Three Deer Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Johnson

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THREE DEER ASSOCIATES LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP v. DENETTE
JOHNSON ET AL.
(AC 46343)
Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of a summary process action, to recover
possession of certain real property that had been leased to the defendant
J. The parties thereafter entered into a stipulated summary process
agreement, which provided that a judgment of possession would be
rendered for the plaintiff, subject to a stay of execution and a use
and occupancy fee. The agreement further provided that the stay of
execution was final and that J agreed not to reopen, appeal, or request
any further stay of execution. The trial court rendered judgment in
accordance with the agreement. J subsequently filed a motion to open
the judgment, seeking an extension of the stay of execution, which the
trial court denied on the grounds that, inter alia, the parties had entered
into the agreement with the assistance of a housing court specialist,
the parties understood the terms of the voluntary agreement, and J had
affirmed that she would not seek, inter alia, further extensions of time
or motions to open. J then filed a second motion to open the judgment,
again seeking an extension of the stay to allow J to secure housing,
which the trial court denied on the same grounds as the first motion
to open. J appealed to this court, challenging, inter alia, the trial court’s
denial of her second motion to open and claiming that the stipulated
summary process judgment should be vacated. Held that, on the basis
of its review of the record and having afforded every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of the trial court’s action, this court could not conclude
that the trial court acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its discretion
when it denied the second motion to open the stipulated summary
process judgment; moreover, this court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over that portion of J’s appeal that challenged the stipulated sum-
mary process judgment, as J did not file her appeal within five days of
the underlying stipulated summary process judgment as required by
statute (§ 47a-35), and, accordingly, that portion of the appeal challeng-
ing the underlying stipulated summary process judgment was dismissed.
Argued November 16, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Ses-
sion, where the parties entered into a stipulated agree-
ment granting possession to the plaintiff subject to a
stay of execution and payment by the defendants of a
reasonable use and occupancy fee; thereafter, the court,
Esperance-Smith, J., rendered judgment in accordance
with the stipulated agreement; subsequently, the court
denied the named defendant’s motion to open the stipu-
lated summary process judgment; thereafter, the court
denied the named defendant’s second motion to open
the stipulated summary process judgment, and the
named defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dis-
missed in part; affirmed.
DeNette Johnson, self-represented, the appellant
(named defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented named defen-
dant, DeNette Johnson (Johnson), appeals following
the trial court’s denial of her second motion to open a
stipulated summary process judgment, rendered after
she had entered into a stipulated agreement with the
plaintiff, Three Deer Associates Limited Partnership,
doing business as Deerfield Apartments,1 in connection
with a summary process action commenced by the
plaintiff against Johnson and her son, the defendant
Eric Johnson II.2 On appeal, Johnson raises five claims,
namely, that (1) the court improperly denied her second
motion to open, (2) the court improperly failed to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing before acting on her second
motion to open, (3) an evidentiary hearing should have
been conducted to determine if she was compliant with
General Statutes § 47a-39, (4) the court violated her due
process rights by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing,
and (5) the underlying stipulated judgment should be
vacated. We affirm the judgment with respect to John-
son’s first four claims relating to the denial of her
motion to open and dismiss the appeal as it pertains
to her fifth claim relating to the stipulated summary
process judgment.
We briefly set forth the following relevant procedural
history. In its summary process action, the plaintiff
sought a judgment of possession of certain premises it
had leased to Johnson pursuant to a one year written
lease after Johnson had failed to pay the monthly rent
due in September and October, 2022. The parties there-
after entered into a stipulated agreement, pursuant to
which a judgment of possession would be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff with a stay of execution through
March 1, 2023, and Johnson would pay a fee of $1450 for
reasonable use and occupancy. The stipulation further
provides that the ‘‘stay of execution is a FINAL stay of
execution. [Johnson] agree[s] not to reopen, appeal or
request any further stay of execution. Judgment shall
enter for Lapse of Time only and not due to any fault
of [Johnson].’’ The stipulation was approved and signed
by the court on February 7, 2023 (stipulated summary
process judgment).
On March 1, 2023, Johnson filed a motion to open
the stipulated summary process judgment, in which she
asserted that she was ‘‘requesting an extension’’ and
that she would pay $1450 on March 10, 2023, in order
to be able to stay in the premises until April 1, 2023.
The plaintiff objected to that request, arguing that it
violated the specific terms of the stipulated judgment
and that Johnson failed to satisfy the requirements of
§ 47a-39, which permits a court to grant a stay of execu-
tion of a judgment of possession if ‘‘the applicant cannot
secure suitable premises’’ and ‘‘has used due diligence
and reasonable effort to secure other premises . . . .’’
On March 6, 2023, the court denied the motion to open,
explaining: ‘‘The parties entered a stipulation on Febru-
ary 7, 2023, with the assistance of a housing court spe-
cialist. All parties affirmed that they understood the
terms of the agreement and voluntarily entered into the
agreement, which called for a final stay through March
1, 2023. The agreement also affirmed that [Johnson]
will not file any extensions of time, motions to open,
or motions to delay or extend execution. . . . [T]he
stipulation was approved by the court.’’
On March 8, 2023, Johnson filed a second motion
to open, in which she asserted that she was ‘‘actively
looking for new housing,’’ that she is a sixty-nine year
old senior with limited mobility, and that she needed
more time. On March 16, 2023, the court denied the
second motion to open for the same reason it denied
the first motion to open. Johnson thereafter filed this
appeal on March 21, 2023, listing the March 16, 2023
denial of her second motion to open and the February
7, 2023 stipulated summary process judgment as the
judgments being appealed.
We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘It is well
established that [t]he denial of a motion to open is an
appealable final judgment. . . . This court does not
undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision
of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion to open
a judgment. . . . In an appeal from a denial of a motion
to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue
of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and
in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . In determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court
must make every reasonable presumption in favor of
its action. . . . The manner in which [this] discretion
is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court
could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Pizzoferrato v. Com-
munity Renewal Team, Inc., 211 Conn. App. 458, 464–
65, 272 A.3d 1145 (2022).
The first four claims on appeal concern the court’s
denial of Johnson’s second motion to open. On the basis
of our review of the record in this case and affording
every reasonable presumption in favor of the court’s
action, we cannot conclude that the court acted unrea-
sonably or in clear abuse of its discretion when it denied
the second motion to open the stipulated summary pro-
cess judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
with respect to the court’s denial of Johnson’s second
motion to open.
Johnson’s fifth claim on appeal challenges the under-
lying stipulated summary process judgment itself and
seeks to have that judgment vacated. Pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 47a-35, appeals from a summary process
judgment must be taken within five days of the judg-
ment. This court recently addressed this issue and
stated: ‘‘Summary process is a special statutory proce-
dure designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . .
It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased
premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense
to which, under the common-law actions, they might
be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their
terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt
hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the
statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly
construed and strictly followed. . . . The process is
intended to be summary and is designed to provide an
expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.
. . . HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650,
658, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).
‘‘In HUD/Barbour-Waverly, our Supreme Court
examined the plain meaning of § 47a-35 and the legisla-
tive policy surrounding the enactment of the statute.
. . . In that case, the court concluded that, [i]n light of
the plain language of § 47a-35, the fact that the summary
process statutes are in derogation of common law and
the legislative policy in favor of the swift resolution of
disputes between landlords and tenants regarding rights
of possession, we conclude that an appeal pursuant to
§ 47a-35 must be brought within five days of the render-
ing of a summary process judgment.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg, 218
Conn. App. 206, 212–13, 291 A.3d 185 (2023).
In the present case, Johnson did not file her appeal
within five days of the underlying stipulated summary
process judgment. Accordingly, this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over that part of her appeal that
challenges the stipulated summary process judgment
itself,3 and that portion of the appeal must be dismissed.
See HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, supra, 235 Conn.
655; see also Ansonia Housing Authority v. Parks, 211
Conn. App. 528, 529, 273 A.3d 245 (2022) (dismissing
appeal from summary process judgment that was filed
beyond five day period for lack of subject matter juris-
diction).
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the plaintiff’s
challenge to the stipulated summary process judgment;
the judgment denying the motion to open is affirmed.
1
As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to file an appellee’s brief on or before
August 29, 2023, this court ordered ‘‘that the appeal shall be considered on
the basis of [Johnson’s] brief, and, if applicable, the appendix, the record,
as defined by Practice Book [§] 60-4, and oral argument, if not waived by
the appellant or the [c]ourt. Pursuant to Practice Book [§] 70-4, oral argument
by the appellee will not be permitted.’’
2
We note that, on appeal, Johnson attempts to raise claims on behalf of
her son, arguing that she and her son signed the stipulated summary process
agreement by mistake and under duress, and that they did not understand
its terms. Because Johnson’s son is not a party to this appeal, to the extent
that Johnson has raised claims on behalf of her son in this appeal, they are
not properly before this court. See Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Klein, 87 Conn.
App. 337, 343–44 n.3, 865 A.2d 500, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 904, 876 A.2d
13 (2005).
3
This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining portion of
the appeal because it was filed within the statutory appeal period following
the denial of the motion to open. See Atlantic St. Heritage Associates, LLC
v. Bologna, 204 Conn. App. 163, 170 and n.6, 252 A.3d 881 (2021); Lopez v.
Livingston, 53 Conn. App. 622, 623 n.1, 731 A.2d 335 (1999).