler factors, our Supreme Court in Linares “decline[d]
to follow the modern, forum based approach currently
employed to resolve claims under the first amendment to
State v. Sidiropoulos

the United States constitution that concern abridgement
of speech on public property” and, instead, “adopt[ed]
the ‘compatibility’ test, as expressed in Grayned v. Rock-
ford, [408 U.S. 104, 116–17, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d
222 (1972)],25 for claims brought under the Connecticut
constitution that involve restrictions on speech on public
property.” (Footnote added.) State v. Linares, supra,
379. In doing so, the court in Linares noted that “our
state constitution is an instrument of progress, it is
intended to stand for a great length of time and should
not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that
it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of
our citizens.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
382. The court further stated that “our constitution’s
speech provisions reflect a unique historical experience
and a move toward enhanced civil liberties, particularly
those liberties designed to foster individuality. . . . This
historical background indicates that the framers of our
constitution contemplated vibrant public speech, and a
minimum of governmental interference, which would be
best fulfilled by the less intrusive Grayned model,” as it
“will best enable our courts to adapt the central tenets of
free speech jurisprudence to the ever changing nature of
public expression and communication in modern society.
. . . [T]his flexible approach prohibits the government
from unilaterally and unnecessarily limiting speech at
public locations; it avoids the grant of plenary power
[that] allows the government to tilt the dialogue heard
by the public, to exclude many, more marginal, voices.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 385–86.
Despite its adoption of the flexible framework for ana-
lyzing claims concerning the abridgement of speech on
25
The Grayned approach assesses “whether the manner of expression
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.” Grayned v. Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. 116. By
contrast, the more rigid federal forum analysis “affords the most rig-
orous protection of speech only at ‘traditional’ forums and narrowly
defines ‘traditional’ to exclude modern public gathering places often
otherwise compatible with public expression.” State v. Linares, supra,
232 Conn. 382.
State v. Sidiropoulos

public property, the court, nonetheless, rejected the
defendant’s overbreadth claim under the Connecticut
constitution, concluding that “the Grayned test requires
the government, under the Connecticut constitution,
to permit free speech and public expression on govern-
ment property up to the point when such free expression
becomes ‘basically incompatible with the normal activ-
ity of a particular place at a particular time. . . . [I]n
assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must
weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved;
the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
[s]tate’s legitimate interest.’ . . . This standard balances
the vital role of free expression in a democratic society
with the need for reasonably functional governmental
institutions and mechanisms. ‘The nature of a place, the
pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regu-
lations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’ ”
(Citation omitted.) Id., 386–87. Therefore, although, as
the defendant contends, the court in Linares recognized
broader free speech rights in the public forum context,
those free speech rights are limited to speech that is
compatible with the activity of the forum.
Subsequently, in Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC,
supra, 319 Conn. 175, our Supreme Court addressed
whether the Connecticut constitution affords employees
broader free speech protections than does the first amend-
ment. In Trusz, the plaintiff was terminated from his
position as a managing director of a real estate invest-
ment management services company after he raised con-
cerns about violations of securities laws. Id., 179, 181.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an action against
the company, alleging a violation of General Statutes
§ 31-51q because he had been subjected to discipline
“ ‘on account of the exercise . . . of rights guaranteed by
. . . [§§] 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the [c]onstitution of
Connecticut.’ ” Id., 181. The court in Trusz rejected the
more recent and restrictive federal standard for analyz-
ing claims concerning expressive rights of employees set
forth in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–20, 126
State v. Sidiropoulos

S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006),26 in favor of the
older, more flexible Connick/Pickering27 standard, which
balances the state constitutional right to speak freely
on all subjects with an employer’s interest in efficient
operations. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC,
supra, 210. Accordingly, the court in Trusz concluded
“that the weight of persuasive federal precedent favors a
broader reading of the free speech provisions of the state
constitution than of the first amendment.” (Emphasis
in original.) Id., 205.
The court in Trusz made clear, however, that
an employer does not infringe on an employee’s
26
Under the Garcetti test, “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for [f]irst [a]mendment purposes, and the [c]onstitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Garcetti
v. Ceballos, supra, [547 U.S. 421] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 185.
“The court in Garcetti reasoned that ‘[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created.’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra,
421–22. Accordingly, under Garcetti, a court will subject the employee’s
speech to the balancing test [set forth in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983), and Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1968)] only if it first determines that the employee was not speaking
pursuant to his or her official duties; if the employee was speaking as
an employee rather than as a citizen, the speech is not protected by the
first amendment.” Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, supra, 185;
see also footnote 27 of this opinion.
27
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed.
2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88
S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). The Connick/Pickering standard
involves a balancing of interests and “weighs an employee’s [f]irst
[a]mendment rights against the interests of the [s]tate as an employer
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Crandon v. State, 257 Kan. 727, 740, 897 P.2d 92 (1995),
cert. denied sub nom. Crandon v. Dunnick, 516 U.S. 1113, 116 S. Ct.
913, 133 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1996). The Connick/Pickering standard protects
employee speech that involves a matter of public concern, whereas, under
Garcetti, speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties is not
protected by the first amendment. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors,
LLC, supra, 319 Conn. 184–85.
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitutional rights when an employee is disciplined
for issues that are not a matter of public concern. See
id., 211. Therefore, while Trusz expanded speech rights
for employees under the state constitution, it reaffirmed
the concept that disruptive speech not regarding a mat-
ter of public concern is not protected by the Connecticut
constitution. See id. (“[i]n our view, Justice Souter’s
test [set forth in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 427] properly balances the
employer’s heightened interest in controlling employee
speech pursuant to official job duties—an interest that
[Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.
Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968)] did not specifically
address—and the important interests of the employee
and of the public in allowing employees to speak without
fear of retaliation about matters of particularly acute
public concern—interests that the Garcetti standard
fails to protect”).
In summary, as noted by Justice Eveleigh in Baccala,
both Linares and Trusz “show that Connecticut’s con-
stitution provides broader freedom of expression protec-
tions than the federal counterpart.” State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 279 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). They
also demonstrate, however, that those broader freedoms
are not without limitation.
The most recent Connecticut jurisprudence to address
free speech under the state constitution is Justice
Eveleigh’s concurrence in State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 269.28 In his Geisler analysis of this factor, Jus-
tice Eveleigh also examined “appellate case law ana-
lyzing state constitutional principles with respect to
content based regulation of speech” and determined that
it “embraces a philosophy that balances the expressive
liberties with the responsibility not to abuse such liber-
ties.” Id., 280. First, Justice Eveleigh noted that, in
State v. McKee, supra, 73 Conn. 18, in connection with
28
Justice Eveleigh was joined by then Chief Justice Rogers and then
Justice Espinosa in concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the
majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment. See State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 257, 309 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
State v. Sidiropoulos

a challenge to a statute punishing the publication of
“ ‘criminal news, police reports, or pictures and stories
of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime’ ”; State v. Baccala,
supra, 280–81 (Eveleigh, J., concurring); our Supreme
Court concluded that “[f]reedom of speech and press does
not include the abuse of the power of tongue or pen, any
more than freedom of other action includes an injurious
use of one’s occupation, business, or property,” and that
“the notion that the state constitution created a refuge
for those who sought to abuse expressive liberties to
the detriment of society belittle[d] the conception of
constitutional safeguards and implie[d] ignorance of
the essentials of civil liberty.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 281 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). Justice
Eveleigh concluded that “[t]hese principles of civil lib-
erty are interwoven into [our Supreme Court’s] reason-
ing in subsequent cases rejecting state constitutional
free speech challenges to statutes proscribing abuse of
expressive liberties.” Id., citing State v. Sinchuk, supra,
96 Conn. 616, and State v. Pape, supra, 90 Conn. 103.
Recognizing that “the narrow holdings of these early
twentieth century expressive rights cases would not
likely withstand modern constitutional scrutiny,” Justice
Eveleigh noted that the defendant in Baccala, none-
theless, was incorrect in his assertion that, “because
the cases provide no evidence of the scope of expressive
rights protection in 1818 [when the state constitution
was ratified] . . . they provide no meaningful insight to
[our Supreme Court’s] analysis.” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 283. Rather, as Justice Eveleigh explained,
“these cases evince a philosophy not dissimilar from
that prevailing in 1818—namely, the belief that citizens
should be free to express themselves but that they bear
responsibility for the abuse of that right.” Id.
Because Connecticut precedent has consistently
favored restrictions on speech that harms others or dis-
rupts business or the public peace, we conclude that this
State v. Sidiropoulos

factor weighs in favor of finding that the state constitu-
tion does not protect fighting words.
3
We next turn to the third Geisler factor, persuasive
federal precedents. As discussed in part I A of this opin-
ion, the federal constitution does not protect speech that
provokes an ordinary person to respond with immediate
violence. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011); R. A. V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed.
2d 305 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409,
109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522–23, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed.
2d 408 (1972); Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S. 20;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 574.
The defendant contends that the United States
Supreme Court has “already construed the fighting words
exception as being extremely narrow—effectively not
utilizing the doctrine at all since 1942.” On the other
hand, the state argues that the federal and state fight-
ing words doctrines are coextensive, as evidenced by
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296. We agree
with the state.
We begin with a discussion of Cantwell, Chaplinsky’s
antecedent. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S.
300, three Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested, charged
with and convicted of, inter alia, breach of the peace. The
charges stemmed from their conduct in going from house
to house in a neighborhood in New Haven, in which 90
percent of the residents were Roman Catholics, and, as
part of a pitch for the sale of books or to obtain donations,
playing a phonographic recording containing attacks on
the Catholic religion. Id., 301. Our Supreme Court upheld
the breach of the peace conviction of Jesse Cantwell,
one of the three defendants. See id., 300. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed Cantwell’s convic-
tion of breach of the peace, finding that his conduct in
trying to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to
State v. Sidiropoulos

make a donation did not constitute breach of the peace;
see id., 310; especially given that there was “no showing
that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing
or offensive.” Id., 308.
In his concurrence in Baccala, Justice Eveleigh noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell, nev-
ertheless, “acknowledged the state’s interest in preserv-
ing peace. . . . The court, in striking a balance between
the competing interests, acknowledged that in some
circumstances it is appropriate for the state to punish
certain speech that tends to provoke violence, noting as
follows: ‘One may, however, be guilty of the offense if he
commit[s] acts or make[s] statements likely to provoke
violence and disturbance of good order, even though no
such eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are
many, but examination discloses that, in practically all,
the provocative language which was held to amount to a
breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abu-
sive remarks directed to the person of the hearer. Resort
to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the [United States constitution], and its punishment
as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument.’ . . . Thus, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged Connecticut’s well established authority
to regulate speech that tends to provoke violence but
refined that authority to conform to federal free speech
principles by permitting regulation of only profane, inde-
cent, or [abusive] remarks likely to provoke violence. It
was this principle that would become the foundation of
the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky.” (Citations
omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 290–91
(Eveleigh, J., concurring).
As discussed in part I A of this opinion, in Chaplin-
sky, the United States Supreme Court fully recognized
the “fighting words” doctrine as an exception to first
amendment protections. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra, 315 U.S. 572. In defining the scope of the first
and fourteenth amendments, the court in Chaplinsky
State v. Sidiropoulos

concluded that, “[a]llowing the broadest scope to the
language and purpose of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment,
it is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libel-
ous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 571–72.
Despite its narrowing of the scope of the fighting words
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the strong interest of the state in preventing immi-
nent and likely breaches of the peace. See R. A. V. v. St.
Paul, supra, 505 U.S. 382–83 (“From 1791 to the present
. . . our society, like other free but civilized societies, has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a
few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.’ . . . We have recognized that the
‘freedom of speech’ referred to by the [f]irst [a]mendment
does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations. . . . Our decisions since the 1960’s have nar-
rowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions
for defamation . . . and for obscenity . . . but a limited
categorical approach has remained an important part of
our [f]irst [a]mendment jurisprudence.” (Citations omit-
ted.)). Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claims in
the present case, the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not affirmed a fighting words conviction since
1942 does not render the doctrine essentially extinct.
Indeed, in 2023 the court acknowledged that it “has not
upheld a conviction under the fighting-words doctrine
State v. Sidiropoulos

in [eighty] years” but, nevertheless, did not discard the
doctrine. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 77 n.4,
143 S. Ct. 2106, 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that federal
precedent does not support the defendant’s claim that
the fighting words doctrine is so exceedingly narrow that
it essentially has become extinct.
4
Next, we address precedents from our sister states.
The defendant asserts that “our sister states are moving
away from the fighting words doctrine” and cites recent
cases from Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon to support
his position. See People in the Interest of R.C., 411 P.3d
1105, 1110 (Colo. App. 2016), cert. denied, Docket No.
16SC987, 2017 WL 5664821 (Colo. November 20, 2017);
State v. Harrington, 67 Or. App. 608, 613–16, 680 P.2d
666, review denied, 297 Or. 547, 685 P.2d 998 (1984);
State v. Tracy, 200 Vt. 216, 237, 130 A.3d 196 (2015).
Of the defendant’s proffered precedent, only Oregon
courts do not follow the fighting words doctrine under
the state constitution. In its appellate brief, the state,
citing State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 285 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring), aptly notes that, with the exception of
Oregon, other jurisdictions continue to adhere to the
fighting words doctrine and that Oregon’s constitutional
approach is incompatible with Connecticut’s Geisler
analysis.29 We agree with the state that it is more per-
29
In particular, Justice Eveleigh explained: “The Oregon Supreme
Court has concluded that its constitutional expressive rights provision
forecloses the enactment of any law written in terms directed to the
substance of any opinion or any subject of communication, unless the
scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical excep-
tion that was well established when the first American guarantees of
freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in
1859 [when the Oregon Bill of Rights was adopted] demonstrably were
not intended to reach. State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 412, 649 P.2d
569 (1982). Applying this test, the Oregon Court of Appeals held a
harassment statute under which the defendant had been convicted for
calling another person a fucking nigger to be unconstitutional because
using abusive language was not a historical exception to speech rights
at the time of ratification of the Oregon constitution. . . . State v.
State v. Sidiropoulos

suasive that all but one of our sister states continue to
recognize the fighting words doctrine under their state
constitutions.
The defendant first points to a statement of the Ver-
mont Supreme Court that, “in this day and age, the
notion that any set of words are so provocative that
they can reasonably be expected to lead an average lis-
tener to immediately respond with physical violence is
highly problematic.” (Emphasis in original.) State v.
Tracy, supra, 200 Vt. 237. Despite expressing uneasiness
over the fighting words doctrine, the Supreme Court
of Vermont upheld the constitutionality of that state’s
disorderly conduct statute, noting that, “if [the statute]
has any continuing force, it is necessarily exceedingly
narrow in scope. The use of foul language and vulgar
insults is insufficient. A likelihood of arousing animosity
or inflaming anger is insufficient. The likelihood that the
listener will feel an impulse to respond angrily or even
forcefully is insufficient. The provision only reaches
speech that, in the context in which it is uttered, is so
inflammatory that it is akin to dropping a match into
a pool of gasoline.” Id. This sentiment is similar to the
one expressed by our Supreme Court in Liebenguth, in
which the court acknowledged the demanding standard
for fighting words but upheld the defendant’s conviction
of breach of the peace in the second degree because he
had used language “akin to dropping a match into a pool
of gasoline.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 708. Further, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court has previously determined that its
state constitution does not afford a more expansive free
speech right than the federal constitution. See State v.
Read, 165 Vt. 141, 156, 680 A.2d 944 (1996). Thus, we
Harrington, [supra, 67 Or. App. 610, 615–16]. Harrington concluded
that the Chaplinsky standard employed a balancing test to determine
whether speech was protected, whereas the Oregon constitution prohib-
ited restricting the right to speak freely on any subject whatever. . . .
Id., 614.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 284–85 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring).
State v. Sidiropoulos

find the defendant’s argument about Vermont precedent
unpersuasive.
We similarly find unavailing the defendant’s reliance
on Colorado precedent. In People in the Interest of R.C.,
supra, 411 P.3d 1107, a juvenile was charged with violat-
ing Colorado’s disorderly conduct statute after he used
the mobile application Snapchat to hand draw an ejacu-
lating penis on the photograph of another juvenile while
at school. Id., 1106. At trial, the juvenile argued that
his drawing constituted protected speech because only
fighting words are prohibited under the statute and the
altered photograph did not qualify as fighting words. Id.,
1107. The trial court found that the altered photograph
amounted to fighting words because “its display would
tend to make the subject of the photo feel humiliated
and ashamed” and it insinuated that the other juvenile
“was gay,” which, the court found, would likely provoke
the average person to respond with violence. Id., 1110.
The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding
that “the mere insinuation that a person is gay” does
not amount to fighting words; id.; and “that the sug-
gestion of homosexuality or homosexual conduct is [not]
so shameful and humiliating that it should be expected
to provoke a violent reaction from an ordinary person.”
Id. Accordingly, because “the circumstances surround-
ing [the juvenile’s] display of the photograph [did] not
support the finding that the display was likely to lead
to immediate violence,” the Court of Appeals reversed
his conviction. Id., 1111, 1113. Thus, as occurred in
Vermont, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the fighting words doctrine under its state
constitution, even though the doctrine did not apply
to the conduct in question. See id., 1111 (“[U]nder the
circumstances presented in this case, [the juvenile’s]
display of the photo did not amount to fighting words
because it was not likely to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. We certainly have not foreclosed the pos-
sibility that, under other circumstances, references to a
person’s sexual orientation might indeed rise to the level
of fighting words.”). Because Colorado still recognizes
State v. Sidiropoulos

the fighting words doctrine under its state constitution,
we find the defendant’s argument concerning Colorado
precedent unpersuasive.
Finally, we likewise find the defendant’s argument
related to Oregon precedent unpersuasive. In State v.
Harrington, supra, 67 Or. App. 615–16, the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the fighting words doctrine
was “not an historical exception that was well established
when first American guarantees of freedom of expression
were adopted” and, thus, was unconstitutional under
its state constitution. Specifically, the Oregon Court
of Appeals found that Oregon territorial legislation
enacted before its constitutional free speech provisions
were ratified lacked any indication that “fighting words”
would be prohibited. Id., 614. Oregon courts consistently
recognized invitations to fight as criminal but found that
“[t]he distinction between challenging another to fight a
duel with deadly weapons and publicly insulting another
by abusive or obscene words likely to provoke a violent
or disorderly response is the difference in the intent of
the actor.” Id. This led the Oregon Court of Appeals to
conclude that the requisite intent to “harass, annoy or
alarm” was unconstitutional because it was directed at
the speech itself, not toward preventing fights. Id., 615.
As Justice Eveleigh explained in his concurrence in
Baccala, “[t]he Oregon approach is inapposite to deter-
mining the protections afforded by the Connecticut con-
stitution because that state employs a different analytic
approach to delineating the scope of state constitutional
provisions. The Oregon approach is a mechanistic, single-
factor approach that focuses solely on statutory sub-
stantive criminal law extant contemporaneously with
ratification of its constitution. Connecticut, by relying
upon the Geisler factors, embraces a ‘structured and com-
prehensive approach to state constitutional interpreta-
tion’ . . . . Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education
Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 272 n.26, 990 A.2d
206 (2010). This multifactor approach provides a more
extensive [tool kit] to fashion appropriate, principled
State v. Sidiropoulos

constitutional rules. See also Honulik v. Greenwich,
293 Conn. 641, 648, 980 A.2d 845 (2009) (noting that
factors are ‘to be considered in construing the contours
of our state constitution so that we may reach reasoned
and principled results as to its meaning’).” State v. Bac-
cala, supra, 326 Conn. 284–85 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Moreover, whereas the Oregon constitutional analysis
seeks precise expressions of historical exceptions, Con-
necticut’s Geisler analysis favors a more contextual
approach that contemplates the historical constitutional
setting and the debates and values of the framers. See
State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 385–86. Because our
research indicates that all states, except for Oregon,
continue to recognize the fighting words doctrine, we
conclude that this factor weighs in favor of the state.
5
Next, we consider the fifth Geisler factor, historical
insights into the intent of the constitutional framers.
The defendant argues that the only preconstitutional
statutes that served as a basis for our modern breach
of the peace statute are “limited to speech that directly
challenges another to engage in a physical altercation or
lawless action” and “not mere name-calling.” The defen-
dant further contends that “the fighting words doctrine,
as developed in Chaplinsky, had no preconstitutional
counterpart in Connecticut prior to 1818,” as the pre-
1818 statutes limited only speech that was threatening
or defamatory, or that “directly called someone to com-
bat” or “called for God to take divine vengeance upon
someone.” As a result, the defendant argues, “this factor
weighs in favor of broader protection of free speech and
a finding that the Connecticut constitution provides
broader protection for offensive speech than the ‘fighting
words’ doctrine does, because the Connecticut constitu-
tion . . . criminalizes [only] true threats and imminent
lawless action.”
On the other hand, the state contends that our state
constitutional framers valued a balance between indi-
vidual freedoms, including free speech, against the order
State v. Sidiropoulos

afforded by government, as evidenced by the qualifying
language of article first, § 4, of the Connecticut consti-
tution. The state asserts that “Connecticut has always
employed an expressive liberties test that balances free-
dom of speech against its impact on the rights of other
members of society,” which is consistent with the fighting
words doctrine set forth in Chaplinsky. According to the
state, “[t]he qualified character of article first, §§ 4 and
5 [of the Connecticut constitution], and the framers’
refusal to afford complete immunity to the expression
of ‘opinions’ can be traced back to the similarly qualified
nature of the general liberties afforded to Connecticut’s
early colonial citizenry.” We agree with the state.
“[R]atification era constitutional law is not the sole
source of state constitutional principles. Indeed, the
common law provides valuable insight to inform our
understanding of constitutional principles. See E. Peters,
[supra, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 264] (‘In defining and enacting
constitutional bills of rights, state and national constitu-
encies would, of course, have drawn [on] the experience of
the common law. . . . Just as the precepts of the common
law influence the style of constitutional adjudication in
[common-law] courts, so common law case law itself is
part of our “usable past.” ’).” State v. Baccala, supra,
326 Conn. 276 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As discussed
previously in this opinion, our state incorporated the
English common-law offense of libel because it “tends
to create ill-blood, and cause a disturbance of the public
peace.” State v. Avery, supra, 7 Conn. 269. Further,
“Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift included the common-
law offense of provocation to breach of the peace in the
second volume of his digest [of the state’s laws] published
in 1823. See 2 Z. Swift, [supra] pp. 340–41. At the very
least, Connecticut common law embraced the principle
that speech that tended to cause a breach of the peace was
illegitimate, even if it did not acknowledge such conduct
as a basis for criminal liability. Indeed, this very rationale
undergirds the fighting words doctrine. See Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 573 (noting that it
is within domain of state power to punish ‘words likely
State v. Sidiropoulos

to cause a breach of the peace’).” (Footnotes omitted.)
State v. Baccala, supra, 277 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Our framers ratified our first state constitution in 1818
after Chief Justice Swift led the call for a constitutional
convention to codify the freedoms that Connecticut
recognized across its statutes and common law. See W.
Horton, The Connecticut State Constitution (2d Ed.
2012) pp. 12, 24. Connecticut’s framers often refer-
enced the social compact theory,30 which “posits that
all individuals are born with certain natural rights and
that people, in freely consenting to be governed, enter a
social compact with their government by virtue of which
they relinquish certain individual liberties in exchange
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and
estates.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v.
Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 598, 660 A.2d 742 (1995).31
The text of much of Connecticut’s individual rights set
forth in article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution
was taken verbatim from the Mississippi constitution of
1817. W. Horton, supra, p. 54. The constitutional con-
vention debates reflect some hesitancy in including the
qualifying language, “being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty,” but this provision ultimately was included.
Id. The constitutional convention debates surrounding
30
Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All
men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges
from the community.”
Connecticut jurists used the state constitution as a vehicle to memorial-
ize “general statements of equal justice” and left many rights “scattered
among the statutes at appropriate places.” C. Collier, “The Connecticut
Declaration of Rights Before the Constitution of 1818: A Victim of
Revolutionary Redefinition,” 15 Conn. L. Rev. 87, 93–94 (1982). As
such, jurists viewed the common law as “more than judicial precedent
and case law; it included the natural law as well.” Id., 94.
31
Chief Justice Swift was a strong proponent of the social compact
theory. In his leading treatise on Connecticut’s founding, he wrote: “A
slight observation of human nature, will demonstrate that the remarks
which Tacitus, and Voltaire have made respecting the Romans, and the
English, are applicable to all nations. That they can neither bear total
servitude, or total liberty.” (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.)
1 Z. Swift, supra, p. 31.
State v. Sidiropoulos

free speech were limited, but perhaps the most insight-
ful remark came from William Bristol, a representative
from New Haven,32 when he stated: “Every citizen has
the liberty of speaking and writing his sentiments freely,
and it should not be taken away from him; there [is] a
very great distinction between taking away a privilege,
and punishing for an abuse of it—to take away the privi-
lege, is to prevent a citizen from speaking or writing his
sentiments—it is like appointing censors of the press,
who are to revise before publication—but in the other
case everything may go out, which the citizen chooses
to publish, though he shall be liable for what he does
publish.”33 (Emphasis in original.) Id. This statement
in particular is compelling evidence that our framers
valued a balance between individual liberties and order
under the social compact theory.
Despite the clear indication that the framers of our
state constitution valued public peace and criminalized
certain speech or acknowledged causes of action related
thereto, the defendant in the present case limits his
analysis to statutes that criminalize true threats and invi-
tations to fight. The defendant contends that, because
Connecticut courts have rejected originalist approaches
to our state constitution, the fighting words doctrine is
unconstitutional under the preferred approach. Despite
this, the defendant reads early Connecticut statutes
with a focus on the specific language used rather than
the framers’ overall values and intentions. See Palka
v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 123–24, 198 A. 265 (1938)
(focusing analysis on framers’ intent in drafting indi-
vidual rights provisions of Connecticut constitution).
According to the defendant, there are no historical
32
See Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates
Convened at Hartford, August 26, 1818 (1901) p. 8.
33
Our Supreme Court noted in Cologne that “[a] broader proposal which
prohibited the molestation of any person for his opinions on any subject
whatsoever was considered at the [1818 constitutional] convention but
rejected.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 64 n.9.
State v. Sidiropoulos

indicators that fighting words are not protected under
our state constitution.
The defendant points to the following three statutes
that preceded the adoption of the 1818 constitution,
which he claims served as the basis for our modern breach
of the peace statute, as evidence that the fighting words
doctrine had no counterpart in Connecticut prior to 1818:
(1) “An Act to prevent the practice of Duelling,”34 (2)
“An Act against breaking the Peace,”35 and (3) “An Act
against profane Swearing and Cursing.”36 According to
the defendant, this claim is supported by the fact that
these statutes limited only speech that was “threatening
. . . defamatory . . . directly called someone to combat or
. . . called for God to take divine vengeance upon some-
one,” but not “mere name-calling.” The defendant also
contends that “[a] review of these statutes underscores
that any state constitutional exception to free speech for
fighting words should be limited to speech that directly
challenges another to engage in a physical altercation
or lawless action.” We disagree with these contentions.
First, we are not persuaded that these statutes support
a determination that the fighting words doctrine has no
historical roots in Connecticut. As Justice Eveleigh noted
in his concurring opinion in Baccala, “the United States
Supreme Court [in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310
34
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. LIII, § 1,
p. 241, punished “challeng[ing] the person of another, or . . . accept[ing]
any such challenge to fight at sword, pistol, rap[i]er, or other danger-
ous weapons . . . .”
35
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. CXXV,
§ 1, p. 545, punished “disturb[ing], or break[ing] the peace, by tumul-
tuous and offensive carriages, threatening, traducing, quarrelling,
challenging, assaulting, beating, or striking any other person . . . .”
To “traduce” is to “expose to shame or blame by means of falsehood
and misrepresentation.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,
supra, p. 1666.
36
Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808) tit. CLVI,
§ 1, p. 639, punished “sinfully and wickedly curs[ing] any person . . . .”
The meaning of “curse” in 1808 was “to wish evil to another person, in
the sense of calling down divine wrath upon that person.” M. Margulies,
“Connecticut’s Free Speech Clauses: A Framework and an Agenda,” 65
Conn. B. J. 437, 442 (1991).
State v. Sidiropoulos

U.S. 296] acknowledged Connecticut’s well established
authority to regulate speech that tends to provoke vio-
lence but refined that authority to conform to federal
free speech principles by permitting regulation of only
profane, indecent, or abuse remarks likely to provoke
violence. It was this principle that would become the
foundation of the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky.”
(Emphasis added.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn.
290–91 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). We agree with Justice
Eveleigh that, “[a]t the very least, Connecticut common
law embraced the principle that speech that tended to
cause a breach of the peace was illegitimate, even if it
did not acknowledge such conduct as a basis for criminal
liability. Indeed, this very rationale undergirds the fight-
ing words doctrine. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra, 315 U.S. 573 (noting that it is within the domain
of state power to punish ‘words likely to cause a breach
of the peace’).” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Baccala,
supra, 277 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). Furthermore, the
fighting words doctrine does not apply only to “name-
calling,” as the defendant suggests, but embraces some
of the very types of speech against which these statutes
were designed to protect.
We are equally unpersuaded that our state constitution
should be construed as permitting criminal punishment
of fighting words only if a defendant directly invites a
fight or challenges another to a physical altercation. We
agree with Justice Eveleigh’s conclusion that, “under
[our] state constitution, speech directly challenging
the listener to a fight is not a necessary element of the
fighting words doctrine. Rather, the standard is whether
the speech at issue is so abusive that it would provoke an
ordinary person to respond with immediate violence.”
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 299 (Eveleigh, J.,
concurring).
For these reasons, and taking into account the context
of the social compact theory and the framers’ debates and
State v. Sidiropoulos

values, we conclude that the fifth Geisler factor weighs
in favor of the state.
6
Finally, we address the sixth Geisler factor, which
concerns “economic and sociological, or public policy,
considerations.” State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 379.
The defendant advances three arguments under this fac-
tor, namely, that (1) “ ‘evolving standards of decency’ ”
favor reworking the fighting words doctrine, as today’s
society presents more opportunities than ever to speak
one’s mind without fear of violence or retaliation, (2)
other avenues of relief, such as social consequences or
civil actions, remove the need for criminalizing fighting
words, and (3) the fighting words doctrine “creates a
special risk of being applied in a discriminatory manner
because the police, prosecutor, and court must engage
in stereotyping in order to convict.” The state counters
by arguing that the fighting words doctrine is limited to
preserving public peace.37 We address the defendant’s
arguments in turn.
In support of his contention that today’s society offers
more freedom to speak one’s mind without fear of vio-
lence, the defendant relies on a case concerning the West-
boro Baptist Church (Westboro), a religious congregation
“espousing the belief [that] God is punishing America
due to its sins, particularly its tolerance of homosexual-
ity.” Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir.
37
We note that the state argues that other “liberal democracies” that
give speech more restrictive treatment regularly have high rankings
of being the happiest and least corrupt countries, and that this demon-
strates that “a liberal democracy’s health and vibrancy are not inherently
dependent upon the adoption of libertarian free speech doctrine, thereby
alleviating concern about possible ramifications stemming from an
interpretation of our state constitution in the instant matter that merely
maintains the status quo regarding the ‘fighting words’ doctrine.” In
making this argument, however, the state recognizes that some of the
restrictions on speech in such countries “would plainly be struck down
as unconstitutional” in the United States and that “this court cannot
interpret our state constitution in such a manner that would clearly run
afoul of binding United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the
federal constitution.” We, therefore, find this argument unavailing.
State v. Sidiropoulos

2013). Westboro garnered attention when its members
began picketing in a peaceful manner near the funerals
of American soldiers. Id.; see Snyder v. Phelps, supra,
562 U.S. 448 (“The church frequently communicates
its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the
more than [twenty] years that the members of Westboro
. . . have publicized their message, they have picketed
nearly 600 funerals.”). During those pickets, Westboro’s
members displayed signs with vile messages such as,
“ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ” “ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ”
and “ ‘Priests Rape Boys’ . . . .” Phelps-Roper v. Koster,
supra, 946. No actual violence occurred as a result of
the picketers’ messages. As a result of the protests, the
legislature of the state of Missouri enacted a funeral
protest law that banned picketing and protest activities
within 300 feet of any location at which a funeral is held.
Id., 947. The plaintiff, Shirley Phelps-Roper, a Westboro
member, subsequently brought a declaratory judgment
action concerning the scope and constitutionality of the
new law, which the federal District Court found to be
unconstitutional. Id., 947 and n.2. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed,
concluding that Phelps-Roper’s speech was entitled to
constitutional protection because it was doubtful that her
words were “ ‘inherently likely to provoke violent reac-
tion . . . .’ ” Id., 948; see id. (“[i]n truth, there have been
few to no reported instances of violence associated with
Westboro’s 500 protests at military funerals, undercut-
ting the notion [that] Phelps-Roper’s protests are likely
to cause an average addressee to fight” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Specifically, the court stated that
it found the lack of violence at Westboro protests, the
lack of evidence indicating that Phelps-Roper intended to
incite violence, and that Westboro’s protests concerned
matters of public importance to be compelling evidence
that Phelps-Roper’s speech did not amount to fighting
words. See id. Notably, however, in its analysis the court
recognized the fighting words doctrine, stating that
“a [s]tate may punish those words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
State v. Sidiropoulos

breach of the peace.”38 (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. Phelps-Roper, therefore, does not advance the
defendant’s argument.
The defendant further contends that, “[r]egardless
of emotional and psychic harm, modern civility has
changed, and it is less likely for a person to respond with
violence now than in the past”; therefore, he contends
that this “antiquated” doctrine does not comport with
Connecticut’s constitutional free speech provisions.
(Emphasis omitted.) In support of this argument, the
defendant cites the majority opinion in Baccala, which
found that “public discourse has become more coarse. [I]n
this day and age, the notion that any set of words are so
provocative that they can reasonably be expected to lead
an average listener to immediately respond with physical
violence is highly problematic.” (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 239. Our Supreme Court later noted in
Liebenguth, however, that “[t]o whatever extent public
discourse in general may have coarsened over time . . . it
has not eroded to the point that the racial epithets used
in the present case are any less likely to provoke a vio-
lent reaction today than they were in previous decades.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn.
38
In fact, the court in Phelps-Roper noted that the broad prohibition
in Missouri’s statutes regulating “all ‘picketing and protest activities’
around funerals—not merely those pickets involving fighting words . . .
pose[d] significant problems because the statutes unquestionably reach
protected expression. See, e.g., [Houston v. Hill], 482 U.S. 451, 465,
107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987) (‘This . . . ordinance, however,
is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting
words[.]’); Gooding v. Wilson, [supra, 405 U.S. 523] (‘Our decisions since
Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state power constitutionally to
punish “fighting” words under carefully drawn statutes not also suscep-
tible of application to protected expression.’). For instance, Missouri’s
statutes are unlike that in Maryland, which specifically prohibits speech
‘that is likely to incite or produce an imminent breach of the peace,’
Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law, § 10-205 (b) (2011), or that in Virginia,
which prohibits disruptions of funerals with speech which ‘has a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person or persons at whom,
individually, the disruption is directed,’ Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415 (B)
(ii) (2006).” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Phelps-Roper v.
Koster, supra, 713 F.3d 948–49.
State v. Sidiropoulos

709. Thus, we find unavailing the defendant’s argument
that public discourse has become so coarse that listeners
are unlikely to respond to vile racial slurs with violence.
Next, the defendant contends that alternative avenues
for relief, such as social consequences and private law-
suits, eliminate the need to criminalize fighting words.
Specifically, the defendant argues that, because this
type of language carries heavy social consequences, such
as the ending of friendships and the loss of business
relationships, and a private person can initiate a civil
action, criminalization “should not be the first response
to offensive language.” We do not agree.
In Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held
that, despite ample evidence of the plaintiff’s emotional
distress to support his claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress resulting from picket signs held
by the defendants during his son’s funeral, he could
not recover tort damages from the defendants because
their speech, which involved a matter of public concern,
was protected under the first amendment. See Snyder
v. Phelps, supra, 562 U.S. 456 (“The record makes clear
that the applicable legal term—‘emotional distress’—
fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice
added to [the plaintiff’s] already incalculable grief. But
Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters
of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public
street. Such space occupies a ‘special position in terms
of [f]irst [a]mendment protection.’ ”).
We also disagree that creating a real likelihood of
immediate violence can be deterred solely through social
consequences or civil actions. The defendant does not
present any authority that social consequences can com-
pensate for the state’s strong interest in protecting public
peace and safety. Instead, the defendant argues that we
should find the fighting words doctrine unconstitutional
because it requires the court to stereotype speakers and
addressees, which is better handled outside of criminal
court. That claim notwithstanding, we cannot conclude
that this outweighs the government’s strong interest in
State v. Sidiropoulos

preserving public peace and safety, which has been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court. See State v.
Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 290 (Eveleigh, J., concurring)
(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 311).
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine strikes a proper
balance between “individual expressive liberties and the
responsibility not to abuse such liberties.” State v. Bac-
cala, supra, 279 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As the state
notes in its appellate brief, the fighting words doctrine
is already an extremely narrowly defined “regulation
on certain incendiary speech,” the “slight social value”
of which “is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Finally, the defendant argues that “the fighting words
doctrine creates a special risk of being applied in a dis-
criminatory manner because the police, prosecutor,
and court must engage in stereotyping to convict,” and
that the lack of clarity in the doctrine “creates an even
greater risk that people in minority communities may be
arrested, prosecuted, and convicted due to police, pros-
ecutors, and judges engaging in harmful stereotyping.”
This, the defendant asserts, is contrary to Connecticut’s
“significant interest in protecting minority communities
from harmful stereotyping.”
The defendant also relies on Justice Ecker’s concur-
rence in Liebenguth to support his position. Specifically,
Justice Ecker expressed concerns that the fighting words
“doctrine . . . confers or withdraws constitutional protec-
tion depending on the demographic characteristics of the
relevant individuals” and that “part of the constitutional
analysis is an assessment of the addressee’s physical
abilities and aggressive tendencies . . . .” (Emphasis in
original.) State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 736–
37 (Ecker, J., concurring). Justice Ecker found one of
the fundamental problems with the doctrine, as it has
been applied in Connecticut, to be that it “invites—even
requires—stereotyping on the basis of age, gender, race,
and whatever other demographic characteristic the adju-
dicator explicitly or implicitly relies to decide whether
State v. Sidiropoulos

a person is likely to respond to offensive language with
immediate violence”; id., 737; and, thus, “ ‘contains an
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement . . .
.’ ” Id., 743. These concerns are consistent with those
expressed by Justice Kahn in her separate concurrence in
Liebenguth, in which she stated that “[c]onsidering the
stereotypes associated with immutable characteristics
of the addressee . . . produces discriminatory results
‘because . . . application [of the fighting words doctrine]
depends on assumptions about how likely a listener is
to respond violently to speech’ ”; id., 723–24 (Kahn,
J., concurring); and “essentially requires courts to pro-
mulgate stereotypes on the basis of race, gender, age,
disability, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among
others, and has led to much of the scholarly criticism
of the fighting words exception.”39 Id., 724; see also C.
Calvert, “Taking the Fight Out of Fighting Words on
the Doctrine’s Eightieth Anniversary: What ‘N’ Word
Litigation Today Reveals About Assumptions, Flaws
and Goals of a First Amendment Principle in Disarray,”
87 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 537–41 (2022) (discussing concerns
raised by Justice Kahn and Justice Ecker in concurring
opinions in Liebenguth).
We, as well, are troubled by the stereotyping that
necessarily occurs when the fighting words doctrine,
as currently formulated by the United States Supreme
Court, is applied under the federal constitution, which
increases the potential for discriminatory enforcement.
And, although “we must adhere to the fighting words
doctrine until the United States Supreme Court says
otherwise” in the context of claims raised pursuant to
the federal constitution, these public policy concerns
bear on our determination of whether fighting words
are protected under our state constitution. See Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed.
2d 762 (1995) (“[t]here is a ‘significant state interest in
39
See, e.g., C. Carlson & T. Buchan, “Fighting Words: A Women’s
Issue?” 29 Comm. L. & Policy 129, 131 (2024) (addressing whether and
how gender influences court’s “analyses of the likelihood that a victim
of potential fighting words will respond with immediate violence”).
State v. Sidiropoulos

eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination’ ”);
Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260
Conn. 691, 706, 802 A.2d 731 (2002) (“there exists a
general public policy in [Connecticut] to eliminate all
forms of invidious discrimination”).
Aside from the concerns regarding stereotyping and
the potential for discriminatory enforcement, we agree
with Justice Eveleigh that deterring speech that con-
stitutes fighting words “does not limit the freedom of
expression but rather, the breach of the peace statute,
as limited by the fighting words doctrine, fosters free-
dom of expression. See State v. Weber, 6 Conn. App.
407, 416, 505 A.2d 1266 (‘[t]he public policy inherent
in [the breach of the peace] statute is not to prevent
the free expression of ideas, but to promote a peaceful
environment wherein all human endeavors, including
the free expression of ideas, may flourish’), cert. denied,
199 Conn. 810, 508 A.2d 771 (1986). . . . [T]he fight-
ing words doctrine strikes the appropriate balance. It
permits the state to regulate speech that is so abusive
and hurtful that it will provoke an immediate violent
response, while protecting harsh but less hurtful speech
that has cognizable expressive value.” (Citations omit-
ted; footnote omitted.) State v. Baccala, supra, 326
Conn. 295–96 (Eveleigh, J., concurring). As Justice
Eveleigh explained: “To begin with, abusive language
and epithets are not entirely harmless expression. Indeed,
there is certain speech that does more than just offend
sensibilities or merely cause someone to bristle. One
commentator has observed the following about abusive
language: ‘Often a speaker consciously sets out to wound
and humiliate a listener. He aims to make the other feel
degraded and hated, and chooses words to achieve that
effect. In what they accomplish, insults of this sort are
a form of psychic assault; they do not differ much from
physical assaults, like slaps or pinches, that cause no real
physical hurt. Usually, the speaker believes the listener
possesses the characteristics that are indicated by his
humiliating and wounding remarks, but the speaker
selects the most abusive form of expression to impose
State v. Sidiropoulos

the maximum hurt. His aim diminishes the expressive
importance of the words.’ . . . K. Greenawalt, ‘Insults
and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?’ 42 Rutgers
L. Rev. 287, 293 (1990); see also Taylor v. Metzger,
[supra, 152 N.J. 503] (‘ “The experience of being called
‘nigger,’ ‘spic,’ ‘Jap,’ or ‘kike’ is like receiving a slap in
the face. The injury is instantaneous.” ’). ‘It is precisely
because fighting words inflict injury that they tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. Fighting words
cause injury through visceral aggression and by attack-
ing the target’s rights. Individuals who are injured in
this way have a strong tendency to respond on the same
level, even though that response may itself be wrongful.’
. . . S. Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into
the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression,’
78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275, 1372 (1998).” State v. Baccala,
supra, 294–95 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
Accordingly, we find that the public policy factor
weighs only in part in favor of the defendant’s posi-
tion that our state constitution should and does protect
fighting words.
7
To summarize, we conclude that the Geisler factors
do not support the defendant’s theory that the fighting
words doctrine is incompatible with the protections
afforded under the Connecticut constitution. Connecti-
cut has historically recognized a strong interest in keep-
ing public peace and safety. The language of article first,
§ 4, of the Connecticut constitution requires speakers
to bear responsibility for the abuse of free speech privi-
leges. Further, beginning with colonial precedent, Con-
necticut jurisprudence consistently has supported the
state’s strong interest in keeping public peace and safety.
Indeed, one of the earliest federal precedents related to
the fighting words doctrine came from Connecticut. The
defendant’s reliance on Oregon case law and recent state-
ments from our Supreme Court justices in concurring
opinions does not persuade us that the framers of our
state constitution intended to allow individuals to say
State v. Sidiropoulos

hurtful and vile things and take no legal responsibility
when those words are likely to incite an immediate vio-
lent reaction by an ordinary person. On the contrary, our
“state’s constitution expressly contemplates holding a
citizen responsible for the abuse of expressive liberty. See
Conn. Const., art. I, § 4. . . . [T]his state has historically
embraced a civil libertarian philosophy that is permis-
sive of government regulation of the abuse of expressive
liberties when such abuse tends toward a breach of the
peace.” State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 297 (Eveleigh,
J., concurring). “[T]he Connecticut constitution does not
demand that citizens should be forced to bear extreme
personal denigration—abuse that pushes a person to
the brink of violence—so that others may freely employ
wanton vilification as a form of expression.” Id., 299.
Furthermore, although public policy considerations
regarding stereotyping and the potential for discrimi-
natory enforcement under the fighting words doctrine
weigh in favor of the defendant’s position, we are not
convinced that those public policy concerns, when con-
sidered in connection with all of the Geisler factors, sup-
port a determination that the Connecticut constitution
protects fighting words. This is especially so in light
of the state’s strong interest in protecting peace and
public safety, long-standing Connecticut jurisprudence
punishing speech that amounts to fighting words, and
the recent application of the fighting words doctrine in
the first amendment context in Liebenguth. Therefore,
we conclude that the Geisler factors do not support the
defendant’s contention that the broader protections for
speech under the state constitution extend to fighting
words.
II
The defendant next claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is
unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to
the facts of this case. The defendant did not raise these
claims before the trial court and, therefore, seeks review
of his unpreserved claims pursuant to State v. Golding,
supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. As stated previously in this
State v. Sidiropoulos

opinion, “[u]nder Golding, a defendant can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record
is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Benson, supra, 235 Conn. App. 603.
We conclude that the record is adequate for review of
the defendant’s claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconsti-
tutionally vague on its face and as applied to this case;
see State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 800–801, 640
A.2d 986 (1994) (for record to be adequate for appellate
review of claim that statute is facially vague, record
must reflect that defendant was convicted under statute
in question, and with respect to claim that statute is
vague as applied, record must further reflect conduct
that formed basis of defendant’s conviction); and that
the claims are of constitutional magnitude. See State v.
Billings, supra, 217 Conn. App. 24 n.15 (claim “asserting
a violation of the defendant’s right to freedom of speech
. . . is of constitutional magnitude” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). We, thus, proceed to the third prong
of Golding—whether the defendant has demonstrated
the existence of a constitutional violation—keeping in
mind that, “[w]hen assessing the constitutionality of
a statute, we exercise de novo review and make every
presumption in favor of the statute’s validity. . . . We
are also mindful that legislative enactments carry with
them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and
that a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly
enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 26. Moreover,
we also “take into account any prior interpretations that
[our Supreme Court] [and this court] . . . have placed on
State v. Sidiropoulos

the statute,” and we “may also add interpretive gloss to
a challenged statute in order to render it constitutional.
In construing a statute, the court must search for an
effective and constitutional construction that reason-
ably accords with the legislature’s underlying intent.”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano, supra, 805–806.
A
The defendant first claims that § 53a-181 (a) (5) “is
unconstitutionally vague on its face because the fighting
words doctrine no longer provides clear guidance as to
what conduct” is prohibited. Specifically, he contends
that “the fighting words doctrine has become increasingly
convoluted and case-specific,” as “[i]t does not provide a
fair warning of what is prohibited,” and that the test for
fighting words has become too subjective, rendering the
statute devoid of a core meaning. In other words, accord-
ing to the defendant, “a reasonable person would need to
guess at the meaning of the terms to understand what
kind of conduct the legislature intended to proscribe.”
We disagree.40
“A statute . . . [that] forbids or requires conduct in
terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process. . . . Laws
must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly. . . . A statute is not void for vagueness
unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional,
making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . .
[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central
precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a gov-
erning statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless
40
We note that the defendant has raised his vagueness challenge to
the statute pursuant to the federal constitution rather than our state
constitution. Accordingly, this court is “bound by applicable United
States Supreme Court precedents regarding the vagueness principle”
and is “not free to interpret the federal constitution so as to recognize
greater rights than the United States Supreme Court has specifically
refrained from recognizing.” State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 802.
State v. Sidiropoulos

law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be
fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness
since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vague-
ness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk
uncertainties. . . . References to judicial opinions involv-
ing the statute, the common law, legal dictionaries, or
treatises may be necessary to ascertain a statute’s mean-
ing to determine if it gives fair warning. . . . Thus, even
[a] facially vague law may . . . comport with due process
if prior judicial decisions have provided the necessary
fair warning and ascertainable enforcement standards.
State v. Ares, 345 Conn. 290, 303–304, 284 A.3d 967
(2022); see also State v. Charles L., 217 Conn. App. 380,
395–96, 288 A.3d 664, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 920, 291
A.3d 607 (2023).” (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Russo, 221 Conn. App. 729,
749 n.16, 303 A.3d 279 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024); see also State v. Caracoglia,
134 Conn. App. 175, 180, 38 A.3d 226 (2012) (“[A] penal
statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . .
. [I]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute
[must] afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited
. . . and must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
“A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a
person must inquire further as to the precise reach of
its prohibitions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Michael R., 346 Conn. 432, 457, 291 A.3d 567,
cert. denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 211, 217 L. Ed. 2d 89
(2023). “[O]ur case law makes clear that the statute at
issue need only give fair warning to those who are poten-
tially subject to it. . . . To that end, [t]he proscription of
the activity . . . need not be definite as to all aspects of
State v. Sidiropoulos

its scope.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219, 244, 177 A.3d
1113 (2018). “We examine the words of the statute and
prior judicial gloss put on it to determine whether the
statute gives proper notice of the conduct it proscribes so
that it does not impinge on free speech rights guaranteed
by the first amendment to the United States constitu-
tion.” State v. Caracoglia, supra, 134 Conn. App. 181.
Section 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A per-
son is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree
when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person .
. . (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language
or makes an obscene gesture . . . . For purposes of this
section, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or
held out for use by the public whether owned or oper-
ated by public or private interests.” (Emphasis added.)
As explained by our Supreme Court in Liebenguth, for
an appellate court to determine whether language that
is “no doubt ‘abusive’ under the commonly understood
meaning of that term . . . is entitled to constitutional
protection . . . we apply the judicial gloss necessary to
limit the reach of the breach of the peace statute to ensure
that it comports with constitutional requirements. See
State v. Baccala, supra, 326 Conn. 234, 251 (placing
gloss on § 53a-181 (a) (5) to avoid possibility of conviction
founded on constitutionally protected speech). For pres-
ent purposes, ‘the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech requires that [§ 53a-181 (a) (5)] be confined to
language [that], under the circumstances of its utterance,
constitutes [unprotected] fighting words—those [that]
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.’ . . . ‘Accordingly,
to establish the defendant’s violation of § 53a-181 (a)
(5) . . . in light of its constitutional gloss, the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s words were likely to provoke an imminent
violent response’ under the circumstances in which they
State v. Sidiropoulos

were uttered.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 697–98.
This court previously rejected a vagueness challenge
to § 53a-181 (a) (5) in State v. Caracoglia, 78 Conn. App.
98, 826 A.2d 192, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d
65 (2003), in which the defendant raised a nearly identi-
cal claim as the one raised in the present case, namely,
that § 53a-181 (a) (5) “has become unconstitutionally
vague,” as the “ ‘fighting words’ ” judicial gloss “creates
an inherent ambiguity about the meaning of ‘the use of
abusive or obscene language in a public place’ . . . .” Id.,
105. The defendant in Caracoglia also asserted that “our
courts have introduced confusion into the definition of
fighting words under Connecticut’s breach of the peace
statute [in that it] fails to provide notice of what conduct
is proscribed under subdivision (a) (1) as opposed to (a)
(5) . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 108.
This court rejected those arguments and concluded, on
the basis of the language of the statute, that “the dis-
tinction that may be drawn between the ‘fighting words’
as contemplated under subdivision (1) and those under
subdivision (5) can be found ‘under the totality of the
circumstances,’ as expressed in [State v. Szymkiewicz,
supra, 237 Conn. 618–22],41 which gives rise to the use
of the words. Subdivision (1) proscribes fighting words
uttered in a violent, tumultuous or threatening manner
. . . whereas subdivision (5) proscribes fighting words
that tend to induce immediate violence by the person or
persons to whom the words are uttered because of their
raw effect. The core meaning of subdivision (5) remains
41
In Szymkiewicz, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
§ 53a-181 (a) (1), the subdivision of the breach of the peace statute that
applies to a person who “[e]ngages in fighting or in violent, tumultu-
ous or threatening behavior in a public place,” proscribes only physical
conduct or whether it also includes speech that constitutes fighting
words. State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 237 Conn. 614. The court concluded
that “[s]ubdivision (1) of § 53a-181 (a) proscribes speech that properly
can be characterized as fighting words when, under the totality of the
circumstances, that speech amounts to ‘violent, tumultuous or threat-
ening behavior’ that portends violence, while subdivision (5) proscribes
‘abusive or obscene language.’” Id., 622.
State v. Sidiropoulos

intact; fighting words may arise in different contexts not
confined to abusive or obscene language. We therefore
must conclude that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is not unconstitution-
ally vague.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote
added.) State v. Caracoglia, supra, 109–10.
In light of this court’s decision in State v. Caracoglia,
supra, 78 Conn. App. 109–10, we reject the defendant’s
facial vagueness challenge to § 53a-181 (a) (5). “[I]t is
axiomatic that one panel of this court cannot overrule
the precedent established by a previous panel’s holding .
. . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. White,
215 Conn. App. 273, 304–305, 283 A.3d 542 (2022),
cert. denied, 346 Conn. 918, 291 A.3d 108 (2023). This
court in Caracoglia specifically found that § 53a-181
(a) (5) has a core meaning and that the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Caracoglia, supra,
110–11. The defendant’s claims to the contrary, thus,
necessarily fail. Moreover, the defendant has not referred
to Caracoglia in his appellate briefs or made any attempt
to distinguish it.
Furthermore, the defendant’s facial vagueness chal-
lenge fails in light of the judicial gloss courts apply to
§ 53a-181 (a) (5), which necessarily limits “the reach of
the breach of the peace statute to ensure that it comports
with constitutional requirements.” State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 698. This court and our Supreme Court
have applied that judicial gloss numerous times since the
statute’s inception. It appears that the defendant would
like this court to conduct a new analysis and place a new
gloss on the statute, which we decline to do, as we are
bound to apply the fighting words doctrine as currently
formulated by the United States Supreme Court and as
applied by our Supreme Court.42 See footnote 17 of this
42
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant asserts that our
Supreme Court’s “latest decision in Liebenguth only served to further
confuse and tangle the already confusing doctrine by prohibiting the
words ‘fucking nigger’ by looking at the case-specific context and ‘a host
of factors’ that do not provide clear guidance.” He further contends
that “[a] defendant cannot be expected to make the same analysis as
the court did in Liebenguth in order to know whether or not his speech
State v. Sidiropoulos

opinion; see also State v. Liebenguth, supra, 725 (Ecker,
J., concurring).
We acknowledge that the defendant’s argument con-
cerning the fact-specific and subjective nature of the
fighting words doctrine and how that has the potential
to affect the adequacy of notice of what is prohibited
is not entirely without merit. Indeed, Justice Ecker
expressed similar concerns in his concurring opinion in
Liebenguth. Specifically, Justice Ecker found one of the
fundamental problems with the fighting words doctrine
to be “that such an intensely contextualized, fact-specific,
and inherently subjective analysis in the area of free
speech creates major constitutional concerns under due
process vagueness principles.”43 State v. Liebenguth,
supra, 336 Conn. 743 (Ecker, J., concurring). Because
the defendant in Liebenguth did not challenge § 53a-181
(a) (5) on vagueness grounds, however, Justice Ecker
did not determine “whether the statute is saved by [our
Supreme Court’s] narrowing construction, which limits
its coverage to fighting words as [our Supreme Court has]
defined that term . . . .” Id., 744–45. He noted, however,
that the majority opinion in Liebenguth has “not made
that future task any easier”; id., 745; and, ultimately,
“agree[d] with the majority that, under our current first
amendment case law,” the words spoken by the defendant
in Liebenguth under the circumstances in that case “fit
is protected.” For the reasons stated in this opinion and because we are
bound by Liebenguth, we reject these arguments.
43
In light of what he described as the untenable nature of the fight-
ing words doctrine, Justice Ecker urged the United States Supreme
Court to adopt “a more sensible first amendment framework”; State v.
Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 725 (Ecker, J., concurring); observing
that our Supreme Court’s “own recent experience applying the fight-
ing words doctrine, as well as the many similar cases adjudicated by
state courts around the country, powerfully illustrates why the United
States Supreme Court should consider fashioning a more defensible
and administrable first amendment framework for deciding when the
government may criminalize the kind of hate speech uttered by the
defendant in the present case.” Id., 745–46.
State v. Sidiropoulos

the bill” as fighting words. (Emphasis added.) Id., 746
(Ecker, J., concurring).
Likewise, in the present case, in light of the judicial
gloss applied to § 53a-181 (a) (5), which our Supreme
Court in Liebenguth confirmed “limit[s] the reach of the
breach of the peace statute to ensure that it comports
with constitutional requirements”; id., 698; we cannot
conclude that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Although this precise issue was not before the court in
Liebenguth, its statements surrounding the judicial gloss
applied to § 53a-181 (a) (5) and its application of the gloss
to conclude that the speech at issue in that case consti-
tuted fighting words within the meaning of the statute,
lead us to conclude that the gloss sufficiently limits the
reach of the statute so as to be consistent with constitu-
tional requirements, which include fair notice of what
is prohibited. For that reason, we cannot conclude that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague when inter-
preted in the context of the judicial gloss as currently
formulated by the United States Supreme Court and as
applied by our Supreme Court. In light of our determi-
nation, the defendant has not established the existence
of a constitutional violation pursuant to Golding with
respect to his facial vagueness claim. Accordingly, the
defendant’s unpreserved facial vagueness challenge to
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) fails.
B
We now turn to the defendant’s unpreserved claim that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the facts of this case. Specifically, the defendant claims
that (1) § 53a-181 (a) (5) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied because he did not have “fair warning to know
what is prohibited,” and (2) “the law does not provide
explicit standards to law enforcement officials, judges,
State v. Sidiropoulos

and juries so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
application . . . .”44 We disagree.
“The proper test for determining [whether] a statute
is vague as applied is whether a reasonable person would
have anticipated that the statute would apply to his or her
particular conduct. . . . The test is objectively applied to
the actor’s conduct and judged by a reasonable person’s
reading of the statute. . . . If the language of a statute
fails to provide definite notice of prohibited conduct,
fair warning can be provided by prior judicial opinions
involving the statute . . . or by an examination of whether
a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably know
what acts are permitted or prohibited by the use of his
common sense and ordinary understanding.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mansfield, 201 Conn.
App. 748, 758, 243 A.3d 822 (2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 910, 244 A.3d 561 (2021). “To demonstrate that
44
The defendant also claims that, if § 53a-181 (a) (5) is found to be
constitutional as applied, “it will create a ‘chilling’ effect that will
lead citizens to steer ‘far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’”
We conclude that the defendant has failed to brief this claim adequately
and, accordingly, decline to review it. “ ‘We repeatedly have stated
that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning
an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judi-
ciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the
parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.
. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing
the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited.’ . . . .
‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned and
not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately
briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no men-
tion of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record .
. . .’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Roberts, 227 Conn. App. 159, 185–86,
320 A.3d 989, cert. granted, 350 Conn. 915, 324 A.3d 792 (2024). The
defendant’s briefing for this claim consists of one short paragraph that
contains conclusory assertions about the alleged “chilling effect” on
“other people’s expression” resulting from his conviction in this case.
Aside from a single citation to a law review article for the proposition
that speech is a precious but fragile right, the defendant provides no
authority or legal analysis regarding this claim. Therefore, we decline
to address this claim.
State v. Sidiropoulos

[a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him,
the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what
was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 757–58.
In the present case, the defendant first argues that he
was not provided with fair warning that his use of racial
epithets toward a multiracial individual is prohibited by
§ 53a-181 (a) (5). The defendant correctly asserts that, as
the fighting words doctrine has evolved over the years,
our courts have recognized that public discussion has
become coarser. Indeed, public discussion has become
so coarse that our Supreme Court has found some of
the most vile insults not to be fighting words under the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Baccala,
supra, 326 Conn. 236, 256 (defendant’s reference to
store manager as “ ‘fat ugly bitch’ ” and “ ‘cunt’ ” did not
constitute fighting words); see also State v. Parnoff, 329
Conn. 412–13 (Kahn, J., concurring in the judgment).
Despite this evolution, in Liebenguth, which was decided
in 2020—nearly three years before the circumstances
underlying the present case—our Supreme Court stated
that “[t]o whatever extent public discourse in general may
have coarsened over time . . . it has not eroded to the point
that the racial epithets used in the present case are any
less likely to provoke a violent reaction today than they
were in previous decades.” State v. Liebenguth, supra,
336 Conn. 709. Significantly, the language at issue in
Liebenguth—“ ‘fucking niggers’ ”—is substantially simi-
lar to the words uttered by the defendant in the present
case, namely, “ ‘stupid nigger,’ ” which undermines the
defendant’s claim that he had no notice “that his speech
was not protected speech.”45
To be clear, our Supreme Court in Liebenguth did not
hold, nor are we holding in the present case, that the
45
We find unavailing the defendant’s contention that his speech
“was more akin to the protected speech in Baccala than the speech in
Liebenguth.” (Emphasis in original.)
State v. Sidiropoulos

mere utterance of the word “nigger” by itself, despite
its vile and reprehensible nature, is sufficient to fall
outside the protection of the first amendment. The words
at issue must be examined in the context in which they
were uttered for a court to determine whether they were
likely to provoke an imminent, violent reaction. Again,
the defendant takes issue with that standard, arguing
that it requires “a defendant to have a crystal ball to see
into the future in order to determine if his speech is likely
to produce a violent reaction.” For the reasons already
stated herein, we are not at liberty to change or discard
the standard. With respect to the present case, we con-
clude, in light of Liebenguth, that a reasonable person
in the defendant’s position would have anticipated that
§ 53a-181 (a) (5) would prohibit the uttering of the words
“stupid nigger” to a multiracial person, repeatedly and
in a loud manner in a confined space in which the speaker
blocked the only exit for the addressee while shouting
the racial epithet. See State v. Mansfield, supra, 201
Conn. App. 758.
The defendant also suggests that this court should fol-
low a decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
“found that a city ordinance banning ‘indecent, insult-
ing, immoral or obscene conduct in any public place’
did not give adequate forewarning that referencing a
person by a racial slur . . . may rise to the level of fight-
ing words.” See People v. Barton, 253 Mich. App. 601,
607, 659 N.W.2d 654 (2002). This claim requires little
discussion. Connecticut Supreme Court precedent—
Liebenguth—construed the same statute at issue in
the present case, § 53a-181 (a) (5), to similar words and
concluded that the words “fucking niggers” were fight-
ing words under the circumstances in which they were
uttered. See State v. Liebenguth, supra, 336 Conn. 708.
That decision, in which our Supreme Court noted that
the word “ ‘nigger’ ” “has been characterized as ‘the most
provocative, emotionally-charged and explosive term in
the [English] language” in light of its inextricable link
to “ ‘racial hatred and bigotry’ ” and its “ ‘degrading and
humiliating’ ” nature; id., 705; governs our analysis and
State v. Sidiropoulos

resolution of this claim and provides adequate warning
that referring to a person with a racial slur can consti-
tute fighting words. With binding precedent from our
state’s highest court, we need not look to the courts of
other states for guidance concerning this issue.
The defendant next argues that the law does not pro-
vide explicit standards to law enforcement officials,
judges, and juries to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
application. To establish his claim that § 53a-181 (a) (5)
is unconstitutional as applied to him due to arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, the defendant must
demonstrate “that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mansfield, supra,
201 Conn. App. 758. In the present case, the defendant,
instead, discusses the general dangers inherent in the
statute’s vagueness, in that “judgment can vary widely
across different legal actors,” and, he speculates, without
any authority, that “it is entirely likely that [he] would
not have been arrested by a different police officer called
to the scene, would not have been prosecuted by a differ-
ent prosecutor in a different courthouse, and would not
have been convicted by a different judge.” Speculation
and conjecture are not sufficient to establish the existence
of a constitutional violation. See generally Breton v.
Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 470, 196
A.3d 789 (2018) (“mere speculation or conjecture . . .
will not suffice to establish a violation of the [e]x [p]ost
[f]acto [c]lause” of federal constitution (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Therefore, the defendant’s claim
that the statute is vague because it has been applied to
him in an arbitrary manner fails.
To establish his claim that § 53a-181 (a) (5) is uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant
had to “demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that
[he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or
that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Mansfield, supra, 201 Conn. App. 757–58. On the
State v. Sidiropoulos

basis of our analysis, we conclude that the defendant
has failed to meet that burden. Accordingly, because
the defendant has not demonstrated that § 53a-181 (a)
(5) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, he has
failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional
violation for purposes of the third prong of Golding as
to this aspect of his vagueness claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.