Reed v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RALPH REED, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 165, 2024
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 9911018706
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: August 15, 2024
Decided: October 9, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Ralph Reed, appeals from a Superior Court order

denying his third motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal

Rule 61. The State has filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on

the ground that it is manifest on the face of Reed’s opening brief that the appeal is

without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) A Superior Court jury convicted Reed of first-degree murder and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The charges arose from
the fatal shooting of Gregory Howard on November 23, 1999,1 when Reed was

eighteen years old. The Superior Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without

parole for the murder conviction and twenty years for the firearm conviction. This

Court affirmed on direct appeal.2

(3) Reed has filed two prior unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief,

the first in 20043 and the second in 2013.4 In November 2023, he filed a third motion

for postconviction relief. The Superior Court denied the motion as procedurally

barred under Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 61, and Reed has appealed

to this Court. We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction

relief for abuse of discretion, although we review legal or constitutional questions

de novo.5

(4) We first address the issue of which version of Rule 61 applies.6 “This

Court repeatedly has held that a motion for postconviction relief is to be adjudicated

in accordance with Rule 61 as it exists at the time the motion is filed.”7 Nevertheless,

Reed contends that we should apply the version of Rule 61 that was in effect before

1
Reed v. State, 2001 WL 819587, at *1 (Del. July 12, 2001).
2
Id.
3
State v. Reed, 2005 WL 2615630 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005), aff’d, 2006 WL 1479763 (Del.
May 26, 2006).
4
Reed v. State, 2013 WL 5346312 (Del. Sept. 20, 2013).
5
Durham v. State, 2023 WL 1488456, at *1 (Del. Feb. 2, 2023).
6
Cf. id. (“The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any
substantive issues.”).
7
Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1094 (Del. 2021).

2
the rule was amended in 2014.8 He argues that applying the revised version of Rule

61 violates federal due process requirements because the 2014 amendments of Rule

61 became effective without fair notice of the changes to the procedural bars. This

argument is unavailing in the circumstances of this case, in which Reed’s first and

second motions for postconviction relief were considered under the pre-2014 version

of Rule 61 and Reed is pursuing a third motion for postconviction relief filed nine

years after the Rule 61 procedural bars were amended.9 We therefore consider

whether Reed’s claims overcome the procedural bars as set forth in Rule 61 as it

existed in November 2023, when Reed filed his third motion for postconviction

relief.

(5) Under that rule, Reed’s successive motion for postconviction relief was

subject to summary dismissal unless it pleaded with particularity either (i) the

existence of new evidence that creates a strong inference of actual innocence or that

(ii) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review

by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to

8
See id. at 1094 & n.185 (explaining that the 2014 amendments to Rule 61 eliminated “an
exception to the application of the procedural bars involving colorable claims of a miscarriage of
justice”).
9
Cf. id. at 1094-95 & notes 184-87 (discussing appellant’s argument that federal due process
considerations required application of pre-2014 version of Rule 61 to appellant’s second Rule 61
motion, filed in 2018, but declining to decide the issue because the appellant’s claims satisfied the
requirements set forth in the revised rule).

3
[Reed’s] case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.”10 Reed does not

claim that there is new evidence of his actual innocence; rather, he contends that his

claims satisfy Rule 61(d)(2)(ii). We conclude that they do not.

(6) Reed argues that his procedural default should be excused under the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Mack v.

Superintendent Mahonoy SCI,11 because Reed purportedly was not represented by

counsel in his earlier postconviction proceedings. As an initial matter, Reed’s

position is belied by the record, which reflects that Reed was represented by counsel

during his first postconviction proceeding.12 Moreover, this Court held in Bennett

v. State13 that Mack “did not create a new rule of constitutional law; the Third Circuit

merely applied the United States Supreme Court precedent of Martinez v. Ryan to

the facts before it.”14 And, in any event, both Mack and Martinez were decided more

10
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(d)(2); see also id. R. 61(i)(1)-(5) (establishing bars to
postconviction relief and providing that the bars “shall not apply either to a claim that the court
lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or
(2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule”). All references and citations to Rule 61 in this order are to
the version of Rule 61 that was in effect from April 6, 2017, through December 31, 2023.
11
714 Fed. Appx. 151 (3d Cir. 2017).
12
See State v. Reed, 2005 WL 2615630, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005) (stating that Reed’s
counsel entered an appearance and participated in the evidentiary hearing and briefing).
13
2019 WL 5105476 (Del. Oct. 11, 2019).
14
Id. at *2 (footnote citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), omitted); see also Rasin v. State,
2019 WL 1410748, at *1 (Del. Mar. 27, 2019) (“As this Court has repeatedly held, a claim of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not relieve a defendant of the burden of
satisfying the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2) in order to avoid summary dismissal of a second or
subsequent postconviction motion.”); Roten v. State, 2013 WL 5808236, at *1 (Del. Oct. 28, 2013)
(stating that “Martinez does not hold that there is a federal constitutional right to counsel in first
postconviction proceedings”).

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than one year before Reed filed his third motion for postconviction relief and

therefore do not help Reed overcome the procedural bars.15

(7) Reed also attempts to satisfy Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) by asserting two

challenges to 11 Del. C. § 4209, the statute under which he was sentenced to life in

prison without parole. First, he contends that this Court’s decision in Rauf v. State16

struck down Section 4209 as unconstitutional. In Rauf, this Court held that

“Delaware’s current death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment role of the

jury as set forth in Hurst.”17 In Powell v. State, this Court held that Rauf applied

retroactively to cases on collateral review.18 But Rauf and Powell do not “appl[y] to

[Reed’s] case and render[] the conviction or death sentence invalid,”19 because Reed

received a sentence of life imprisonment, not a death sentence.20

15
See DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 61(i)(1) (barring a motion for postconviction relief that “asserts a
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final” if
the motion is filed “more than one year after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of
Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court”).
16
145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).
17
Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433 (referring to Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)). Rauf was charged
with a murder that occurred on August 23, 2015. Reed was convicted of a crime that occurred on
November 23, 1999. Section 4209 was amended several times between 1999 and 2015. Because
Rauf determined only that the death-penalty provisions of Section 4209 were unconstitutional and
Reed was not sentenced to death, the differences between the versions of Section 4209 that applied
to Rauf and to Reed are not material to whether Reed’s claim satisfies Rule 61(d)(2)(ii).
18
153 A.3d 69, 76 (Del. 2016).
19
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(d)(2)(ii).
20
See Garvey v. State, 2018 WL 6824585 (Del. Dec. 26, 2018) (holding that successive motion
for postconviction relief was procedurally barred and stating: “[A]lthough Rauf and Powell set
forth a new rule of constitutional law, those decisions do not apply to invalidate Garvey’s
conviction or sentence. As we have held many times, Rauf did not strike down the entirety of the
first-degree murder statute—it struck down only the death penalty portion. Because Garvey was
not sentenced to death, but received a sentence of life imprisonment, Rauf and Powell do not apply
to Garvey’s case.” (citations omitted)); see also Brice v. State, 2024 WL 3710504 (Del. Aug. 7,

5
(8) Second, Reed argues that Section 4209 is unconstitutional as applied to

him because he was eighteen at the time of his crime and Section 4209 did not

provide the sentencing judge with discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life

without parole. At the time of Reed’s offense, Section 4209(a) provided: “Any

person who is convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by death or by

imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of

probation or parole or any other reduction . . . .”21 In 2012, the United States

Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that “mandatory life without parole for

those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”22 In lieu of mandatory life without

parole sentences for juveniles, “Miller required that sentencing courts consider a

child’s ‘diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change’ before

condemning him or her to die in prison.”23 In 2016, the Court held in Montgomery

v. Louisiana that Miller applies retroactively in cases on collateral review.24

(9) Reed argues that, under the reasoning of Miller, Section 4209 is

unconstitutional as applied to youthful offenders who, like him, were between the

2024) (affirming denial of successive motion for postconviction relief and stating that Powell “did
not create a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law requiring the vacatur of the
appellant’s life sentence”).
21
11 Del. C. § 4209(a) (1999).
22
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
23
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 195 (2016) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
24
Id. at 206.

6
ages of eighteen and twenty when they committed their crimes. Indeed, some state

supreme courts have extended Miller’s reasoning to “emerging adult” offenders

between the ages of eighteen and twenty, holding that such offenders may never be

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole25 or that such a sentence may be

imposed only if the sentencing court determines that the sentence is appropriate after

individualized consideration of the “mitigating characteristics of youth.”26 But

neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has held that a sentencing

scheme mandating a sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder is

unconstitutional as applied to an eighteen-year-old offender, and this argument

therefore does not satisfy Rule 61(d)(2)(ii).27

25
See Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410, 428 (Mass. 2024) (holding, under Massachusetts
state constitution, that “it is unconstitutional to sentence individuals from eighteen to twenty years
of age to life without the possibility of parole”). Cf. also id. at 427-28 (stating that twenty-two
states and the District of Columbia “do not mandate life without parole in any circumstance,” the
“United Kingdom has banned life without parole for any offender under twenty-one years of age
at the time of the offense,” and “in 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously ruled that life
without parole sentences were unconstitutional for all offenders, regardless of age”).
26
People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161, 165, 171 (Mich. 2022) (holding that mandatory sentence of
life without parole for eighteen-year-old offender violated the Michigan Constitution’s ban on
“cruel or unusual” punishment); In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 288 (Wash. 2021) (“There is no
meaningful cognitive difference between 17-year-olds and many 18-year-olds. When it comes to
Miller’s prohibition on mandatory [life without parole] sentences, there is no constitutional
difference either. Just as courts must exercise discretion before sentencing a 17-year-old to die in
prison, so must they exercise the same discretion when sentencing an 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old.”).
27
See Shah v. State, 2018 WL 2110995, at *1 (Del. May 7, 2018) (affirming denial of successive
motion for postconviction relief and stating that the “Superior Court did not err when ruling that
the Miller holding, although retroactively applicable in appropriate cases, did not apply in Shah’s
case because Shah was eighteen years old when he committed the offense”). Cf. also Fatir v.
State, 2016 WL 3525273, at *2 (Del. May 24, 2016) (rejecting argument that mandatory life
without parole sentence for appellant who was twenty-two at the time of his crime was
unconstitutional).

7
(10) Finally, Reed also asserts that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to raise a Batson28 claim, challenge the voir dire, or investigate

and subpoena certain witnesses. These contentions are not based on any new rule of

constitutional law and therefore are procedurally barred.29

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice

28
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
29
See DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(d)(2)(ii) (providing that a successive motion for
postconviction relief is not subject to summary dismissal if it pleads with particularity that “a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States
Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the
conviction or death sentence invalid”); id. R. 61(i)(1) (barring a motion for postconviction relief
that “asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of
conviction is final” if the motion is filed “more than one year after the right is first recognized by
the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court”).

8