Cameron v. Santiago

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CATHERINA CAMERON v. JAVIER SANTIAGO
(AC 46440)
Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia,
alleged assault arising out of a sexual encounter between the parties.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not complied with the terms
of the plaintiff’s consent to the encounter because he did not wear a
condom during the entirety of the encounter. The plaintiff brought two
prior actions against the defendant, a small claims matter in which the
court rendered judgment for the defendant, and an action in the Superior
Court alleging breach of contract that resulted in a stipulated judgment
for the plaintiff. The trial court in the present case held a pretrial confer-
ence, during which it stated that the plaintiff could not continue retrying
the case against the defendant. Thereafter, the court issued a written
order dismissing the action sua sponte with prejudice, concluding that
the plaintiff’s claims involved the same parties and factual allegations
as her two prior actions. In a subsequent articulation, the court compared
the facts of the present case to those of the breach of contract action
and explained that its dismissal was based on the prior pending action
doctrine. The court also applied this court’s holding in Edgewood Village,
Inc. v. Housing Authority (54 Conn. App. 164), and concluded that it
could not afford meaningful relief to the plaintiff and that the action,
therefore, was moot because both of the plaintiff’s actions demanded
the same relief, which was available to her via the stipulated judgment
rendered in the ‘‘prior pending action.’’ On the plaintiff’s appeal to this
court, held:
1. The trial court deprived the plaintiff of procedural due process by sua
sponte dismissing her action without giving her notice and affording
her an opportunity to be heard with respect to the grounds on which
the court based its dismissal: the plaintiff was entitled to adequate notice
of the issues that the court intended to address at the pretrial conference,
and the court never gave the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on
any of the grounds that it raised sua sponte and on which it based its
dismissal of the action; moreover, a court does not have the right to
raise sua sponte the prior pending action rule when a moving party has
not done so and, accordingly, the court exceeded its authority by acting
sua sponte on those grounds as a basis to dismiss the action; furthermore,
once the court determined that the plaintiff’s action might be moot, it
was required to give the parties an opportunity to address the issue, so
that they could be heard on the matter, which the court failed to do.
2. The trial court incorrectly concluded that, pursuant to this court’s decision
in Edgewood Village, Inc., it could not afford the plaintiff any practical
relief and that her action was, therefore, moot: although the trial court’s
application of Edgewood Village, Inc., was premised on its determination
that the present action and the plaintiff’s prior breach of contract action
demanded the same relief, which the court concluded was available to
the plaintiff via her stipulated judgment in ‘‘her prior pending action,’’
namely, the breach of contract action, the breach of contract action
had already concluded in a stipulated judgment, and, as a result, there
was nothing pending before the court that would have rendered the
present action moot; moreover, both actions, although related to the
same underlying incident, did not involve identical allegations, and prac-
tical relief could be afforded to the plaintiff if she were to prevail on
her claims in the present action, so long as she could prove her damages
in connection therewith.
Submitted on brief November 14, 2023—officially released February 20, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dant’s alleged assault, and for other relief, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Meriden,
where the court, Riley, J., rendered judgment dismiss-
ing the action, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court; thereafter, the trial court, Riley, J., denied the
plaintiff’s motion to reargue and for reconsideration,
and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal. Reversed;
further proceedings.
Catherina Cameron, self-represented, filed a brief as
the appellant.
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Catherina
Cameron, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
dismissing, sua sponte, her action against the defen-
dant, Javier Santiago.1 On appeal, she claims that the
court deprived her of procedural due process by sua
sponte dismissing her action, with prejudice, without
giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the grounds on which the court based its
dismissal. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. In July, 2016, the plaintiff and the
defendant had a sexual encounter in a hotel room.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant did not comply
with the terms of her consent to that sexual encounter
because he did not wear a condom during the entirety
of the sexual encounter. In February, 2018, the plaintiff
filed a small claims action against the defendant seeking
$5000 for medical expenses and pain and suffering stem-
ming from the 2016 sexual encounter with the defen-
dant, alleging that, following the encounter, she experi-
enced anxiety and fear about becoming pregnant or
contracting a sexually transmitted disease. In the small
claims matter, the court rendered judgment for the
defendant after finding that the plaintiff had ‘‘failed to
prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence her claim
for medical expenses and pain and suffering from an
alleged sexual assault by the defendant.’’
Thereafter, in June, 2019, the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant in the Superior Court for
breach of contract. The complaint in the breach of con-
tract action, which detailed the same 2016 sexual
encounter, alleged that the defendant had failed to pay
the plaintiff certain sums of money pursuant to agree-
ments entered into by the parties. In November, 2021,
the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a stipulated
judgment in the breach of contract action, pursuant to
which the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff
$10,000 by November, 2024. The defendant has not yet
made any payment pursuant to that judgment.
In May, 2022, the plaintiff commenced the present
action, alleging that the defendant did not comply with
the terms of her consent to the 2016 sexual encounter
by failing to wear a condom during the entirety of the
sexual encounter. On March 3, 2023, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint alleging claims for assault, battery,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, recklessness, and negligence. On March 8, 2023,
the defendant filed an answer. A remote, on-the-record
pretrial conference was held on April 14, 2023, at which
only the plaintiff appeared and did so as a self-repre-
sented party. At the outset of the pretrial conference,
the court stated to the plaintiff that, before it would
hear from her, it wanted to review the history of the
case. It then proceeded to question the plaintiff several
times regarding whether the facts of the present case
involved the same circumstances concerning her 2016
sexual encounter with the defendant, to which she
replied, ‘‘[y]es.’’ It also questioned her regarding the
two prior actions she had brought related to the 2016
sexual encounter. The court then stated: ‘‘[U]nder the
law, you cannot continue to keep retrying a case, espe-
cially when you’ve already obtained a judgment, which
you did in this case.’’ Even though the plaintiff
responded that the defendant waived any defenses, the
court simply stated that the present action was brought
well beyond the statute of limitations and that it would
issue a written order on the matter. It then adjourned
the conference.
On April 17, 2023, the court issued a written order
dismissing the action sua sponte with prejudice. In the
order, the court noted that the plaintiff previously had
filed a small claims matter related to the 2016 sexual
encounter, which resulted in a judgment for the defen-
dant after a hearing. The court also noted the plaintiff’s
prior breach of contract action, which resulted in a
stipulated judgment, and stated: ‘‘The plaintiff now
brings this action again involving the same parties and
same factual allegations. A remote, on-the-record pre-
trial conference was held on April 14, 2023. The plaintiff
acknowledged . . . that the claim involves the same
parties and factual allegations of the two prior actions,
arising from an incident which occurred on July 3, 2016.
She stated she believes the defendant should be
defaulted and she should be allowed to proceed, despite
the matter having already gone to judgment in the
[breach of contract] case. The case is dismissed with
prejudice. The matter has already been adjudicated
through a final stipulated judgment and the present
action has been brought well past the statute of limita-
tions.’’ Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue
and for reconsideration, which the court denied, and
this amended appeal followed.2
On May 2, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for articu-
lation seeking an articulation and clarification of the
legal basis for the trial court’s dismissal of her action
with prejudice. On May 31, 2023, the court issued a
written articulation of its decision. In that articulation,
the court first compared the facts of the present case
to those of the prior breach of contract action and
explained that its dismissal was based on the prior
pending action doctrine.3 Specifically, the court stated:
‘‘In the present case, the content of the pleadings reveals
that both actions arise out of the same course of con-
duct. Therefore, in the present case and the prior pend-
ing action, the liabilities asserted are based entirely on
the same underlying facts. In each action, the plaintiff
seeks to adjudicate the same underlying rights; there-
fore, the actions are exactly the same. Accordingly,
because the present case and the prior pending action
are exactly the same . . . the court has no discretion
and must dismiss the present case under the prior pend-
ing action doctrine.’’4 Next, the court applied this court’s
holding in Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority,
54 Conn. App. 164, 166–68, 734 A.2d 589 (1999), to the
facts of the present case and concluded that it could
not afford meaningful relief to the plaintiff and that the
action, therefore, was moot. In particular, the court
stated that ‘‘both of the plaintiff’s actions here demand
the same relief, which is available to her via the stipu-
lated judgment entered in her prior pending action, and
the court cannot afford her any further relief than that
already pending.’’
I
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court deprived
her of procedural due process by dismissing her case,
sua sponte, without affording her with notice and an
opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the
court’s dismissal. We agree and conclude that, under
the circumstances of this case, the court’s sua sponte
dismissal of the action was improper.
We first set forth our standard of review and govern-
ing legal principles. ‘‘Whether a party was deprived of
his [or her] due process rights is a question of law to
which appellate courts grant plenary review. . . . The
core interests protected by procedural due process con-
cern the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. . . . Fundamental tenets
of due process require that all persons directly con-
cerned in the result of an adjudication be given reason-
able notice and opportunity to present their claims or
defenses. . . . It is the settled rule of this jurisdiction,
if indeed it may not be safely called an established
principle of general jurisprudence, that no court will
proceed to the adjudication of a matter involving con-
flicting rights and interests, until all persons directly
concerned in the event have been actually or construc-
tively notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and
given reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
. . . It is fundamental in proper judicial administration
that no matter shall be decided unless the parties have
fair notice that it will be presented in sufficient time to
prepare themselves upon the issue.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Houghtaling v.
Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 246, 279–
80, 248 A.3d 4 (2021); see also Coleman v. Bembridge,
207 Conn. App. 28, 45, 263 A.3d 403 (2021); Jackson v.
Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, 205 Conn. App. 189,
195–96, 257 A.3d 314 (2021).
Our Supreme Court has stated that, ‘‘[f]or more than
a century the central meaning of procedural due process
has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified. . . . It is
equally fundamental that the right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. . . . Due process,
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and cir-
cumstances. . . . Instead, due process is a flexible
principle that calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands. . . . [T]hese princi-
ples require that a [party] have . . . an effective oppor-
tunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses
and by presenting his [or her] own arguments and evi-
dence orally.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re DeLeon J., 290 Conn. 371, 378,
963 A.2d 53 (2009).
In the present case, the plaintiff was entitled to ade-
quate notice of the issues that the court intended to
address at the pretrial conference. The court, further-
more, never gave the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard
on any of the grounds that it raised sua sponte and on
which it based its dismissal of the action. Accordingly,
the court improperly considered and based its dismissal
of the action on issues that the plaintiff had no notice
would be addressed at the pretrial conference and with-
out giving the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to
and address the issues raised. The court’s sua sponte
dismissal of the action, therefore, violated the plaintiff’s
right to procedural due process and cannot stand. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, supra,
205 Conn. App. 194–98 (court violated plaintiffs’ rights
to due process when it granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss on ground that court raised sua sponte, as plain-
tiffs were not provided with notice and reasonable
opportunity to submit evidence on issue).
We also address the propriety of the court’s sua
sponte raising issues at the pretrial conference that had
not previously been raised by the parties. ‘‘[D]ue to the
adversarial nature of our judicial system, [t]he court’s
function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues
raised by the parties on the proof they have presented
and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on
motion of a party. . . . Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn.
App. 511, 528, 955 A.2d 667 (2008). Additionally, it is
axiomatic that parties should be afforded adequate
notice of the issues the court intend[s] to address . . . .
Id., 529. Thus, a trial court generally acts in excess of
its authority when it raises and considers, sua sponte,
issues not raised or briefed by the parties. See id. (con-
cluding that court improperly raised and decided issues
in its memorandum of decision of which parties were
not afforded adequate notice); see also Greene v. Keat-
ing, 156 Conn. App. 854, 861, 115 A.3d 512 (2015) (we
conclude, under the facts of this case, that the court
acted in excess of its authority when it raised and con-
sidered, sua sponte, a ground for summary judgment
not raised or briefed by the parties).’’ (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown-
stone Exploration & Discovery Park, LLC v. Borodkin,
220 Conn. App. 806, 819–20, 299 A.3d 1189 (2023).
An exception to the general rule that a court is limited
to adjudicating issues raised by the parties is that a
court may, sua sponte, raise an issue relating to its
subject matter jurisdiction, which ‘‘involves the author-
ity of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy
presented by the action before it.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Tirado v. Torrington, 179 Conn. App.
95, 100, 179 A.3d 258 (2018). As this court has stated
previously, ‘‘[t]he subject matter jurisdiction require-
ment may not be waived by any party, and also may
be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any
stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. In the present case, how-
ever, the tort statute of limitations in General Statutes
§ 52-577 and the prior pending action doctrine do not
implicate subject matter jurisdiction. See Orticelli v.
Powers, 197 Conn. 9, 16–17, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985) (stat-
ute of limitations in § 52-577 is procedural rather than
jurisdictional, which renders it subject to waiver; there-
fore, trial court erred in raising issue of statute of limita-
tions contained in § 52-577 sua sponte and applying it
to bar cause of action); Tirado v. Torrington, supra,
101 n.7 (‘‘[a]lthough subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, a court is limited in its ability to
raise, sua sponte, the issue of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction for a plaintiff’s failure to timely commence
an action, where the statute of limitations ‘is procedural
and personal rather than substantive or jurisdictional
and is thus subject to waiver’ ’’); see also Luongo Con-
struction & Development, LLC v. MacFarlane, 176
Conn. App. 272, 284, 170 A.3d 57 (prior pending action
doctrine ‘‘does not truly implicate subject matter juris-
diction’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 327 Conn. 988, 175 A.3d 562 (2017). Moreover,
this court has stated previously that a court ‘‘does not
have the right to raise, sua sponte, the prior pending
action rule when the moving party has not done so. To
do so would preclude the opposing party from any
opportunity to argue that the doctrine does not apply.’’
Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn. App. 174, 178, 579 A.2d 576
(1990). Accordingly, the court exceeded its authority
by acting sua sponte on those grounds as a basis to
dismiss the action. See Doe v. Flanigan, 201 Conn. App.
411, 434, 243 A.3d 333 (‘‘‘[a] trial court lacks authority
to render summary judgment on grounds not raised or
briefed by the parties that do not involve the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction’ ’’), cert. denied, 336 Conn.
901, 242 A.3d 711 (2020).
Furthermore, even though mootness implicates a
court’s subject matter jurisdiction and ‘‘can be raised
at any stage of the proceedings’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1, U.S.
Bank, National Assn. v. Catale, 213 Conn. App. 674,
694, 278 A.3d 1057, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 905, 282
A.3d 980 (2022); a court must still comply with the
requirements of due process and provide the parties
with notice that the issue is being raised and a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard thereon. Barros v. Barros,
309 Conn. 499, 507, 72 A.3d 367 (2013) (to satisfy proce-
dural due process, ‘‘[p]arties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see, e.g., Stamford Property Holdings,
LLC v. Jashari, 218 Conn. App. 179, 191 and n.10, 291
A.3d 117 (because this court raised mootness issue sua
sponte, parties were notified to be prepared to address
issue of whether appeal was moot at oral argument),
cert. denied, 347 Conn. 901, 296 A.3d 840 (2023); Taber
v. Taber, 210 Conn. App. 331, 336 n.3, 269 A.3d 963
(2022) (parties were given opportunity to file supple-
mental briefs on issue of whether portion of appeal was
moot when mootness issue was raised by this court
after oral argument); Kloiber v. Jellen, 207 Conn. App.
616, 620–21, 263 A.3d 952 (2021) (parties were given
opportunity to file supplemental briefs on issue of
standing that was raised by this court following oral
argument); see generally Blumberg Associates World-
wide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311
Conn. 123, 128, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (when reviewing
court raises issue that parties did not raise, parties must
be given opportunity to be heard on issue). Therefore,
once the court determined that the plaintiff’s action
might be moot, it was required to give the parties the
opportunity to address the issue, so that they could be
heard on the matter.
II
Although our conclusion that the plaintiff was denied
procedural due process is dispositive of this appeal, we
also address the plaintiff’s claim challenging the court’s
determination that, pursuant to this court’s decision in
Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, supra,
54 Conn. App. 166–68, it could not afford the plaintiff
any practical relief and that her action is moot, as this
issue concerns the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
and will likely arise on remand. ‘‘Mootness [is a thresh-
old issue that] implicates subject matter jurisdiction,
which imposes a duty on the [trial] court to dismiss a
case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to
the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We the
People of Connecticut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn. App.
576, 581, 92 A.3d 961 (2014). ‘‘Since mootness implicates
subject matter jurisdiction and raises a question of law,
our review . . . is plenary.’’ Drabik v. East Lyme, 97
Conn. App. 142, 145, 902 A.2d 727 (2006).
An overview of our decision in Edgewood Village,
Inc., is first necessary. In that case, the plaintiffs
appealed to this court from the trial court’s dismissal
of their action against the defendant, which was based
on the fact that ‘‘the plaintiffs’ summons did not contain
a proper return date or date for filing an appearance.’’
Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, supra,
54 Conn. App. 166. After the dismissal of their action,
the plaintiffs, this time using a proper summons, served
a second complaint, which was identical to the first
complaint. Id. On appeal, this court concluded: ‘‘In this
case, the plaintiffs have filed an identical lawsuit to the
one that was dismissed. Because both actions demand
the same relief, the legal redress that the plaintiffs seek
is available to them in their pending action. If this court
were to reverse the trial court’s dismissal and order
this case reinstated, the plaintiffs could not be afforded
any further relief than that which they [could] obtain
in the second case, which is pending in the trial court.
The relief that a court must be able to provide should
be ‘meaningful’ . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 167.
This court, therefore, dismissed the appeal as moot.
Id., 168.
In Edgewood Village, Inc., the central basis for our
determination that the appeal was moot was the fact
that the plaintiffs had brought another identical action
that sought identical relief and was pending in the trial
court. Id., 167. As a result, even if this court reversed
the judgment of dismissal in the first action in Edgewood
Village, Inc., the plaintiffs ‘‘could not be afforded any
further relief than that which they [could] obtain in the
second case, which [was] pending in the trial court.’’
Id. In the present case, the trial court’s application of
Edgewood Village, Inc., was premised on its determina-
tion that the present action and the plaintiff’s prior
breach of contract action both demand the same relief,
which the court concluded was available to the plaintiff
via her stipulated judgment in ‘‘her prior pending
action,’’ namely, the breach of contract action. The
court therefore concluded that it could not ‘‘afford her
any further relief than that already pending.’’ The plain-
tiff’s prior breach of contract action against the defen-
dant, however, already had concluded in a stipulated
judgment. As a result, there is nothing pending in the
trial court that would render the present action moot.
Moreover, both actions, although related to the same
underlying incident, do not involve identical allegations.
Practical relief could be afforded to the plaintiff if she
were to prevail on any of her claims in the present
action, so long as she can prove her damages in connec-
tion therewith and the defendant fails to plead and
prove a dispositive special defense. Accordingly, the
court’s finding of mootness was based on a misreading
of this court’s decision in Edgewood Village, Inc.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The defendant did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal.
As a result, on September 7, 2023, this court ordered ‘‘that the appeal shall
be considered on the basis of the appellant’s brief and, if applicable, the
appendix, the record, as defined by Practice Book [§] 60-4, and oral argument,
if not waived by the appellant or the court. Pursuant to Practice Book [§]
the plaintiff waived oral argument before this court.
2
We note that the plaintiff amended her appeal to include a challenge to
the trial court’s decision denying her motion to reargue and for reconsidera-
tion. The plaintiff, however, never filed supplemental briefing addressing
that decision, and her appellate brief is devoid of any argument relating to
the trial court’s decision denying her motion to reargue and for reconsidera-
tion. We, therefore, deem any claim relating thereto abandoned due to
inadequate briefing. See DeRose v. Jason Robert’s, Inc., 191 Conn. App. 781,
800, 216 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 934, 218 A.3d 593 (2019).
3
‘‘[T]he prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dismiss a second
case that raises issues currently pending before the court. The pendency
of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties, brought to
obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement.
It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the
second, and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious. This is a rule
of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits
are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction. . . . The policy behind the
doctrine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a burden on crowded
court dockets.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barbara v. Colonial
Surety Co., 221 Conn. App. 337, 351 n.13, 301 A.3d 535, cert. denied sub
nom. Colonial Surety Co. v. Phoenix Contracting Group, 348 Conn. 924,
304 A.3d 443 (2023). ‘‘In Salem Park, Inc. v. Salem, 149 Conn. 141, 176 A.2d
571 (1961), our Supreme Court overruled a plea in abatement made on the
ground that a prior action involved the same land and the same issues on
the basis that the judgment in the prior action had been rendered and had
not been set aside. Salem Park, Inc., espouses the principle that if a judgment
in a prior action has been rendered and has not been set aside on appeal,
there is no action pending within the meaning of the prior pending action
doctrine. . . . [Moreover] [o]nce a case has been withdrawn . . . there is
no action pending to implicate the prior pending action doctrine.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 710 Long Ridge Operating Co.
II, LLC v. Stebbins, 153 Conn. App. 288, 293 n.7, 101 A.3d 292 (2014).
4
Notably, the court did not specifically refer to the prior pending action
doctrine during the pretrial conference. Following our review of the tran-
script of the pretrial conference and the court’s written order, we conclude
that it is apparent from the court’s comments during the pretrial conference,
when compared to its written order, that the court was alluding to its belief
that the action had to be dismissed pursuant to the prior pending action
doctrine, although it did not use those words.