Boykin v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ISAIAH BOYKIN, §
§ No. 442, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Superior
§ Court of the State of
v. § Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. N2203013250 A/B
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: October 15, 2025
Decided: December 17, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and

following oral argument, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Isaiah Boykin appeals his criminal convictions, claiming that the

Superior Court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Boykin remained

in custody for nearly two years before his trial was held. The delay was the product

of three trial continuance requests that were initiated by the State but to which

Boykin did not object. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that there was no

violation of Boykin’s right to a speedy trial and therefore affirm his convictions.
(2) Boykin was arrested on April 7, 2022. 1 A grand jury indicted Boykin

on August 15, 2022. The indictment contained the following counts: one count of

first-degree home invasion-burglary; one count of first-degree attempted robbery;

one count of second-degree conspiracy; one count of second-degree assault; one

count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; one count of

terroristic threatening; and six other counts that were later severed or dropped.2 The

Superior Court scheduled Boykin’s trial for March 20, 2023, but the trial was

delayed three times. 3

(3) The first delay was due to the unavailability of Boykin’s co-defendant.

The co-defendant’s attorney had a scheduling conflict with the trial date and needed

a continuance.4 The State, on behalf of all the parties (including Boykin), submitted

the continuance request to the court.5 The Superior Court granted the continuance

request, postponing the trial until late May 2023.6

(4) The second delay occurred when the State asked for another

continuance. Detective Christopher Skrobot, one of the State’s witnesses, reported

1
Appendix to Opening Br. at A1 [hereinafter as “A_”] (Super. Ct. Crim. Dkt. No. 1 [hereinafter
“Dkt.”]).
2
Dkt. No. 4; see also A13–18 (Indictment by the Grand Jury).
3
A2–5 (Dkt. Nos. 8, 19, 25, 28–29).
4
Appendix to Answering Br. at B1 [hereinafter as “B_”] (Continuance Req. dated Mar. 9, 2023).
5
Id.
6
A3 (Dkt. No. 19).

2
that his wife expected to give birth in late May 2023 and that he would likely be on

family leave during the trial.7 The State offered to replace Detective Skrobot with

Detective Daniel Vucci, who did not have personal knowledge of the facts but was

otherwise familiar with Detective Skrobot’s work on the case. Boykin rejected the

State’s offer to substitute Detective Skrobot but did not oppose the continuance

request.8 The Superior Court postponed the trial for four months, setting trial for

September 11, 2023. 9

(5) The third delay occurred on August 29, 2023, when the State asked for

another continuance because Detective Skrobot had not yet returned from family

leave. 10 To avoid further delay, the State offered to arrange for Detective Skrobot

to testify remotely. Boykin rejected this alternative, but did not oppose the

continuance request.11 The court took the matter under advisement; no trial date was

set at this time.

(6) Seven weeks later, on October 19, 2023, the parties appeared for a

scheduling conference. 12 At the conference, Boykin, for the first time, asserted his

7
B4–5 (Continuance Req. dated Aug. 29, 2023).
8
Id.
9
A4 (Dkt. No. 25).
10
B4–5 (Continuance Req. dated Aug. 29, 2023).
11
Id.
12
A4–5 (Dkt. No. 28).

3
right to a speedy trial and demanded dismissal of the charges against him.13 The

Superior Court did not rule on the request—because Boykin had not filed a motion—

and instead set trial for March 4, 2024.14

(7) Boykin filed a motion for speedy trial on January 18, 2024.15 The

Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that “[Boykin’s] failure to assert that

right at an earlier time and acquiesce to the continuance requests weigh[ed] against

him,” 16 and that Boykin had not shown substantial prejudice caused by the delay.17

Boykin’s trial started, as scheduled, on March 4, 2024. The trial lasted seven days.

A jury acquitted Boykin of the terroristic threatening charge but convicted him on

all other charges.18 Boykin was subsequently sentenced to 14 years of incarceration

followed by probation. 19

(8) On appeal, Boykin claims that the Superior Court violated his right to

a speedy trial when it granted the State’s second and third continuance requests. 20 It

is undisputed that these continuances were necessitated by the unavailability of the

13
See State v. Boykin, 2024 WL 772557, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2024) [hereinafter “Opinion
_”].
14
A5 (Dkt. No. 29).
15
A5 (Dkt. No. 30).
16
Opinion at *3.
17
See id.
18
A6 (Dkt. No. 38).
19
Appellant’s Opening Br. 1 [hereinafter “Opening Br.”].
20
Boykin does not take issue with the first delay, as it was jointly requested by all parties.

4
State’s witness, Detective Skrobot.21 In response, the State points out that Boykin

refused two options to avoid scheduling delays—(a) replacing Detective Skrobot

with Detective Vucci, or (b) allowing Detective Skrobot to testify remotely. The

State contends that Boykin’s insistence that Detective Skrobot testify in-person was

the true cause of the delay.22

(9) The Delaware and United States Constitutions both protect a criminal

defendant’s right to a speedy trial.23 We review claims alleging infringement of a

constitutionally protected right de novo. 24 When determining whether a criminal

defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, we consider and weigh

the following four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo: 25 (a) the length of delay; (b)

the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice

to the defendant. 26 Furthermore, “[w]e regard none of the four factors identified

above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of

21
Opening Br. 2 (arguing that “Boykin was denied his rights to a speedy trial when, as the result
of the State’s repeated continuance requests to accommodate one of its [witnesses] . . . [Boykin]
was prevented from going to trial until nearly 2 years after his arrest.”).
22
Appellee’s Answering Br. 17–18 [hereinafter “Answering Br.”].
23
Del. Const., art. 1, § 7; U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
24
Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 163 (Del. 2008) (citation omitted).
25
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
26
Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (1972)).

5
the right of speedy trial.” 27 Rather, “courts must . . . engage in a difficult and

sensitive balancing process.”28

(10) We first consider the length of delay. There is no precise time-period

that uniformly triggers a speedy trial analysis.29 If the delay between arrest or

indictment (whichever occurs first) and trial exceeds one year, we generally proceed

to consider the other Barker factors. 30 Here, Boykin was arrested on April 7, 2022,

indicted on August 15, 2022, and tried on March 4, 2024. Thus, almost two years

lapsed between his arrest and trial. The State concedes that the first factor “weighs

in Boykin’s favor” and that the gap of time in this case “warrants review of the other

[Barker] factors.” 31 Therefore, we find that the first factor favors Boykin and

continue our analysis under the Barker factors.

(11) We next consider the reason for delay. We have held that “[d]ifferent

weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay.” 32 If the State intentionally

caused the delay to undermine the defense, then that attempt is weighed heavily

against the State. 33 However, if the State is merely negligent or the courts are

27
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
28
Id.
29
Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1990) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
30
Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. Dec. 5, 2011) (citations omitted).
31
Answering Br. 14.
32
Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 274 (Del. 2002).
33
Id.

6
overcrowded, then those more neutral reasons are not weighed as heavily.34

Similarly, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, may justify appropriate delay

and will not weigh against the State.” 35 On the other hand, if a delay was caused by

the defendant, then the defendant “cannot [] blame the result solely on the acts or

omissions of the prosecution.” 36

(12) The second and third delays were caused by the unavailability of a State

witness. The State provided a justifiable reason for the delays—the witness would

be on family leave. The State also proposed alternatives, which Boykin rejected.

Under these circumstances, we do not weigh this factor against the State. However,

neither does this factor weigh against Boykin. He validly exercised his

constitutional right to confrontation when he rejected the State’s offer to replace

Detective Skrobot with a witness who lacked personal knowledge of the facts and

insisted on cross-examining Detective Skrobot in person. Although the right to meet

a witness face-to-face is not an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment, 37 it

34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 637–38 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted); see also Butler v. State, 2009
WL 1387640, at *2 (Del. May 19, 2009) (“[A defendant] cannot complain about the result of his
exercise of [a procedural] right.”).
37
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50 (1990) (ruling that “though we reaffirm the importance
of face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot say that such
confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to
confront one’s accusers. . . . [T]here are circumstances that excuse compliance with the right of
confrontation”).

7
remains important, and no individual should feel pressured to surrender one

constitutional right in fear of losing another.38 Therefore, we do not hold Boykin’s

refusal to agree to the State’s proposed alternatives against him. 39 This factor is

neutral.

(13) We next consider when Boykin first asserted his right to a speedy trial.

Although his initial failure to assert his right does not prevent him from raising the

issue later, a “defendant does have some responsibility to call attention to what he

views as an unfair postponement.’”40 That is, a defendant cannot wait silently for a

prolonged period of time and then later claim time is essential. Boykin remained

38
See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807–08 (1977) (holding that a New York law
was coercive and thus unconstitutional because “it requires [an individual] to forfeit one
constitutionally protected right as the price for exercising another”).
39
The State argues that it was Boykin’s insistence that Detective Skrobot testify in person that
caused the delay. To support its argument, the State cites to State v. Malachi, where the Superior
Court held:
The State attempted to cure the unavailability of its witness by having him testify
via Zoom, which Defendant opposed. Thus, the true impetus for the delay is more
attributable to the Defendant rather than the State. . . . Defendant cannot prolong
the matter then claim infringement on her right to a speedy trial. Therefore, this
factor weighs in favor of the State.
State v. Malachi, 2021 WL 4805515, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 14, 2021).
The State contends that we should follow the reasoning of Malachi and find that the “reason for
delay” factor tips in the State’s favor. See Answering Br. 18. We disagree. A criminal defendant’s
right to confront a witness is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, both the U.S. Supreme Court
and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the strong preference for “face-to-face” confrontation
at trial. See, e.g., McGriff v. State, 781 A.2d 534, 539 (Del. 2001) (recognizing “[the Sixth
Amendment] has been interpreted to express a preference for the in-court testimony of witnesses”)
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1980)).
40
Key, 463 A.2d at 637 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 532).

8
silent for nearly eighteen months after his arrest. During this time, the State

requested to postpone the trial twice to accommodate Detective Skrobot, and Boykin

did not oppose those continuance requests. Boykin concedes that he did not raise

his speedy trial rights before raising them at the October 2023 scheduling

conference.41 Tellingly, Boykin further concedes that “[he] may not have asserted

his right as early as one would have hoped.” 42 Given the fact that Boykin did not

assert his right to a speedy trial when the delays occurred, we find this factor weighs

in favor of the State.

(14) Last, we consider the prejudicial effect of the delay on Boykin. The

Barker Court explained that prejudice “should be assessed in the light of the interests

of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.” 43 It went on to

identify three such interests: (a) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) to

minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (c) to limit the possibility that the

defense will be impaired. 44 Boykin bases his argument solely on the second

interest—to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused. Boykin claims to have

suffered from “presumptive[] anxiety” due to the delay, but has not accompanied

41
See Opinion at *1.
42
Appellant’s Reply Br. 2.
43
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
44
See id.

9
this assertion with any evidence. 45 We must acknowledge, as we did before, that

“time spent in jail awaiting trial by one presumed innocent until proven guilty often

means loss of a job, disrupts family life, and enforces idleness.” 46 “Imposing these

consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.”47 Nevertheless,

the negative impact that might be generally experienced by all criminal defendants

does not necessarily warrant a legal finding of prejudice. Due to the absence of

prejudice to Boykin, we find this factor in favor of the State.

(15) In sum, after carefully considering the Barker factors, we find that

Boykin’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. Boykin failed to raise his speedy

trial right when the delays occurred and failed to show that he has suffered prejudice.

These failures, under the facts of this case, significantly outweigh the “length of

delay” factor—the only factor on which Boykin prevailed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice

45
Opening Br. 20–21.
46
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 276.
47
Id.

10