Millman, Tasha v. DSCYF/DFS TPR

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TASHA MILLMAN,1 §
§ No. 500, 2025
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. 25-09-3TK
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES § Petition No. 25-21721
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND §
THEIR FAMILIES, §
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §

Submitted: April 16, 2026
Decided: May 15, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses thereto, and

the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) By order dated November 26, 2025, the Family Court terminated the

parental rights of the appellant, Tasha Millman (“Mother”), in her son, born in May

2024 (the “Child”).2 Mother appeals.

1
The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2
The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s father. We refer only
to facts in the record that relate to Mother’s appeal.
(2) On appeal, Mother’s counsel has filed an opening brief and a motion to

withdraw under Rule 26.1(c). Counsel asserts that she has conducted a conscientious

review of the record and the relevant law and has determined that Mother’s appeal

is wholly without merit. Counsel informed Mother of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c),

provided her with a copy of counsel’s motion to withdraw and the accompanying

brief, and advised her that she could submit in writing any additional points that she

wished for the Court to consider. Mother has submitted a narrative for the Court’s

consideration. The Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their

Families (“DSCYF”) as the appellee and the Child’s attorney from the Office of the

Child Advocate have responded to counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the

Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

(3) On November 25, 2024, DSCYF petitioned for emergency custody of

the Child after learning that Mother, who was on probation, had been discharged

from the sober living home where she had been staying because of her erratic

behavior and failure to supervise the Child. Mother’s lack of supervision led to the

Child—then six months old—rolling off of Mother’s bed on at least two occasions.

(4) With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency-and-neglect petition, the

mandated hearings ensued.3 At the preliminary protective hearing, Mother stipulated

3
When a child is removed from his home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court
is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute
and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. Proc. R. 212-219.
2
that the Child was dependent in her care because she lacked stable housing and

waived her right to an adjudicatory hearing.

(5) At the January 15, 2025 dispositional hearing, the court reviewed with

Mother the case plan that DSCYF had developed to facilitate her reunification with

the Child. Mother’s case plan required her to: (i) comply with the terms of her

probation; (ii) undergo a substance abuse evaluation, follow all treatment

recommendations, and submit to random urine screens; (iii) complete a parenting

course and attend the Child’s medical appointments; (iv) obtain and maintain stable

income and housing; and (v) visit regularly and appropriately with the Child. Since

the last hearing, the Child had been diagnosed with failure to thrive and had been

hospitalized for one week after refusing food and vomiting blood. Further testing

had been ordered.

(6) As of the February 26, 2025 three-month review hearing, Mother had

completed a substance abuse evaluation and was consistently testing negative for

illegal substances. Mother had also enrolled in a 14-week parenting course, had

submitted multiple job applications, and was enjoying appropriate visits with the

Child. However, Mother lacked stable housing and was staying at a hotel. Since the

last hearing, the Child had lost weight and had been hospitalized twice. He was now

being fed via a Nasal Gastric feeding tube.

3
(7) As of the April 1, 2025 six-month review hearing, Mother was

compliant with the criminal, substance-abuse, and parenting-class components of

her case plan. However, she not yet secured employment and was once again

homeless after the cold-weather shelter where she had been staying closed for the

season. The Child was to have a Gastric feeding tube (“G-tube”) surgically

implanted later in April.

(8) The Family Court held a nine-month review hearing on June 24, 2025.

Mother was compliant with the criminal and substance-abuse components of her

case plan and had started working at a chicken plant. But Mother was unable to pass

the parenting course’s final assessment, scoring lower than she had on the initial

assessment. And Mother lacked stable housing: she had been evicted from a

homeless shelter and was staying at a hotel. The Child had the G-tube implanted in

April, had been placed in a new foster home that was better equipped to meet his

medical needs, and was gaining weight.

(9) Before the September 16, 2025 permanency hearing, DSCYF moved to

change the permanency goal from reunification to termination of parental rights

(“TPR”) for the purpose of adoption. As of the permanency hearing, Mother had

been discharged successfully from probation, remained complaint with the

substance-abuse component of her case plan, and was on track to complete a second

parenting course. But Mother had been fired from the chicken plant, was living in a

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pallet village where children were not allowed, and did not have any means of

transportation. The Family Court emphasized to Mother that she would need to

secure stable employment, obtain housing that could accommodate the Child and his

medical needs, and demonstrate that she could meet the Child’s medical needs

before the Child could be returned to her. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

Family Court changed the permanency goal from reunification to the concurrent

goals of reunification and TPR for the purpose of adoption. On September 25, 2025,

DSCYF moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights for her failure to plan for the

Child’s physical needs or mental and emotional health and development.4

(10) At the November 26, 2025 TPR hearing, the Family Court heard

testimony from Mother, one of the Child’s treating physicians, the program manager

for Mother’s parenting course, Mother’s DSCYF treatment worker’s supervisor, the

Child’s foster mother, and the Child’s court-appointed special advocate. The

evidence fairly established that Mother had, admirably, completed the substance-

abuse component of her case plan and maintained sobriety. But Mother was not

employed and did not have stable housing—she moved in with a friend three weeks

before the TPR hearing. Mother candidly acknowledged that she: (i) did not know

what medications the Child was prescribed or what therapies he received at daycare;

4
When a child comes into DSCYF custody as an infant, DSCYF may file a TPR petition after the
child has been in DSCYF custody for six months. 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(b).
5
(ii) would need help administering the Child’s feedings through the G-tube; (iii) did

not have family help or a support system; and (iv) had not made arrangements for

the Child to go to daycare in the event that her efforts to find employment were

successful. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court granted DSCYF’s

TPR petition. This appeal followed.

(11) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as

well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.5 We review legal

rulings de novo.6 We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial

court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly

erroneous.7 If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, then our standard of

review is abuse of discretion.8 On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute

our judgment for that of the trier of fact.9

(12) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate

parental rights requires two separate inquiries.10 First, the court must determine

whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.11

When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must

5
Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010).
6
Id. at 440.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).
10
Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
11
Id. at 537.
6
also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition.12 If the Family Court

finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court must then

determine whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the child’s

best interest.13 Both of these requirements must be established by clear and

convincing evidence.14

(13) Here, the Family Court found that DSCYF had proved, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was

appropriate because of her failure to plan15 and that the Child had been in DSCYF

custody for more than six months.16 The Family Court also found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s

best interest.

(14) In the narrative that Mother has submitted for the Court’s consideration,

Mother claims that she is now receiving unemployment benefits and that she has

secured a place to live that is suitable for her and the Child. To the extent that Mother

argues that the Family Court should not have terminated her parental rights because

she satisfied the housing and income components of her case plan after the TPR

12
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)-(e) (listing additional conditions).
13
Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 536-37.
14
Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del.
2008).
15
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).
16
Id. § 1103(a)(5)(b).
7
hearing, Mother was required to complete her case plan while the dependency-and-

neglect proceedings were pending in order to be reunited with the Child. Simply put,

Mother’s post-TPR accomplishments, while commendable, are overdue.

(15) Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions and the record on

appeal, we find that the Family Court’s factual findings are supported by the record,

and we can discern no error in the court’s application of the law to the facts. We

therefore conclude that Mother’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any

arguably appealable issues. We are satisfied that Mother’s counsel made a

conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that

Mother could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice

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