Carrero v. D'Aguila

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Carrero v. D’Aguila

LUIS CARRERO v. TIM D’AGUILA ET AL.
(AC 47649)
Elgo, Wilson and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The defendants, a property management company and its employee, appealed
from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff tenant in an action brought
pursuant to the entry and detainer statute (§ 47a-43). The defendants claimed,
inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
plaintiff did not have actual possession of the parking area at issue. Held:

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action and
correctly found in his favor, as the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff
did not possess a leasehold interest in the parking area did not implicate
subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, challenged the legal sufficiency of
the plaintiff’s claim, and the defendants did not demonstrate that the court
lacked the authority to adjudicate the action or that it failed to address the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in denying their motions to dismiss.

Argued February 5—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover possession of certain premises and
personal property following the unlawful entry and
detainer by the defendants, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Haven, Housing Session at Meriden, and tried to the
court, Jacobs, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defen-
dants’ motion to dismiss and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff; subsequently, the court denied the defendants’
motion for reconsideration and to dismiss, and the defen-
dants appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David V. DeRosa, for the appellants (defendants).
Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendants, Tim D’Aguila and
Carabetta Management Co., appeal from the judgment of
the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Luis Car-
rero, in an action for unlawful entry and detainer under
General Statutes § 47a-43. On appeal, the defendants
Carrero v. D’Aguila

claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiff’s action because the plaintiff did
not have actual possession of the property at issue, as
required pursuant to § 47a-43. We disagree and, accord-
ingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The plaintiff operated an automobile
repair shop on property located at 955 Broad Street in
Meriden (premises). The plaintiff rented the premises
from Atkins Street, LLC, pursuant to a written month-
to-month lease. It is undisputed that D’Aguila is an
employee of Carabetta Management Co., and both are
agents of the lessor, Atkins Street, LLC, which is not a
party to this action.
On April 1, 2024, the plaintiff filed a verified lockout
complaint and application for a temporary injunction
pursuant to § 47a-43, alleging that, on March 29, 2024,
the defendants or their agents prevented him from occu-
pying the premises and had him falsely arrested for tres-
passing. The plaintiff further alleged that, on behalf of
the lessor, the defendants or their agents “[b]roke locks
[and] towed over seventy cars, damaging the plaintiff’s
commercial business.” The defendants subsequently were
served with a summons and complaint on April 2, 2024,
and a trial on the plaintiff’s cause of action for unlawful
entry and detainer was scheduled for April 9, 2024.1
On the morning of April 9, 2024, the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The defendants contended that, “while
Connecticut provides protection for residential dwellers
and commercial tenants, renters of parking spaces do
not enjoy the same benefits.” In addition, the defen-
dants argued that they had, at all relevant times, acted
1
General Statutes § 47a-43 (b) provides in relevant part that the court
“shall forthwith issue a summons to the party complained of, directed
to some proper officer, to notify him to appear at a specified time and
place, within eight days from the exhibition of such complaint, in the
superior court for the judicial district wherein the injury complained
of was done, to answer to the matters contained in the complaint.”
Carrero v. D’Aguila

in accordance with the terms of the plaintiff’s rental
agreement.
The defendants and their counsel subsequently failed
to appear for trial on that same day. The court, Jacobs,
J., proceeded to trial in their absence in accordance with
§ 47a-43 (d).2 Several exhibits were entered into evidence,
including the written lease agreement, and the court
heard testimony from the plaintiff. At the conclusion
of the trial, the court made oral findings in favor of the
plaintiff on the merits of his complaint and stated that
it was denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Following the trial, the court issued a written order
summarily denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The court also issued a written decision rendering judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and finding the defendants
“guilty of an illegal entry and detainer in violation of . .
. § 47a-43 (a) . . . .” The court made the following factual
findings in support of this determination: “On March
29, 2024, the plaintiff . . . was, pursuant to a written
month-to-month lease, a tenant lawfully and actually in
possession of the premises, a parking lot bounded on the
sides by a wooden fence and on the front side by a wire
fence with a gate and where he kept vehicles which had
been placed in his care and custody by his customers, as
well as engines, transmissions, and automotive parts.
On said date, representatives of the defendant Carabetta
Management Co. cut the lock to the gate of the premises,
and the police were called to the premises. Despite the
plaintiff’s explanation to the police that he was lawfully
in possession of the premises, and no notice to quit had
been served, the police detained the plaintiff and charged
him with trespass. . . . On [that same date], there were
approximately seventy vehicles on the premises . . . and
on or about said date, D&L Towing [and Repair, LLP],
an affiliate of Carabetta Management Co., removed the
vehicles from the premises and towed the vehicles to its
2
General Statutes § 47a-43 (d) provides: “If, after service of such sum-
mons, the party complained of does not appear and defend, the judge
shall proceed in the same manner as if he were present.”
Carrero v. D’Aguila

lot where, to the best of the plaintiff’s knowledge and
belief, those vehicles remain to this date. In addition to
the removal of the vehicles, the plaintiff’s equipment,
including, but not limited to, engines, transmissions, and
automotive parts . . . was destroyed by the defendants.
. . . The court further finds that the defendants have
prevented the plaintiff from occupying the premises
since March 29, 2024, and the plaintiff remains out
of possession of the premises. The court finds that the
defendants took possession of and destroyed personal
property belonging to the plaintiff. . . . The forcible entry
into the parking lot was an entry into land of which the
plaintiff was lawfully and actually in possession. . . .
The defendants have caused irreparable loss and damage
because the plaintiff is being deprived of the premises, his
personal property, and the vehicles which had been placed
by his customers in his custody and care and removed by
D&L Towing [and Repair, LLP]. The court finds that the
plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law.”
As relief, the trial court ordered that the plaintiff “be
immediately restored to, and reseized of, the premises,”
and that, not later than April 23, 2024, the vehicles
and personal property removed from the premises be
returned to the plaintiff. In addition, the court issued a
permanent injunction “preventing the defendant[s] and
their [agents] . . . from depriving the plaintiff of access
to the premises and to his personal property so long as
he remains in lawful and actual possession of the prem-
ises,” and awarded the plaintiff a writ of restitution.
Finally, the court ordered the defendants to compensate
the plaintiff for any economic loss he had suffered as a
result of the illegal entry and detainer, the amount of
which would be determined by the court following an
evidentiary hearing.3
3
In his brief to this court, the plaintiff raised the question of whether
the defendants are appealing from a final judgment given that the
trial court had not yet ruled on damages. We conclude that there is a
final judgment because the court resolved the question of liability and
issued, inter alia, a permanent injunction as equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. New Haven, 275 Conn. 580, 599–600, 881 A.2d 978 (2005)
(party is permitted to appeal injunction in absence of determination of
Carrero v. D’Aguila

On April 23, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to
reconsider the denial of their previous motion to dismiss,
along with a corrected motion to dismiss. In their motion
to reconsider, the defendants argued that their previous
motion to dismiss was filed in error, as it contained “the
incomplete work product of an intern,” and that genuine
issues of material fact remained as to the jurisdiction of
the court. In their corrected motion to dismiss, the defen-
dants again argued that the action should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and requested that
the court “vacate its prior order and hold an evidentiary
hearing on the jurisdiction of the court and to reconsider
any potential liability of the defendant[s].” The court held
a hearing on the defendants’ motions on May 9, 2024.
On May 10, 2024, the trial court issued a written deci-
sion denying the defendants’ motions. With respect to
the motion to reconsider, the court found, inter alia,
that “[t]he date assigned for the [unlawful entry and
detainer] hearing was within the time frame prescribed
by [§] 47a-43 (b)”; the court had issued notice of that
hearing on April 1, 2024; proper service of that notice
was made on April 2, 2024; the defendants failed to
appear for that hearing, although an appearance was
filed on their behalf just one day prior; and “[p]roceeding
with the April 9 hearing in the absence of the defendants
was a statutory imperative [pursuant to § 47a-43 (d)].”
The court also concluded: “The court having denied the
motion to reconsider, the defendants’ motion to dismiss
is denied as moot.” This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendants claim, inter alia, that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s action because the plaintiff did not have actual
possession of the property at issue, as required pursuant
to § 47a-43.4 Specifically, they argue that the plaintiff
damages as long as all issues alleged in complaint as to liability have
been determined).
4
The defendants also claim that (1) the trial court deprived them
of due process by failing to schedule a hearing on their motion to dis-
miss and proceeding to trial, and (2) the plaintiff’s action is now moot
because the plaintiff subsequently was evicted from the premises and
Carrero v. D’Aguila

“was never in actual possession of the parking area”
because he “possessed a license and not a leasehold inter-
est in the premises.” In addition, they contend that the
court improperly failed to address the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction in ruling on their motions to dismiss.
“[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our
review is plenary. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves
the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of con-
troversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court
lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over
which it is without jurisdiction . . . .” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority
v. Stevens, 209 Conn. App. 569, 577, 267 A.3d 927, cert.
denied, 343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022).
“The process of entry and detainer is in its nature an
action by which one in the possession and enjoyment
of any land, tenement or dwelling unit, who has been
deprived of it, may be restored to the possession and
enjoyment of that property. . . . In an action commenced
under the entry and detainer statute, § 47a-43, the plain-
tiff must show that he was in actual possession of the
premises at the time of the defendant’s entry.5 . . . Gen-
the vehicles that the defendants removed from the premises are back
in his possession.
We conclude that the defendants’ due process claim has no merit and
requires little discussion because it is undisputed that the defendants
and their counsel had notice of when trial was scheduled to commence
and, without any explanation, decided not to appear. In addition, we sum-
marily reject the defendants’ mootness claim because there is practical
relief that can be afforded to the parties given that “the validity of the
earlier finding of unlawful entry and detainer will govern the disposition
of the damages claim currently pending before the trial court.” Wilcox
v. Ferraina, 100 Conn. App. 541, 549, 920 A.2d 316 (2007).
5
Specifically, General Statutes § 47a-43 (a) provides: “When any person
(1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and
with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable
entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains
the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enters into any land, tene-
ment or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to
or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor,
or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause
Carrero v. D’Aguila

erally, the inquiry is whether the one claiming actual
possession has exercised the dominion and control that
owners of like property usually exercise, although it is
not necessary to show a continuous personal presence on
the land.” (Footnote added.) Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92
Conn. App. 400, 404, 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), aff’d, 284
Conn. 502, 935 A.2d 126 (2007).
We conclude that the defendants mistakenly conflate
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction with the
merits of the plaintiff’s unlawful entry and detainer
action. See Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209
Conn. App. 577; see also Fleming v. Bridgeport, supra, 92
Conn. App. 404 (“[t]he question of whether the plaintiff
was in actual possession at the time of the defendant’s
entry is one for the trier of fact” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The arguments raised by the defendants
do not implicate jurisdiction but, rather, challenge the
legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim. See Machado v.
Taylor, 326 Conn. 396, 400–401, 163 A.3d 558 (2017);
see also In re Jose B., 303 Conn. 569, 572–80, 34 A.3d
975 (2012). Beyond arguing that the plaintiff was not in
actual possession of the premises, the defendants have
not attempted to demonstrate that the trial court lacked
the authority to adjudicate the plaintiff’s unlawful entry
and detainer action and therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.6
In addition, we briefly address the defendants’ con-
tention that the trial court improperly failed to address
damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain
possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering
damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court.”
6
As part of their claim that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the defendants also contend that the plaintiff had a license
rather than a lease and, therefore, lacked a possessory interest in the
property. As we have pointed out in this opinion, whether the plaintiff
had a possessory interest in the property goes to the merits of the action
and not to whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the action. Even if the plaintiff had a license rather than a lease, how-
ever, he could still have had “actual possession” within the meaning of
§ 47a-43. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Ferraina, 100 Conn. App. 541, 551, 920
A.2d 316 (2007) (“Even if we assume arguendo that [the plaintiff] had
Carrero v. D’Aguila

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in denying their
motions to dismiss. To the extent the defendants argue
that the court “never acted” on their initial motion to
dismiss, we disagree. The court expressly denied the
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of trial, as reflected in
an order issued on that same date, and, as we previously
explained in this opinion, the defendants’ claim that the
court lacked jurisdiction is legally flawed.
We do, however, agree with the defendants insofar as
the trial court denied their corrected motion to dismiss
as “moot.” “[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction
of a court is raised, [i]t must be disposed of no matter
in what form it is presented . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Machado v. Taylor, supra, 326 Conn.
402; see also id., 404 (“it is proper to consider a challenge
to subject matter jurisdiction raised posttrial before
the trial court”); Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn.
App. 527, 536, 344 A.3d 527 (2025) (“[a] claim that a
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time during the proceedings” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Because the court had subject matter
jurisdiction over this action for the reasons discussed
previously in this opinion, we conclude that the court
reached the correct result in denying the defendants’
corrected motion to dismiss, even if it did so for the
wrong reason.7
The judgment is affirmed.

a license and thereby lacked any possessory interest in the property, we
fail to see how that fact pertains to the ‘actual possession’ inquiry that
is the touchstone of entry and detainer law. Many who have no right
of possession to land or property are nonetheless in ‘actual possession’
within the meaning of § 47a-43.”).
7
See, e.g., Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC,
226 Conn. App. 583, 596–97, 319 A.3d 123 (“[w]e may affirm the judg-
ment of the court if it reached the right result, even if it did so for the
wrong reason” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350
Conn. 905, 323 A.3d 344 (2024).