State v. Leuders

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State v. Leuders

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HEIDI LEUDERS
(AC 45519)
Cradle, Prescott and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a bench trial, of criminal damage of a landlord’s prop-
erty in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming
that there was insufficient evidence that she intentionally damaged the
tangible property of the landlord, R, and that the trial court improperly
denied her motion to suppress evidence discovered following a war-
rantless entry into her residence and statements she made while in
police custody. The defendant had entered into a residential lease agree-
ment with R for a single family home. At that time, she was the vice
president of a dog rescue company and owned a dog behavioralist
company. R was aware of the defendant’s businesses and the lease
agreement allowed the defendant to keep dogs at the home. One night,
the defendant texted R, reporting that the heat to the home was not
working and asked R to send someone to repair it. The initial repair
person could not fix the heating problem. R asked if she could return
with another repair person and the defendant agreed but requested that
R not enter the upstairs portion of the home, claiming that the upstairs
would be locked and the dogs would be there. When R accompanied
another repair person to the home the next day, the doors were unlocked
and R went upstairs, observing large amounts of trash, damage to the
home, and drug paraphernalia. She called the police, but they did not
enter the house that day. She also contacted the defendant, who apolo-
gized for the condition of the home and promised to clean it up. R
sought permission to enter the house two days later during daylight
hours, and the defendant agreed. When R returned to the home, the
defendant was not present. R discovered piles of trash everywhere, as
well as accumulated feces and urine, and a cage with the skeletal remains
of a dog inside. She then left the house and called the police, who
arrived promptly to the home. Two police officers and an animal control
officer arrived and proceeded to enter the home to ensure no one needed
medical attention, because the smell of rotting flesh was emanating
from the house. During their time in the home, they found the skeletal
remains of five dogs, and, after exiting, they secured the home and
notified the detective bureau of the situation. The condition of R’s home
was so severe that it required a hazmat company to clean the house
due to the dogs’ remains having rotted in the home. Extensive repairs
to the home were required in order for it be habitable again, including,
inter alia, the replacement of floors, subfloors, counters, and all appli-
ances, due to the pervasive presence of feces and urine. An arrest
warrant was subsequently issued for the defendant for animal cruelty,
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State v. Leuders
and she turned herself in, where she was processed for booking by a
police detective, D. After being advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), the defendant made comments to D ques-
tioning whether she would go to jail or be permitted to own dogs in
the future. The defendant was ultimately charged with ten counts of
animal cruelty and a single count of criminal damage of a landlord’s
property. The defendant was acquitted of the charges of animal cruelty,
the trial court having found that the state failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime. The court noted that a
veterinary pathologist had testified that there was no way to determine
how the dogs had died due to their advanced state of decomposition
when brought to the laboratory. A detective testified that his investiga-
tion revealed that the remains had been in the home for between two
and ten months. As to the count of criminal damage to R’s property, the
court sentenced the defendant to five years of incarceration, execution
suspended after fifteen months, and probation for five years with special
conditions, which included that she not work with organizations that
involve animals and that she complete an animal cruelty prevention
program. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that there was insufficient
evidence that she intentionally damaged the home she was renting to
sustain her conviction for criminal damage of a landlord’s property in
violation of statute (§ 53a-117e), which required a finding of specific
intent: on the basis of the totality of the evidence the state produced
at trial, and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, the
trial court reasonably could have found that the defendant specifically
intended to damage R’s property and that the damage was not the
product of accident or neglect but, rather, was done with specific intent,
as the damage was pervasive and severe, due, in large part, to conditions
the defendant not only allowed to occur, but left to exist and fester for
extended periods of time, and that required the services of a hazmat
company to remediate, and it was permissible for the court to infer
that the defendant intended the natural consequences of these actions;
moreover, the defendant’s conduct with respect to the damage, first,
by attempting to prevent R from seeing it and, then, by acknowledging
the damage and expressing shame and remorse about causing it, demon-
strated her consciousness of guilt, which was also indicative of her
specific intent.
2. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
certain evidence obtained as the result of the alleged unlawful and
illegal entry into her home and statements she made to the police while
in custody:
a. The trial court did not improperly determine that the warrantless entry
into the defendant’s residence by the police after R returned to inspect
the home was supported by the emergency aid doctrine; although the
defendant claimed that there was no evidence of an emergency when
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State v. Leuders
the police entered the home or that whatever emergency had existed
had since passed, the court credited the testimony of R and the police
officers who entered the home, the police officers having testified that
they were concerned that an animal or a person, including the defendant,
might have needed immediate assistance inside, and, in light of the
circumstances, which included the open door to the home, R’s discovery
of several dog carcasses, the smell of rotting flesh emanating from the
home, uncertainty of the defendant’s whereabouts and lack of contact
with her, the presence of drug paraphernalia in the home, and evidence
of unclaimed packages and a mailbox overflowing with uncollected,
unopened mail, it was objectively reasonable for the police officers to
believe that an emergency existed when they entered the home.
b. This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that
the statements that she made to D while in police custody were not the
result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of her Miranda rights and
were not voluntary, the record having been inadequate for review of that
claim: defense counsel did not argue at the conclusion of the suppression
hearing that the defendant failed to knowingly and intelligently waive
her Miranda rights, instead, counsel argued that the court should sup-
press her statements because the searches that led to the defendant’s
arrest were illegal, and the defendant raised for the first time on appeal
claims that she was highly emotional, confused, and under the influence
of intoxicants, having just been released from a rehabilitation facility;
moreover, because defense counsel did not make these arguments to
the trial court, the court made no findings regarding waiver, but found
only that the defendant had been properly advised of her Miranda rights
and that the defendant ‘‘gave those statements anyway.’’
c. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the statements she
made to D were not voluntary: there was no evidence of any coercive
conduct by D, and the trial court properly credited D’s testimony, which
was the only testimony about the circumstances surrounding the defen-
dant’s statements, that she asked the defendant only basic demographic
questions, and, after the defendant had been advised of her Miranda
rights, the defendant initiated conversation of her own accord and made
her statements within that context, and, although the defendant appeared
to be tired and sometimes crying, D testified that the defendant did not
appear to be intoxicated by alcohol or drugs.
3. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court violated
her right to due process by relying on evidence related to the animal
cruelty charges in imposing its sentence without explicitly finding that
her conduct with respect to the deaths of the dogs had been proven by
a preponderance of evidence: although the court did not explicitly state
during sentencing that it found that the defendant’s conduct, with respect
to the deaths of the dogs, had been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, it was implicit from the court’s probation orders and its
observations that, even though the court had not found the evidence
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State v. Leuders
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the
animal cruelty charges, it did find that the defendant’s conduct with
respect to the deaths of the dogs had been proven by at least a preponder-
ance of the evidence; moreover, the evidence regarding the defendant’s
conduct underlying the acquitted charges had the required minimal
indicium of reliability, as many of the facts and circumstances related
to the charges of animal cruelty also bore on the offense of criminal
damage to a landlord’s property, including that there was overwhelming
evidence that the deceased dogs had been in the defendant’s care, that
they had perished two to ten months prior to being discovered in the
home from which she ran a dog rescue, and much of the damage to the
home, which the defendant was convicted of causing, resulted from the
toxins that emanated from the dog’s carcasses when they were left to
rot; furthermore, the court expressly considered the defendant’s actions
after the verdict, which included bragging on social media about how
she had been found innocent, which the court referenced during sentenc-
ing by emphasizing that the defendant had not been found innocent,
but was, instead, found not guilty.

Argued November 15, 2023—officially released May 28, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
ten counts of the crime of cruelty to animals and one
count of the crime of criminal damage of a landlord’s
property in the first degree, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, geographical
area number two, where the court, McShane, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, McShane,
J.; judgment of guilty of criminal damage of a landlord’s
property in the first degree, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was
Kevin M. Smith, for the appellant (defendant).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, and Felicia Valentino, deputy assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
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State v. Leuders

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Heidi Leuders,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
lowing a court trial, of criminal damage of a landlord’s
property in the first degree in violation of General Stat-
utes § 53a-117e.1 The defendant makes three claims on
appeal. First, the defendant claims that there was insuf-
ficient evidence that she intentionally damaged the tan-
gible property of her landlord, Celly Roberts (landlord).2
Second, she claims that the trial court improperly
denied her motion to suppress (a) evidence discovered
following a warrantless entry into her residence and
(b) statements she made to the police following her
arrest. Finally, she claims that, at her sentencing, the
court violated her federal and state constitutional rights
to due process by considering conduct related to the
crimes of which she was acquitted. We disagree with
each of the defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment
of conviction.
The following facts, which are either undisputed or
reasonably could have been found by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On
or about September 21, 2017, the defendant entered
into a residential lease agreement with the landlord for
a single family home at 37 Prince Street in Fairfield
(home). At that time, the defendant was the vice presi-
dent of Bully Breed Rescue, a dog rescue company, and
1
General Statutes § 53a-117e provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A tenant is
guilty of criminal damage of a landlord’s property in the first degree when,
having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he
intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises
in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars. . . .
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord’s property in the first degree is a class
D felony.’’
2
The defendant also argued in her appellate brief that the state presented
insufficient evidence to establish that the damage to her landlord’s property
exceeded $1500. The defendant’s counsel withdrew this claim during oral
argument before this court.
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she owned a dog behavioralist company. The landlord
was aware of the defendant’s involvement with dogs,
and the lease agreement allowed the defendant to keep
dogs, reptiles and a snake at the home. The landlord
knew that when the tenancy began on October 1, 2017,
the defendant would have four dogs living with her at
the home; she subsequently became aware that there
was a fifth dog living there, which the landlord ‘‘had
no problem with.’’
On Sunday, November 11, 2018, the defendant sent
a text message to the landlord, reporting that the heat
at the home was not working; she asked the landlord
to send someone to repair it. The landlord arranged for
an emergency plumber to visit the home that evening.
The plumber attempted to repair the problem but could
not. The defendant was home at that time.
The landlord spoke with the defendant on the tele-
phone later that evening and asked the defendant if she
could come to the home with a heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning (HVAC) repair person the following
day. The defendant agreed and told the landlord that she
would leave the exterior door unlocked. The defendant
also asked the landlord not to go into the upstairs por-
tion of the home. She said the door to the upstairs
would be locked and the dogs would be there. When
the landlord and the HVAC repair person went to the
home on the evening of November 12, 2018, the exterior
door was unlocked, and the interior doors to both the
basement and the upstairs were wide open, as well.
The home had an open floor plan, and the landlord was
able to see ‘‘all the way through’’ the open door to the
upstairs.
The landlord and the HVAC repair person went into
the basement when they arrived. There, they discovered
water damage that had probably occurred a couple of
months prior, and the HVAC repair person could not
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State v. Leuders

fix the heating problem. When they finished in the base-
ment, they went to the first floor level. The landlord
observed trash and ‘‘devastation’’ through the open door
to the upstairs. She also smelled something burning.
Concerned about a fire hazard, she walked into the
upstairs area and ‘‘unplugged the [electric] heater that
was sitting on a pile of trash, with the TV on and the
fan blowing.’’ She saw drugs and drug paraphernalia,
as well.
The landlord stayed in the upstairs area for only a
couple of minutes before she left and called the police,
reporting that there ‘‘were drugs and paraphernalia and
devastation in the house.’’ The police responded imme-
diately but did not enter the home that day.
The landlord also sent a text message to the defen-
dant. She testified that in that message she stated that
she was ‘‘devastated [by] the condition of [her] home,’’
she asked the defendant how she ‘‘could . . . have
done that,’’ and she asked the defendant about her drug
use. The landlord also told the defendant she would
return to the home on Wednesday, November 14, 2018,
to see it during the daylight hours.3 The landlord testi-
fied that the defendant responded to her text message
and stated she ‘‘felt terrible,’’ it was ‘‘just surface dam-
age,’’ she would clean up the home and ‘‘she was trying
to seek help’’ for her ‘‘problem.’’
When the landlord returned to the home on Novem-
ber 14, 2018, ‘‘[t]he house was completely open,’’ and
the defendant was not there. The landlord went inside
and observed ‘‘[a] lot of damage. A lot of trash. A lot
of unopened dog food. A lot of food containers, needles.
3
The lease agreement provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he Landlord shall
have the right to enter the Premises during normal working hours by provid-
ing at least twenty-four (24) hours notice in order for inspection, [to] make
necessary repairs, alterations, or improvements, to supply services as agreed
or for any reasonable purpose. . . .’’
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It was very hard to walk because . . . you couldn’t see
[the] floor.’’ When the landlord reached the front room,
she observed a cage with the skeletal remains of a dog
inside. She immediately left, went to a neighbor’s home,
told him what she had found, and they returned to the
home to walk through it together. They discovered more
dog carcasses and observed damage throughout the
home, including ‘‘a lot of teeth marks and scratches in
the downstairs bathroom . . . on the baseboards and
on the door.’’ They stayed inside for less than five
minutes because the ‘‘smell was so intense.’’
When the landlord left the home, she called the police
and reported what she had observed.4 Officers Ray-
mond Quiles and John McGrath and Animal Control
Officer Paul Miller, all of the Fairfield Police Depart-
ment, arrived within minutes. Officer Quiles testified
at trial that the house looked run down on the outside
and that there was a smell of rotting flesh coming from
within.5 After speaking with the landlord, the three offi-
cers entered the home ‘‘in case there was anybody in
need of assistance inside, or a dead body inside, or
anything like that.’’
The officers were inside the home for between five
and fifteen minutes. During that time, they found the
remains of five dogs.6 Officer Miller testified at trial that
the dogs were ‘‘decomposed almost totally so that they
had been there in that situation for a while.’’ The officers
also observed ‘‘garbage all over the floor’’ and ‘‘a lot of
filth.’’ They ‘‘established that there was nobody in need
of any aid inside, [so they] exited the residence and
4
The landlord reported that she found four dead dogs in the home. It
was determined later that there were five.
5
Officer Quiles testified that he had ‘‘responded to several calls where
there were dead bodies on scene. It’s a very memorable smell.’’
6
There were two dog carcasses on the first floor and three dog carcasses
on the second floor. Four of the carcasses were inside crates and the fifth
was uncrated.
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secured it . . . .’’ They then notified the detective
bureau of the Fairfield Police Department about the
situation.
Detective Kevin McKeon arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter and started an investigation. He and Detec-
tive Frederick Caruso applied for and secured a search
warrant for the property. Detective McKeon took photo-
graphs of the exterior and interior of the home and then
he and his colleagues searched for ‘‘deceased animals
or anything else that stood out.’’ Besides the five dog
carcasses, there was ‘‘tons of garbage, trash, dog feces.
Just piles of garbage’’ inside the home. There was also
a terrarium with the carcass of a dead lizard inside.
Several windows were open and there were multiple
air fresheners hanging on doorknobs.7
The officers tagged, separately bagged and removed
the remains of the five deceased dogs from the home
in accordance with police department protocol. The
remains were taken for testing at the Connecticut Veter-
inary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory the following day,
and the pathologic findings reflected in the November
16, 2018 final laboratory reports indicate that each dog
‘‘possibly died from lack of food/water.’’ Detective
McKeon’s investigation revealed that the remains had
been in the home for two to ten months.8
After gathering information and conducting inter-
views, Detective McKeon prepared a warrant for the
defendant’s arrest, which charged her with five counts
7
Several photographs taken by Detective McKeon were admitted into
evidence. Many depict large amounts of garbage and clutter strewn through-
out the home. The floors, countertops and furniture were covered with
all sorts of debris, including feces. One photograph shows piles of feces
completely covering several feet of the living room floor. Exterior photo-
graphs depict a front porch cluttered with boxes and unopened packages,
and a mailbox overflowing with unopened mail.
8
Herbert Van Kruiningen, a senior pathologist, testified at trial that when
he examined the dogs’ remains, they were ‘‘decomposed to an extreme
level’’ and that, based upon what was provided to the laboratory to examine,
there was no way to know for certain how the dogs died.
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State v. Leuders

of cruelty to animals in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 53-247 (b) (1),9 and one count of crimi-
nal damage of a landlord’s property in the first degree
in violation of § 53a-117e. On January 15, 2019, the
defendant turned herself in on the arrest warrant. The
defendant told Detective Kerry Dalling, who processed
her booking, that she ‘‘had just gotten out of a rehab
facility that day . . . . ’’ After reading the defendant
her Miranda10 rights and asking her basic demographic
questions, Detective Dalling did not question the defen-
dant.
The landlord had the damage to the home assessed
and was advised that she should first have a hazmat
company come in ‘‘because it was so toxic in there
because [the dogs] had decayed for [so] long.’’11 The
walls needed to be ‘‘flushed through with chemicals’’
before the home could be safely inhabited. In addition,
the kitchen cabinets, the countertops, and all the appli-
ances were ruined and needed to be replaced, and all
of the flooring and subflooring needed to be removed
and replaced because the floors had been saturated
with feces and urine. The lowest quote the landlord
received for hazmat services alone was $25,000. The
landlord did not have the funds to make the necessary
repairs and she ultimately lost the home to foreclosure.
On November 29, 2021, the state filed an amended
substitute information and charged the defendant with
five counts of cruelty to animals in violation of § 53-
9
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53-247 (b) provides in relevant part:
‘‘Any person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures,
wounds or kills an animal shall, (1) for a first offense, be guilty of a class
D felony . . . .’’
All references herein to § 53-247 are to the 2017 revision of the statute.
10
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
11
On November 16, 2018, a Fairfield Health Department inspector had
similarly advised the landlord to hire a ‘‘professional cleaner’’ because of
the unsanitary conditions.
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State v. Leuders

247 (b) (1), five counts of cruelty to animals in violation
of § 53-247 (a)12 and one count of criminal damage of
a landlord’s property in the first degree in violation of
§ 53-117e. This case was tried to the court, McShane,
J., and, on February 9, 2022, it returned its verdict. The
court found the defendant not guilty of the ten counts
of cruelty to animals and guilty of criminal damage
of a landlord’s property in the first degree.13 At the
conclusion of the May 4, 2022 sentencing hearing, the
court imposed a total effective sentence of five years
of imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen
months, and probation, with special conditions, for a
period of five years. This appeal followed. Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as neces-
sary.
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for crimi-
12
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53-247 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘[A]ny person who . . . tortures, deprives of necessary sustenance, muti-
lates or cruelly beats or kills or unjustifiably injures any animal, or who,
having impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such animal proper
care . . . or fails to supply any such animal with wholesome air, food and
water . . . or, having charge or custody of any animal, inflicts cruelty upon
it or fails to provide it with proper food, drink or . . . abandons it . . .
shall, for a first offense, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or
imprisoned not more than one year or both . . . .’’
13
Prior to returning its verdict, the court commented: ‘‘I think it’s important
to point out nobody in . . . any criminal trial . . . is ever found innocent.
There’s no such finding as innocent. . . . At trial, if the state proves all its
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict is guilty. If the state fails
to prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact finder
is obligated to come back with a verdict of not guilty.’’ It explained that
‘‘[t]o prove the first five counts of animal cruelty, the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did maliciously and intentionally’’
kill the dogs but that Dr. Herbert Van Kruiningen testified that he could not
tell how the dogs died. With respect to the second five counts of animal
cruelty, it explained that the state had the burden to prove that the defendant
deprived the dogs of necessary sustenance and stated: ‘‘It doesn’t matter
what I think. It doesn’t matter what I suspect. What matters is what the
state proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
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State v. Leuders

nal damage of a landlord’s property.14 Specifically, she
claims that there was insufficient evidence that she
intentionally damaged the home. She argues that the
evidence ‘‘does nothing to prove that the damage was
caused by anything other than accident or neglect.’’ In
response, the state argues that the photographic evi-
dence of, and testimonial evidence about, extensive
damage to the home, coupled with evidence that dem-
onstrated the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, amply
supports the conclusion that the defendant intentionally
damaged her landlord’s property. We agree with the
state.
We begin our analysis by setting forth our standard
of review and the relevant legal principles. ‘‘The stan-
dard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evi-
dence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we
apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
Second, we determine whether upon the facts so con-
strued and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom
the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded
that the cumulative force of the evidence established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘We also note that the [finder of fact] must find every
element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but]
each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those
conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the [finder
of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact
is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted to consider the
14
This is the third issue the defendant presents in her appellate brief. We
address this issue first because if she prevails on her sufficiency claim, the
defendant would be entitled to a directed judgment of acquittal and it would
not be necessary to address her other claims. See State v. Moore, 100 Conn.
App. 122, 126 n.2, 917 A.2d 564 (2007).
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State v. Leuders

fact proven and may consider it in combination with
other proven facts in determining whether the cumula-
tive effect of all the evidence proves the defendant
guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all
possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reason-
able doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of
innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [finder of fact], would have
resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict
of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thomas S., 222 Conn. App. 201, 211–12, 304 A.3d 513
(2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 943, 307 A.3d 909 (2024).
‘‘[I]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given specific testimony . . . and the trial
court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] rea-
sonably believes to be credible. . . . On appeal, we do
not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of wit-
nesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stilkey v.
Zembko, 200 Conn. App. 165, 178, 238 A.3d 78 (2020).
‘‘A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord’s
property in the first degree when, having no reasonable
ground to believe that [she] has a right to do so, [she]
intentionally damages the tangible property of the land-
lord of the premises in an amount exceeding one thou-
sand five hundred dollars . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 53a-117e (a). In State v. Goode, 208 Conn. App. 198,
262 A.3d 1028 (2021), this court addressed and rejected
a defendant’s claim that the state had not presented
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sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent
required to sustain his conviction for violating § 53a-
117e (a). In doing so, this court explained that ‘‘§ 53a-
117e (a) is a specific intent crime, because it requires,
inter alia, that a tenant intentionally damage a landlord’s
property in an amount exceeding $1500. . . . Intent is
a question of fact, the determination of which should
stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an
unreasonable one. . . . [T]he [trier of fact is] not
bound to accept as true the defendant’s claim of lack
of intent or his explanation of why he lacked intent.
. . . Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from the
defendant’s verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent
may also be inferred from the surrounding circum-
stances. . . . The use of inferences based on circum-
stantial evidence is necessary because direct evidence
of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available . . . .
Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence.
. . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a neces-
sary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended
the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 202–203. Applying these legal principles in Goode,
this court concluded that testimonial and photographic
evidence of substantial damage throughout the land-
lord’s property15 allowed the fact finder to reasonably
infer that the defendant had the specific intent to cause
the damage, as did evidence of the defendant’s con-
sciousness of guilt after he did so. Id., 203–204.
As in Goode, the testimonial and photographic evi-
dence here depicted substantial damage to the home.
15
This evidence included ‘‘holes in the sheetrock, shattered mirrored
closet doors, broken closet doors, burn marks on a butcher block kitchen
countertop, a damaged refrigerator, damage to vanities and kitchen cabinets,
a broken railing, garbage throughout the property, mold and water damage,
cracked and broken tile flooring, broken towel bars, damaged carpeting,
hardwood and trim, and animal feces in most of the rooms of the property.’’
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Goode, supra, 208 Conn. App. 203.
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See id., 203. The damage was extensive and so extreme
that the landlord was advised that to remediate it, she
would first need to employ a hazmat company to
address dangerously unsanitary conditions, which
included toxins from the remains of the five dogs that
had been left to decay in the home for two to ten
months, as well as the accumulated feces and urine.
The stench was so strong that it could be smelled from
the outside, making it difficult to stay inside for longer
than a few minutes, and the walls needed to be ‘‘flushed
through with chemicals’’ and sanitized before anyone
could safely live there again. The lowest quote the land-
lord received for these services was $25,000.
The physical damage to the home also included ‘‘teeth
marks and scratches’’ on baseboards and doors, and
water damage in the basement that had existed for
months. There was garbage and feces throughout the
home, which made it difficult to walk. In fact, there
were areas where piles of feces had accumulated and
were fully covering several feet of the floor. All the
flooring and subflooring had to be removed and
replaced because the floors had been saturated with
feces and urine, and the kitchen cabinets, the count-
ertops, and all the appliances were ruined and had to
be replaced.
In addition, the defendant’s conduct after damaging
her landlord’s property indicated her consciousness of
guilt. When the defendant had no choice but to allow
the landlord access to the home because the heat was
not working, she asked the landlord to stay out of the
upstairs area where the extent and severity of the dam-
age was most evident. When the landlord confronted
the defendant on November 12, 2018, by text message,
about the condition of the home, the defendant
acknowledged the damage, replied that she ‘‘felt terri-
ble’’ about it and told the landlord that she would clean it
up. When the landlord returned two days later, however,
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the defendant was not there, and the home had not
been cleaned. Several windows had been left open and
there were multiple air fresheners hanging on door-
knobs. When the defendant turned herself in on the
arrest warrant, she told Detective Dalling that ‘‘she
[couldn’t] believe she did this’’ and that ‘‘she was a
terrible person.’’
On the basis of this evidence, the court reasonably
could have inferred that the damage the defendant
caused to the home was not the product of accident
or neglect but, rather, was done with a specific intent.
See State v. Goode, supra, 208 Conn. App. 203–204. The
damage was pervasive and severe, due, in large part,
to conditions the defendant not only allowed to occur,
but left to exist and fester for extended periods of time.
It was permissible, therefore, for the court to infer that
the defendant intended the natural consequences of
these actions. See State v. Pjura, 200 Conn. App. 802,
808–809, 240 A.3d 772, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 977, 241
A.3d 131 (2020). Likewise, the defendant’s conduct with
respect to the damage, first by attempting to prevent
the landlord from seeing it, and then by acknowledging
the damage and expressing shame and remorse about
causing it, demonstrates her consciousness of guilt,
which is also indicative of her specific intent. See State
v. Goode, supra, 208 Conn. App. 204; see also State v.
Richards, 196 Conn. App. 387, 403, 229 A.3d 1157 (2020)
(fact finder may use consciousness of guilt evidence to
draw inference of intent to commit criminal offense),
aff’d, 339 Conn. 628, 261 A.3d 1165 (2021).
On the basis of the totality of the evidence the state
produced at trial, and the reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence, the court reasonably could have
found that the defendant specifically intended to dam-
age her landlord’s property. We therefore conclude that
the defendant’s sufficiency claim is without merit.
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II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
denied her motion to suppress certain evidence
obtained as a result of ‘‘an unlawful and illegal entry
and search’’ of her home and the statements she made
to the police while in their custody. Specifically, she
argues that the court improperly (1) determined that
the November 14, 2018 warrantless entry into her home
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine, which
is an exception to the warrant requirement16 and (2)
admitted into evidence at trial statements she made
while in police custody because she had not knowingly
and intelligently waived her Miranda rights17 and
16
In her appellate brief, the defendant refers to ‘‘four illegal searches,’’
three of which allegedly were conducted by the landlord prior to the entry
by the police on November 14, 2018, and she claims that ‘‘[t]he three initial
searches by [the landlord], and subsequent searches by law enforcement,
were conducted in violation of the fourth amendment and unjustifiable
under the emergency doctrine.’’ It is well settled, however, that ‘‘[f]ourth
amendment constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures apply . . . only to governmental action and do not apply to action
by private citizens acting in their private capacity. . . . [A] wrongful search
or seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the [f]ourth [a]mend-
ment and . . . such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government
of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully. . . . An exception,
however, to the general rule that the fourth amendment does not protect
against searches by private persons is that the fourth amendment may be
invoked where a private person, in light of all circumstances of the case,
is acting as the agent or instrument of the state.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 40 Conn. App. 789, 792–93, 673
A.2d 1149, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 915, 675 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
873, 117 S. Ct. 191, 136 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1996).
There is no dispute that the landlord was a private citizen. Moreover, the
trial court found that the landlord was not being used as an agent of the
police when she entered the home on the occasions preceding the entry by
the police, and the defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal. We
conclude, therefore, that the fourth amendment does not apply to the entries
by the landlord, and we confine our review of this argument to the single
warrantless entry by the police on November 14, 2018.
17
Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prior to a custodial interrogation a criminal suspect
must ‘‘be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’’
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because the statements were not voluntary. We disagree
with both of the defendant’s arguments and therefore
reject this claim.
The following procedural history is relevant to the
defendant’s claims. On November 2, 2021, the defendant
filed a motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss all
charges. Therein, she claimed that ‘‘any and all’’ evi-
dence seized or related to ‘‘an unlawful and illegal entry
and search’’18 of her home on November 14, 2018, and
statements she made while in police custody ‘‘upon
being subject to questioning without being informed of
her rights pursuant to Miranda,’’ should be suppressed.
Prior to the start of trial, the court held a hearing on
the defendant’s motion to suppress. The landlord and
six members of the Fairfield Police Department testified
at the hearing and four exhibits were admitted into
evidence. The following evidence was adduced.
The landlord and the defendant exchanged several
text messages on November 11, 2018, because the heat
in the home had not been working for at least two days.
The landlord was concerned that the defendant had
been living in the home without heat and the defendant
responded that ‘‘it wasn’t that cold in there. Until today.’’
The defendant met with a plumber at the home that
evening, but he could not fix the problem. On November
12, 2018, the defendant sent the landlord a text message
advising that she left the side door unlocked and that
the ‘‘[HVAC repair person] can go in the basement. Just
tell him not to go upstairs, I have a dog loose.’’ The
landlord knew the defendant ran a dog rescue from
the home.
When the landlord went with the HVAC repair person
to the home on November 12, 2018, there was garbage
18
The defendant relied upon her right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 7, 8 and
9, of the Connecticut constitution in support of this claim.
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everywhere and her property was ‘‘destroyed.’’ She tes-
tified that ‘‘[i]t was so disgusting [inside], the smell
alone you couldn’t even be in there for more than two
minutes.’’ She called the police, and Officer Michael
Komm responded, but he did not enter the home. The
landlord also sent the defendant a text message indicat-
ing that she would return to the home on November
14, 2018, and the defendant agreed. The door was open
when the landlord arrived on November 14, and, shortly
after she entered the home, she found the remains of
a dog. She left, returned with a neighbor and together
they discovered four additional dog carcasses. The land-
lord called the police.
Officer Quiles was first to respond to the landlord’s
November 14, 2018 call, and he met with the landlord
when he arrived. She told him there was an extreme
amount of garbage, filth, drug paraphernalia, and a few
dog carcasses inside. The defendant was not present
and, according to Officer Quiles’ report, the landlord
told him that the defendant had not been staying at the
home for one week. He knew the landlord and the
defendant had been in recent contact, and that the
defendant would not tell the landlord where she was
staying.19
Officer Quiles described the ‘‘smell of rotting flesh
coming from within the building’’ and testified that that
is why they entered the home. They also knew there
were dead dogs inside the home which, according to
Officer Miller’s testimony, indicated that ‘‘something is
wrong, [and that] you have to look at what else is wrong
. . . .’’ Officer Quiles testified that they went in to
‘‘make sure that there was nobody inside who is either
19
The landlord testified that the defendant had been living at the home
at least until November 12, 2018, and that the defendant mentioned that
she was at a hotel at some point after that. The landlord also testified that
she had been speaking with the defendant on November 11 and 12, 2018,
and the defendant stopped responding at some point after that.
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dying [or] dead . . . .’’ Officer McGrath testified that
they went in to check for ‘‘anyone in need of medical
assistance . . . .’’ Officer Miller testified that they were
‘‘going . . . to make sure that there were no injured
or suffering animals.’’ Officer Quiles waited to enter
the home until Officers McGrath and Miller arrived
‘‘because we knew that there were several dogs within
the residence. We didn’t know if there would be more.
[Officer Miller is] better trained . . . to handle it.’’ They
were inside the home for less than fifteen minutes, they
did not take any pictures, nor did they search for or seize
anything. Once they ‘‘established that the residence was
not occupied, [they] left, secured it, and notified super-
visors to contact the detective bureau.’’ Detectives were
able to obtain a search warrant for the home and subse-
quently obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant.

Detective Dalling processed the defendant when she
turned herself in on the arrest warrant. She read the
defendant her Miranda rights, the defendant acknowl-
edged that she understood them and signed a ‘‘notice
of rights’’ that identifies the rights and confirms that
‘‘I have been advised of my rights.’’ Detective Dalling
testified that the defendant looked tired and was crying
at times but that she did not appear to be intoxicated
by alcohol or drugs. Besides asking the defendant ‘‘basic
standard prisoner questioning [about] demographics,’’
Detective Dalling did not question the defendant, but
the defendant made statements to her. Detective Dalling
testified that ‘‘[the defendant] stated something to the
effect of, I don’t want to say anything that can be used
against me, but I can’t believe I did this.’’ Detective
Dalling recalled that ‘‘[s]he said that she was a horrible
person. She can’t believe that she did this. She asked
me a couple of questions about whether I thought she
would go to jail. She asked me if I thought she’d ever
be able to own dogs again.’’
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally
denied the defendant’s motion. It found the testimony
of the landlord and the officers credible and stated
that the officers’ testimony that they entered the home
‘‘because . . . there was a clear smell of rotten flesh
from within’’ was ‘‘sincere.’’ The court also found that
the officers ‘‘were in[side the home] for less than fifteen
minutes,’’ that no evidence was seized, no pictures were
taken and no field tests of any items were performed
during that time. It concluded that ‘‘the search [was]
lawful . . . .’’
With respect to the defendant’s statements, the court
recounted that defense counsel had ‘‘solely argued’’ that
the search was unlawful and that, because of that, the
defendant’s statements should ‘‘be suppressed as well.’’
It found that, ‘‘[s]ince I find that the search is lawful,
I also find that the statement is . . . admissible.’’ The
court also found that there had been a ‘‘proper advise-
ment of rights in a custodial situation and that the
defendant was advised and gave those statements any-
way. I don’t have to go into whether or not . . . the
statements were in response to any of the questions,
but . . . it certainly seems that these were almost vol-
unteered.’’20
We begin by setting forth our standard of review of
a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection
with a motion to suppress. ‘‘As a general matter, the
standard of review for a motion to suppress is well
settled. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it
is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and plead-
ings in the whole record. . . . [W]hen a question of
fact is essential to the outcome of a particular legal
determination that implicates a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights, [however] and the credibility of witnesses
20
The court previously had stated that ‘‘the statements made by the defen-
dant, I’m not quite sure, were in response to any particular questions the
officer was asking and I find the statements are admissible.’’
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is not the primary issue, our customary deference to the
trial court’s factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous
examination of the record to ascertain that the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the
court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we
must determine whether they are legally and logically
correct and whether they find support in the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Sayles, 202 Conn. App.
736, 745–46, 246 A.3d 1010 (2021), aff’d, 348 Conn. 669,
310 A.3d 929 (2024). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is by now well
settled that, in order to determine whether the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights have been infringed, [w]e
review the record in its entirety and are not limited to
the evidence before the trial court at the time the ruling
was made on the motion to suppress.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631,
687 n.28, 262 A.3d 44 (2021), cert. denied, U.S. ,
142 S. Ct. 873, 211 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2022).
We now address the defendant’s two challenges to
the court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
A
The defendant first argues that the court improperly
determined that the warrantless entry into her resi-
dence by the police on November 14, 2018, was sup-
ported by the emergency aid doctrine. She avers that
the court’s legal conclusions were not logically and
legally correct because ‘‘there was no evidence of any
emergency’’ when the police entered her residence and
‘‘whatever emergency may have once existed had
passed.’’ Although she acknowledges that the court
found that the officers and the landlord testified credi-
bly, she argues that crediting their testimony did ‘‘not
produce any valid reasons . . . to believe [that] an
emergency existed . . . .’’ As such, she claims that the
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search violated her fourth amendment rights under the
United States constitution.21 The state responds that the
‘‘facts found by the trial court support the . . . conclu-
sion that a reasonable officer would have believed that
an emergency may have existed inside the defendant’s
home’’ and that, consequently, the warrantless entry
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. We
agree with the state.
The fourth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion provides that ‘‘[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.’’ U.S. Const., amend. IV.
‘‘[A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon
probable cause is per se unreasonable . . . subject
only to a few specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609,
617, 626 A.2d 273 (1993). The emergency aid doctrine
is one such exception. State v. Curet, 346 Conn. 306,
321, 289 A.3d 176 (2023).
‘‘[T]he emergency [aid] exception to the warrant
requirement allows [the] police to enter a home without
a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured
or imminently threatened with such injury. . . . The
need to protect or preserve life or [to] avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency. . . . As a result, the
21
Although the defendant cites article first, § 7, of the constitution of
Connecticut in her brief, she has abandoned any separate state claim under
our state constitution by failing to include a separate state constitutional
analysis. See State v. Ebron, 219 Conn. App. 228, 247 n.8, 295 A.3d 112, cert.
denied, 347 Conn. 902, 296 A.3d 840 (2023).
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use of the emergency [aid] doctrine evolves outside the
context of a criminal investigation and does not involve
probable cause as a prerequisite for the making of an
arrest or the search for and seizure of evidence. . . .
Nevertheless, the emergency [aid] doctrine does not
give the state an unrestricted invitation to enter the
home. [G]iven the rationale for this very limited excep-
tion, the state actors making the search must have rea-
son to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy
and that the intrusion is reasonably necessary to allevi-
ate the threat. . . . The police, in order to avail them-
selves of this exception, must have valid reasons for
the belief that an emergency exists, a belief that must
be grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective
feelings . . . . It is an objective and not a subjective
test. The test is not whether the officers actually
believed that an emergency existed, but whether a rea-
sonable officer would have believed that such an emer-
gency existed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 321–22; see also State v. DeMarco,
311 Conn. 510, 535, 88 A.3d 491 (2014) (stating that
‘‘test for the application of the [emergency aid] doctrine
is objective . . . and looks to the totality of the circum-
stances’’).

The ‘‘emergency aid doctrine has its roots in the
police’s caretaking function, as opposed to its law
enforcement function . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Curet, supra, 346 Conn. 323–24.
‘‘The extent of the search is limited, involving a prompt
warrantless search of the area . . . [that] is strictly
circumscribed by the emergency which serves to justify
it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 618. It is the state’s burden to
demonstrate that a warrantless entry falls within the
emergency aid doctrine exception. State v. Curet,
supra, 322–23.
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‘‘[I]n reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the emergency
[aid] doctrine, subordinate factual findings will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous and the trial court’s
legal conclusion regarding the applicability of the emer-
gency doctrine in light of these facts will be reviewed
de novo. . . . Conclusions drawn from [the] underly-
ing facts must be legal and logical. . . . We must deter-
mine, therefore, whether, on the basis of the facts found
by the trial court, the court properly concluded that it
was objectively reasonable for the police to believe that
an emergency situation existed when they entered [the
home].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
DeMarco, supra, 311 Conn. 518–19. In doing so, ‘‘[w]e
must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the credi-
bility of the witnesses . . . . ’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 520.
Significantly, the court credited the testimony of the
landlord and the officers who entered the home. Each
officer testified that he was concerned that there might
be a person and/or animal in need of immediate assis-
tance inside.22 See id. Moreover, their shared concerns
about there being an emergency inside the home were
objectively reasonable given the circumstances.
In addition to the smell of rotting flesh coming from
the home, there was evidence that the defendant’s
whereabouts was unknown and that, although she had
been living in the home and communicating with the
landlord a few days before November 14, 2018, she
had stopped responding. Moreover, photographs of the
22
We are not aware of any Connecticut case that has applied the emergency
aid doctrine to animal life. Although we need not decide whether the doctrine
extends to animals in this case given the evidence that the police officers
were concerned about both human and animal life when they entered the
home, we note that courts in other jurisdictions have done so. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 752, 7 N.E.3d 469 (stating that
‘‘permitting warrantless searches to protect nonhuman animal life fits coher-
ently within the existing emergency aid exception to the warrant require-
ment’’), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 891, 135 S. Ct. 224, 190 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2014).
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home’s exterior depict unclaimed packages and a mail-
box overflowing with uncollected, unopened mail.
These factors, coupled with the evidence that the land-
lord had seen drugs and drug paraphernalia inside the
home, support a reasonable belief that the defendant,
herself, may have been inside and in need of assistance.
See id., 540 (‘‘putrid, overwhelming odor’’ in connection
with other facts, including mail that was ‘‘piling up,’’
justified warrantless entry into home under emergency
aid doctrine). Moreover, the fact that the door was
open on November 14, 2018, when the landlord arrived
suggests that someone other than the defendant could
have entered the home, was inside and needed assis-
tance.
The defendant claims that the fact that there is no
evidence that the landlord ‘‘mentioned any signs that
anyone else, or any other animal, was in the [defen-
dant’s] home or in any sort of danger’’ should have
deterred the police from entry and argues that ‘‘[a]ll
signs available pointed to a static situation where what-
ever emergency may have existed in the past was no
longer active by the time the police arrived . . . .’’
‘‘The reasonable belief standard is a less exacting
standard than probable cause . . . and must be applied
by reference to the circumstances then confronting the
officer, including the need for prompt assessment of
sometimes ambiguous information concerning poten-
tially serious consequences. As one court usefully put
it, the question is whether the officers would have been
derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Curet, supra, 346 Conn. 330–31. When
Officer Quiles met with the landlord, she was distressed
and visibly upset after finding several dead dogs and
extensive damage to the home. Given the circumstances
they encountered, it would not have been reasonable
for the officers to believe that no emergency existed
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simply because the landlord, a lay person in a distressed
state, did not ‘‘mention any signs’’ that there was some
person or animal who needed assistance.
Also, the landlord had alerted the police officers
about several dead dogs inside the home. As Officer
Miller testified, this indicates that ‘‘something is wrong,
[and that] you have to look at what else is wrong . . . .’’
The knowledge that some dogs were already dead inside
does not foreclose the possibility that there may have
been other living dogs or their human caretakers inside
the home, as the defendant suggests. See Tamborino
v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 3d 919, 921–23, 719 P.2d 242,
226 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1986) (officer responding to robbery
at which injury was reported could, upon finding one
injured person, look elsewhere in apartment to deter-
mine presence of other victims). Under the totality of
the circumstances that confronted the officers on
November 14, 2018, it was objectively reasonable for
them to believe that an emergency existed when they
entered the home and the court properly concluded
that their warrantless entry was lawful under the emer-
gency aid doctrine.
B
The defendant next argues that the court should not
have admitted into evidence statements that she made
to Detective Dalling because (1) they ‘‘were not the
result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of her
Miranda rights’’ and (2) because they were not volun-
tary. In response, the state contends that (1) because
the defendant has raised the waiver argument for the
first time on appeal, it is not properly preserved, and
(2) the court properly concluded that the defendant’s
statements to Detective Dalling were made voluntarily
and not in response to an interrogation or questioning.
We agree with the state.
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1
First, the defendant argues that she preserved her
claim that she did not knowingly or intelligently waive
her Miranda rights because she ‘‘moved in limine to
suppress’’ her statements and that, ‘‘despite clear evi-
dence that [the defendant] . . . who [Detective] Dal-
ling testified had just been released from a drug rehab
. . . had not made a knowing waiver of her right to
remain silent,’’ the court denied her motion. ‘‘It is well
known that this court is not bound to consider a claim
unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subse-
quent to the trial. . . . The requirement that [a] claim
be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as
to bring to the attention of the court the precise matter
on which its decision is being asked. . . . [It must] alert
the trial court to the specific deficiency now claimed
on appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roberts, 224
Conn. App. 471, 490, A.3d (2024). The defendant
argued in her motion to suppress that she had not been
informed of her Miranda rights, not that she failed to
knowingly and intelligently waive them. Defense coun-
sel also did not argue at the conclusion of the suppres-
sion hearing that she failed to knowingly and intelli-
gently waive her Miranda rights. Rather, counsel
argued at that time that the court should suppress her
statements because the searches that led to the defen-
dant’s arrest were illegal. As such, the court was not
apprised of the claim she has raised on appeal and did
not decide it. This claim is not preserved. See State v.
Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 443–44, 988 A.2d 167 (2009)
(motion to suppress that did not articulate basis for
constitutional challenge defendant raised on appeal did
not preserve claim).
Furthermore, the defendant did not request that, in
the event we conclude this claim is unpreserved, we
review it under the well settled standard set forth in
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State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823
(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,
781,120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Even so, our Supreme Court
has stated that, to obtain Golding review, ‘‘a defendant
need only raise that claim in [her] main brief, wherein
[she] must present a record that is [adequate] for review
and affirmatively [demonstrate] that [her] claim is
indeed a violation of a fundamental constitutional
right.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 755, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). Here,
however, the defendant has not presented us with a
record that is adequate to review her unpreserved
waiver claim.
‘‘To be valid, a waiver [of a defendant’s Miranda
rights] must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. . . .
The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently waived [her] Miranda rights.
. . . Whether a purported waiver satisfies those
requirements is a question of fact that depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn. App.
591, 599, 915 A.2d 327, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903, 919
A.2d 1037 (2007). The defendant argues for the first
time on appeal that ‘‘despite clear evidence that [she]—
who . . . had just been released from a drug rehab—
had not made a knowing waiver of her right to remain
silent, [the court] denied’’ her motion to suppress the
statements she made to Detective Dalling. (Emphasis
added.) She argues that the ‘‘record is replete with evi-
dence that [the defendant] was highly emotional, con-
fused about her rights and how to act upon them, and
under the influence of intoxicants that were still
impairing her due to her recent discharge from rehab.’’23
23
Contrary to the defendant’s argument, Detective Dalling testified that
the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs
and the court credited that testimony.
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Further, she states that she ‘‘even told [Detective] Dal-
ling, prior to making any statements, that she did not
‘want to say anything that might be used against her,’ ’’
which she argues indicates ‘‘both an attempt to invoke
her rights and a clear misunderstanding of the contours
of the rights [Detective] Dalling had advised her of and
how to act upon them.’’
Because the defendant did not make these arguments
to the trial court, however, it made no findings regarding
waiver. The court found only that the defendant had
been properly advised of her Miranda rights and that
she gave the statements anyway. The court credited
Detective Dalling’s testimony, and it had no reason to
further probe or endeavor to reconcile her testimony
that the defendant acknowledged that she understood
her rights with her testimony that the defendant was
crying and emotional to make the factual determination
as to whether that acknowledgment was knowing and
voluntary. Nor did the court further probe Detective
Dalling’s testimony to learn more about the circum-
stances surrounding the defendant’s statement that she
did not ‘‘want to say anything that might be used against
her.’’ Although the defendant argues that this statement
indicates ‘‘both an attempt to invoke her rights and a
clear misunderstanding of [their] contours,’’ it could
just as easily mean she understood her rights and made
the statements anyway. These are questions of fact that
we, as a reviewing court, cannot resolve.
For any Golding claim, ‘‘[i]t is incumbent upon the
[defendant] to take the necessary steps to sustain [her]
burden of providing an adequate record for appellate
review. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities
. . . but to review claims based on a complete factual
record developed by a trial court. . . . Without the nec-
essary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the
trial court . . . any decision made by us respecting
[the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.’’
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti,
279 Conn. 39, 63, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1212, 127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007).
‘‘[W]e will not attempt to supplement or reconstruct
the record, or to make factual determinations, in order
to decide the defendant’s claim.’’ State v. Golding,
supra, 213 Conn. 240. The defendant has not presented
us with an adequate record to review her claim that
the statements she sought to have suppressed ‘‘were
not the result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of
her Miranda rights,’’ and we will not review it.
2
We turn now to the defendant’s argument that her
statements to Detective Dalling were not voluntary and
should not have been admitted because ‘‘[d]espite . . .
[her] obvious signs of confusion and impairment [while
she was in custody], [Detective] Dalling continued to
engage [the defendant],’’ on the one hand, and because
the defendant ‘‘express[ed] a clear desire not to waive
her right against self-incrimination but [Detective] Dal-
ling failed to heed [her] wishes,’’ on the other. In other
words, she claims that Detective Dalling improperly
coerced her into saying that she was a ‘‘horrible person’’
and admitting she ‘‘[could not] believe that she did this.’’
The following legal principles guide our analysis.
‘‘Irrespective of Miranda, and the fifth amendment
itself . . . any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary
confession is a denial of due process of law. . . . The
state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the
confession by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
. . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examina-
tion of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct
of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear
[the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confes-
sions not freely self-determined . . . . The ultimate
test remains . . . [i]s the confession the product of an
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essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?
If it is, if [she] has willed to confess, it may be used
against [her]. If it is not, if [her] will has been overborne
and [her] capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of [her] confession offends due pro-
cess. . . . The determination, by the trial court,
whether a confession is voluntary must be grounded
upon a consideration of the circumstances surrounding
it. . . . Factors that may be taken into account, upon
a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the
accused; [her] lack of education; [her] intelligence; the
lack of any advice as to [her] constitutional rights; the
length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature
of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment,
such as the deprivation of food and sleep. . . . Under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
however, in order for a confession to be deemed invol-
untary and thus inadmissible at trial, there must be
police conduct, or official coercion, causally related to
the confession . . . . In other words, there must be an
essential link between [the] coercive activity of the
[s]tate, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by
a defendant, on the other . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher
S., 338 Conn. 255, 280–81, 257 A.3d 912 (2021); see also
State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 670 (‘‘the totality of
the circumstances test [for voluntariness] depend[s]
[on] a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against
the power of resistance of the person confessing’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
‘‘[As for the scope of our review] we note the estab-
lished rule that [t]he trial court’s findings as to the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interroga-
tion and confession are findings of fact . . . which will
not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.
. . . [A]lthough we give deference to the trial court
concerning these subsidiary factual determinations,
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such deference is not proper concerning the ultimate
legal determination of voluntariness. . . . Consistent
with the well established approach taken by the United
States Supreme Court, we review the voluntariness of
a confession independently, based on our own scrupu-
lous examination of the record. . . . [A]pplying the
proper scope of review to the ultimate issue of voluntar-
iness requires us . . . to conduct a plenary review of
the record in order to make an independent determina-
tion of voluntariness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266,
322, 96 A.3d 1199 (2014).
Our scrupulous examination of the record, the trial
court’s factual findings and its credibility determina-
tions to which we defer, lead us to conclude that the
statements the defendant made to Detective Dalling
were voluntary. Detective Dalling testified that the only
questions she asked the defendant after she voluntarily
turned herself in were basic demographic questions and
that, after she advised the defendant of her Miranda
rights, the defendant ‘‘started making comments’’ and
asking Detective Dalling questions about whether she
might go to jail or be permitted to own dogs in the
future. In other words, the defendant initiated conversa-
tion of her own accord and made her statements within
that context. Detective Dalling further testified that,
although the defendant looked tired and was crying at
times, she did not appear to be intoxicated by alcohol
or drugs.
The court credited Detective Dalling’s testimony,
which was the only testimony about the circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s statements. ‘‘Questions of
whether to believe or disbelieve a competent witness
are beyond our review. . . . We must defer to the trier
of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
that is made on the basis of its firsthand observation
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of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. DeMarco, supra, 311
Conn. 520. We thus defer to the trial court’s credibility
determination and conclude that its derivative findings
were not clearly erroneous. There is no evidence of
any coercive conduct by Detective Dalling, let alone
coercive conduct that could be said to have prompted
the defendant’s statements. See State v. Christopher S.,
supra, 338 Conn. 280–81. The defendant cannot prevail
on her claim that the trial court improperly denied the
motion to suppress her statements as involuntarily
made.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that her sentence vio-
lated her right to due process under both the fifth
amendment to the United States constitution and article
first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution because the
court relied on conduct related to the cruelty to animal
charges of which she was acquitted. Although the defen-
dant acknowledges that it is ‘‘constitutionally permissi-
ble to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing under
certain circumstances,’’ she cites to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Watts, 519
U.S. 148, 117 S. Ct. 633, 136 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1997), to
argue that the sentencing court improperly considered
her conduct related to the deaths of the dogs here
without explicitly finding that her conduct had been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.24 In
24
In her appellate brief, the defendant argues more broadly that ‘‘it was
patently improper for the trial court to consider such acquitted conduct at
sentencing without finding it proven by a preponderance of the evidence’’
and that the court ‘‘did not find that such evidence was proven by any
standard, let alone a preponderance of the evidence.’’ During oral argument
before this court, however, the defendant’s counsel argued that, ‘‘in the case
of acquitted conduct [that] standard should be explicit and it should be
stated,’’ and he has invited this court to articulate a ‘‘bright-line rule’’ to
that effect.
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response, the state argues that the court properly con-
sidered the evidence related to the acquitted charges.
Specifically, the state asserts that this case is controlled
by our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Langston,
346 Conn. 605, 641, 294 A.3d 1002 (2023), cert. denied,
U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 698, 217 L. Ed. 2d 391 (2024), which
held that a sentencing judge may properly consider
conduct related to a charge of which a defendant was
acquitted when it sentences the defendant on other
charges, as long as the underlying conduct and evidence
considered has a ‘‘minimal indicium of reliability’’ and
the sentence imposed is within the permissible statu-
tory range for the conviction.25 The state argues that,
as in Langston, the trial court here properly considered
the conduct evidence underlying the acquitted
charges.26
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary for our resolution of this claim. The court
sentenced the defendant on May 4, 2022. At the begin-
ning of that hearing, defense counsel objected to the
court’s consideration of information contained in the
presentence investigation report (PSI) ‘‘that relates to
the alleged death of the dogs or that relates to the dogs’’
when sentencing the defendant because that informa-
tion pertained to ‘‘allegations that were never suffi-
ciently proven.’’ The prosecutor responded that it would
be impossible to ‘‘separate the fact that the dogs were
25
The maximum sentence of imprisonment for criminal damage of a land-
lord’s property, a class D felony, is five years; General Statutes § 53a-35a
(8); and thus, the five year sentence the court imposed was within the
permissible statutory range for the conviction. The defendant does not
challenge this conclusion on appeal.
26
Our Supreme Court decided Langston after the defendant filed her
opening brief in this appeal and, thus, she did not address the decision
there. The state filed its brief after Langston was decided and addressed
the decision at length in that brief. The defendant did not file a reply brief,
and, at oral argument before this court, her appellate counsel maintained
that Watts supports her position.
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in the house when they died and caused the damage
to the landlord’s property . . . [b]ecause they’re the
mechanism of the damage.’’

The court stated that it could not consider the con-
victed charge of criminal damage of a landlord’s prop-
erty ‘‘without also considering the crimes . . . [of]
which the defendant was acquitted . . . .’’ The court
stated: ‘‘The name of the case on point is [State v.
Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986)] . . . a 1986
Connecticut Supreme Court case. There are many cases
that follow along with this.27 This is not the first case
in which somebody was acquitted of a crime and sen-
tencing transpired thereafter. [Huey] indicated that the
factors that could be considered by a court in sentenc-
ing include responsible unsworn out-of-court informa-
tion relative to the circumstances of the crime and to
the convicted person’s life and circumstances. Evidence
of crimes to which the defendant was indicted but nei-
ther tried nor convicted, evidence bearing on charges
for which the defendant was acquitted. Evidence of
counts of [the] indictment that [have] been dismissed
by the government and the defendant’s demeanor and
the lack of veracity and remorse that [was observed]
by the court during the course of the trial on the merits.
Those are suggestions that our [Supreme] Court has
indicated that a sentencing judge can follow.

‘‘I will tell the parties this. The PSI remains the same.
The court is sentencing the defendant on the crime she
was convicted of and not on the other ten counts . . . .
[B]ut in this case as [the prosecutor] has [indicated]
there is some interplay. We did hear from the landlord
and rightfully so, her testimony on sentencing should
not be restricted . . . . And we will hear from Attorney
27
The court also specifically referenced State v. Anderson, 212 Conn. 31,
561 A.2d 897 (1989), which cited to Huey.
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Bernhard and I do not want to limit him in what informa-
tion he provides to the court.’’28 (Emphasis added; foot-
note added.)
The prosecutor described the case as ‘‘unique
because the mechanism of the damage caused was done
by way of [the] animals.’’ She stated that the landlord
had lost the home and that her reputation had been
‘‘dragged through the mud’’ as a result of the defendant’s
actions, and that the defendant had shown no remorse.
She recounted that, ‘‘after being found not guilty of the
animal cruelty charges, [the defendant] went on social
media and recorded videos prompting the public with
her apparent victory. She may have been found not
guilty of those charges but . . . she still stands before,
Your Honor, convicted of a felony.’’
Defense counsel explained that the defendant had no
prior criminal record and that she had been a productive
citizen until her addiction to drugs. Finally, the defen-
dant, exercising her right of allocution, discussed her
addiction, apologized, and acknowledged that her ‘‘path
forward does not include working with animals.’’
Prior to the imposition of sentence, the court com-
mented: ‘‘[T]here are many things a court can take into
consideration when issuing a sentence and they include
such thing[s] as [the] relevant background of the defen-
dant. The impact on the victim of course, and the defen-
dant’s attitude toward the offense.’’ It specified that it
‘‘can certainly look at [the defendant’s] actions after
the verdict’’ and that, among other things, it had seen
‘‘the defendant’s behavior right [afterward]. I saw her
bragging about how she was found innocent. I thought
I was pretty clear that she was not found innocent. She
was found not guilty.’’ It further stated that ‘‘I do not
take into consideration . . . the charges of [which]
28
Attorney Kenneth G. Bernhard is an animal advocate who addressed
the court over the defendant’s objection.
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the defendant was acquitted . . . . However, I do indi-
cate that the death of those five innocent dogs do impact
me on this. Because it was their damage [so to] speak.
And when I say their damage, it makes it seem like I’m
blaming them but the fact that those dogs who died
were left to rot. Were left to decay. Were left to diminish
in the cages in which an animal should be able to find
some comfort, it’s horrific.
‘‘So, I have reviewed the PSI. I have reviewed the
restitution study. I take into account the totality of all
circumstances including the facts and circumstances
related to the offense. The relevant background of the
defendant, including her age, family, history, education,
employment, relationships, and the fact that she has
no criminal record.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court
imposed a total effective sentence of five years of
imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen
months, and probation, with special conditions,29 for a
period of five years.
We review this claim with considerable deference to
the trial court’s exercise of discretion. ‘‘A sentencing
judge has very broad discretion in imposing any sen-
tence within the statutory limits and in exercising that
discretion he may and should consider matters that
would not be admissible at trial. . . . Of necessity
much of the information garnered by the probation
officer will be hearsay. . . . To arrive at a just sen-
tence, a sentencing judge may consider information that
would be inadmissible for the purpose of determining
guilt . . . evidence of crimes for which the defendant
was indicted but neither tried nor convicted . . . evi-
dence bearing on charges for which the defendant was
The special conditions included that the defendant is ‘‘not to work or
29

operate for any organization that involves animals’’ and that she is ‘‘to
complete the Connecticut Animal Cruelty Prevention and Education Pro-
gram.’’
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acquitted . . . and evidence of counts of an indictment
which has been dismissed by the government. . . .
’’Generally, due process does not require that infor-
mation considered by the trial judge prior to sentencing
meet the same high procedural standard as evidence
introduced at trial. Rather, judges may consider a wide
variety of information. . . . Consistent with due pro-
cess the trial court may consider responsible unsworn
or out-of-court information relative to the circum-
stances of the crime and to the convicted person’s life
and circumstance. . . . It is a fundamental sentencing
principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately con-
duct an inquiry broad in scope, and largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information he may consider
or the source from which it may come. . . . The trial
court’s discretion, however, is not completely unfet-
tered. As a matter of due process, information may be
considered as a basis for a sentence only if it has some
minimal indicium of reliability. . . . As long as the sen-
tencing judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for
relying on the information which he uses to fashion
his ultimate sentence, an appellate court should not
interfere with his discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Huey, supra,
199 Conn. 126–27. Moreover, with respect to a court’s
consideration of evidence related to acquitted conduct,
‘‘due process is generally satisfied when the conduct has
been established by a preponderance of the evidence.’’
State v. Langston, supra, 346 Conn. 622, citing United
States v. Watts, supra, 519 U.S. 156.
In the present case, the defendant claims that, when
fashioning her sentence, the court abused its discretion
by relying on evidence relating to the animal cruelty
charges of which she was acquitted. She argues that
the court’s failure to explicitly find that her conduct
related to the deaths of the dogs had been proven by
a preponderance of the evidence violated her right to
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due process under the federal and state constitutions.30
Under our Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v.
Langston, supra, 346 Conn. 605, this argument fails.

In Langston, the defendant claimed that a sentencing
court’s consideration of the conduct underlying the
charge of which he was acquitted violated his federal
and state constitutional rights to due process under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution
and under article first, § 8, of our state constitution. Id.,
609. There, the defendant had been charged with assault
in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm,
and robbery in the first degree following his arrest in
connection with an armed robbery and shooting. He
was convicted, after a jury trial, of all but the assault
charge. Prior to sentencing the defendant, however,
and in addition to reviewing the facts surrounding the
charges of which the defendant was convicted, the sen-
tencing court commented at length, and in great detail,
regarding the conduct related to the acquitted charge
of assault. In doing so, it found that ‘‘[t]he evidence
was telling and the witnesses credible.’’ Id., 610–11.

Following a comprehensive analysis of the principles
governing the constitutionality of sentencing practices
in both the federal and state courts, including the ‘‘long
line of both federal and state precedent [that] has
allowed significant latitude for what judges may con-
sider during sentencing and has permitted sentencing
courts to consider a wide range of conduct, including
conduct related to acquitted charges’’; id., 609; our
Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge may prop-
erly consider conduct related to a charge of which a
30
The defendant did not separately brief her state constitutional claim
and predicates her argument on ‘‘the constitutional minimum established
by the United States Supreme Court.’’ We therefore deem her state constitu-
tional claim abandoned. See State v. Ebron, 219 Conn. App. 228, 247 n.8,
295 A.3d 112, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 902, 296 A.3d 840 (2023).
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defendant was acquitted when it sentences the defen-
dant on other charges, as long as the underlying conduct
and evidence has a ‘‘ ‘minimal indicium of reliability’ ’’
and the sentence imposed is within the permissible
statutory range for the conviction. Id., 641. The court
further concluded that, because the sentencing court’s
consideration of the conduct underlying the acquitted
assault charge and the sentences it imposed satisfied
these requirements, the court did not violate the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights. Id.
In reaching these conclusions, the court followed the
holdings in Watts, and its own decision in Huey, and
it declined to exercise its supervisory authority to
impose a rule prohibiting the consideration of acquitted
conduct at sentencing. In Watts, the United States
Supreme Court held that a ‘‘verdict of acquittal does not
prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct
underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct
has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.’’
United States v. Watts, supra, 519 U.S. 157. The court
explained: ‘‘[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact.
An acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the
government failed to prove an essential element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Without specific
jury findings, no one can logically or realistically draw
any factual finding inferences . . . . Thus . . . the
jury cannot be said to have necessarily rejected any
facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 155; see also State v. Langston, supra, 346 Conn.
617, citing United States v. Watts, supra, 155–157. In
Huey, our Supreme Court held that a sentencing court
has very broad discretion to consider a wide variety of
information as a basis for a sentence, provided that the
information ‘‘has some minimal indicium of reliability.’’
State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 127. The court in Langs-
ton explained that ‘‘the rationale supporting Watts and
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State v. Leuders

Huey extends to a sentencing court’s consideration of
acquitted conduct, so long as it meets the requisite
standard.’’ State v. Langston, supra, 622.
Most notably, our Supreme Court in Langston con-
cluded that the sentencing court did not violate the
defendant’s right to due process when it considered the
conduct underlying the assault charge for which the
defendant had been acquitted, even though the sentenc-
ing judge did not ‘‘explicitly reference the quantum of
evidence’’ when doing so. Id., 621. It explained: ‘‘In
the present case, the sentencing court considered the
testimony and evidence presented by witnesses at a
trial over which it presided. It had sufficient opportunity
to observe and judge the credibility of such witnesses,
and their sworn testimony is exactly the kind of mini-
mally credible evidence that we anticipate sentencing
judges will rely on. In fact, the sentencing judge specifi-
cally explained that he found that [t]he evidence was
telling and the witnesses [were] credible’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); id.; and the court determined
that the judge’s ‘‘findings as to the sufficiency of the
evidence he relied on was implicit in his explana-
tion.’’ Id.
The same is true in this case. As in Langston, the
court did not explicitly state when sentencing the defen-
dant that it found the defendant’s conduct with respect
to the deaths of the dogs had been proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. It did, however, expressly con-
sider the defendant’s ‘‘actions after the verdict’’ and her
‘‘bragging’’ on social media about how she was found
innocent. It responded to that by emphasizing that the
defendant ‘‘was not found innocent. She was found not
guilty.’’ Also, as part of the special conditions the court
imposed at sentencing with respect to the defendant’s
probation, the court ordered that she was ‘‘not to work
or operate for any organization that involves animals’’
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State v. Leuders

and that she was ‘‘to complete the Connecticut Animal
Cruelty Prevention and Education Program.’’
It is implicit from these probation orders and its other
observations that, even though the court had not found
that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of violating § 53-247 (a)
and (b) when it acquitted her of those charges, it did
find that the defendant’s conduct with respect to the
deaths of the dogs had been proven at least by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. See State v. Langston, supra,
346 Conn. 617 (‘‘an acquittal only indicates the presence
of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt’’). Had
it not, the court’s pointed emphasis on the distinction
between ‘‘innocent’’ and ‘‘not guilty’’ and the special
conditions it imposed regarding the defendant inter-
acting with animals and undergoing animal cruelty
training simply would not follow.31 We therefore con-
clude that the court did not violate the defendant’s right
to due process by considering the conduct underlying
the charges of which the defendant was acquitted with-
out explicitly referencing the quantum of evidence by
which that conduct had been proven.32 See State v.
Langston, supra, 621.
31
We note that the court had made similar findings and observations prior
to returning its verdict when it explained that ‘‘[t]here’s no such finding as
innocent’’ and that, ‘‘[i]f the state fails to prove each and every element
beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact finder is obligated to come back with
a verdict of not guilty.’’ It noted that Dr. Herbert Van Kruiningen testified
that he could not tell what caused the dogs to die and, with respect to
whether the defendant deprived the dogs of necessary sustenance, food and
water, the court stated that ‘‘[i]t doesn’t matter what I think. It doesn’t
matter what I suspect. What matters is what the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.’’ As such, the court’s findings were implicit from the time
it returned the verdict it credited the acquitted conduct evidence even
though it did not find that the defendant’s guilt was established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
32
Even if it was not implicit in the court’s findings and observations
that it found that the defendant’s acquitted conduct had been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, it remains well established that a reviewing
court will not presume error where the record does not reveal what standard
of proof the court has applied. Rather, we presume the court used the
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State v. Leuders

Moreover, the evidence regarding the defendant’s
conduct underlying the acquitted charges had a ‘‘ ‘mini-
mal indicium of reliability.’ ’’ Id., 622. The court had
presided over both the suppression hearing and the trial
where testimonial and documentary evidence regarding
the defendant’s conduct with respect to the deaths of
the dogs had been presented. As in Langston, the court
had sufficient opportunity to observe and judge the
credibility of the witnesses and assess their sworn testi-
mony, which is ‘‘exactly the kind of minimally credible
evidence that we anticipate sentencing judges will rely
on.’’ Id., 621. In fact, the situation is even more compel-
ling here given that the court was also the fact finder
at trial and, thus, its credibility determinations and
weighing of evidence informed both the returning of
the verdict and the defendant’s sentencing. See In re
Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000)
(‘‘[I]n cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole
arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they
who determine the weight to be given specific testi-
mony. . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact
finder to reject or accept certain evidence . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
There was overwhelming evidence that the deceased
dogs had been in the defendant’s care and that they had
perished two to ten months prior to being discovered
in the home from which she ran a dog rescue. Much
of the damage to the home, which the defendant was
convicted of causing, resulted from the dogs’ carcasses
and the toxins that emanated as they were left to rot.
In fact, many of the facts and circumstances related to
the acquitted charges also bore on the convicted
offense. The court’s acknowledgment that the ‘‘death
of those five innocent dogs do impact me on this’’ and
its observation that it ‘‘was their damage’’ from being
appropriate standard in such circumstances. State v. Brown, 145 Conn. App.
174, 187 n.13, 75 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 936, 79 A.3d 890 (2013).
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‘‘left to rot’’ reflects this. The court had a reasonable and
persuasive basis for considering the evidence regarding
the defendant’s conduct in relation to the death of the
dogs when it sentenced her for criminal damage to
her landlord’s property, and it did not abuse its broad
discretion or violate her due process rights in doing so.
See State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 126–27; see also
State v. Langston, supra, 346 Conn. 620 (‘‘[t]rial judges
ought not be reprimanded for acknowledging on the
record the impact of information they have gained in
the plea bargaining or sentencing processes unless the
use of such information confounds reason and a just
result’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the
defendant’s claims that her due process rights were
violated at sentencing must fail.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.