Vincent, Bennett v. Eden Michaels

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BENNETT VINCENT,1 §
§ No. 346, 2025
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. CN24-05194
EDEN MICHAELS, § Petition No. 24-23335
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §

Submitted: February 13, 2026
Decided: May 6, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the Family Court

record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Bennett Vincent appeals the Family Court’s order affirming a

commissioner’s order granting the appellee’s petition for a protection-from-abuse

(“PFA”) order. We find no error or abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s

decision and therefore affirm.

(2) Vincent and the appellee, Eden Michaels, were married in 2019 and

share a child together—a girl, born in November 2020 (the “Child”). On October 4,

1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2024, Michaels, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a PFA order and moved for an

emergency ex parte PFA order, alleging that Vincent had choked her in the Child’s

presence on three occasions—once in August 2023 and twice in March 2024. A

Family Court commissioner granted Michaels’ motion for an emergency ex parte

PFA order later that day. On October 9, Michaels, with the assistance of counsel,

filed an amended PFA petition, clarifying the dates on which the alleged abuse

occurred—August 2023, mid-March 2024, mid-April 2024, October 3, 2024, and

October 9, 2024. On October 31, Vincent filed a cross-petition for a PFA order.

(3) A Family Court commissioner held a hearing on the parties’ cross-PFA

petitions over three days in early 2025. The commissioner heard testimony from

one of Michaels’ close friends, a mutual friend of the parties, Vincent’s father, two

officers from the New Castle County Police Department, and the parties. Relevant

here, Michaels testified about an August 2023 incident that happened at a hotel in

upstate New York while the family was on a road trip. After the family finished

dinner at a nearby restaurant, Vincent drove them back to their hotel. As he did so,

he started a video recording of Michaels and the Child, who were giggling in the

backseat. The video, which was admitted into evidence, also showed Vincent

speeding through the hotel parking lot and appearing to sideswipe a pedestrian.

After the near-miss with the pedestrian, Michaels can be heard repeatedly asking

Vincent to slow down until Vincent parks the car and ends the recording. Vincent

2
and Michaels continued to argue as the family made their way back to their hotel

room. Once in the hotel room, Vincent “came at” Michaels, and she slapped him on

his cheek with an open palm.2 Michaels testified that Vincent “immediately grabbed

[her] wrists and threw [her] on the bed, and hopped on top of [her], and sat on her

torso, like, halfway up so [she] legitimately could barely breathe.”3 With what

breath she had, Michaels screamed for help. Vincent held Micheals in this position

for at least five minutes and at one point told Michaels that he would not let her go

“until somebody heard [her] scream.”4 Eventually, Vincent released Michaels and

retreated into the bathroom.

(4) Vincent acknowledged that he had held Michaels down but argued that

he had done so to prevent Michaels from attacking him. The Family Court admitted

into evidence three video recordings that Vincent took in the aftermath of the alleged

assault without Michaels’ knowledge. In the recordings, which total over twelve

minutes in length, Michaels emotionally and repeatedly described being “scared”

because of Vincent’s “out of control” driving in the parking lot. Vincent can be

heard acknowledging that “of course” he “restrained” Michaels because, he claimed,

she was hitting him, at which point she clarified, “I slapped you once and walked

2
App. to Opening Br. at A0289-A0291.
3
Id. at A0291.
4
Id. at A0293-A0294.
3
away.” Vincent did not disagree and confirmed that he told her that he would not

release her until someone heard her scream.

(5) By way of order dated March 18, 2025, the commissioner granted

Michaels’ PFA petition on the basis of the August 2023 incident described above

and granted Vincent’s PFA petition on the basis of an April 2023 incident. The

Family Court commissioner made the following findings regarding Michaels’ PFA

petition:

The [c]ourt find that [Michaels] proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that [Vincent] committed an act of abuse against her in August
2023. Specifically, the [c]ourt finds that [Vincent] committed an act of
abuse as defined in 10 Del. C. § 1041(1)(d) and (i). The [c]ourt finds
that [Vincent] engaged in a course of alarming or distressing conduct
when he caused fear in [Michaels] by his driving of the vehicle.
[Michaels] asked him multiple times to slow down, and her wishes were
ignored. While [Vincent] claims it was because of him seeing a
“disheveled” man, it was clear to the [c]ourt that [Vincent] engaged in
a course of conduct that caused [Michaels] fear. The [c]ourt also finds
that [Vincent’s] conduct was conduct which a reasonable person, under
the circumstances, would find threatening or harmful. The argument
continued into the hotel room and resulted in [Vincent] restraining
[Michaels]. [Vincent] claims his restraint of [Michaels] was to stop her
from attacking him. During his testimony, he admitted to saying to
[Michaels], while [Michaels] was screaming and telling him the cops
were going to come, that he hoped someone did show up because they
would see what was going on. This caused [Michaels] to feel scared
and under the circumstances, this [c]ourt finds that a reasonable person
would find this threatening or harmful.5

5
Id. at A1217-18 (citations omitted).
4
Vincent and Michaels each filed timely requests for a review of the commissioner’s

order. By way of order dated August 7, 2025, a Family Court judge affirmed the

commissioner’s PFA orders. Vincent appealed to this Court.

(6) When a party files timely request for review of a commissioner’s order,

a Family Court judge must conduct an independent de novo review of the record to

determine whether the portions of the commissioner’s order to which an objection

has been raised should be accepted, rejected, or modified in whole or in part. 6 Our

review of a decision of the Family Court extends to a review of the facts and law, as

well as inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.7 Our duty is to review

the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings.8 Findings of

fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.9 If the Family

Court correctly applied the law to the facts, we review its decision for abuse of

discretion.10 “When the determination of facts turns on a question of the credibility

and the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of witnesses appearing before the

trier of fact, we will not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.” 11 To

6
10 Del. C. § 915(d)(1).
7
Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Clark v. Clark, 47 A.3d 513, 517 (Del. 2012).
11
Shimel v. Shimel, 2019 WL 2142066, at *2 (Del. May 14, 2019) (citations omitted).
5
obtain a PFA order, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the respondent has committed an act of domestic violence.12

(7) Vincent raises four arguments on appeal: (i) he was deprived of due

process because Michaels’ PFA petition did not put him on notice that his driving

could form the basis of a finding of abuse; (ii) the Family Court erred when it

determined that Vincent’s driving constituted a “course of conduct” as defined by

10 Del. C. § 1041(1)(d); (iii) the Family Court failed to perform the “reasonable-

person” analysis required for a finding of abuse under Section 1041(1)(i); and (iv)

the Family Court erred when it held that the justification defense is not available to

a respondent in PFA proceedings.

(8) Although Vincent’s dangerous driving was not cited in Michaels’ PFA

petition, it was inextricably intertwined with the parties’ August 2023 confrontation

cited in the petition. As both parties testified and the video evidence showed, the

parties began arguing about Vincent’s driving in the car. Both parties also testified

that they continued to argue about Vincent’s driving as they returned to the hotel

room. And the video evidence documenting the aftermath of their physical

altercation—evidence that Vincent himself created without Michaels’ knowledge—

demonstrated that the parties continued to fight about Vincent’s driving long after

12
Stuart v. Stuart, 2017 WL 1090543, at *1 (Del. Mar. 22, 2017).
6
the fact. We note, too, that: (i) Vincent had, and exercised, his right to be heard and

defend his driving, (ii) Vincent detailed the parking lot incident in his cross-PFA

petition, and (iii) Vincent introduced into evidence the video recordings that

ultimately buttressed Michaels’ testimony that his driving caused her to feel

threatened. In short, the omission of Vincent’s driving from Michaels’ PFA petition

did not violate his procedural due process rights.13

(9) Vincent next argues that his “single incident of driving” did not

constitute a “course of conduct” under Section 1041(1)(d).14 Assuming, arguendo,

that Vincent’s repeated failure to comply with Michaels’ persistent pleas for him to

slow down did not constitute a course of conduct, we find it evident that the Family

Court’s PFA judgment should be affirmed on the basis of its finding that Vincent’s

physical restraint of Michaels in their hotel room constituted abuse because it was

“conduct which a reasonable person under the circumstances would find threatening

or harmful” under Section 1041(1)(i).

(10) Vincent also argues that the Family Court erred because it did not

engage in a robust analysis of the reasonable-person standard that he claims is

13
See Tsipouras v. Tsipouras, 677 A.2d 493, 496 (Del. 1996) (observing that procedural due
process requires that parties whose rights are to be affected by the proceedings are entitled to notice
and the opportunity to be heard).
14
10 Del. C. § 1041(1)(d) (defining “abuse” as “[e]ngaging in a course of alarming or distressing
conduct in a manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress or to provoke a violent or
disorderly response, including conduct that is directed towards any companion animal or service
animal”).
7
required by Section 1041(1)(i). We disagree. The Family Court made the following

findings of fact relevant to a reasonable-person analysis: (i) Vincent restrained

Michaels in the hotel room; (ii) while restrained, Michaels screamed for help; (iii)

Vincent admitted that he told Michaels that he hoped people would respond to her

cries so that they could witness their encounter; and (iv) Michaels was scared. Those

findings of fact support the Family Court’s conclusion that a reasonable person

would find Vincent’s conduct threatening or harmful.

(11) Finally, Vincent argues that the Family Court erred in its review of the

commissioner’s PFA order because it found that a justification defense is not

available in PFA proceedings. After the court opined that “the criminal defense of

justification for use of force in self-protection does not apply to this civil

proceeding,”15 it nevertheless proceeded to consider the evidence presented and

concluded that Vincent’s use of force was not justified under the circumstances.

Although a justification defense is not expressly contemplated in the PFA statutory

framework, it is expressly included in the Child Protection from Domestic Violence

Act.16 It follows that reasonable acts of self-defense may be justified in the PFA

context. We therefore affirm the Family Court’s judgment because we agree that

15
App. to Opening Br. at A1263.
16
13 Del. C. § 703A(a) (“Domestic violence” does not include reasonable acts of self-defense by
1 parent for self-protection or to protect the child from abuse or threats of abuse by the other parent
or other adult living in the child’s home).
8
Vincent’s purported acts in self-defense were neither justified nor reasonable under

the circumstances.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice

9