Housing Authority v. Williams

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Housing Authority v. Williams

SEELEY, J., dissenting. I respectfully disagree with
the conclusions reached by the majority that (1) the trial
court’s “finding of duress” is clearly erroneous, (2) the
trial court required the plaintiff, the Housing Author-
ity of the town of East Hartford, “to submit direct evi-
dence to establish a serious nuisance claim” against the
defendant, Harriett Williams, and (3) the trial court’s
findings that there existed “ ‘no evidence’ regarding the
defendant’s alleged drug activity in the unit” and “ ‘no
evidence’ that the defendant had engaged in or allowed
others to engage in violence in her unit” are clearly erro-
neous. For the reasons that follow, I reach a contrary
conclusion and, therefore, would affirm the judgment
of the trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to my analysis and why I disagree with the majority. The
plaintiff, which owns a low-income housing development
in East Hartford (development) and had leased a unit in
the development to the defendant, commenced this sum-
mary process action against the defendant1 alleging, in
count one, that the defendant had violated various provi-
sions of the lease by “fail[ing] to act and cause her guests
to act in a manner that would not disturb her neighbors’
quiet enjoyment,” by “engag[ing] in (or allow[ing] oth-
ers to engage in) physical violence in her unit,” and by
“using (or allowing others to use) her unit for the illegal
sale of drugs.” In count two, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant committed a nuisance in violation of General
Statutes § 47a-32 in two ways, namely, by “substantially
interfer[ing] with the comfort and safety of other ten-
ants when, on or about December 7, 2023, [she] allowed
(and/or directed) one of her guests in her unit to assault
another tenant by punching her and then allowed another
of her guests to cut her and drag that same individual
through the hallway of her building by her hair,” and/
or by allowing her unit to be used for the illegal sale of
1
As indicated in the majority opinion, prior to commencing this
action, the plaintiff sent the defendant a pretermination notice and
served the defendant with a notice to quit, but the defendant did not
quit possession of the premises.
Housing Authority v. Williams

drugs. Count three alleged that the defendant commit-
ted a serious nuisance in violation of General Statutes
§ 47a-15 by “allowing the subject premises to be used
for the illegal sale of drugs” and when, on December 7,
2023, “she threatened another tenant with bodily harm
and directed and/or allowed one of her guests in her unit
to assault that tenant and inflict bodily harm by punch-
ing her and then allowed another of her guests to cut
her and drag that same individual through the hallway
of her building by her hair.” Finally, count four alleged
that the defendant violated General Statutes § 47a-11 as
a result of the December 7, 2023 incident and by creat-
ing a nuisance through the illegal sale of drugs from her
unit and by failing to conduct herself or requiring her
guests to conduct themselves in a manner that does not
create a nuisance.
On April 19, 2024, the self-represented defendant
filed an answer and special defenses, in which she denied
involvement in criminal activity. Specifically, the defen-
dant asserted: “Everything that was said about me was
by a third part[y] and signed by several people in order
to keep their apartment. I have proof [of] this as . . . each
person gave me permission to record them and [I] verified
this is what happened [at] housing.”
The case was tried to the court over the course of two
days on July 3 and August 9, 2024. At trial, the plain-
tiff presented testimony from several witnesses. First,
Lynn Naughton, a compliance director for the plain-
tiff, testified that she was familiar with the defendant
“from numerous complaints from other tenants and
also documented videos and issues that [have] occurred
in [the] building . . . .” When asked what conduct of the
defendant preceded the pretermination notice, Naughton
explained that “[t]here [had] been excessive amounts
of disturbances in [regard] to the neighbors, solicita-
tion of illegal activity,” and lease violations stemming
from tenants being harmed from the defendant’s unit.
Naughton testified that she knew an individual by the
Housing Authority v. Williams

name of Lucius Mathis, a now deceased tenant against
whom an eviction proceeding had been commenced the
prior year for his alleged involvement in a knife fight
with another individual in the defendant’s building
that extended from outside of the defendant’s unit to
the elevators and to other floors, resulting in that other
individual having his lungs punctured. In particular,
she testified that the fight between Mathis and the other
individual began after the two exited the defendant’s
unit. The building in which the fight took place and the
defendant resides has a camera system that captured the
fight. Video footage from those cameras was admitted
into evidence and viewed by the court.2 In addition to
the fight, it shows the defendant cleaning up blood on
the floor outside of her unit.
Naughton testified further that, after an eviction pro-
ceeding was commenced against Mathis, Mathis reached
out to her to speak to her in an effort to remain in the
2
With respect to that video footage evidence, the court stated in its
memorandum of decision: “The court reviewed video evidence that dis-
played two incidents of violence. The first incident of violence recorded
took place on December 7, 2023, when a tenant residing in the prem-
ises was dragged out of the defendant’s unit by another tenant. The
assault continued in the hallway, involving punching and kicking. The
evidence established that both tenants resided in the building in their
own separate units and were bound to separate lease agreements. The
tenants involved in this altercation were subsequently evicted from the
premises. There was also video evidence submitted of another violent
altercation that took place after another tenant and another individual
left the defendant’s unit. The violence took place in the hallway of the
premises and ultimately spilled into the elevator, where the tenant
involved stabbed the other individual with a knife.
“The court further reviewed video evidence where the same tenant
involved in the stabbing left the home of the defendant and was then
found (hours later) in the unit he was residing in, unresponsive as a
result of a drug related overdose. Lastly, the court reviewed security
camera footage that displayed heavy foot traffic to and from the defen-
dant’s unit on multiple dates. Multiple individuals, some of whom were
identified as tenants, would visit the defendant’s unit for very brief
periods of time at all hours of the day and night. Some visits would
only last minutes and the visitors would vary, with some individuals
making multiple visits.”
Housing Authority v. Williams

building.3 According to Naughton, Mathis told her that
the reason for the fight was “a drug deal that went bad”
and that drugs were being sold out of the defendant’s
unit. Naughton explained that Mathis eventually was
evicted but he returned to the building because he had
no place to stay, as he befriended another tenant, Julia
Rivera, and moved into her unit. In December, 2023,
Mathis died of an overdose of fentanyl while in Rivera’s
unit. Naughton also testified regarding the video of a ten-
ant, Rivera, pulling another tenant, Angela Brown, out
of the defendant’s unit by her hair. Rivera had provided
a statement to the plaintiff to the effect that she had
been instructed by the defendant to do that to Brown.
After the court admitted the video of that incident into
evidence without objection from the self-represented
defendant, the court stated to the plaintiff’s counsel:
“And counsel, I . . . would just like for your client to just
be cautious of third-party statements being brought into
court without the witness being present.” The plaintiff’s
counsel responded that he would do his best.
After that exchange, Naughton was questioned regard-
ing a document that was placed before her dated March
22, 2024, which set forth a conversation that had taken
place between Naughton and Brown in which Brown
admitted to buying illegal drugs from the defendant out
of the defendant’s unit. The document was admitted into
evidence as exhibit 7 without objection by the defendant.
During cross-examination, Naughton testified that
“all the tenants that [were] facing eviction, once they’re
facing eviction, they want to stay. And, unfortunately
for [the defendant], they would talk about the things that
[the defendant] did not expect them to tell the housing
authority. . . . So, what they did was they actually put
it in writing hoping that we would say, okay, you know
what, you can stay based on the information.” After
the defendant finished cross-examining Naughton, the
3
Specifically, Naughton testified that Mathis “called me up and he
wanted to speak to me in regard to is there any possible way he can stay
in the building because he has no place to go.”
Housing Authority v. Williams

plaintiff’s counsel stated to the court: “Given that the
defendant asked my client whether any other tenants
have complained about her, I think that’s opened the
door.” He then questioned Naughton on redirect whether
any other tenants have complained about the defendant,
to which Naughton responded, “[y]es,” and named several
individuals, including Frances Brewster, after which
the plaintiff’s counsel marked for identification a hand-
written note purportedly from Brewster and questioned
Naughton about the note. The note consists of a single,
handwritten sentence stating that Brewster received
drugs in exchange for money from the defendant in the
defendant’s unit. Naughton explained that Brewster
provided the note because she was going to be evicted
from the property for her conduct in doing “illegal activi-
ties,” but that the eviction was never commenced because
Brewster’s family moved her out of the building. That
note was admitted into evidence.4
The plaintiff’s counsel next offered into evidence a
handwritten note purportedly from Rivera, who had
been evicted from the development, in which Rivera
states in a few sentences that the defendant sells drugs
from the bedroom of her unit. When the court asked the
defendant if she had an objection, a lengthy exchange
took place in which the defendant expressed confusion
about raising an objection. During that exchange, the
court asked the defendant a number of times whether
she had an evidentiary or legal reason why she believed
that the court should not review the evidence, to which
the defendant expressed disagreement with the contents
of the note and replied: “The reason is because the day
that this lady signed this paper, she came to my house
and she said that [Naughton] had wanted to see her in
her office and say that she was getting evicted. And so
4
Prior to the admission of the note into evidence, the court asked the
defendant if she had any objection to the court reviewing the document,
to which the defendant replied by asking: “If—by me saying yes or no,
do I have an opportunity to speak on these?” The court replied, “[y]es,”
and the defendant responded: “Okay, thank you. That’s all I wanted.
Yes, you can present it.” After that exchange, the court admitted the
note into evidence.
Housing Authority v. Williams

. . . her reason was supposed to be getting evicted . . .
because she was having problems going in and out of
[people’s] house[s], apartment[s], the whole building,
everybody’s building, [for] which [Naughton] had [given]
the lady numerous warnings . . . .” The court considered
the defendant’s response as an objection. The plaintiff’s
counsel replied that the objection was not based on an
evidentiary ground, and the court agreed, overruling
the defendant’s objection and admitting the document
into evidence. In doing so, the court stated: “I’m going
to allow the document to come in as a full exhibit; how-
ever, I’m going to give it the weight that it deserves
in light of your objection.”5 Subsequently, Naughton
testified to the contents of the note. Naughton testified
that Rivera gave her that note because she “did not want
to get evicted and asked after there was the altercation
that occurred in [regard] to numerous altercations of
bullying, of fighting, and other issues from this unit
and also from her unit, she did not want to be evicted.
So, she figured if she came (indiscernible) then we would
have her stay. Unfortunately, this is a pattern of what
everyone else does.”
Next, the plaintiff’s counsel called to the witness stand
Brian Dixon, the housing coordinator for the plaintiff
who was in charge of overseeing the defendant’s build-
ing. Dixon explained that he had drafted the document
that had been admitted into evidence as exhibit 7. Dixon
was asked whether Brown was “coerced in any way in
speaking to [him],” to which he replied, “[n]o,” and that,
in his opinion, Brown had spoken with him voluntarily.
Finally, the plaintiff presented testimony from Frank
Healy, who works for the plaintiff as an information tech-
nology manager. Healy had reviewed eighteen to twenty
days of video footage of the defendant’s unit, and he
documented what had occurred by taking notes regarding
his observations. The documents of his observations were
5
Although the handwritten notes offered by the plaintiff that were
admitted into evidence each purportedly were signed by Brown and
Rivera, those notes, which were informal in nature, were neither sworn
to nor made under oath.
Housing Authority v. Williams

admitted into evidence. The documents showed that mul-
tiple people, including tenants, visited the defendant’s
unit at various times of the day, for various lengths
of time, and some on multiple occasions. For example,
one document, dated March 3 and 4, 2024, shows that
there were twenty-seven visits to the defendant’s unit,
many of which lasted less than five minutes. The plain-
tiff also offered two other videos, which were admitted
into evidence, one of which showed Mathis leaving the
defendant’s unit on December 29, 2023, going to the
elevator and then entering Rivera’s unit, and a second
that showed the paramedics bringing Mathis’ body out of
Rivera’s unit and trying to revive him, which occurred
on the same day, approximately two hours after he left
the defendant’s unit.
After the plaintiff rested, the defendant sought to
admit documents that were “signed . . . statements,”
which allegedly showed that the plaintiff “put words” in
the mouths of the tenants who had submitted notes to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff’s counsel, however, objected on
the ground that the documents offered by the defendant
were from third parties who were not present to testify
and, thus, constituted hearsay. The court agreed with the
plaintiff’s counsel and declined to admit the proffered
evidence.6 The defendant testified and denied selling
6
In its principal appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts that, “since
Brown, Mathis, and Rivera were all evicted there is nothing to support
the notion that the [plaintiff] made any promises to them or agreed to
stop their respective evictions if they provided statements,” that “the
defendant did not provide a single witness or document to suggest oth-
erwise,” and that the defendant “offered nothing as to what the other
tenants were told or promised in exchange for making their statements.”
I find these assertions to be disingenuous given what occurred at trial.
The plaintiff offered evidence of hearsay statements from various ten-
ants regarding the defendant’s alleged drug activity in her unit, and that
evidence was admitted either because the self-represented defendant did
not object or because she did not raise a proper basis for the court not to
admit the evidence, likely due to her self-represented status. Yet, when
the defendant proffered evidence that similarly included hearsay from
individuals who were not testifying, the plaintiff’s counsel objected
to the admission of that evidence on hearsay grounds, and the court
sustained the objection. According to the defendant, the “signed . . .
Housing Authority v. Williams

drugs, and she was cross-examined by the plaintiff’s
counsel. Following the conclusion of trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, conclud-
ing that the plaintiff had not met “its burden of proof
regarding the substance of the [defendant’s] noncompli-
ance with the lease, the nuisance alleged, or the serious
nuisance alleged.” This appeal followed.
In its opinion, the majority states that the trial court,
in its memorandum of decision dated October 2, 2024,
determined that “the written statements by former ten-
ants were ‘likely made in duress’ and discredited them.”
The majority concludes that the trial court’s finding of
duress is clearly erroneous because there was no evidence
in the record to support it. See part I of the majority
opinion.
First, I believe that the majority does not provide
the full context of the court’s decision not to credit the
handwritten notes of the former tenants, which the
court referred to in its decision as “letters” from the
former tenants.7 In its memorandum of decision, the
court stated: “To support its case, the plaintiff called as
witnesses representatives from the [plaintiff] . . . . These
witnesses testified regarding two violent altercations
statements” that she had proffered would have showed that the plaintiff
“put words” in the mouths of the tenants who had submitted statements
to the plaintiff. The defendant expressed her confusion and dismay at not
being able to present the hearsay statements given that the plaintiff had
done so, stating: “[The plaintiff is] going by statements, just the same
thing I have, statements. That’s the same thing they presented to the
court, which is false statements, Your Honor. . . . [T]hey had evicted so
many people that [came] to my apartment only, only [the ones that came]
to my apartment, because they wanted statements from these people to
testify or to say something against me . . . . Your Honor, I wish—oh my
God, I didn’t know. I thought I could just get these statements. I didn’t
know.” Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, the defendant did
try to offer documentary evidence demonstrating the circumstances
under which the other tenants provided statements to the plaintiff but
was precluded from doing so, even though similar evidence offered by
the plaintiff was admitted at the trial, which thereby demonstrates the
hazards of self-representation.
7
For consistency with the trial court’s decision, I refer to the handwrit-
ten notes collectively as letters of the former tenants, as well.
Housing Authority v. Williams

involving other tenants that occurred while the individu-
als were leaving the defendant’s unit, as well as the foot
traffic to and from the defendant’s unit. These were the
only witnesses who testified in this matter for the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff submitted letters from tenants who
had been evicted or no longer resid[ed] in the premises
as proof of the defendant’s drug selling. The court did
not find those statements to be credible as they were
most likely made in duress and not one resident, past
or current, was present to testify in the multiday trial.”
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, with respect to the basis
for the court’s determination not to credit the former
tenants’ letters, the court provided two reasons as to why
it did not find those letters to be credible, namely, “they
were most likely made in duress and not one resident,
past or current, was present to testify in the multiday
trial.” (Emphasis added.)
I also believe that the trial court’s statement regarding
the failure of any of the former tenants to testify, when
considered in conjunction with the court’s statements
surrounding the admission of the letters during trial,
further demonstrates that the court made the determina-
tion not to credit or assign any weight to the information
contained in the letters made by the nontestifying wit-
nesses that were admitted into evidence because they (1)
were likely made under duress and (2) included hearsay
statements and the court did not have the benefit of
evaluating the witnesses who made the statements in
the letters or evaluating the circumstances under which
the statements were made. As I already have noted, the
hearsay statement in Brewster’s handwritten note had
been admitted into evidence without objection by the
self-represented defendant. When the plaintiff offered
Rivera’s handwritten note into evidence, the court, which
already had cautioned the plaintiff’s counsel regarding
“third-party statements being brought into court without
the witness being present,” asked the defendant if she had
an objection, and the defendant expressed confusion and
disagreement with the contents of Rivera’s handwrit-
ten note, which the court considered to be an objection.
Housing Authority v. Williams

Nevertheless, because the defendant did not provide an
evidentiary or legal reason as to why she believed that the
court should not review the document, the court admitted
Rivera’s handwritten note into evidence, stating: “I’m
going to allow the document to come in as a full exhibit;
however, I’m going to give it the weight that it deserves
in light of your objection.” Subsequently in its decision,
the court again stated that it was not persuaded by the
“letters” presented by the plaintiff.
Even though the trial court admitted the former ten-
ants’ letters into evidence in the absence of a proper
objection by the self-represented defendant, that did
not mean that the court had to afford any particular
weight to that evidence. See State v. Smith, 179 Conn.
App. 734, 766, 181 A.3d 118 (“the court’s ruling that
the evidence was admissible did not affect the weight
that the [fact finder] should afford the evidence”), cert.
denied, 328 Conn. 927, 182 A.3d 637 (2018). When,
as in the present case, a court has conflicting evidence
before it—here, the hearsay statements in the letters
of the former tenants that the defendant was selling
drugs, versus the defendant’s testimony denying that
she sold drugs—it is the function of the fact finder to
determine which version to believe. See Finkelstein v.
45 Lake Drive, LLC, 235 Conn. App. 740, 752, 347 A.3d
303 (“[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of fact
to weigh the conflicting evidence” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 932, 346 A.3d
516 (2025). Moreover, it was within the discretion of the
court not to credit the information in the former tenants’
letters on the ground that the persons who provided those
letters did not testify. See Gleason v. Atkins, 225 Conn.
App. 745, 778, 317 A.3d 1168 (“ ‘[i]t is well settled that
[t]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses are within the sole province of the trial
court’ ”), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 901, 322 A.3d 1059
(2024); see also Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman,
234 Conn. App. 45, 67, 343 A.3d 781 (“it is not our role
to second-guess [the trial court’s] credibility determina-
tions” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
Housing Authority v. Williams

353 Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025); State v. Chemlen,
165 Conn. App. 791, 820, 140 A.3d 347 (“[t]he weight
to afford evidence is within the exclusive purview of the
trier of fact, and we must defer to the [trier of fact’s]
credibility assessment”), cert. denied, 322 Conn. 908,
140 A.3d 977 (2016).
Consequently, I do not believe that this court needs to
address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s finding
of duress was clearly erroneous, as the court provided
a second basis for its decision not to credit the former
tenants’ letters, which the plaintiff has not challenged
on appeal, and that decision involved a matter that was
within the sound discretion of the court to make.8
I also disagree with the conclusions in part II of the
majority opinion that the trial court improperly required
8
Nevertheless, I am not entirely satisfied, following my review of the
record, that there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court’s finding
of duress, or that the finding rested on speculation, as the majority
concludes. The majority explains that “[t]he defendant testified only
that statements by former residents were ‘false’ and that the plaintiff
wanted the former residents to testify against her. The defendant said
that Naughton had somehow fabricated the statements against her by
former residents, suggesting that there had been some type of agreement
between the plaintiff and the former residents. The defendant offered
no independent knowledge of any agreement between the plaintiff and
former residents and offered no testimony to allow the court to infer that
such an agreement had been made. Further, the defendant proffered no
evidence of any act, threat, or misconduct by the plaintiff that would
compel the former residents to offer statements against the plaintiff.”
See part I of the majority opinion. The majority’s analysis, however, fails
to take into account Naughton’s testimony that (1) Mathis reached out
to her “about trying to remain [in] the building” after eviction proceed-
ings against him had been commenced; (2) “all the tenants that [were]
facing eviction, once they’re facing eviction, they want to stay . . . [and]
[s]o, what they did was they actually put . . . in writing [about buying
drugs from the defendant], hoping that [the plaintiff] would say, okay,
you know what, you can stay based on the information [you just gave
to the plaintiff about the defendant]”; (3) when Brewster provided her
statement, “she was also going to be evicted”; and (4) Rivera “did not
want to get evicted . . . [and] figured [that] if she came (indiscernible)
then we would have her stay. Unfortunately, this is a pattern of what
everyone else does.” At a minimum, this testimony demonstrates that
the former tenants’ letters accusing the defendant of dealing drugs
out of her unit were written when those tenants were under threat of
Housing Authority v. Williams

the plaintiff to submit direct evidence to establish its
serious nuisance claim, and that the trial court’s findings
that there existed no evidence regarding the defendant’s
alleged drug activity in the unit and that the defendant
had engaged in or allowed others to engage in violence
in her unit were clearly erroneous.
In concluding that the plaintiff had failed to meet its
burden as it relates to the allegation that the defendant
sold or allowed the sale of illegal drugs in her unit, which
was one of the grounds on which the serious nuisance
claim was based, the trial court stated: “There was no
evidence presented that the defendant was engaged in or
allowed the illegal sale of drugs on the subject premises.
The court was not persuaded by the letters presented by
the plaintiff, and there was no direct evidence that the
third-party tenant’s death was a result of purchasing
illegal drugs from the defendant. Additionally, no illegal
drugs, paraphernalia, or items related to the sale of illegal
drugs were found in the defendant’s unit. Further, there
was no police involvement, investigation, or the observa-
tion of the sale of illegal drugs in or around the subject
premises. . . . The defendant’s unit had an unreasonably
high amount of traffic from individuals visiting at all
hours of the day and night for brief durations of time;
eviction, which suggests an element of coercion regarding the produc-
tion of those letters and provides a reasonable basis for such an infer-
ence. Moreover, at trial the plaintiff countered the defendant’s claim
that the statements offered by the plaintiff had been coerced when,
on direct examination of Dixon, the plaintiff’s counsel asked Dixon
whether Brown was “coerced in any way in speaking to [him],” to which
Dixon replied, “[n]o,” and that, in his opinion, Brown had offered her
statements voluntarily. The court, however, as the fact finder in this
case, did not have to credit Dixon’s testimony. See Gleason v. Atkins,
supra, 225 Conn. App. 778.
I am also not persuaded that the trial court’s use of “in duress” requires
evidence of an agreement between the plaintiff and the former tenants
who wrote letters. I think the court’s finding that the tenants made the
statements “in duress” can cover the situation we have here, in which all
of the tenants were trying to avoid eviction, which also was consistent
with the language in the defendant’s special defense—“[e]verything
that was said about me was by a third part[y] and signed by several
people in order to keep their apartment.”
Housing Authority v. Williams

however, that alone does not lead to the conclusion that
the defendant is selling illegal drugs or allowing her
premises to be used for that purpose. Thus, the plaintiff
has not met its burden of proving, by a fair preponderance
of the evidence, the substance of the serious nuisance
complained of, namely, that the defendant engaged in
or allowed the premises to be used for the sale of illegal
drugs or within 1500 feet of the subject premises.” (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis added.)
It is clear from the trial court’s decision that its “no
direct evidence” statement related only to the lack of
direct evidence tying Mathis’ death to the selling of ille-
gal drugs by the defendant; the court did not require the
plaintiff to present direct evidence to establish its serious
nuisance claim. Moreover, because the record does not
contain direct evidence establishing that Mathis’ death
was the result of his purchase of illegal drugs from the
defendant, the court’s “no direct evidence” finding per-
taining to Mathis is not clearly erroneous. Additionally,
I do not agree that the trial court determined that there
was no evidence of the defendant’s alleged drug activity
due to a lack of direct evidence alone.
As a result of its conclusion that the trial court required
the plaintiff to present direct evidence to establish its
serious nuisance claim, the majority concludes that,
because there was testimonial and circumstantial evi-
dence before the court, and, “because there is no legal
distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence
. . . the [trial] court’s finding that there existed ‘no evi-
dence’ regarding the defendant’s alleged drug activity
in the unit was clearly erroneous.” See part II of the
majority opinion. Again, my review of the record does
not support this conclusion. Even though the trial court
did state that there “was no evidence presented that the
defendant was engaged in or allowed the illegal sale of
drugs on the subject premises,” the court ultimately
found that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of
proof of demonstrating, by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant sold or allowed the sale of
Housing Authority v. Williams

illegal drugs in her unit. The court made that determina-
tion on the basis of a number of grounds, including (1)
“[t]he court was not persuaded by the letters presented
by the plaintiff”; (2) “there was no direct evidence that
[Mathis’] death was a result of purchasing illegal drugs
from the defendant”; (3) there was no evidence presented
of “illegal drugs, paraphernalia or items related to the
sale of illegal drugs . . . found in the defendant’s unit”;
(4) there was no evidence presented as to “police involve-
ment, investigation or the observation of the sale of
illegal drugs in or around the subject premises”; and,
(5) although there was evidence presented that showed
“an unreasonably high amount of traffic” to and from
the defendant’s unit “at all hours of the day and night
for brief durations of time . . . that alone [did] not lead
to the conclusion that the defendant [was] selling illegal
drugs or allowing her [unit] to be used for that purpose.”
My review of the trial court’s decision leads to the
conclusion that the court considered what little evidence
it had before it and determined that it was not sufficient
to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof on this issue. The
record demonstrates, contrary to the conclusion of the
majority, that the trial court did consider the direct
and circumstantial evidence presented. The trial court,
after stating that it was not persuaded by the notes
and pointing out the evidence that was not presented,
namely, evidence linking Mathis’ drug overdose to the
purchase of drugs from the defendant, of drug dealing
in the defendant’s unit or police activity, addressed the
only evidence before it relating to the defendant’s alleged
drug dealing—the high foot traffic evidence—which it
considered and concluded was not enough to satisfy the
plaintiff’s burden of proof with respect to the claim of
drug dealing by the defendant.
Notably, the court’s decision not to afford weight
to the former tenants’ letters and hearsay statements
implicating the defendant in drug dealing from her unit,
which the court was within its discretion to do, factored
into the court’s ultimate determination that the plaintiff
Housing Authority v. Williams

failed to meet its burden of proof. “As the finder of fact,
the court is responsible for weighing the evidence. It is
the [fact finder’s] right to accept some, none or all of
the evidence presented. . . . It is the [finder of fact’s]
exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence
and to determine the credibility of witnesses.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hudson City Savings Bank
v. Hellman, supra, 234 Conn. App. 66. As an appellate
court reviewing whether the trial court’s factual findings
underlying its determination that a party has failed to
sustain its burden of proof are clearly erroneous, we must
“not invade the factfinding province of the trial court or
disturb its legal conclusions when they are sufficiently
supported by the evidence before it . . . [as] the weight
and credibility to be accorded witnesses [and evidence]
is totally within the purview of the trier of fact.” (Cita-
tion omitted.) Francoline v. Klatt, 26 Conn. App. 203,
210, 600 A.2d 8 (1991), cert. granted, 221 Conn. 913,
603 A.2d 404 (1992) (appeal withdrawn April 1, 1992);
see also Hadji v. Snow, 232 Conn. App. 829, 851, 339
A.3d 1168 (in reviewing underlying factual determina-
tions of trial court under clearly erroneous standard, we
must defer to court’s credibility determinations), cert.
denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 958 (2025); Kohl’s
Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Rocky Hill, 219 Conn. App. 464,
494, 295 A.3d 470 (2023) (“[t]he trial court, as the fact
finder, is privileged to accept, in whole or in part, what-
ever testimony [or evidence] it reasonably believes to be
credible” (emphasis in original)).
As a consequence of the majority’s determination that
the trial court’s failure to credit the former tenants’
letters and hearsay statements was based on a clearly
erroneous finding of duress, and its resulting failure
to recognize that the trial court’s decision not to credit
the former tenants’ letters was based on its discretion-
ary determination not to afford any weight to hearsay
statements in letters from nontestifying witnesses, the
majority entirely discounts the court’s statement that
it “was not persuaded by the letters presented by the
plaintiff,” which formed the basis, in part, for its finding
Housing Authority v. Williams

that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proof on the
issue of the defendant’s alleged involvement in drug deal-
ing. I believe that the majority, in doing so, improperly
invaded the province of the trial court as the fact finder
in this case.9
Next, I turn to the majority’s conclusion that the trial
court’s “finding that there was ‘no evidence’ that the
defendant had engaged in or allowed others to engage in
violence in her unit . . . is clearly erroneous.” See part II
of the majority opinion. The majority bases this conclu-
sion on video evidence of “two violent altercations that
appear to begin in the defendant’s unit,” as well as the
defendant’s testimony confirming that, on December 7,
2023, she had asked Rivera to remove Brown from her
unit and that Rivera did so by dragging Brown out of
the unit by her hair. With respect to this issue, the trial
court made the following findings: “The court reviewed
evidence of other tenants engaging in dangerous and
violent activities mainly in the hallways and elevator of
the building; however, there was no evidence of the defen-
dant’s involvement in the violence that took place, only
that the parties left the defendant’s unit prior to the inci-
dents taking place. Further, the defendant’s attempt to
clean the blood from her door and hallway does not reflect
participation in the violence. The individuals involved in
the violent altercations that took place were third-party
tenants who did not reside in the defendant’s unit and
were not subject to the terms of the defendant’s lease.
They were not just ‘guests’ of the defendant’s unit, but
tenants of the plaintiff who were bound to the terms of
their individual lease agreements. The tenants involved
in the December 7, 2023 incident were all subsequently
evicted from the premises. The defendant herself was
not engaged in conduct [that] presented an immediate
9
The majority states in a footnote that “[w]hether the evidence on
remand, including statements attributed to tenants, should be credited
remains the sole province of the trier of fact.” See footnote 15 of the
majority opinion. This statement ignores the fact that the trial court
already found that the former tenants’ letters should not be credited
because “not one resident, past or current, was present to testify” and
it did not find the letters persuasive.
Housing Authority v. Williams

and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the
landlord, and there is insufficient evidence to establish
that she failed to act and/or caused her guests to conduct
themselves in a manner that disturbs her neighbor’s quiet
enjoyment of the premises. Thus, the plaintiff has failed
to meet its burden regarding the defendant’s involvement
in the incident that took place on December 7, 2023.”
First, I believe that the majority is incorrect in stat-
ing that there was video evidence of “two violent alter-
cations that appear to begin in the defendant’s unit.”
(Emphasis added.) See part II of the majority opinion.
As the trial court noted in its memorandum of decision,
the video evidence before it concerned two incidents of
violence: “[t]he first incident of violence recorded took
place on December 7, 2023, when a tenant residing in
the premises was dragged out of the defendant’s unit
by another tenant,” and a second incident concerned
“another violent altercation that took place after another
tenant and another individual left the defendant’s unit.”
(Emphasis added.) As a result, there was evidence of only
one incident that appeared to begin in the defendant’s
unit, the December 7, 2023 incident.
I believe the trial court’s finding that there was no
evidence presented of the defendant’s involvement in
the violence that took place is correct. The majority’s
conclusion mischaracterizes the trial court’s decision.
The trial court concluded that “there was no evidence
of the defendant’s involvement in the violence that took
place”; it did not find, as the majority concludes, that
the plaintiff “proffered no evidence” in support of its
allegation that the defendant engaged in or allowed oth-
ers to engage in violence in her unit. In other words,
the court examined and considered the evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiff to support this allegation, which
included, inter alia, the video evidence, as well as the
defendant’s attempt to clean the blood from the door to
her unit, which the trial court found did not reflect the
defendant’s participation in the violence. Ultimately,
however, the court found that the evidence presented
Housing Authority v. Williams

did not show that the defendant engaged in violence.
As the court aptly noted, the video footage showed that
the individuals had left the defendant’s unit prior to
engaging in the violent altercation in the hallway that
resulted in a stabbing. With respect to the December 7,
2023 incident, the court explained that the individuals
involved in that incident were tenants, not guests of the
defendant, and as tenants, they were bound to the terms
of their individual lease agreements, as demonstrated
by the fact that both tenants subsequently were evicted
from the development. I agree with the trial court that
the plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating
that the defendant herself had engaged in conduct that
presented an immediate and serious danger to the safety
of other tenants in the building. It is apparent from the
court’s decision that it was not convinced that the evi-
dence showing that the defendant told Rivera to remove
Brown from her unit demonstrated that the defendant
failed to act and/or caused her guests to conduct them-
selves in a manner that disturbs her neighbor’s quiet
enjoyment of the premises, especially given the court’s
determination that the individuals involved were fellow
tenants, not necessarily “guests.” See Gleason v. Atkins,
supra, 225 Conn. App. 778–79 (“ ‘[a]lthough there may
be evidence in the record that would support the [plain-
tiff’s] position, it is not the role of this court to examine
that evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court’ ”). Consequently, I do not believe that the
trial court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of establishing this allegation in support of its
serious nuisance claim is clearly erroneous.
The clearly erroneous standard of review is a deferen-
tial one, under which “[w]e do not examine the record to
determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. Rather, we focus
on the conclusion of the trial court, as well as the method
by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine
whether it is legally correct and factually supported.
. . . The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial
court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence
Housing Authority v. Williams

presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including
its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses and parties, which is not fully reflected in
the cold, printed record which is available to us.” (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O &
G Industries, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
204 Conn. App. 614, 624–25, 254 A.3d 955 (2021). “A
court’s determination is clearly erroneous [when] the
record contains no evidence to support it, or [if there is
evidence] . . . the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Vance v. New Haven, 236
Conn. App. 724, 736, 349 A.3d 1116 (2025). “In making
this determination, every reasonable presumption must
be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 236 Conn.
App. 168, 175, 347 A.3d 912 (2025), cert. denied, 354
Conn. 903, 349 A.3d 18 (2026).
I believe that the majority fails to adhere to this def-
erential standard. Specifically, the record supports
the court’s findings that the plaintiff failed to meet
its burden of proof of establishing the allegations that
the defendant sold or allowed the sale of illegal drugs
in her unit, that she engaged in violent conduct that
presented an immediate and serious danger to the safety
of other tenants or the landlord, and that she failed to
act and/or caused her guests to conduct themselves in
a manner that disturbs her neighbor’s quiet enjoyment
of the premises, which were the grounds alleged by the
plaintiff in support of its serious nuisance claim. For that
reason, I am not left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. I believe that the court’s
finding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of
proof regarding its serious nuisance claim is not clearly
erroneous and must be upheld. See Woodbridge Crossing
Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Ferguson, 229 Conn. App.
99, 104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024).
Finally, because I do not believe that the trial court’s
findings are clearly erroneous, I do not agree that we need
Housing Authority v. Williams

to address the issue of harm. I note, nevertheless, that
in part III of the majority opinion addressing the issue
of harm, the majority concludes, in part, that, because
the trial court did not find the former tenants’ letters to
be credible on the basis of its clearly erroneous finding
of duress, a new hearing is warranted. As I stated previ-
ously, the court identified two reasons as to why it did
not credit the former tenants’ letters: (1) the letters most
likely were made under duress and (2) not one resident,
past or current, was present to testify about the contents
of those letters. Therefore, even if I were to agree that
the court’s finding of duress is clearly erroneous, any
such error pertaining to that finding is harmless, as the
court’s decision not to credit the former tenants’ letters
also was based on a second, unchallenged ground that
involved a matter within the court’s discretion.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

************************************************
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************************************************
Housing Authority v. Williams

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF EAST
HARTFORD v. HARRIETT WILLIAMS
(AC 48089)
Elgo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the
defendant tenant in the plaintiff’s summary process action. The plaintiff
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly found that certain evidentiary
statements proffered by the plaintiff were the product of duress. Held:

The trial court’s finding that certain written statements by former tenants
of the plaintiff were likely made under duress was clearly erroneous, as there
was no basis in the record for such a finding other than mere speculation.

The trial court erroneously required the plaintiff to submit direct evidence
to establish its serious nuisance claim, as such a requirement is contrary to
law, and, on the basis of this court’s careful review of the ample testimonial,
documentary, and security video evidence admitted at trial, this court was left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed with
respect to the trial court’s finding that there was no evidence in the record
that the defendant committed a serious nuisance through violent altercations
in the defendant’s unit and alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit.

This court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial, as the
trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, premised in part on
speculation, contradictory, and incorrect as a matter of law and, thus, were
not harmless and warranted reversal of the judgment rendered against the
plaintiff.

Argued September 9, 2025—officially released March 31, 2026

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Ses-
sion, and tried to the court, Esperance-Smith, J.; judg-
ment of possession for the defendant, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial.
Michael S. Wrona, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Opinion

ELGO, J. In this summary process action, the plaintiff,
the Housing Authority of the town of East Hartford,
appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in
Housing Authority v. Williams

favor of the defendant, Harriett Williams.1 On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly found
that certain evidentiary statements proffered by the
plaintiff were the product of duress and (2) erred in
requiring direct evidence to find that the defendant had
committed a serious nuisance. We agree and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history. The plaintiff is the owner of Meadow Hill, a low-
income housing development in East Hartford (develop-
ment). On or about December 20, 2021, the defendant
entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiff for a
unit in the development (unit). At all relevant times, the
defendant remained in possession of the unit.
On January 1, 2023, a tenant of the plaintiff, identi-
fied as Lucius Mathis, and another unidentified indi-
vidual exited the defendant’s unit and immediately began
attacking each other with knives. That violent altercation
spilled into the elevator, where they repeatedly stabbed
each other, causing injuries. The unidentified individual
sustained a punctured lung, and Mathis sustained vari-
ous lacerations.2
On December 7, 2023, a tenant of the plaintiff, identi-
fied as Julia Rivera, dragged another tenant, identified
as Angela Brown, out of the defendant’s unit by her hair
and into the hallway. Brown remained in the hallway,
knocking on the defendant’s door for about ten minutes.
At approximately 3:25 a.m. on December 29, 2023,
the plaintiff’s security cameras recorded Mathis exiting
the defendant’s unit, walking through the building, and
1
The defendant appeared but has not participated in this appeal.
Because she did not file an appellate brief, we ordered that the appeal
shall be considered on the basis of the plaintiff’s brief and appendix,
the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument by the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Ammar I. v. Evelyn W., 227 Conn. App. 827, 830
n.2, 323 A.3d 1111 (2024).
2
Following that January 1, 2023 altercation, Mathis was evicted from
his residence in the development. He thereafter continued to live as an
unauthorized occupant in the development with Julia Rivera, another
tenant of the plaintiff.
Housing Authority v. Williams

entering Rivera’s unit, where he lived as an unauthor-
ized resident. Rivera entered her unit at approximately
5:27 a.m. At this point, Mathis apparently was unre-
sponsive. Rivera, or another resident, called emergency
services, who arrived at Rivera’s unit at approximately
5:37 a.m. and attempted to revive Mathis. Their efforts
were unsuccessful, and Mathis died due to a drug related
overdose.3
In addition to these three incidents, the plaintiff’s
security cameras recorded heavy foot traffic at the defen-
dant’s unit on a recurring basis. The foot traffic was
comprised of various individuals, some of whom were
tenants, visiting the unit for varying lengths of time
and at all hours of the day and night.
On December 12, 2023, the plaintiff sent the defen-
dant a pretermination notice. On January 31, 2024,
the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit.
On March 12, 2024, the plaintiff served the defendant
with a summary process complaint, attaching both the
pretermination notice and the notice to quit. In count one
of its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had violated her lease4 by disturbing her neighbors’ quiet
enjoyment, engaging in or allowing others to engage
3
Rivera subsequently was evicted from the development due to this
incident and for allowing Mathis, an unauthorized individual, to live
with her.
4
The defendant’s lease provides in relevant part that the tenant “[s]hall
act, and cause household members or guests to act, in a manner that will
not disturb other resident’s peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations
and will be conducive to maintaining the development in a decent, safe
and sanitary condition.” The defendant’s lease also provides in relevant
part that the tenant “[s]hall not engage in any unlawful activities in the
dwelling unit or premises, and shall prevent criminal activity in the unit
or premises . . . . Any of the following criminal activities by a [h]ousehold
member, on the premises . . . shall be a violation of the lease, a cause for
termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the unit: (a) any crime
or threat of physical violence to persons or property . . . (b) illegal use,
sale, manufacture or distribution of narcotics, or possession with the
intent to use, sell, manufacture or distribute controlled substances.”
Furthermore, the lease provides that the plaintiff may terminate the
lease for a “serious or repeated” lease violation, including if the ten-
ant or the tenant’s guests cause “physical violence to other tenants . . .
Housing Authority v. Williams

in physical violence regarding the December 7, 2023
altercation between Rivera and Brown, and using or
allowing others to use her unit to sell drugs. In count two,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had committed
a nuisance, as defined by General Statutes § 47a-32,5
in light of both the December 7, 2023 altercation and
the defendant’s use of her unit to sell drugs. In count
three, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant commit-
ted a serious nuisance, as defined by General Statutes
§ 47a-15,6 for the same reasons specified in count two.
In count four, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
violated her responsibilities as a tenant, as defined in
General Statutes § 47a-11,7 by creating a nuisance, by
using her unit to sell drugs, and in light of the December
7, 2023 altercation.
On April 19, 2024, the defendant filed an answer and
special defenses, denying the plaintiff’s allegations and
alleging that any statements made about her were made
under duress.8 The matter was tried to the court on July
3 and August 9, 2024.
At trial, the plaintiff called witnesses Urleen
Naughton,9 the compliance director for the plain-
tiff; Brian Dixon, the housing coordinator for the
or threaten the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of our
premises by other residents or employees . . . .”
5
General Statutes § 47a-32 defines a nuisance as including, but not
limited to, “any conduct which interferes substantially with the comfort
or safety of other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent build-
ings or structures.”
6
General Statutes § 47a-15 defines a serious nuisance in relevant
part as “conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to
the safety of other tenants or the landlord” or “using the premises or
allowing the premises to be used for . . . the illegal sale of drugs . . . .”
7
General Statutes § 47a-11 defines a tenant’s statutory responsibili-
ties, which include keeping the premises “clean and safe” and conduct-
ing himself or herself and guests “in a manner that will not disturb his
neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute a nuisance
. . . or a serious nuisance . . . .”
8
Specifically, the defendant pleaded that “[e]verything that was said
about [her] was by a third part[y] and signed by several people in order
to keep their apartment[s].”
9
The transcripts refer to Naughton as both Urleen and Lynn.
Housing Authority v. Williams

development; and Frank Healy, the information tech-
nology manager for the plaintiff. The plaintiff also intro-
duced several exhibits into evidence, including security
footage videos, demonstrative exhibits, and written
statements by Rivera, Dixon, and former resident Fran-
ces Brewster.10
Naughton testified that the plaintiff sought to evict the
defendant due to “excessive amounts” of disturbances,
illegal activity, and tenants being harmed as a result of
visits to the defendant’s unit. Naughton testified that
she had received “numerous complaints in [regard] to the
drug activity in the building . . . [s]temming from [the
defendant’s] unit.” Naughton further testified that the
defendant’s activities constituted a “health and safety
violation” and “other tenants [were] concerned about
their safety.” Naughton testified that Brown, Rivera,
and Brewster had complained about the defendant. Addi-
tionally, Naughton testified that other residents, who
did not provide statements, had likewise complained to
the plaintiff about the defendant.
Healy testified that he had reviewed approximately
twenty days of security camera footage involving the
door to the defendant’s unit. From that footage, Healy
created demonstrative exhibits of the foot traffic at the
defendant’s unit. Those exhibits were admitted into
evidence as full exhibits at trial.11 Those exhibits docu-
mented fifty visits to the defendant’s unit on December
14, 2023; forty visits on January 8, 2024; forty-four
visits on February 2 and 3, 2024; twenty-seven visits on
March 3 and 4, 2024; thirty-one visits on April 1 and 2,
2024; and twenty-seven visits on June 28 and 29, 2024.
10
Those exhibits included an uncut video from approximately 8:03
p.m. on December 6, 2023, to 12:37 a.m. on December 7, 2023, which
showed the foot traffic to and from the defendant’s unit and was rep-
resentative of the type of security footage Healy reviewed to create the
plaintiff’s demonstrative exhibits recording the heavy foot traffic at
the defendant’s unit.
11
The plaintiff’s demonstrative exhibits (1) described the visitors to
the defendant’s unit on a particular day, (2) noted the number of times
that visitors entered the defendant’s unit that day, and (3) noted the
length of time the visitors stayed in the defendant’s unit.
Housing Authority v. Williams

Not all visits, however, were unique, with some individu-
als visiting multiple times per day.
Also admitted into evidence were several written state-
ments by former tenants, which described drug activi-
ties in the defendant’s unit. Rivera’s written statement
provides: “I live at [the development] and there has been
[drug selling] in the [defendant’s unit]. [The defendant]
sells the crack [from] her unit in her bedroom. There is a
lot of drug [selling].” Brewster’s written statement pro-
vides in relevant part: “I’m receiving drugs in exchange
for money from . . . [the defendant] in [her unit].”
Dixon’s written statement, which concerned a recorded
statement from Brown, provides in relevant part: “Brown
stated that she had spent the money and no longer had it. .
. . [Naughton] asked what happened to the other forty
dollars. It was then that Brown admitted to ‘buying’ from
[the defendant] out of [her unit]. Brown seemed scared
that she told us this information and as a result did not
accompany us up to [the defendant’s unit] . . . .” Dixon
testified that “buying” meant purchasing narcotics.
Dixon further testified that Brown offered her statement
to the plaintiff “voluntarily” and that the plaintiff made
no promises to Brown in exchange for her statement.
Mathis’ statement, which was admitted into evidence
without objection through Naughton’s testimony, pro-
vides in relevant part that the January 1, 2023 alterca-
tion was the result of a “drug deal that went bad” and
that the unidentified individual “owed [Mathis] money
for the drugs that [he and the defendant] were selling out
of [the defendant’s] unit.” Naughton further testified
that Mathis reported that crack, cocaine, and fentanyl
were being sold out of the defendant’s unit.12
The defendant testified on her own behalf at trial.13
She produced no other witnesses or additional evidence.
12
Naughton’s testimony regarding Mathis’ statement was admitted
at trial into evidence without objection by the defendant.
13
We note that the court made no credibility determination as to the
defendant’s testimony, concluding, instead, that the plaintiff had not
met its burden of proof with respect to any of the counts.
Housing Authority v. Williams

She testified that the plaintiff had evicted residents who
visited her apartment “because they wanted statements
from these people to testify or to say something against
me . . . .” Much of the defendant’s testimony accused the
plaintiff of proffering “false statements” against her.
The defendant also denied the amount of foot traffic at
her apartment, stating that she did not receive the num-
ber of visitors the plaintiff alleges the recordings and
demonstrative exhibits show. The defendant, however,
subsequently explained that the visitors came to her unit
to help her with cooking and to play cards.
The defendant testified that she did not “sell any drugs.
I never sold drugs. I had sold drugs twenty years ago, but
. . . in the recent past, I have not sold [any] drugs . . . .” The
defendant claimed that the statements provided by previ-
ous residents were false and the product of the plaintiff’s
coercion. The defendant also claimed that, regarding the
December 7, 2023 altercation, she had asked Rivera to
remove Brown from her unit before Rivera “dragged
[Brown] out . . . of [the defendant’s] unit.”
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
the written statements by former tenants were “likely
made in duress” and discredited them. The court deter-
mined that there was “no evidence” of the defendant’s
involvement in any instances of violence that took place.
The court also determined that there was “no evidence
presented that the defendant was engaged in or allowed
the illegal sale of drugs on the subject premises” and
that there was “no direct evidence” that Mathis’ death
was related to drug activity at the defendant’s unit.
The court specifically cited the lack of “direct evidence”
in the record regarding any alleged drug activity. The
court determined that the plaintiff failed to meet its
evidentiary burden for serious nuisance and that “[t]here
was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
violated her lease or created a nuisance . . . .” This appeal
followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note that “[s]ummary pro-
cess is a special statutory procedure designed to provide
Housing Authority v. Williams

an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain
possession of leased premises without suffering the delay,
loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions,
they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding
over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a
prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore,
the statutes relating to summary process must be nar-
rowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209
Conn. App. 569, 575, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022).
Further, it is well established that “[t]he scope of our
appellate review depends upon the proper characteriza-
tion of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent
that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review
is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly
erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Altama,
LLC v. Napoli Motors, Inc., 181 Conn. App. 151, 158,
186 A.3d 78 (2018). “The trier of fact’s determination
of a question of fact will not be overturned unless it is
clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Under the clearly erroneous standard of
review, a finding of fact must stand if, on the basis of the
evidence before the court and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably
could have found as it did. . . . In reviewing factual find-
ings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Giglio v. Ardohain, 233 Conn. App. 743, 752, 341 A.3d
272 (2025). “[W]here . . . some of the facts found [by the
trial court] are clearly erroneous and others are supported
by the evidence, we must examine the clearly erroneous
findings to see whether they were harmless, not only in
Housing Authority v. Williams

isolation, but also taken as a whole. . . . If, when taken
as a whole, they undermine appellate confidence in the
court’s [fact-finding] process, a new hearing is required.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Autry v. Hosey,
200 Conn. App. 795, 801, 239 A.3d 381 (2020). We are
mindful that it is “the [trial] court’s exclusive province
to weigh the conflicting evidence [and] determine the
credibility of witnesses . . . . The function of the appel-
late court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings
of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App.
580–81. “When, however, the trial court draws conclu-
sions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide
whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct
and find support in the facts as they appear in the record.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Proper-
ties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, 226 Conn. App.
583, 589, 319 A.3d 123, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 905,
323 A.3d 344 (2024).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court’s finding of
duress was clearly erroneous because there was no evi-
dence in the record to support such a finding. We agree.
Duress is defined as a “forcible restraint or restriction”
or a “compulsion by threat.”14 Merriam-Webster’s Colle-
giate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 511. In its memoran-
dum of decision, the court determined that the written
statements of previous tenants that were admitted into
14
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines duress as, “[b]roadly, a
threat of harm made to compel a person to do something against his
or her will or judgment; [especially], a wrongful threat made by one
person to compel a manifestation of seeming assent by another person
to a transaction without real volition.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.
2009) p. 579. In other contexts, this court has stated: “The classical or
common law definition of duress is any wrongful act of one person that
compels a manifestation of apparent assent by another . . . without his
volition. . . . The defendant must prove: [1] a wrongful act or threat
[2] that left the victim no reasonable alternative, and [3] to which the
victim in fact acceded, and that [4] the resulting transaction was unfair
to the victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Raffy’s
Café I, LLC, 173 Conn. App. 193, 207, 163 A.3d 672 (2017).
Housing Authority v. Williams

evidence were not “credible as they were most likely
made in duress and not one resident, past or current,
was present to testify in the multiday trial.” The court
made no other findings regarding duress.
After our careful review of the record, we cannot find
any basis for the court’s findings of duress in the record,
other than mere speculation. The defendant testified
only that statements by former residents were “false”
and that the plaintiff wanted the former residents to
testify against her. The defendant said that Naughton
had somehow fabricated the statements against her by
former residents, suggesting that there had been some
type of agreement between the plaintiff and the former
residents. The defendant offered no independent knowl-
edge of any agreement between the plaintiff and former
residents and offered no testimony to allow the court to
infer that such an agreement had been made. Further,
the defendant proffered no evidence of any act, threat, or
misconduct by the plaintiff that would compel the former
residents to offer statements against the defendant. We
conclude that the court’s finding that such statements
were “most likely made in duress” is not based on evi-
dence, but on mere speculation and is therefore clearly
erroneous.15 See In re Selena O., 104 Conn. App. 635,
644–45, 934 A.2d 860 (2007) (“[i]f the court’s conclu-
sions or findings of fact rest on speculation rather than
on sufficient evidence, they are clearly erroneous”).
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in requir-
ing it to submit direct evidence to establish a serious
nuisance claim. We agree.
15
In concluding that the court’s finding of duress is erroneous, we are
cognizant of our limited role on appeal. Whether the evidence on remand,
including statements attributed to tenants, should be credited remains
the sole province of the trier of fact. See Housing Authority v. Stevens,
supra, 209 Conn. App. 580–81 (“It is the court’s exclusive province to
weigh the conflicting evidence [and] determine the credibility of wit-
nesses . . . . Thus, if the court’s dispositive finding . . . was not clearly
erroneous, then the judgment must be affirmed. . . . The function of
the appellate court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings of the
trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Housing Authority v. Williams

Section 47a-15 defines a serious nuisance in relevant
part as “conduct which presents an immediate and serious
danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord” or
“using the premises or allowing the premises to be used
for . . . the illegal sale of drugs . . . .” “[T]he existence
of a nuisance generally is a question of fact, for which
we invoke a clearly erroneous standard of review . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority
v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App. 580. To the extent the
court draws a conclusion of law, however, our review
is plenary. See Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic
Multimedia, LLC, supra, 226 Conn. App. 589.
We note that “there is no legal distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative
[value] is concerned. . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence
may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence. . . . Insofar as circumstantial evidence
can be and is routinely used to meet the higher standard
of proof in a criminal prosecution, so can it be used in a
case such as this where the applicable standard is that
of [a preponderance of the evidence].” (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v.
Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 278, 873 A.2d 208, cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005), and cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005).
In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff
did not proffer any evidence demonstrating that illegal
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other items relating to
the sale of drugs were found in the defendant’s unit and
that “there was no police involvement, investigation, or
the observation of the sale of illegal drugs in or around
the subject premises.” The court thus determined that
there was “no direct evidence” tying Mathis’ death to
any alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit. On
this basis, the court concluded that there was “no evi-
dence” that the defendant was involved in the illegal
sale of drugs.
The evidence proffered by the plaintiff regarding the
alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit included the
Housing Authority v. Williams

January 1, 2023 altercation, the December 29, 2023 over-
dose, the Naughton/Mathis statement, Rivera’s written
statement, Brewster’s written statement, and the Dixon/
Brown written statement. The four statements were
admitted into evidence without objection, and all stated
that the defendant sold drugs out of her unit. Addition-
ally, the plaintiff provided evidence of the “unreasonably
high amount of [foot] traffic from individuals visiting at
all hours . . . .” Thus, there certainly existed testimonial
and circumstantial evidence in the record to support
the plaintiff’s claim of serious nuisance. We reiterate,
however, that we do not, as a reviewing court, suggest
that the trial court is required to credit such evidence,
circumstantial or not, in determining whether the plain-
tiff has met its burden of proof. Nevertheless, because
there is no legal distinction between circumstantial and
direct evidence, we conclude the court’s finding that
there existed “no evidence” regarding the defendant’s
alleged drug activity in the unit was clearly erroneous.
See In re Jacob W., 330 Conn. 744, 774, 200 A.3d 1091
(2019) (“[i]n light of the abundance of evidence in the
record contrary to the trial court’s statement that there
was no evidence presented . . . we are left with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made and, therefore,
conclude that the trial court’s finding was clearly errone-
ous” (emphasis in original)); Osborn v. Waterbury, 197
Conn. App. 476, 485, 232 A.3d 134 (2020) (finding “ ‘no
evidence’ despite an abundance of evidence in the record
to the contrary” left this court with firm conviction that
mistake had been made), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 903,
242 A.3d 1010 (2021).
For similar reasons, we conclude that the court’s find-
ing that there was “no evidence” that the defendant
had engaged in or allowed others to engage in violence
in her unit also is clearly erroneous. The video evidence
admitted at trial portrays two violent altercations that
appear to begin in the defendant’s unit. Moreover, the
defendant testified regarding the December 7, 2023
altercation and confirmed that she had asked Rivera
to remove Brown from her unit before Rivera dragged
Housing Authority v. Williams

Brown out of the unit by her hair. The trial court credited
that evidence that the altercation occurred in its find-
ings of fact, wherein the court found “a tenant residing
in the premises was dragged out of the defendant’s unit
by another tenant. The assault continued in the hall-
way, involving punching and kicking.” Accordingly,
the court’s own recitation of the facts and the evidence
adduced at trial that substantiates those findings belie
the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff proffered no
evidence in support of these allegations.
The court’s decision to require the plaintiff to submit
direct evidence, as opposed to circumstantial evidence, to
establish a serious nuisance is contrary to law. See Boc-
canfuso v. Conner, supra, 89 Conn. App. 278 (“[T]here
is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence so far as probative [value] is concerned. . . . In
fact, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, sat-
isfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Further,
on our careful review of the ample testimonial, docu-
mentary, and security video evidence admitted at trial,
we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed”; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Giglio v. Ardohain, supra, 233 Conn. App. 752;
with respect to the court’s finding that there was “no
evidence” in the record that the defendant committed
a serious nuisance through violent altercations in the
defendant’s unit and the alleged drug activity in the
defendant’s unit. See Osborn v. Waterbury, supra, 197
Conn. App. 485; see also Commissioner of Environmental
Protection v. State Five Industrial Park, Inc., 304 Conn.
128, 151, 37 A.3d 724 (2012) (reviewing court was left
with “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made” due to, inter alia, trial court’s employment
of improper reasoning when analyzing facts); Casir-
aghi v. Casiraghi, 200 Conn. App. 771, 791, 241 A.3d
717 (2020) (“[b]ecause the court’s finding of wilful-
ness stands in direct contradiction to the facts found
by the court related to the plaintiff’s ability to pay, we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
Housing Authority v. Williams

finding is clearly erroneous and, thus, cannot stand”).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court’s
finding that there existed “no evidence” in the record
regarding the plaintiff’s allegations that the defen-
dant committed a serious nuisance is clearly erroneous.
III
We now must determine whether the court’s clearly
erroneous factual findings were harmful and thus war-
rant reversal of the judgment rendered against the plain-
tiff. See Autry v. Hosey, supra, 200 Conn. App. 801. We
conclude that, because these determinations were clearly
erroneous, premised in part on speculation, contradic-
tory, and incorrect as a matter of law, the plaintiff is
entitled to a new hearing.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
the written statements submitted into evidence by the
plaintiff were “most likely made in duress” even though
there was no evidence proffered to support a finding
of duress. In part I of this opinion, we concluded that
this finding was clearly erroneous. On the basis of this
clearly erroneous finding, the court “did not find those
statements to be credible . . . .” In part II of this opinion,
we concluded that the court improperly determined that
there was “no evidence” that the defendant or her guests
engaged in either of the uncontroverted acts of violence.
On the basis of that improper finding, the court deter-
mined that there was insufficient evidence in the record
to find that the defendant acted or caused her guests to
act in a manner that “presented an immediate and serious
danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord . .
. .” Lastly, the court found that there was “no evidence”
that the defendant sold drugs from her unit, despite the
evidence of foot traffic, written statements, and testi-
mony. On the basis of this clearly erroneous finding, the
court determined that there was insufficient evidence
in the record to find that the defendant had engaged in
serious nuisance.
Those erroneous findings, together with the court’s
logical inconsistencies, were inextricably intertwined
Housing Authority v. Williams

with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to
meet its evidentiary burden on all counts of its complaint.
After our careful review of the record, we are left with
the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
Giglio v. Ardohain, supra, 233 Conn. App. 752; and these
errors have undermined our “confidence in the court’s
[fact-finding] process . . . .” Autry v. Hosey, supra, 200
Conn. App. 801. We acknowledge that a reversal based
on a trial court’s findings of fact, or lack thereof, should
be rare, and one that we do not engage in lightly. Yet, we
are convinced that this is one of those rare cases where
such a mistake has been made. See Papantoniou v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 674, 692, 346
A.3d 985 (2025). In light of the court’s clearly erroneous
findings, and its reliance on these findings in its memo-
randum of decision, we cannot conclude that these errors
were harmless. As such, a new trial is warranted in this
case. See Osborn v. Waterbury, supra, 197 Conn. App.
488 (“our careful review of the record has undermined
our confidence in the court’s fact-finding process to the
point where there is no other adequate or just remedy
but to order a new trial”).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
In this opinion BISHOP, J., concurred.