Bouchard v. Wheeler

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Bouchard v. Wheeler

CAITLYN BOUCHARD ET AL. v. CHEYANNE E.
WHEELER ET AL.
(AC 45627)
Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 38a-336 (e)), an underinsured motor vehicle is a motor
vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under
insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the
applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the
policy against which the claim is made.

The plaintiffs, who sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident, sought to
recover underinsured motorist benefits under an automobile insurance
policy issued to them by the defendant S Co. At the time of the accident,
the plaintiffs’ policy and the insurance policy of the defendant tortfeasors
each provided liability coverage of up to $100,000 per person and
$300,000 per accident. The tortfeasors’ insurer thereafter made payments
to the plaintiffs and to others injured in the accident that exhausted the
$300,000 per accident limit of the tortfeasors’ policy. After the plaintiffs
settled their claims with the tortfeasors and withdrew their action as
against them, S Co. moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because,
under our Supreme Court’s precedent, their underinsured motorist cov-
erage did not exceed the liability limits of the tortfeasors’ policy. The
plaintiffs contended that the tortfeasors’ vehicle was an underinsured
motor vehicle and that they were entitled to underinsured motorist
benefits because a legislative amendment (P.A. 14-20, § 1) to the underin-
sured motorist statute (§ 38a-336) had overruled that precedent. The
trial court denied S Co.’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the plaintiffs were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because
the total recovery they obtained from the tortfeasors was less than the
$300,000 per accident limit in the tortfeasors’ policy. The court reasoned
that P.A. 14-20 required that the proper comparison of the applicable
limits of the policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant must be between
the amount of liability insurance actually available to a plaintiff under
a tortfeasor’s policy, after other claimants under that policy are paid,
with the amount of a plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage. The
plaintiffs and S Co. then entered into a stipulation that reserved S Co.’s
right to appeal the propriety of the court’s denial of its motion for
summary judgment and in which they agreed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’
policy and the tortfeasors’ policy contained identical coverage limits
and that the $300,000 per accident limit of liability coverage in the
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Bouchard v. Wheeler
tortfeasors’ policy had been exhausted. The court then rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, from
which S Co. appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly
denied S Co.’s motion for summary judgment, as the tortfeasors’ vehicle
plainly was not an underinsured motor vehicle within the meaning of
that term in § 38a-336 (e) because their underinsured motorist coverage
was not less than, but identical to, the plaintiffs’ liability coverage:
although the language of § 38a-336, as amended by P.A. 14-20, was
ambiguous as applied to the facts of this case, this court determined
that the legislature, in P.A. 14-20, did not intend to alter the definition
of an underinsured motor vehicle in § 38a-336 (e) or to overrule the
precedent of our Supreme Court concerning that definition but, rather,
intended to clarify that an insurer may offset from its insured’s underin-
sured motorist coverage, pursuant to § 38a-336 and the applicable regula-
tion (§ 38a-336-4), only that amount their insured actually received from
the tortfeasor’s coverage for bodily injury; moreover, this court was
hard-pressed to conclude that the legislature intended to amend the
definition of an underinsured motor vehicle in § 38a-336 (e) and overrule
sub silentio a substantial body of our Supreme Court’s precedent per-
taining to that definition, as this court was required to presume that
the legislature was aware that the court repeatedly has held that the
application of § 38a-336 involves separate inquiries involving, first,
whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle is underinsured pursuant to § 38a-336
(e), which requires a comparison of the coverage limits contained in
the respective insurance policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant, and,
if so, the calculation of the amount, if any, to be paid to the claimant;
furthermore, the legislative history of P.A. 14-20 indicated that it was
enacted to preclude the practice condoned by this court in Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Lenda (34 Conn. App. 444) that an insurance carrier could offset
underinsured motorist benefits owed to its insured by all amounts paid
by or on behalf of the tortfeasor to the insured and others for bodily injury
and property damage; additionally, although the plaintiffs contended
that § 38a-336 is a remedial statute that must be construed liberally to
protect people injured by uninsured motorists, our Supreme Court has
expressly declined to apply that maxim to decide whether a vehicle met
the statutory definition of an underinsured motor vehicle.

Argued October 3, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the named
defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain, where Safeco Insurance Company was
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

cited in as a defendant; thereafter, the action was with-
drawn as against the named defendant et al.; subse-
quently, the court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial
referee, denied the motion for summary judgment filed
by the defendant Safeco Insurance Company; there-
after, the court, Morgan, J., rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs in accordance with the parties’ stipulation,
from which the defendant Safeco Insurance Company
appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Philip T. Newbury, Jr., for the appellant (defendant
Safeco Insurance Company).
James J. Walker, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

ELGO, J. This case concerns the proper application
of General Statutes § 38a-336, commonly known as the
underinsured motorist statute. See Tannone v. Amica
Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 665, 676, 189 A.3d 99 (2018).
The defendant Safeco Insurance Company1 appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accor-
dance with the stipulation that it entered into with the
plaintiffs Caitlyn Bouchard, Kayla Bouchard and Mada-
lyn Bouchard.2 On appeal, the defendant claims that
the court improperly concluded that the automobile in
question constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as
that term is used in § 38a-336. We agree and, accord-
ingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
1
Although Cheyanne E. Wheeler and Russell Wheeler also were named
as defendants, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint against them approxi-
mately seven months after this action commenced. We therefore refer to
Safeco Insurance Company as the defendant in this opinion.
2
Caitlyn Bouchard appeared before the court in both her individual capac-
ity and as parent and next friend of Kayla Bouchard and Madalyn Bouchard.
Although Caitlyn Bouchard also appeared on behalf of the plaintiff Tristan
Bouchard, as parent and next friend, Tristan Bouchard was not a party to
the stipulation and is not participating in this appeal.
For clarity, we refer to Caitlyn Bouchard, Kayla Bouchard and Madalyn
Bouchard individually by first name and collectively as the plaintiffs.
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The relevant facts are not in dispute. On February
16, 2018, Caitlyn was operating a vehicle insured by the
defendant on East Main Street in Thomaston. Among
her passengers were her daughters, Kayla and Madalyn.
At that time, Cheyanne E. Wheeler was operating a
vehicle owned by Russell Wheeler (Wheeler vehicle). As
she approached an intersection, Cheyanne E. Wheeler
negligently turned the Wheeler vehicle into Caitlyn’s
lane of traffic, causing a collision that injured the plain-
tiffs and other individuals.
The plaintiffs thereafter commenced the present
action, alleging negligence and recklessness on the part
of Cheyanne E. Wheeler, as well as family car doctrine
liability; see Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836
n.14, 836 A.2d 394 (2003); on the part of Russell Wheeler
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-182. In addition, the
plaintiffs alleged that, at all relevant times, the Wheeler
vehicle was an underinsured motor vehicle and that
they were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits
from the defendant, their insurer. After the plaintiffs
settled their claims with the tortfeasors’ insurer and
withdrew their action against Cheyanne E. Wheeler and
Russell Wheeler, the defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that ‘‘the plaintiffs are not
entitled to underinsured benefits [because their] under-
insured coverage is equal to the tortfeasor’s liability
coverage.’’
In its January 5, 2021 memorandum of decision, the
court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee,
acknowledged the precedent of our Supreme Court
holding that a motor vehicle is not underinsured where
the liability limits in the tortfeasor’s policy are equal to
or greater than the underinsured benefits in the claim-
ant’s policy. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property &
Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 87–91, 743 A.2d 156
(1999); Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
236 Conn. 299, 301, 673 A.2d 474 (1996); American
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, 213 Conn. 625, 632–33, 569
A.2d 1105 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds
by Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d
977 (1991). The court nevertheless concluded that a
2014 amendment to § 38a-336 (b) legislatively overruled
that Supreme Court precedent. Whereas the pertinent
inquiry under that precedent entailed comparison of
the applicable limits of the respective insurance policies
of the tortfeasor and the claimant, the trial court held
that, following passage of No. 14-20, § 1, of the 2014
Public Acts (P.A. 14-20), ‘‘the comparison must be
between the amount of liability insurance actually
available to the plaintiff under the tortfeasor’s liability
insurance policy, after other claimants under that policy
are paid, with the amount of the plaintiff’s underinsured
motorist coverage.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Because the
total recovery obtained by the plaintiffs was less than
the $300,000 per accident limit for coverage under the
automobile policy issued by the defendant (Bouchard
policy), the court concluded that they were entitled
to additional underinsured motorist benefits. For that
reason, the court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
The parties thereafter entered into a stipulated judg-
ment that reserved the defendant’s right to appeal the
propriety of the court’s denial of its motion for summary
judgment. That stipulation set forth the following addi-
tional facts. At the time of the accident, the Wheeler
vehicle was insured for automobile liability by State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Wheeler
policy). The Wheeler policy provided coverage of up
to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company subse-
quently made payments to the plaintiffs and other indi-
viduals injured in the accident, thereby exhausting the
$300,000 per accident limit of the Wheeler policy.3
3
The stipulated judgment indicates that State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company paid ‘‘$80,500 to settle the claim by Caitlyn,’’ ‘‘$60,000
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At all relevant times, the plaintiffs were insured under
the Bouchard policy. As the parties noted in their stipu-
lation, ‘‘the uninsured and underinsured motorist limits
of the [Bouchard] policy are $100,000 per person and
$300,000 per accident without conversion coverage
. . . .’’4 (Emphasis added.) It therefore is undisputed
that the Wheeler policy and the Bouchard policy contain
identical coverage limits.
By order dated June 27, 2022, the court rendered
judgment in accordance with the stipulation of the par-
ties. The defendant then commenced this timely appeal.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the
court correctly determined that the Wheeler vehicle
constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as that term
is used in § 38a-336. The proper construction of § 38a-
336 presents a question of law, over which our review is
to settle the claim by Kayla,’’ ‘‘$50,000 to settle the claim by Madalyn,’’ and
‘‘$109,500 to settle claims by additional injured persons who are not parties
to this agreement . . . .’’
4
In their operative complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Bouchard
policy ‘‘provided underinsured motorist conversion coverage.’’ They never-
theless agreed, in the stipulated judgment entered into with the defendant
and approved by the court, that the Bouchard policy did not provide conver-
sion coverage. The record before us contains a copy of the Bouchard policy,
which was appended as an exhibit to the defendant’s memorandum of law
in support of its motion for summary judgment. That exhibit confirms that
the Bouchard policy did not provide underinsured motorist conversion cov-
erage.
‘‘[C]onversion coverage is an option [that] is available for an additional
premium to consumers who wish to purchase it in lieu of standard underin-
sured motorist coverage under § 38a-336 [and] provides enhanced protection
to victims of underinsured motorists . . . . In contrast to traditional under-
insured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist conversion coverage is
not reduced by the amount of any payment received by or on behalf of the
tortfeasor or a third party. . . . As our Supreme Court succinctly explained,
conversion coverage . . . means that any [uninsured] motorist benefits [a
plaintiff] is entitled to from the defendant will not be reduced by the amount
recovered from the legally responsible parties.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russbach v. Yanez-Ventura,
213 Conn. App. 77, 103–104, 277 A.3d 874, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282
A.3d 465 (2022).
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

plenary. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty
Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. 84.
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sera-
monte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 83,
282 A.3d 1253 (2022). Pursuant to General Statutes § 1-
2z, ‘‘[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance,
be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and
its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining
such text and considering such relationship, the mean-
ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does
not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered.’’
I
In ascertaining the proper meaning of § 38a-336, we
do not write on a blank slate, but rather are guided by
our Supreme Court’s prior decisions construing that
statute. See Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Drown,
314 Conn. 161, 173, 101 A.3d 200 (2014); New England
Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 308
Conn. 180, 186, 61 A.3d 505 (2013). In American Motor-
ists Ins. Co. v. Gould, supra, 213 Conn. 625, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a tortfeasor’s
vehicle constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as
that term was used in General Statutes (Rev. to 1983)
§ 38-175c, the precursor to § 38a-336. The court first
noted that the statute contained an explicit definition
of the term ‘‘underinsured motor vehicle’’; id., 629; and
explained that § 38-175c ‘‘requires that the insured’s
uninsured motorist coverage limits be greater than
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the total liability limits for a [tortfeasor’s] vehicle before
it may be deemed underinsured.’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Id., 631. The court then continued: ‘‘[T]he legisla-
tive objective was simply to give an insured who is
injured in an accident the same resource he would have
had if the tortfeasor had carried liability insurance equal
to the amount of the insured’s uninsured motorist cover-
age. Where an underinsured motor vehicle is statutorily
defined as an insured motor vehicle with applicable
liability limits less in amount than the injured person’s
uninsured motorist’s limits, it is clear that the underin-
sured motorist coverage is not applicable if the insured
person’s uninsured motorist limits are equal to, or less
than, the tortfeasor’s liability limits.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 632.
Six years later, the Supreme Court was asked to over-
rule its decision in Gould. In Florestal v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236 Conn. 301, the court
declined to do so and expressly reaffirmed its holding
in Gould. The plaintiffs in Florestal argued that ‘‘a strict
construction of [the definition of ‘underinsured motor
vehicle’ set forth in] § 38a-336 (e) is inconsistent with
the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of our
uninsured and underinsured motorist statutes, which,
they assert, is to ensure ‘that automobile accident vic-
tims receive fair, just and reasonable compensation for
their injuries.’ ’’ Id., 305. The court acknowledged that
‘‘broadly stated . . . the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage is to protect the named insured and
other additional insureds from suffering an inade-
quately compensated injury caused by an accident with
an inadequately insured automobile.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. The court continued: ‘‘It does
not follow, however, that the legislature, in providing
for underinsured motorist coverage, necessarily
intended to guarantee that each and every accident
victim would be fully, or even adequately, compensated
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

for injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. . . .
[T]he legislative objective [in enacting § 38a-336] was
simply to give an insured who is injured in an acci-
dent the same resource he would have had if the tortfea-
sor had carried liability insurance equal to the amount
of the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 306.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that ‘‘the purpose
of underinsured motorist coverage is neither to guaran-
tee full compensation for a claimant’s injuries nor to
ensure that the claimant will be eligible to receive the
maximum payment available under any applicable pol-
icy. Indeed, underinsured motorist protection is not
intended to provide a greater recovery than would have
been available from the tortfeasor . . . .’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 310.
Notably, the tortfeasor’s automobile liability policy in
Florestal—like the Wheeler policy here—was exhausted
by payment to multiple claimants. Id., 301. For purposes
of determining whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle was an
underinsured motor vehicle under § 38a-336, our
Supreme Court held that this was a distinction without
a difference, stating: ‘‘The fact that [the tortfeasor’s]
liability coverage has . . . been exhausted because of
multiple claims does not change the effect of the statute
in activating uninsured motorist coverage only when the
liability insurance of the tortfeasor is less in amount.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 306.
The court further recognized that, ‘‘several years after
[its] decision in Gould, the legislature enacted the Auto-
mobile Insurance Reform Act; Public Acts 1993, No. 93-
297; which, among other things, requires any insurance
company licensed to sell automobile liability insurance
in this state to offer a type of underinsured motorist
coverage known as underinsured motorist conversion
coverage . . . . This option, which is available for an
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additional premium to consumers who wish to pur-
chase it in lieu of standard underinsured motorist
coverage under § 38a-336, provides enhanced protec-
tion to victims of underinsured motorists because, in
contrast to coverage under § 38a-336, it is activated
when the sum of all payments received by or on behalf
of the covered person from or on behalf of the tortfeasor
are less than the fair, just and reasonable damages of
the covered person. . . . By retaining the standard
option under § 38a-336 and providing for another, differ-
ent kind of underinsured motorist coverage . . . it is
apparent that the legislature chose to address the cover-
age issue raised in Gould not by overruling our holding
therein but, rather, by mandating the availability of a
more comprehensive, and more expensive, optional
form of underinsured motorist coverage.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 306–308.
In Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins.
Co., supra, 252 Conn. 84, the Supreme Court again
adhered to its earlier precedent, and Florestal in partic-
ular, stating that, ‘‘[i]n all of these cases, we reasoned
that the determination of whether there was underin-
sured motorist coverage available to the plaintiff was
to be determined by comparing the amount of liability
insurance potentially available to the plaintiff from the
tortfeasor with the amount of underinsured motorist
coverage potentially available to the plaintiff under his
or her underinsured motorist policy. These potential
availabilities were calculated, moreover, by comparing
the respective stated policy limits—liability and under-
insured motorist. That comparison is mandated by the
specific language of § 38a-336 (e) . . . . Furthermore,
this simple comparison—of potentially available liabil-
ity insurance with potentially available underinsured
motorist coverage—was to be done, we held, irrespec-
tive of whether the liability coverage had been fully or
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

partially exhausted by other claimants . . . .’’ Id., 87–
88.
The court also reiterated the proper analytical frame-
work that governs claims involving § 38a-336, stating:
‘‘Application of § 38a-336 involves two separate inquir-
ies. First, it must be determined whether the tortfeasor’s
vehicle is an ‘underinsured vehicle’ within the meaning
of the statute. Second, after this determination is made
and underinsured motorist coverage is found to be
applicable, the finder of fact calculates the amount of
the award to be paid the victim.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 84. As an intermediate appellate
tribunal, this court is bound by that precedent. See
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Under-
writers at Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn. App.
31, 48–49, 994 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 918,
996 A.2d 277 (2010).
II
With that context in mind, we turn to the statutory
language at issue. Section 38a-336 requires automobile
insurance policies in this state to include underinsured
motorist coverage, which pertains to bodily injuries
caused by owners and operators of underinsured motor
vehicles. Importantly, the statute contains a detailed
definition of that term. Section 38a-336 (e) provides:
‘‘For the purposes of this section, an ‘underinsured
motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle with respect to
which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily
injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable
at the time of the accident is less than the applicable
limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion
of the policy against which claim is made under subsec-
tion (b) of this section.’’5
5
The Bouchard policy contains a definition of an ‘‘underinsured motor
vehicle’’ that largely mirrors the statutory definition provided in § 38a-336
(e), stating: ‘‘ ‘Underinsured motor vehicle’ means a land motor vehicle or
trailer of any type for which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily
injury bonds or policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than
the limit of liability for this coverage.’’
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On appeal, the defendant claims that the plain lan-
guage of § 38a-336 (e) indicates that an automobile qual-
ifies as an ‘‘underinsured motor vehicle’’ only if the
claimant’s uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the lia-
bility limits of the tortfeasor’s policy, as our Supreme
Court repeatedly has held. See Doyle v. Metropolitan
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. 87–88;
Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236
Conn. 301; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, supra,
213 Conn. 632.
The plaintiffs, by contrast, submit that the enactment
of P.A. 14-20 served to amend not only § 38a-336 (b),
but also altered the definition of ‘‘underinsured motor
vehicle’’ contained in § 38a-336 (e). As amended by P.A.
14-20, § 38a-336 (b)—which pertains to underinsured
motorist coverage limits—provides in relevant part: ‘‘In
no event shall there be any reduction of uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage limits or benefits pay-
able . . . for amounts paid by or on behalf of any tort-
feasor for bodily injury to anyone other than individuals
insured under the policy against which the claim is
made, or [for] amounts paid by or on behalf of any
tortfeasor for property damage. . . .’’ In this regard, the
plaintiffs emphasize that the definition of ‘‘underinsured
motor vehicle’’ set forth in § 38a-336 (e) explicitly incor-
porates § 38a-336 (b) by reference.6 They thus argue
that, for purposes of the comparison mandated by § 38a-
336 (e), the applicable limits of liability under an under-
insured motorist policy that was in effect at the time
of the accident ‘‘means the amount of liability coverage
actually, not just potentially, available’’ to individuals
6
General Statutes § 38a-336 (e) provides: ‘‘For the purposes of this section,
an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle with respect to
which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds
and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than
the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the
policy against which claim is made under subsection (b) of this section.’’
(Emphasis added.)
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

insured under that policy pursuant to § 38a-336 (b).7
(Emphasis in original.)
Under our rules of statutory construction, ambiguity
arises whenever statutory language is subject to more
than one plausible interpretation. See, e.g., Redding v.
Georgetown Land Development Co., LLC, 337 Conn.
75, 84 n.9, 251 A.3d 980 (2020) (‘‘[o]ur case law is clear
that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at
issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpre-
tation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v.
Pond, 315 Conn. 451, 468, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015)
(‘‘[b]ecause the statutory language is subject to multi-
ple, plausible interpretations, and it does not expressly
address or resolve the certified question, [the language]
is facially ambiguous’’); Commissioner of Correction
v. Freedom of Information Commission, 307 Conn. 53,
68, 52 A.3d 636 (2012) (‘‘[b]ecause we believe that both
of these interpretations are plausible, we conclude that
the language [in question] is ambiguous’’). We conclude
that the statutory language in question is subject to
more than one plausible interpretation. For that reason,
§ 38a-336 is ambiguous as applied to the facts of this
case.8 Accordingly, resort to extratextual materials is
7
That construction was adopted by the trial court in the present case. In
its memorandum of decision, the court stated in relevant part: ‘‘[Section]
38a-336 . . . defines an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ as one with respect
to which the limits of liability coverage ‘applicable at the time of the accident’
is less than the applicable limits of the underinsured motorist coverage of
the policy under which claim is made ‘under subsection (b) of this section.’
Interpreting subsection (e) so that it is consistent with the statute as a
whole, including the amended subsection (b), as the court must . . . the
limits of liability coverage ‘applicable at the time of the accident’ must mean
the amount of liability coverage actually not just potentially available to
the plaintiff.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)
8
Multiple judges of the Superior Court have determined that § 38a-336 is
ambiguous in similar factual scenarios, necessitating consideration of the
legislative history of P.A. 14-20. See, e.g., Rasimas v. Kemper Independence
Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex
Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (December 16, 2021) (Ozalis,
J.) (reviewing P.A. 14-20 and its legislative history to ascertain ‘‘what portion
of the tortfeasor’s liability limits are ‘applicable’ to the plaintiff’s underin-
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warranted. See, e.g., State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn.
1, 17, 981 A.2d 427 (2009).
III
The parties agree that, prior to the enactment of P.A.
14-20, a motor vehicle was not deemed underinsured
pursuant to the definition set forth in § 38a-336 (e)
where the liability limits in the tortfeasor’s policy were
equal to or greater than the underinsured benefits in
the claimant’s policy. Their fundamental disagreement
concerns whether the legislature, in enacting P.A. 14-
20, intended to alter that definition of an ‘‘underinsured
motor vehicle.’’
The legislative history of P.A. 14-20 is illuminating in
this regard. On March 4, 2014, the Connecticut Trial
Lawyers Association (association) submitted a letter to
the legislature’s Insurance and Real Estate Committee
in support of what ultimately became P.A. 14-20. It
stated in relevant part: ‘‘Following last year’s legislative
session, a joint study group comprised of both members
of the [association] and the Insurance Association of
Connecticut . . . was formed under the auspices of
the Connecticut Department of Insurance. Senate Bill
number 280 is the product of that working committee.
The legislation was drafted, and is agreed to by both
the [association and the Insurance Association of Con-
necticut] . . . . Under the current state of the law, an
underinsured motorist carrier is entitled to reduce its
sured motorist claim’’ and concluding that, ‘‘[i]t is clear . . . after examining
the text of § 38a-336 (e), that the ‘applicable’ liability coverage in this context
is the amount actually available and paid to the insured, after other claimants
are paid’’); Ismail v. Sanchez, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 22, 2020) (Aurigemma, J.) (‘‘After
reviewing . . . the legislative history of P.A. 14-20, the court agrees with the
[defendant] that the public act did not change the definition of ‘underinsured
motorist’ [set forth in § 38a-336 (e)] but, rather, intended to clarify the law
concerning deduction to payments due to underinsured motorists. Since
the plaintiff and the tortfeasor had identical insurance coverage, the plaintiff
was not an underinsured motorist for purpose[s] of P.A. 14-20 . . . .’’).
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coverage for any payments made to the injured party
pursuant to the liability policy issued to the [tortfeasor].
The proposed bill does not seek to change this rule.
However, the Connecticut Appellate Court interpreted
this rule as allowing underinsured motorist carriers to
also claim a reduction for payments made to individuals
other than the claimant by the liability carrier for the
[tortfeasor]. Allstate [Ins. Co. v. Lenda, 34 Conn. App.
444, 642 A.2d 22, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 906, 648 A.2d
149 (1994), and cert. denied, 231 Conn. 906, 648 A.2d
149 (1994)]. A result of this ruling is that the claimant’s
uninsured motorist coverage can be reduced by pay-
ments they never received which were paid by the liabil-
ity carrier for the [tortfeasor] to other individuals,
totally unrelated to the claimant. . . . [This bill] seeks
to correct this inequity by disallowing any reduction in
underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage for amounts
paid by or on behalf of any tortfeasor for bodily injury
to anyone other than the individuals insured under the
policy against which the claim is being made. [It] further
prohibits any reductions for payments made by the
tortfeasor on behalf of property damage.’’ (Emphasis
added.) That letter was admitted into the record of the
hearing of the Insurance and Real Estate Committee
on March 4, 2014.

On that date, the president of the association, Mike
Walsh, testified before the Insurance and Real Estate
Committee and reiterated that ‘‘the purpose of this . . .
proposed legislation . . . is to essentially correct what
we perceived to be an inequity . . . that was created by
the Connecticut Appellate Court [in Lenda] that allowed
[underinsured motorist] carriers to reduce their cover-
age for payments made by the liability carrier.’’ Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real
Estate, Pt. 2, 2014 Sess., p. 489. Walsh was the only
person who testified before the committee on that bill,
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and the letter from the association was the only corre-
spondence entered into the record. That testimony and
documentation indicate that the bill that ultimately
became P.A. 14-20 was drafted not in response to the
precedent of our Supreme Court such as Gould, Flo-
restal and Doyle but, rather, in response to a decision
of this intermediate court decided in 1994—four years
after our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Gould
regarding the proper meaning of the term ‘‘underinsured
motor vehicle.’’ That Appellate Court decision, there-
fore, demands closer scrutiny.
In Lenda, the defendant was injured in a five car
collision caused solely by the negligence of Peter Sey-
mour, the tortfeasor. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lenda, supra,
34 Conn. App. 445. Seymour’s automobile insurance
policy provided a total of $100,000 in liability coverage,
which was exhausted through payments to the defen-
dant and four other injured individuals for both personal
injuries and property damage they sustained. Id., 445–46
and 446 n.3. The defendant was paid $73,071.51 as com-
pensation for personal injuries and $6987.45 for prop-
erty damage. Id., 446 n.3.
The defendant’s underinsured motorist policy in
effect at that time provided $100,000 in coverage. Under
the terms of that policy, the plaintiff insurer was ‘‘enti-
tled to reduce the amount of underinsured motorist
benefits payable to [the defendant] by all the amounts
paid by or on behalf of Seymour to all injured parties
both for personal injury and for property damages.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., 453. On appeal, the parties dis-
agreed as to ‘‘whether [that] reduction is allowed under
§ 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies.’’ Id. After examining the language of that regu-
lation, this court concluded that, ‘‘[u]nder the terms and
provisions of [the defendant’s underinsured motorist
policy], [the plaintiff] was entitled to reduce the amount
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owed to [the defendant] for underinsured motorist cov-
erage by all amounts paid by or on behalf of Seymour
to [the defendant] and to others . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) Id., 456. Although the defendant also argued
that ‘‘the limit of coverage should not be reduced by
the amounts paid for property damages,’’ this court
disagreed, stating: ‘‘From our review of the language
of the regulation, we conclude that the ‘damages’ for
which there may be a reduction of limits are not limited
to bodily injury. Therefore, under the language of the
regulation, damages paid for property damages as well
as damages paid for bodily injury may be deducted for
the purpose of reducing limits of coverage.’’ Id., 455.
The court thus concluded that ‘‘the language of § 38a-
334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
authorizes [the] type of policy provision’’ contained in
the defendant’s underinsured motorist policy. Id., 456.
In Lenda, this court was presented with a question
regarding the proper application of § 38a-334-6 of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Lenda did
not concern, and did not address, the proper construc-
tion of the term ‘‘underinsured motor vehicle.’’
The legislative history of the debate in the House of
Representatives demonstrates that the intent of P.A.
14-20 was to clarify the proper meaning of § 38a-334-6
of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies with
respect to offsets taken by underinsured motorist carri-
ers. As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘the statement
of the legislator who reported the bill out of committee
carries particular weight and deserves careful consider-
ation.’’ Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of
Review, 181 Conn. 1, 15 n.4, 434 A.2d 293 (1980). In
moving for acceptance of the Insurance and Real Estate
Committee’s favorable report and passage of the bill
that became P.A. 14-20, Representative Robert W.
Megna, the chairman of that committee, introduced the
bill by stating that ‘‘this is a bill that’s been around our
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committee for the last several years. . . . It has to do
with what we refer to as offsets when it comes to
uninsured and underinsured motorists claims. . . .
[T]he Department of Insurance had established regula-
tions talking about the application of that section of
the statute . . . and offsets. . . . We had several com-
plaints. The trial attorneys came in front of our commit-
tee and it . . . became apparent that . . . there was
. . . some wiggle room [in the regulations] and some
insurers may have been taking offsets greater than what
was really intended under the statute . . . . It was a
few insurance companies that were taking additional
offsets. And what this language represents is an agree-
ment between the industry and the trial attorneys on
how the correct application of that regulation put out
by the Department of Insurance should apply.’’ See 57
H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 2014 Sess., pp. 3714–15.
Shortly thereafter, Megna reiterated that the bill was
‘‘just really a clarification about the regulation that the
Department of Insurance had put out.’’ Id., pp. 3719–20.
Megna explained that, as a matter of practice under
§ 38a-336, ‘‘most carriers . . . would simply take an
offset for . . . what part of the coverage of the tortfea-
sor that was paid to . . . the insured. And [what] hap-
pened was when the Department of Insurance drafted
the regulation one . . . or more carriers had interpre-
ted it in such a way that they can take several offsets
for several individuals that were making claim[s] . . .
that were passengers of the car or were injured in some
manner. So essentially it’s really just clarifying . . . the
intent of the existing statute.’’ Id., p. 3720.
In his remarks, Representative Richard A. Smith
noted that ‘‘[t]his is an area of the law that I do practice
in so I’m interested in hearing the dialogue. I’m actually
happy to hear [that] this bill [is] being proposed. It’s
been an issue that we have dealt with . . . over the
past several years where the offsets have been reduced
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just based on the number of claimants disregarding who
actually received the money.’’ Id., p. 3732. The following
colloquy then ensued:
‘‘[Representative Smith]: But just so I’m sure and for
the colleagues out there who might be interested in
what [is] in this bill . . . if there is [a] $100,000 [under-
insured] policy and a tortfeasor policy of $20,000 how
much available coverage then would be available to the
insured? . . .
‘‘[Representative Megna]: . . . I believe $80,000.
. . .
‘‘[Representative Smith]: And thank you for that. And
then if there were several claimants against that
[$]20,000 policy which probably would be a $40,000
multiple claim policy. If [$]40,000 of that policy was
paid out to various parties and the insured . . . actu-
ally received $30,000 total, how much then would be
left pursuant to his underinsured policy? . . .
‘‘[Representative Megna]: . . . [H]is offset would be
the $30,000 . . . which would leave $70,000 collectible
under his [underinsured] policy . . . .
‘‘[Representative Smith]: . . . Thank you. And that’s
how I . . . came to the same answer and we’re not
using hard math here so . . . I’m trying to keep it sim-
ple. But the [$]70,000 that’s available now to the insured
because he received [$]30,000 from the tortfeasor, that
[$]70,000 under this bill would still be available regard-
less of how much else the tortfeasor’s insurance com-
pany paid out. As long as the insured received [$]30,000
then the only offset would be that [$]30,000. Just want
to be clear. . . .
‘‘[Representative Megna]: . . . [T]hat’s the way I
understand it. . . . [T]he intent would be for those car-
riers not to take an offset greater than that [$]30,000
hypothetical if there were somebody else in the vehicle
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that also collected from the tortfeasor’s policy. And
that’s really . . . the essence of the bill before us.’’ Id.,
pp. 3732–35.
Megna then explained that P.A. 14-20 ‘‘comes out of
a regulation that the Department of Insurance had [that
provided] wiggle room for those few carriers that took
other injured [parties’] offsets off of the insured’s limit
of liability. . . . [The carriers] got that ability . . .
through a department regulation . . . . But yes the
intent is to clarify the statute so to speak. . . . [B]ut
the argument [for this bill] seemed to have come out of
. . . the drafting of this regulation by the Department
of Insurance that had to do with offsets under that
section of the statute.’’ Id., p. 3736.
Shortly thereafter, another pertinent colloquy occurred
between Representatives Smith and Megna:
‘‘[Representative Smith]: . . . [L]adies and gentle-
men of the Chamber, this is a significant point so for
legislative intent purposes what I’m hearing [from] the
good Chairman is that . . . the intent of the current
legislation is that the offset should be only that amount
which the insured actually received. That was the intent
then, that is the intent now and that will be the intent
moving forward . . . . Is that fair to say? . . .
‘‘[Representative Megna]: . . . Absolutely. That is
the intent. . . . That is the intent of this bill. That’s the
intent of the legislation. . . .
‘‘[Representative Smith]: . . . I appreciate the Chair-
man’s confirmation of the intent of this statute, the
intent of the existing law . . . . The intent being that
offsets are only those amounts that the insured actually
received. That’s our current law. This bill just clarifies
that law.’’ Id., pp. 3743–45.
Furthermore, although the legislative history contains
several hypothetical scenarios that outline when such
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offsets properly may be taken, none involved the sce-
nario at issue here, in which the tortfeasor and the
claimant had identical coverage limits in their respec-
tive insurance policies. In every such hypothetical, the
claimant’s underinsured motorist coverage exceeded
the limits of tortfeasor’s liability coverage.9

The legislative history thus confirms that the intent
of P.A. 14-20 was to clarify the extent to which underin-
sured motorist carriers properly may take offsets pursu-
ant to § 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies and § 38a-336 (b). Indeed, the title of
P.A. 14-20 is ‘‘An Act Concerning Uninsured and Under-
insured Motorist Coverage Offsets.’’ See Peck v. Jacque-
min, 196 Conn. 53, 68 n.17, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) (‘‘[t]he
title and stated purpose of legislation are, while not
conclusive, valuable aids to construction’’).

We have carefully reviewed the legislative history
of P.A. 14-20. Nothing in it suggests that the General
Assembly intended to alter the definition of ‘‘underin-
sured motor vehicle’’ contained in § 38a-336 (e).10 If the
legislature wanted to amend that statutory definition,
it certainly knew how to do so. See Scholastic Book
Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 304
Conn. 204, 219, 38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it is a well settled princi-
ple of statutory construction that the legislature knows
how to convey its intent expressly’’), cert. denied, 568
U.S. 940, 133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). The
9
There was one instance in which Representative Megna began to refer-
ence a situation in which both the tortfeasor’s liability coverage and the
claimant’s underinsured motorist coverage were $100,000. Megna stopped
himself midsentence when he realized that, in such a scenario, ‘‘if [the
claimant] had [a] $100,000 limit it would cancel it out,’’ and then immediately
altered the hypothetical to one in which the claimant had a $200,000 limit.
57 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 3754, remarks of Representative Megna.
10
Although the legislative history is replete with references to underin-
sured motorist coverage, the term ‘‘underinsured motor vehicle’’ does not
appear once in that history.
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legislature nevertheless made no changes to § 38a-
336 (e).

We also are mindful that ‘‘[t]he legislature is presumed
to know the judicial interpretation placed upon a statute
. . . and [is] presumed . . . to be cognizant of judicial
decisions relevant to the subject matter of a statute
. . . and to know the state of existing relevant law
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Fernando A., supra, 294 Conn. 19;
see also Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn.
709, 722, 735 A.2d 306 (1999) (‘‘[t]he legislature is pre-
sumed to be aware of [our Supreme Court’s] deci-
sions’’). We therefore must presume that the legislature,
in enacting P.A. 14-20, was aware that our Supreme
Court repeatedly has held that the ‘‘[a]pplication of
§ 38a-336 involves two separate inquiries. First, it must
be determined whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle is an
‘underinsured vehicle’ within the meaning of the statute.
Second, after this determination is made and underin-
sured motorist coverage is found to be applicable, the
finder of fact calculates the amount of the award to be
paid the victim.’’ Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, supra, 220
Conn. 33; see also Doyle v. Metropolitan Property &
Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. 84. We also must
presume that the legislature was aware that our Supreme
Court consistently has held that the former inquiry
entails application of the definition of ‘‘underinsured
motor vehicle’’ set forth in § 38a-336 (e); see Doyle v.
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra,
87–88; Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
supra, 236 Conn. 301; American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Gould, supra, 213 Conn. 632; which requires a compari-
son of the coverage limits contained in the respective
insurance policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant.
In light of the foregoing, we are hard-pressed to con-
clude that the legislature intended to amend that critical
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statutory definition—and overrule that substantial body
of Supreme Court precedent—sub silentio.11
IV
We therefore conclude that the legislature, in enacting
P.A. 14-20, did not intend to alter the definition of an
‘‘underinsured motor vehicle’’ or to overrule the prece-
dent of our Supreme Court in Doyle v. Metropolitan
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. 79,
Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236
Conn. 299, and American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould,
supra, 213 Conn. 625, as the plaintiffs suggest. To the
contrary, our review of the legislative history reveals
that P.A. 14-20 was enacted in direct response to this
court’s decision in Lenda, which held that § 38a-334-6
of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies per-
mitted insurance carriers to offset underinsured motor-
ist benefits owed to an insured claimant ‘‘by all amounts
paid by or on behalf of [the tortfeasor] to [the insured
claimant] and to others for both bodily injury and prop-
erty damages.’’ (Emphasis added.) Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Lenda, supra, 34 Conn. App. 456. As the association
emphasized in its March 4, 2014 letter to the legislature’s
Insurance and Real Estate Committee, the bill that
became P.A. 14-20 was drafted ‘‘to correct this inequity
by disallowing any reduction in underinsured/uninsured
motorist coverage for amounts paid by or on behalf of
any tortfeasor for bodily injury to anyone other than
the individuals insured under the policy against which
11
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 313 Conn. 535, 569–72, 98 A.3d
808 (2014) (Espinosa, J., dissenting) (noting that our Supreme Court ‘‘consis-
tently [has] required clear evidence in the legislative record to support [the]
conclusion’’ that ‘‘a legislative amendment was intended to overrule our
prior decision construing a statute’’ and ‘‘that in the absence of clear and
unequivocal evidence of legislative intent to overrule one of our prior inter-
pretive decisions, that decision continues to control the meaning of the
relevant statutory provision’’); see id. (Espinosa, J., dissenting) (discussing
case law construing ‘‘clear evidence’’).
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the claim is being made. [It] further prohibits any reduc-
tions for payments made by the tortfeasor on behalf of
property damage.’’ Simply put, § 38a-336 (b), as
amended by P.A. 14-20, precludes the practice affirma-
tively condoned by this court in Lenda.
The plaintiffs nonetheless contend that, because our
Supreme Court has held that § 38a-336 is a remedial
statute, it must be construed liberally to protect people
injured by underinsured motorists. See, e.g., Tannone
v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 329 Conn. 673 (‘‘public
policy dictates that every insured is entitled to recover
for the damages he or she would have been able to
recover if the uninsured motorist [responsible for the
insured’s injury] had maintained a policy of liability
insurance’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); but see
Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 225 Conn. 566,
573, 624 A.2d 892 (1993) (‘‘underinsured motorist pro-
tection is not intended to provide a greater recovery
than would have been available from the tortfeasor’’).
In so doing, they overlook the fact that our Supreme
Court has expressly declined to apply that maxim of
liberal construction in the specific context now before
us. As the court explained: ‘‘[I]n other contexts we have
described our uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage statute as having a broad and remedial pur-
pose. . . . In none of those cases, however, did we
employ that description in order to decide whether a
vehicle met the statutory definition of an underinsured
motor vehicle. Furthermore, such a description cannot
override the purpose of the statute to put the injured
party in no better or worse a position than he would
have been in had the tortfeasor carried adequate insur-
ance. Thus, the description of the statute as remedial
cannot convert an adequately insured motor vehicle
into an underinsured motor vehicle.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis in original.) Doyle v. Metropolitan Prop-
erty & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. 88 n.5. That
logic applies equally here.
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There may well be cases in which an inequity results
from the application of the underinsured motorist laws
of this state when an accident involves multiple claim-
ants. As our Supreme Court aptly noted, ‘‘redress from
any such unfairness must be sought from the legislature,
not from the courts . . . .’’12 Florestal v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236 Conn. 310; see also
Dugas v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 217 Conn.
631, 647, 587 A.2d 415 (1991) (‘‘even if the plaintiff is
correct that this result [under the statute in question]
is anomalous, his remedy lies with the legislature or
the insurance commissioner, not with this court’’); Roy
v. Centennial Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 463, 476, 370 A.2d
1011 (1976) (‘‘[t]his court cannot . . . by a tortured
construction of the statutory . . . provisions, indi-
rectly eliminate possible inequities in coverage, where
the legislature has failed to do so directly’’). Principles
of judicial restraint constrain this court from adopting
a judicial construction of § 38a-336 that is not supported
by either the plain language of that statute or extratex-
tual sources.
In light of the foregoing, and applying the well estab-
lished precedent of our Supreme Court to the present
case, the Wheeler vehicle plainly is not an underinsured
motor vehicle as that term is used in § 38a-336. See
Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,
supra, 252 Conn. 87–88; Florestal v. Government
12
For example, Colorado previously defined an underinsured motor vehi-
cle in relevant part as a motor vehicle with liability coverage limits that
were less than the insured’s underinsured motorist limits or less than the
insured’s underinsured motorist limits after having been ‘‘[r]educed by pay-
ments to persons other than an insured in the accident . . . .’’ Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 10-4-609 (1995); see also Leetz v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 839 P.2d
511, 512–13 (Colo. App. 1992) (interpreting § 10-4-609 and concluding that
its reduction provision was not applicable to payments made to persons who
were insureds under underinsured motorist policy). In 2007, the Colorado
legislature amended § 10-4-609 and deleted that reduction provision. See
2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1921.
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Bouchard v. Wheeler

Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236 Conn. 301; American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, supra, 213 Conn. 632. The
tortfeasor’s liability coverage is not less than, but rather
is identical to, the plaintiffs’ underinsured motorist cov-
erage. See General Statutes § 38a-336 (e). For that rea-
son, the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment for the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.