Wright v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WAYMOND WRIGHT, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 126, 2025
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1208019720 (N)
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: July 14, 2025
Decided: August 21, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Waymond Wright, appeals from the Superior Court’s

order denying his second motion for postconviction relief. The State has filed a

motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on

the face of Wright’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and

affirm.

(2) Wright and two codefendants, Natasha Mahaley and Steven Huff, were

charged with committing two robberies on August 18, 2012. After trial began, the

charges relating to one of the robberies were dropped, and Huff and Mahaley pleaded
guilty to charges relating to the second robbery and then testified against Wright as

to the second robbery. The jury found Wright guilty of second-degree robbery and

second-degree conspiracy. The Superior Court sentenced Wright in September

2015, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal in 2016.1

(3) Wright then filed a motion for postconviction relief. The Superior

Court denied that motion in 2018, and this Court affirmed.2

(4) In July 2024, Wright filed a second motion for postconviction relief.

He claimed that his trial counsel’s concurrent representation of another client, Izzy

Whitehurst, in an unrelated robbery case prevented counsel from effectively cross-

examining Mahaley at Wright’s trial. Wright asserted that Mahaley had “similar

involvement” in the robbery with which Whitehurst was charged and that Wright’s

counsel could have impeached Mahaley’s credibility by questioning her about her

role in the other robbery, but counsel’s representation of Whitehurst purportedly

prevented him from doing so. The Superior Court denied the motion, holding that

Wright’s claim did not constitute new evidence creating a strong inference of actual

1
Wright v. State, 2016 WL 4702061 (Del. Sept. 7, 2016). Wright was convicted in a separate trial
of second-degree criminal solicitation arising from soliciting Huff to recant his testimony against
Wright in the robbery trial. That conviction was also affirmed on direct appeal. Wright v. State,
2016 WL 3453707 (Del. May 23, 2016). The Superior Court sentenced Wright in both the robbery
case and the criminal solicitation case at the same time. Notably, after Wright was indicted for
criminal solicitation, his trial counsel withdrew because counsel had become a potential fact
witness in the criminal solicitation trial. Wright therefore had different counsel by the time of
sentencing and direct appeal.
2
Wright v. State, 2018 WL 5251911 (Del. Oct. 19, 2018).

2
innocence and therefore did not overcome the procedural bars to a successive

postconviction motion.

(5) We agree that Wright has not overcome the procedural bars under

Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 61. Rule 61(d)(2) provides that a second

or subsequent motion shall be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted

after a trial and the motion pleads with particularity either that “new evidence exists

that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts

underlying the charges of which he was convicted” or that “a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United

States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case

and renders the conviction . . . invalid.”3

(6) Wright contends that he has satisfied the “actual innocence” exception

to summary dismissal. We disagree. Wright claims that Mahaley’s participation in

the Whitehurst robbery “is amply suggestive of some pre-existing relationship with

the State”4 and that evidence of her participation would have undermined her

credibility with Wright’s jury. Even assuming that (i) Wright’s discovery in 2024

that his counsel represented Whitehurst in 2013 satisfies Rule 61(d)(2)’s “newness”

3
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(d)(2); see also id. R. 61(i)(2)(i) (“No second or subsequent
motion is permitted under this Rule unless that second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading
requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule.”).
4
Opening Brief at 14.

3
requirement, (ii) counsel’s representation of Whitehurst impeded his ability to cross-

examine Mahaley, and (iii) evidence of Mahaley’s role in an entirely separate

robbery would have been admissible in Wright’s trial—all of which are dubious

propositions—Wright has presented nothing that creates a strong inference that he

is actually innocent.

(7) “Satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, a heavy burden, and

such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.”5 Evidence that goes only to the

weight or credibility of evidence that was presented to the jury is “almost never

adequate” to satisfy the actual innocence test.6 In Purnell, on which Wright heavily

relies, the defendant based his successive postconviction motion on ballistic

evidence contrary to the ballistic evidence presented at trial, evidence of recantation

by three key witnesses, and an expert medical opinion that at the time of the crime

the defendant would not have had the physical capacity to run in the manner

described by an eyewitness.7 That evidence had exculpatory value as to Purnell and,

taken together, created an inference of actual innocence strong enough to overcome

the procedural bars. Wright’s claim that examining Mahaley about her participation

in the Whitehurst robbery would show that she was motivated to testify in the State’s

5
Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1100 (Del. 2021).
6
Id. at 1098.
7
Id. at 1119-22.

4
favor at Wright’s trial is conclusory speculation and, in any event, is at most

impeaching. Mahaley’s participation in another robbery does not exculpate Wright

as to his participation in the robbery at issue in this case. After careful consideration,

we conclude that Wright has not presented new evidence that creates a strong

inference of actual innocence.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm be

GRANTED and that the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

5