Speer v. Skaats

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Speer v. Skaats

SHERI SPEER v. DONNA SKAATS ET AL.
(AC 47921)
Alvord, Moll and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defen-
dants’ motions to dismiss her complaint, in which she sought, inter alia, an
injunction requiring the defendants to return to her certain of her confidential
records and documents they allegedly had misappropriated in violation of
the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) (§ 35-50 et seq.). The
plaintiff claimed that the court erred in determining that her alleged failure
to comply with the three year statute of limitations (§ 35-56) in CUTSA could
properly be raised in a motion to dismiss. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion
to disqualify the defendants’ counsel, L, as the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate a common factual issue and a substantial relationship between the
present action and L’s representation of the plaintiff in an action seventeen
years earlier.

The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendants, as they
improperly raised § 35-36 in their motions to dismiss when they were instead
required to plead it as a special defense under the applicable rule of practice
(§ 10-50).

Because the right of action raised in the plaintiff’s complaint existed at
common law, independent of CUTSA, § 35-56 was not jurisdictional in
nature, and there was no indication in the legislative history and case law
predating the 1983 enactment of CUTSA that the legislature intended to
deprive trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction over untimely trade secret
actions; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.

Argued December 9, 2025—officially released April 28, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction requiring the
defendants to return to the plaintiff certain of her confi-
dential records the defendants allegedly had misappropri-
ated, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New London, where the court,
Graff, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the
defendants’ counsel; thereafter, the court granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and rendered judgment
Speer v. Skaats

thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; judgment directed; further proceedings.
Sheri Speer, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Lloyd L. Langhammer, for the appellees (defendants).
ALVORD, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri
Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dis-
missing her action alleging that the defendants, Donna
Skaats and Lloyd Langhammer, violated the Connecticut
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes
§ 35-50 et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly (1) denied her motion to disqualify
the defendants’ counsel and (2) granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss the action on the ground that the
statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes §
35-56 had expired.1 We agree with the plaintiff’s second
claim and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of
the trial court.2
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff commenced the
present action on October 10, 2023, by way of a two count
complaint. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that Skaats,
an attorney who had received “records and other financial
documents as to the plaintiff’s affairs” via a subpoena
duces tecum served in a prior action, had misappropri-
ated, shared, and unlawfully disseminated the plaintiff’s
records. The plaintiff alleged that Skaats had copied and
transferred the records into the possession of Langham-
mer, who was Skaats’ attorney. The plaintiff alleged that
she had made a demand for the return of the records. In
count two, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, seek-
ing the return of the records and alleging that she was
“continuing to be the subject of fines, penalties, interest
and even lost business opportunities as a consequence of
1
For ease of discussion, we address the plaintiff’s claims in a dif-
ferent order than that in which they are presented in her principal
appellate brief.
2
The plaintiff raises two additional claims on appeal that we need
not address in light of our conclusion that the trial court improperly
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Speer v. Skaats

the defendants’ refusal to disgorge the records necessary
to file and amend the plaintiff’s tax returns.”
On January 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for
disqualification of counsel. Therein, she alleged that
Langhammer had represented her in a prior action
involving a commercial real estate transaction, cit-
ing Bluefin Mortgage Fund, LLC v. Speer, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2007 WL 1415922 (Conn. Super.
April 30, 2007) (Bluefin Mortgage Fund, LLC matter).
The plaintiff alleged that the present action seeks the
return of her documents, which she alleged “were stolen
during the course of a fraudulent involuntary bank-
ruptcy [by] the defendants, [in] concert with their other
client, Seaport Capital Partners, LLC, and have not
been returned.” The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that
Langhammer had “unprecedented access to confidential
information concerning trade secrets, business practices,
financing strategies and other information . . . .” On
January 19, 2024, the defendants filed an objection to
the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify. They argued that the
plaintiff “references a case that is eighteen years old . . .
without analysis or explanation as to why an eighteen
year old case would require disqualification in the instant
action.” Moreover, the defendants argued that “[t]he
plaintiff references matters that have been litigated
ad nauseum in other cases, i.e., the alleged fraudulent
involuntary bankruptcy, etc. All of these matters have
soundly been rejected by the Bankruptcy Court and the
Superior Court. Again, she provides no legal analysis
for her claims regarding how a ten year old involuntary
bankruptcy where she was denied a discharge impacts
this instant case.”
On February 14, 2024, the court, Graff, J., denied
the plaintiff’s motion for disqualification. The court
explained: “[T]he plaintiff argues that she did not con-
sent to permit [Langhammer] to represent [Skaats] in
this action when he previously represented the plaintiff
in a prior action. In support of her argument, the plain-
tiff attaches an appearance by [Langhammer], dated
Speer v. Skaats

July 5, 2007, and a letter dated October 25, 2007. These
documents establish that [Langhammer] represented
the plaintiff in 2007 when she was a defendant in the
Bluefin Mortgage Fund, LLC matter. No other facts
were introduced to the court by the plaintiff regarding
[Langhammer’s] representation of her in that matter.
Comparatively, as the defendant points out, [Langham-
mer’s] representation of the plaintiff in the Bluefin Mort-
gage Fund, LLC matter is from seventeen years ago.
There is no evidence that there was an ongoing attorney-
client relationship from 2007 to the present between the
plaintiff and [Langhammer].” The court found that the
representation did not violate rule 1.9 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct because “there is no relationship
either factual or legal between the Bluefin Mortgage
Fund, LLC matter and the present matter. The plaintiff
has failed to carry her burden and demonstrate that there
is a common factual issue between the Bluefin Mortgage
Fund, LLC matter and the disputes at issue here.”
Prior to the trial court’s decision on the motion for
disqualification, the defendants each filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on February 9, 2024, a joint memo-
randum of law in support of the motions to dismiss, and
several exhibits. In their memorandum of law, the defen-
dants maintained that the action should be dismissed for
a number of reasons, including that it was not brought
within the three year statute of limitations applicable to
actions alleging violations of CUTSA. The defendants
attached as an exhibit a copy of a 2016 subpoena issued
by Skaats to the plaintiff’s accountant. The defendants
maintained that, in July, 2020, the plaintiff had com-
menced a prior action in which she alleged that the defen-
dants had not returned her documents. The defendants
also attached as an exhibit a copy of the complaint in
that prior action.3 Thus, the defendants alleged that the
3
The plaintiff’s complaint in the prior action, filed on July 7, 2020,
contained allegations of preferential treatment of certain entities to
obtain sensitive information, specifically, “tax, financial and medical
records of the plaintiff, including original, irreplaceable records that
were subpoenaed by the defendant Skaats from her accountant and never
Speer v. Skaats

present action, commenced in October, 2023, was barred
by the statute of limitations.
On February 20, 2024, the plaintiff filed a memo-
randum of law in opposition to the motions to dismiss.
Therein, she responded to the defendants’ statute of
limitations argument in one paragraph, maintaining:
“[A]lthough it is not the proper subject of a motion to
dismiss, the defendants claim the applicable statute of
limitations has run—even though this action involves
an ongoing course of conduct. Subject matter jurisdic-
tion is the power of the court to hear a controversy. The
court must hear the case in order to determine the issue
of whether or not any statute of limitations has run. Not-
withstanding that issue and most certainly taking into
mind that all favorable inferences toward subject matter
jurisdiction must be inferred, the issue of ongoing and
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets continues
along with the withholding of . . . the plaintiff’s original
records to her exclusion.”
On July 1, 2024, the trial court issued an order grant-
ing the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court con-
sidered the subpoena and the July, 2020 complaint and
concluded that “the plaintiff knew since at least July 7,
2020, that the defendants allegedly misappropriated
her records. Three years from July 7, 2020, was July 7,
2023. The statute of limitations ran out on the plaintiff’s
claims on July 7, 2023. This action was served on the
defendants on October 10, 2023, and filed on October 20,
2023. The claims are outside of the statute of limitations
and are time barred.” Accordingly, the court concluded
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action
and granted the motions to dismiss.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the trial court’s decision denying her motion for
disqualification, which was denied. The plaintiff also
returned. This also included medical records obtained by Norwich Public
Utilities under false pretense, which were ordered by the defendant
Langhammer to be turned over to [Steven] Tavares’ counsel, Patrick
Boatman, representing his shell entities/alter egos.”
Speer v. Skaats

filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s decision
granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Therein, she
argued, inter alia, that the statute of limitations must
be pleaded as a special defense and is not a proper basis
for a motion to dismiss, and that the action was saved
by the accidental failure of suit statute. See General
Statutes § 52-592. On July 24, 2024, the court issued
an order denying the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal, in which it stated: “The plaintiff argues that
reconsideration is warranted because the court failed
to address the plaintiff’s claim that the present action
is saved by the accidental failure of suit statute. The
plaintiff did not argue in her objection to the motions
to dismiss that the accidental failure of suit statute
tolled the statute of limitations for her claims or that
the statute of limitations had not run on legal claims
because of the accidental failure of suit statute. The
plaintiff’s argument in the motion for reconsideration
is nothing more than a second bite at the apple and an
attempt to avoid dismissal of this action. Furthermore,
it is questionable whether the plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that she is bringing the present action under the
accidental failure of suit statute.”4 The court’s ruling
did not address the plaintiff’s argument regarding the
statute of limitations. This appeal followed.5
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court improperly denied her motion for disqualification
of counsel. We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review gov-
erning our resolution of this claim. “The standard of
review for determining whether the court properly denied
4
The trial court then rejected the plaintiff’s contention that her prior
action had accidentally failed. Specifically, the court noted that the
plaintiff voluntarily had withdrawn the prior action and, thus, was
not entitled to take advantage of the extension of time provided by the
accidental failure of suit statute.
5
The plaintiff sought articulation of the trial court’s decisions grant-
ing the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denying the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, both of which were denied.
Speer v. Skaats

a motion to disqualify counsel is an abuse of discretion
standard. The Superior Court has inherent and statutory
authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys who are
officers of the court. . . . In its execution of this duty,
the Superior Court has broad discretionary power to
determine whether an attorney should be disqualified for
an alleged breach of confidentiality or conflict of inter-
est. . . . In determining whether the Superior Court has
abused its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify,
this court must accord every reasonable presumption in
favor of its decision. Reversal is required only where an
abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears
to have been done. . . .
“Disqualification of counsel is a remedy that serves to
enforce the lawyer’s duty of absolute fidelity and to guard
against the danger of inadvertent use of confidential
information. . . . In disqualification matters, however,
we must be solicitous of a client’s right freely to choose
his counsel . . . mindful of the fact that a client whose
attorney is disqualified may suffer the loss of time and
money in finding new counsel and may lose the benefit
of its longtime counsel’s specialized knowledge of its
operations. . . .
“The competing interests at stake in the motion to
disqualify, therefore, are: (1) the [plaintiff’s] interest in
protecting confidential information; (2) the [defendant’s]
interest in freely selecting counsel of [its] choice; and (3)
the public’s interests in the scrupulous administration
of justice. . . . Rule 1.9 (a) [of the Rules of Professional
Conduct] expresses the same standard that we had applied
under the Code of Professional Responsibility when a
claim of disqualification based on prior representation
arose. Thus, an attorney should be disqualified if he
has accepted employment adverse to the interests of a
former client on a matter substantially related to the
prior representation. . . . This test has been honed in its
practical application to grant disqualification only upon
a showing that the relationship between the issues in
the prior and present cases is patently clear or when the
Speer v. Skaats

issues are identical or essentially the same. . . . Once a
substantial relationship between the prior and present
representation is demonstrated, the receipt of confiden-
tial information that would potentially disadvantage a
former client is presumed.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriel C., 196 Conn.
App. 333, 348–50, 229 A.3d 1073, cert. denied, 335
Conn. 938, 248 A.3d 708 (2020).
We conclude that the trial court acted well within its
discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to disqual-
ify. The court considered the plaintiff’s documentation
that Langhammer represented the plaintiff in 2007,
which was seventeen years before the present action.
The court noted that the plaintiff had provided no other
facts regarding Langhammer’s representation in 2007.
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate a common factual issue between the prior
representation and the present action. We agree with the
trial court that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of
demonstrating that the two proceedings are substantially
related. See id., 351 (respondent failed to meet burden
of demonstrating substantial relationship because she
provided no record, aside from conclusory statements, to
support claim that matters were substantially related).
On the basis of the court’s findings and the record before
us, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify.
II
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court improperly granted the defendants’ motions to
dismiss her complaint. She argues that the court erred
in determining that the failure to comply with the three
year statute of limitations set forth in CUTSA, § 35-56,
properly could be raised in a motion to dismiss. The plain-
tiff contends that the statute of limitations was required
to be pleaded as a special defense. The defendants wholly
fail to respond to this argument in their appellate brief,
nor did they provide any authority or analysis to support
a conclusion that the legislature intended § 35-56 to
Speer v. Skaats

create a jurisdictional bar. For the reasons that follow,
we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
relevant legal principles. “The standard of review for a
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss [under Practice
Book § 10-31 (a) (1)] is well settled. A motion to dismiss
tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the
court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the
court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [deter-
mination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . .
When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised
by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the alle-
gations of the complaint in their most favorable light. .
. . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those
alleged in the complaint, including those facts neces-
sarily implied from the allegations, construing them in
a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion
to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded,
invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that
alone.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid,
Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013).
In undertaking review of the granting of a motion to
dismiss on the ground of a lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, we are mindful that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction
involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of
controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court
does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has
competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is
determined that a tribunal has authority or competence
to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs,
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in
favor of entertaining the action.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel
v. Vena, 236 Conn. App. 39, 53, 347 A.3d 945 (2025).
“[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction
Speer v. Skaats

should be indulged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 626.
“Generally, [a] claim that an action is barred by the
lapse of the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a
special defense . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ahrens v. Hartford Florists’ Supply, Inc., 198 Conn.
App. 24, 35, 232 A.3d 1129 (2020). Practice Book §
10-50 provides in relevant part: “No facts may be proved
under either a general or special denial except such as
show that the plaintiff’s statements of fact are untrue.
Facts which are consistent with such statements but
show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause
of action, must be specially alleged. Thus . . . the statute
of limitations . . . must be specially pleaded . . . .” “When
a statute of limitations is not jurisdictional in nature, it
may be waived when not specially pleaded.” Freidheim
v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 796 n.6, 290 A.3d
801 (2023); see also Martino v. Scalzo, 113 Conn. App.
240, 249, 966 A.2d 339, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904,
976 A.2d 705 (2009).
“There is an exception to this general rule, however,
as noted by our Supreme Court, when a statute gives a
right of action which did not exist at common law, and
fixes the time within which the right must be enforced,
the time fixed is a limitation or condition attached to
the right—it is a limitation of the liability itself as cre-
ated, and not of the remedy alone.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ahrens v. Hartford Florists’ Supply,
Inc., supra, 198 Conn. App. 35; see also Greco v. United
Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 349–50, 890 A.2d
1269 (2006). “The courts of Connecticut have repeatedly
held that, under such circumstances, the time limita-
tion is a substantive and jurisdictional prerequisite . .
. .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neighborhood
Assn., Inc. v. Limberger, 321 Conn. 29, 47, 136 A.3d
581 (2016); see also Pereira v. State Board of Educa-
tion, 304 Conn. 1, 48, 37 A.3d 625 (2012) (“[u]nder such
circumstances, the time limitation is a substantive and
jurisdictional prerequisite, which may be raised . . . at
Speer v. Skaats

any time, even by the court sua sponte” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
“[A]lthough . . . mandatory language may be an indica-
tion that the legislature intended a time requirement to
be jurisdictional, such language alone does not overcome
the strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does such
language alone prove strong legislative intent to create
a jurisdictional bar. . . . [A] conclusion that a time limit
is subject matter jurisdictional has very serious and
final consequences. It means that, except in very rare
circumstances . . . a subject matter jurisdictional defect
may not be waived . . . may be raised at any time, even on
appeal . . . and that subject matter jurisdiction, if lack-
ing, may not be conferred by the parties, explicitly or
implicitly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lostritto
v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269
Conn. 10, 32, 848 A.2d 418 (2004). Therefore, “there is a
presumption in favor of subject matter jurisdiction, and
[our Supreme Court has required] a strong showing of
legislative intent that such a time limit is jurisdictional.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the determination of whether the
trial court properly granted the motions to dismiss turns
on whether the statute of limitations contained within
§ 35-56 is jurisdictional in nature. That determination
requires consideration of whether the statute gives a
right of action that did not exist at common law. See
id., 23. Courts conducting such an inquiry examine the
legislative history of the relevant statute. See id. (“In
order to determine whether the 120 day time limitation
[for bringing an apportionment claim] is substantive or
procedural, therefore, we must first ascertain whether
[General Statutes] § 52-102b created a right that did not
exist at common law. The facts essential to this query,
which we answer in the affirmative, can be found in the
legislative history of that statute.”).
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges a violation of CUTSA,
the statutory framework governing misappropriation
of trade secrets. CUTSA was enacted in 1983 and is
Speer v. Skaats

Connecticut’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act. To establish liability under CUTSA, the plaintiff
must prove the existence of a trade secret, as defined
by General Statutes § 35-51 (d); see BTS, USA, Inc. v.
Executive Perspectives, LLC, 166 Conn. App. 474, 494,
142 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 919, 150 A.3d 1149
(2016); and a “misappropriation,” as defined by § 35-51
(b). See Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513, 534, 321
A.3d 295 (2024). General Statutes § 35-53 (a) “permits
a plaintiff to seek, in addition to or in lieu of injunctive
relief, damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment not
considered in computing damages for actual loss. More-
over, a plaintiff may seek punitive damages for wilful
and malicious misappropriation and reasonable attor-
ney’s fees.” Evans v. General Motors Corp., 277 Conn.
496, 509, 893 A.2d 371 (2006). Section 35-56 provides:
“No action for misappropriation shall be brought but
within three years from the date the misappropriation
is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been discovered. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single
claim.” General Statutes § 35-58 provides that “[t]his
chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect
to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.”
The legislative history of CUTSA demonstrates
that the legislation was intended to codify and clarify
common-law trade secrets protections. Representative
Richard D. Tulisano stated that “what this legislation
does is it replaces our common law to some extent by
establishing a statutory remedy for misappropriation of
a trade secret. It clarifies and expands the legal protec-
tions of commercial parties and commercial secrets.”6 26
H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1983 Sess., pp. 2082–83. Similarly,
Senator Howard T. Owens, Jr., remarked that “the bill
6
Representative Tulisano continued: “This is designed to combat
industrial espionage and conflicting claims over valuable intellectual
property. As we presently have it right now, we also have a different
definition in the Freedom of Information Act and for purposes of that
act the definition has not been changed. Remedies available to an injured
Speer v. Skaats

would establish a statutory definition of trade secret and
would clarify the court procedures available to prevent
wrongful acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret
and to recover damages. It goes in and defines what trade
secrets are, what type of information it does. It also sets
forth what the penalties are in the event that there’s
acquisition of another’s trade secret by theft, bribery,
misrepresentation. It also goes into what damages are
in the event that there’s a violation of the statute and it,
in fact, codifies all of the old common law definitions.”
26 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1983 Sess., p. 2645. Finally, Anita
Loalbo, a staff attorney for the Connecticut Business
and Industry Association, similarly remarked during a
committee hearing that “[t]he uniform act makes statu-
tory the principles found in common law trade secrets
protection.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1983 Sess., p. 135.
The legislative recognition that trade secret actions
were available at common law also is reflected in deci-
sions of our appellate courts. In Evans v. General Motors
Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 496, which held that plaintiffs
have a right to a jury trial on trade secret claims, the
court considered the historical background of trade secret
litigation, explaining that “all of the available evidence
suggests that claims alleging the improper disclosure of
a trade secret were recognized at common law and tried
before juries in English courts when the Connecticut
constitution was adopted in 1818. The earliest published
opinion to consider the issue was Newbery v. James, 35
Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch. 1817), in which the plaintiffs sought
to continue an injunction restraining the defendants
from disclosing a secret involving the manufacture of a
certain medicine. . . . The court observed that it could not
party under this bill, or damages for actual loss [c]aused by misappro-
priation and unjust and gain by the misappropriation.
“Mr. Speaker, I think this is important legislation for a modern,
technological society. We are less and less a manufacturing state and
less and less a manufacturing society and more and more one engaged
in high technology and trade secrets become more and more important.
I think it is important to institute this stand, and I hope everyone will
support it.” 26 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 2083.
Speer v. Skaats

decide whether the parties’ agreement to maintain the
secret had been violated unless the secret was disclosed
to the court. . . . Disclosure of the secret, however, would
defeat the purpose of the injunctive relief requested.
. . . The court concluded that it could do nothing but
put the parties in a way to try their legal rights by an
action. . . . It therefore dissolved the injunction, ordered
the defendants to keep an accounting of what they sold
while the parties tried their rights and proceeded to
expedite the matter by removing a procedural obstacle
arising from the fact that the plaintiff was also one of
the executors for the named defendant, who then was
deceased. . . . There is no hint in Newbery that the court’s
directive for the parties to bring an action in a court of
law was in any way unusual. We thus conclude, on the
basis of Newbery, that, although plaintiffs in the early
nineteenth century could seek injunctive relief in courts
of equity to restrain defendants from misappropriating
business secrets, English courts of law during that time
also conducted jury trials on trade secret claims seeking
damages.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. General Motors
Corp., supra, 510–11.
The court in Evans further considered the uniform act,
stating that “the prefatory note to the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, upon which CUTSA is based, provides that
the uniform act ‘codifies the basic principles of common
law trade secret protection . . . .’ Unif. Trade Secrets Act,
prefatory note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005). An
examination of CUTSA and the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act therefore supports our conclusion that trade secret
protection was available under the common law and,
as a result, the plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial on
their trade secret claims seeking damages.” Evans v.
General Motors Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 518; see also
News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis,
86 Conn. App. 527, 540 n.2, 862 A.2d 837 (2004) (not-
ing that “trade secrets act has been interpreted as a
Speer v. Skaats

codification of the common law”), aff’d, 276 Conn. 310,
885 A.2d 758 (2005).
Other decisions of our appellate courts, issued prior to
the adoption of CUTSA in 1983, further illustrate that
a civil action for misappropriation of trade secrets was
recognized at common law. See Plastic & Metal Fabrica-
tors, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 258–59, 303 A.2d 725
(1972) (affirming judgment enjoining and restraining
defendant from using or disclosing trade secret); Town
& Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150
Conn. 314, 320–21, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) (holding that
trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s customer list
was not trade secret was not supported by subordinate
facts, and explaining that, “[i]f the list of customers was
a trade secret, the plaintiff would be entitled, in addition
to any other proper relief, to an injunction restraining
the defendant from performing services for customers
on the list”); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509,
517, 144 A.2d 306 (1958) (affirming judgment enjoining
defendants from disclosing trade secret); see also Holiday
Food Co. v. Munroe, 37 Conn. Supp. 546, 553–54, 426
A.2d 814 (1981) (affirming trial court’s decision that
certain customer lists did not constitute trade secrets).
Our appellate courts have not had occasion to construe
§ 35-56 to determine whether the legislature intended the
statute of limitations to be jurisdictional.7 Our review of
the legislative history and case law predating the enact-
ment reveals no indication that the legislature intended
to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to
7
The trial court in the present case cited Nash v. Roland Dumont
Agency, Inc., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2019 WL 4344339 (Conn.
Super. August 21, 2019), aff’d, 201 Conn. App. 906, 242 A.3d 776
(2020). In that case, the trial court rendered summary judgment in
favor of the defendants on their claim that the statute of limitations
had lapsed on the plaintiff’s CUTSA claims. See id., *5. A review of
the record in that case reveals that the defendants had pleaded as a
special defense that the plaintiff’s claims were time barred by § 35-56.
Accordingly, although the court in Nash cited language regarding
jurisdictional statutes of limitation, the procedural posture of that case
is different in that the statute properly was pleaded and raised at the
summary judgment stage, rather than by way of a motion to dismiss.
Speer v. Skaats

entertain untimely trade secret actions, much less the
“strong showing of a legislative intent to create a time
limitation that, in the event of noncompliance, acts as a
subject matter jurisdictional bar.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Williams v. Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 277–78, 777
A.2d 645 (2001); see also Lostritto v. Community Action
Agency of New Haven, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 32.
Moreover, it is evident that the right of action raised
in the plaintiff’s complaint existed at common law, inde-
pendent of CUTSA. Accordingly, we conclude that the
statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. See Martino
v. Scalzo, supra, 113 Conn. App. 249 (concluding that,
where right to enforce mortgage existed at common law,
statute of limitations contained within General Statutes
§ 42a-3-118 (b) did not implicate subject matter of court
and thus plaintiff was responsible for pleading statute);
see also L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167
Conn. 509, 513, 356 A.2d 144 (1975) (“That the right
and remedy once existed at common law determines
that the limitation in [General Statutes §] 12-119 is
procedural and personal rather than substantive or juris-
dictional and is thus subject to waiver. Accordingly, the
court erred in raising the issue of limitation on its own
motion.”).
In the present case, the defendants have not filed an
answer and special defenses. Rather, the defendants filed
motions to dismiss the action, alleging a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Gianetti v. Connecticut News-
papers Publishing Co., 136 Conn. App. 67, 75, 44 A.3d
191 (statute of limitations “defenses are appropriately
raised as special defenses . . . and not in motions to dis-
miss”), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 923, 55 A.3d 567 (2012).
Because the statute of limitations contained within §
35-56 does not implicate the court’s subject matter juris-
diction, it must be specially pleaded. Raising the statute
of limitations in § 35-56 by way of a motion to dismiss is
Speer v. Skaats

procedurally improper. Accordingly, we conclude that
the court improperly granted the motions to dismiss.8
The judgment is reversed only as to the granting of
the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that
the statute of limitations had expired and the case is
remanded with direction to deny the defendants’ motions
to dismiss as to the statute of limitations claim and for
further proceedings according to law; the judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

8
On appeal, the defendants raise several alternative grounds for
affirmance, all of which are inadequately briefed in that they contain
minimal citation to authority and lack analysis and application of the
law to the facts of the case. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are
not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to
this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere
abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by
failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the
statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in
the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and
efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349
A.3d 614 (2026). Because the defendants’ briefing of their alternative
grounds for affirmance is inadequate to conduct any meaningful review,
we conclude that we cannot address them.