Henry v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JHALIR HENRY, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 519, 2024
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: The Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2304008809A/B
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: September 24, 2025
Decided: December 9, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and
GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, (argued), COLLINS PRICE WARNER WOLOSHIN,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant Below/Appellant.

Julia M. Donoghue, Esquire, (argued), DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
SEITZ, Chief Justice:

On April 14, 2023, police arrested Jhalir Henry, Donregus Holland, and

Shyheem Latham-Purnell for the fatal shooting of Corey Mumford. A grand jury

indicted the three men for Murder First-Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the

Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and

Conspiracy First-Degree. Latham-Purnell pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. Following a six-day

bench trial, the court acquitted Holland but found Henry guilty of all charges. The

court denied Henry’s post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. It sentenced

Henry to life in prison.

On appeal, Henry focuses on the Superior Court’s decision denying his

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. He raises two issues: first, whether he could be

convicted of first-degree murder when the State did not prove his specific intent to

kill Mumford, an unintended victim of the crime; and second, whether the State

proved that he was an accomplice to first-degree murder and did not terminate his

complicity before the commission of the offense.

After careful consideration, we find that this appeal should be affirmed based

on accomplice liability. Thus, we do not comment on the Superior Court’s other

grounds for denying the motion.

2
I.

A.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, on April 14, 2023,

Corey Mumford was shot nine times at the Wexford Village apartment complex in

Laurel, Delaware. The bullets came from a 9-millimeter Luger handgun.1 Mumford

died from his injuries.

Minutes before Mumford’s death, a three-car caravan (a Mazda, an Audi, and

a Volkswagen) left the Hollybrook Apartments Complex in Laurel, Delaware. 2 The

caravan stopped briefly before continuing to Wexford.3 The Volkswagen and the

Audi arrived at Wexford just before the shooting.4 The two cars backed into adjacent

parking spaces in front of buildings 102 and 103.5

Keishaun Copes, a passenger in another car parked at Wexford, left the car,

ran to the back of building 105, and warned that “Jha’s spinning” or “Jha’s coming.”6

1
Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A171-72, A178, A194, A214-15 [hereinafter A__].
2
A225, A706-07, A709-10; Appendix to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B-4-7, B-21-23 [hereinafter
B__].
3
A877; B-23.
4
State v. Henry, 2024 WL 3757156, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2024) [hereinafter Henry].
5
A440-41; Henry, at *2.
6
A285-86, A369-70; Henry, at *2.

3
Jha is Henry’s nickname and spinning means shooting.7 Shortly after, two men left

the recently parked cars and shots were fired. 8 One man ran to the back of building

105 while the second man stayed in front of the building. 9 The second man was

identified as Henry.10 Henry shot into the air toward building 102. 11 Shots were

fired behind building 105.12 Mumford, who was behind building 105, was shot nine

times.13 Latham-Purnell was later identified as Mumford’s shooter. 14 In addition to

being seen in the front of the building, Henry was seen walking to the back or back

corner of building 105. 15 A witness testified that Henry held a firearm in one hand

standing near Mumford behind building 105. 16 A third unidentified individual was

seen on the side of the building opposite the two shooters.17 Following the incident,

7
A369-70, A374-75; B-31-32; Henry, at *2.
8
A444; Henry, at *2.
9
A446-51, A460; Henry, at *2.
10
A444-448.
11
A450-51, A458-59, A468-69.
12
A254-56, A258, A281-82, A289-90, A311, A384, A507-10.
13
A783.
14
A415; Henry, at *2.
15
A452, A471-72, A482-84; Opening Br. at 44.
16
A509, A514-16.
17
A380-81, A973; Henry, at *2-3.

4
the individuals ran from the back of building 105 and got into the cars parked in

front of buildings 102 and 103.18 The cars then sped out of Wexford together. 19

B.

The police arrested Holland, Latham-Purnell, and Henry and charged them

with killing Mumford. A grand jury eventually indicted Henry, Holland, and

Latham-Purnell for Murder First-Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the

Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and

Conspiracy First-Degree. 20 Before trial, the Superior Court severed the Possession

of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited charges into a “B” case. Latham-Purnell pleaded

guilty to Manslaughter and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a

Felony.21 Henry and Holland waived their right to a jury trial and agreed to a bench

trial.22 On June 24, 2024, the Superior Court judge found Henry guilty of all

charges. 23 The court acquitted Holland of all charges.24

18
A440-41, A519-23; Henry, at *2-3.
19
A259, A262, A264, A287-89, A312, A314, A453-54.
20
A3 at D.I. 15, A78-80. “D.I.___” refers to the Superior Court criminal docket item numbers in
State v. Jhalir Henry, ID No. 2304008809A.
21
A85; Henry, at *1.
22
A7 at D.I. 59, A130, A133, A137-53, A186.
23
A7-8 at D.I. 59, 64, A15 at D.I. 10.
24
A1035, A1054; Henry, at *1.

5
C.

Henry filed a motion for judgment of acquittal raising three grounds: (1) the

State failed to prove that he intended to kill Mumford; (2) the State failed to prove

that he was an accomplice to the crimes; and (3) even if he was an accomplice, Henry

ended his complicity before the crime occurred. The court denied the motion. It

reasoned that a defendant’s culpability turns on the intent to kill, not the identity of

the victim. Thus, Henry could be found guilty of first-degree murder even when he

did not intend to kill Mumford. 25 The court also found that Henry’s substantial

involvement before, during, and after the shooting meant he was guilty of first-

degree murder as an accomplice.26 Finally, the court found that Henry did not

withdraw or otherwise end his participation as an accomplice.27 The Superior Court

sentenced Henry to life in prison and additional time.

D.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for judgment of

acquittal.28 Specifically, we must determine “whether any rational trier of fact,

viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light

25
Henry, at *3-4.
26
Id. at *4-5.
27
Id. at *5.
28
Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145, 150 (Del. 2023).

6
most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of all the elements of the crime.”29

II.

As stated earlier, we have decided to resolve this appeal based on Henry’s

actions as an accomplice to Mumford’s murder. As explained below, an accomplice

to a murder can be guilty of the murder even if he did not pull the trigger. When the

evidence at trial is viewed in a light most favorable to the State, we agree with the

Superior Court that “[Henry] was an active participant from start to finish” in

Mumford’s killing and did not terminate his complicity.30

A.

Under 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1), a person is guilty of first-degree murder if that

“person intentionally causes the death of another person[.]” 31 For accomplice

liability and guilt for the underlying crime, “[a] person is guilty of an offense

committed by another person when . . . [i]ntending to promote or facilitate the

commission of the offense the person: [s]olicits, requests, commands, importunes or

otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or [a]ids, counsels or

29
Id.
30
Henry, at *5.
31
11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1).

7
agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it . . . .” 32 Here,

Henry is guilty of first-degree murder if, as an accomplice, he aided and abetted

Mumford’s murder.33

We have explained that “[t]he inquiry under § 271 is not whether each

accomplice had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether he intended to

promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct constituting the offense.”34 Should a

murder occur and be “a foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious

conduct,” one’s intent as an accomplice would “include[] the intent to facilitate the

happening of this result.”35

The State introduced sufficient evidence to show Henry aided, counseled, or

agreed or attempted to aid Latham-Purnell in killing Mumford. As the Superior

Court held, “[t]he plan these Defendants formulated prior to arriving is demonstrated

by their actions.”36 Before arriving at Wexford, Henry coordinated his actions with

his co-conspirators. Henry was a part of the caravan of cars that traveled from

32
11 Del. C. § 271(2).
33
Kellam v. State, 341 A.3d 475, 497 (Del. 2025).
34
Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385, 393 (Del. 2006) (citing Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282
(Del. 1991)).
35
Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1282. A “jury is not required thereafter to find that the defendants
specifically intended the result of a consequential crime which occurs . . . .” Id.
36
Henry, at *5.

8
Hollybrook to Wexford. 37 Henry left the vehicle “at approximately the same time”

as the other shooters, “fired shots in the parking lot” as the other shooters went to

their shooting positions, “went to the backyard or corner of building 105,” and left

“in a hurry” in the same vehicles. 38 Although Henry might not have shot and killed

Mumford, he and Latham-Purnell were working together and without any reasonable

doubt agreed beforehand to carry out a shooting that resulted in Mumford’s death.

Accordingly, a rational factfinder could find Henry was an accomplice to first-degree

murder and, under § 271(2), was guilty of first-degree murder.

B.

Under 11 Del. C. § 273, an accomplice can avoid criminal liability if he

“terminates [his] complicity prior to commission of the offense” and “[w]holly

deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense” or “[g]ives timely

warning to the Attorney General or the police or otherwise makes a proper effort to

prevent the commission of the offense.”39 The defendant must take affirmative steps

to sever his involvement in the criminal activity. The Commentary to the 1973

Delaware Criminal Code suggests that one may “deprive his complicity of its

37
A46-49, A95-96, A101-02, A706-09, A1295; Henry, at *5.
38
A256-59, A262, A264, A282-90, A311-14, A438-41, A444, A449-54, A458-59, A463-65, A510,
A515, A519, A522-23, A848-51; Henry, at *5.
39
11 Del. C. § 273.

9
effectiveness by taking back a weapon which he has supplied to an intending killer,

or, if he has counseled commission of the offense, he may urge reconsideration and

abandonment of it.”40 In other words, a withdrawal is effective if a person’s earlier

help no longer meaningfully aids the offense.

Henry claims that he terminated his complicity prior to the shooting when he

“stood in the parking lot doing nothing for [a] short while” and “then fired shots in

the opposite direction of where Purnell was shooting Mr. Mumford.” 41 Because

Henry refrained from “going straight to the backyard,” he argues that he effectively

withdrew and severed his complicity. 42

Whether Henry fired in the right direction or merely stayed in front of the

building as a look out, he did not terminate his involvement as an accomplice. Henry

“did not take actions to show he had abandoned his criminal purpose.”43 To

withdraw from the crimes, Henry needed to take affirmative steps, like disarming a

potential shooter or urging abandonment of the crime.44 Physically distancing

40
GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIM. L., DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE WITH
COMMENTARY 52 (1973) [hereinafter Del. Crim. Code with Comm.].
41
Opening Br. at 47.
42
Id.
43
Answering Br. at 40-41.
44
See Del. Crim. Code with Comm., at 52. See also Lee v. State, 44 A.3d 922 (Table), 2012 WL
1530508, at *2 (Del. Apr. 30, 2012) (under 11 Del. C. § 541 and § 273, even though the defendant
told his co-conspirators that they were robbing the wrong house, the defendant did not renounce

10
himself from Latham-Purnell in the parking lot, firing in the opposite direction, and

walking “partway down the path” to the back of building 105 does not demonstrate

affirmative withdrawal or even an attempted withdrawal from the shooting. As

explained earlier, Henry was an active participant in the events from start to finish.45

Henry claims that “[t]he State, like the Superior Court, places much emphasis

on the cars arriving and leaving together.”46 The court, however, also considered his

actions in between. 47 While Henry stood in front of building 105 as Mumford was

shot and killed, his actions were coordinated with the other shooters, which included

repeatedly shooting a gun and walking towards the back of building 105.48 The

his participation in a robbery when he continued to participate in the robbery and shared the
proceeds).
45
A256-59, A283-92, A312-14, A375-77, A415-19, A444, A449-55, A458-59, A468-69, A470-72,
A474, A482-84, A1111-12; Henry, at *5.
46
Reply Br. at 15; Henry, at *5.
47
Henry, at *5. Henry met with his conspirators prior to driving together to Wexford. The cars
drove in a caravan-like manner “back-to-back” carrying the shooters before parking
simultaneously. The shooters all exited their cars at the same time and walked to their respective
spots. Once the shooting occurred, the shooters all departed at the same time and drove away
together from Wexford. A256, A258-59, A262-64, A284-88, A312-14, A380-85, A390-94, A415,
A438-43, A450-54, A458-59, A463-64, A478-80, A510-26; B-4, B-8, B-11-20, B-23, B-28.
48
A256-59, A283-92, A312-14, A375-77, A415-19, A444, A449-55, A458-59, A468-69, A470-72,
A474, A482-84, A1111-12; Henry, at *5.

11
evidence supported a reasonable inference by a rational factfinder that Henry did not

effectively withdraw from his participation. 49

Finally, the Superior Court held that Henry’s conduct “did not terminate his

complicity under the meaning of 11 Del. C. § 273” because “the plain language of

the statute requires that the termination occur prior to the commission of the offense,

not during it.”50 Henry argues that the “‘offense’ here was Mumford’s shooting, not

driving to Wexford Village” and that if he was ever an accomplice, he withdrew his

complicity before arriving at Wexford.51 We are unpersuaded because Henry’s

continued presence at the crime scene and shooting a gun in front of building 105

support an inference that he remained actively involved and had not meaningfully

withdrawn. The Superior Court concluded correctly that “[Henry] was an active

participant from start to finish” and did not terminate his participation in the crimes.

III.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

49
See Lee, 2012 WL 1530508, at *1-2.
50
Henry, at *5.
51
Opening Br. at 48.

12