Johnson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SCOTT O. JOHNSON, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 251, 2025
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2211007190 (N)
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: November 17, 2025
Decided: December 5, 2025

ORDER

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Scott O. Johnson, appeals from the Superior Court’s

order denying his motion for correction of an illegal sentence. The State has filed a

motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on

the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) Johnson was indicted for various drug-related offenses arising from

conduct that occurred on November 17, 2022. In September 2023, he pleaded guilty

to drug dealing heroin as a Class D felony and second-degree conspiracy. Johnson

agreed that he was subject to habitual-offender sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a)
based on numerous predicate offenses listed on the plea agreement. The State and

Johnson agreed to recommend the following sentence: for drug dealing, twenty-five

years of imprisonment, suspended after eight years for eighteen months of level III

probation; and for second-degree conspiracy, ten years of imprisonment, suspended

for eighteen months of Level III probation. The Superior Court sentenced Johnson

in accordance with the plea agreement.

(3) In April 2025, Johnson filed a motion for correction of an illegal

sentence under Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). The Superior

Court denied the motion, and Johnson has appealed to this Court. Relying on

Erlinger v. United States,1 Johnson argues that his sentence is illegal because two of

the predicate offenses on which his habitual-offender sentence was based were

juvenile adjudications; the State did not prove that the predicate offenses were

committed on separate occasions; and the indictment did not indicate that the State

would seek enhanced sentencing.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of an illegal sentence

for abuse of discretion, although questions of law are reviewed de novo.2 A sentence

is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with

respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory,

1
602 U.S. 821 (2024).
2
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).

2
omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is

a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.3

(5) Johnson has not demonstrated that his sentence is illegal. Under

Section 4214(a), Johnson was subject to a sentence of up to life in prison for drug

dealing and for second-degree conspiracy if he had three prior felony convictions.4

In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[v]irtually any fact that

increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed

must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt” or “freely

admitted in a guilty plea.”5 In his plea agreement, Johnson admitted the facts that

made him subject to sentencing under Section 4214(a), and the truth in sentencing

form stated that he could receive a sentence of up to life for each of the two offenses

to which he was pleading guilty. Johnson, who was represented by counsel, did not

object when the State moved for habitual-offender sentencing, nor has he asserted

on appeal any meritorious grounds on which he could have contested his habitual-

offender eligibility. Even without considering the offenses that he claims were

juvenile adjudications—and combining the offenses that he seems to contend were

not committed on separate occasions—he admitted that he was subject to habitual-

offender sentencing based on offenses from 1988, 1993, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2007,

3
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
4
11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (2022).
5
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

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2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, and 2021. Johnson has not articulated a factual basis on

which he could argue that he did not have the requisite number of prior, successive

convictions under Section 4214(a).6 Johnson has not shown that his sentence was

illegally enhanced.

(6) Nor is Johnson’s sentence illegal because the indictment did not allege

his predicate offenses or indicate that the State would seek habitual-offender

sentencing. By pleading guilty and agreeing that he was subject to habitual-offender

sentencing, Johnson forfeited his right to assert that challenge to the indictment.7

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice

6
See Morris v. State, 2025 WL 2541982, at *2 (Del. Sept. 3, 2025) (addressing defendant’s
argument under Erlinger that “his admissions in his guilty plea did not address the requirement
that the prior convictions occurred on separate occasions” and stating that defendant had not
“asserted on appeal any grounds on which he could have contested his habitual-offender
eligibility” and, “[m]ore specifically, he has not articulated a factual basis on which he could argue
that his prior felonies—of which he admitted he was convicted in 1995, 1997, and 2002—did not
constitute successive prior convictions under Section 4214(a)”).
7
See Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312 (Del. 1988) (holding that, by pleading guilty, defendant
forfeited right to attack indictment that charged nonexistent offense).

4