Matthews v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHAHEED MATTHEWS, §
§ C.A. No. 24, 2023
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID. No. 1806004163(N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: March 13, 2024
Decided: June 10, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and
GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.

Shaheed Matthews, pro se, New Castle, Delaware.

John R. Williams, Esquire (argued), Delaware Department of Justice, Dover,
Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.

Garrett B. Moritz, Esquire (argued) and Elizabeth M. Taylor, Esquire, Ross
Aronstam & Moritz LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Amicus Curiae for Appellant.1

1
The Court expresses its appreciation to the law firm Ross Aronstam & Moritz, and in particular
attorneys Garrett Moritz and Elizabeth Taylor, for serving by Court appointment as amicus curiae
and their commitment of time and effort in pursuing postconviction relief on behalf of Mr.
Matthews.
GRIFFITHS, Justice:

On December 28, 2017, just after midnight in New Castle, Delaware, police

found Antoine Terry lying on the sidewalk unresponsive due to multiple gunshot

wounds. He died from his injuries. The police later arrested Terry’s friend, Shaheed

Matthews, for the murder.

In 2019, Matthews was tried for murder and possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony. No direct physical evidence linked Matthews to Terry’s

shooting. Instead, the State relied on circumstantial evidence—including evidence

from Matthews’s cellphone, witness testimony, video camera footage of varying

quality, and gunshot residue of an unknown vintage found on Matthews’s jacket.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Matthews’s convictions.

Matthews then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Superior

Court. He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective on four grounds. The

Superior Court denied Matthews’s motion and this appeal followed. On appeal,

Matthews limits the scope of his claim for relief to one ground: that trial counsel’s

failure to move to suppress the evidence obtained from his cellphone constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel.

With the State’s entire case dependent on circumstantial evidence, it was

essential for trial counsel to suppress any inappropriately derived evidence. Our

review leads us to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome

2
of the trial would have been different if Matthews’s trial counsel had moved to

suppress the evidence obtained from his cellphone. Therefore, we reverse his

convictions and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial without the taint of the

improperly seized evidence.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. The Shooting of Antoine Terry

Antoine Terry and Shaheed Matthews were friends.3 Matthews frequently

stayed with his girlfriend, Devon Johnson. Johnson’s residence was located at 227

Parma Avenue in New Castle, Delaware.4 The residence was in a “high crime area”

with “a lot of shootings.”5 On December 27, 2017, Terry, Matthews, and Johnson

spent the evening together at Johnson’s house watching a basketball game and eating

Chinese food.6 Johnson testified that around 10:30 p.m., she went upstairs to use the

restroom and grab additional layers of clothing because she planned to drive

Matthews to the home of his longtime friend, Chanelle Brooks.7 She told the jury

2
The facts, except as otherwise noted, are taken from the transcript of the trial testimony. See
App. to Amicus Curiae’s Opening Br. at AA1–239 [hereinafter “AA[_]”] (Trial Transcript
[hereinafter “Trial Tr. at [_]”]).
3
AA81 (Devon Johnson Testimony [hereinafter “Johnson Test. at [_]”] at 100:1–8).
4
AA80 (Johnson Test. at 98:3–4).
5
AA72, AA195 (Detective Eugene Reid Testimony [hereinafter “Reid Test. at [_]”] at 65:3–6;
124:4–12); see also AA99 (Johnson Test. at 174:8–11).
6
AA82–84, AA99 (Johnson Test. at 105:3–114:3; 171:9–172:16); see also AA341 (Transcription
of Detective Smith’s Dec. 28, 2017 Body Camera Footage of Interview of Shaheed Matthews
[hereinafter “Matthews Int.”]).
7
AA84–85 (Johnson Test. at 114:7–115:10).
3
that when she came back downstairs, Matthews and Terry were gone.8 She testified

that she waited in the house for Matthews to call her to pick him up and that she left

to pick him up at a nearby church around 10:45 p.m.9 She then drove him to

Brooks’s house.10

At 10:42 p.m., the New Castle County Police Department received a call from

a resident on Briarcliff Drive, which runs parallel to Parma Avenue.11 The resident

reported hearing five or six gunshots.12 Around the same time, another resident from

243 Parma Avenue called the police and reported being awakened by “three or four”

gunshots.13 Multiple officers responded to the area.14 The police did not

immediately locate a shooting victim.15 Shortly after midnight, however, police

found Terry’s body on the sidewalk between 243 and 245 Parma Avenue.16 He

8
AA85, AA86, AA89, AA99, AA103 (Johnson Test. at 116:13–15; 120:5–9; 131:18–132:1;
173:1–3, 188:14–18).
9
AA85, AA86, AA87, AA101 (Johnson Test. at 116:6–117:1; 121:18–122:10; 124:6–12; 180:11–
23).
10
AA84–85, AA101 (Johnson Test. at 114:16–115:10; 182:6–8); see also AA115–116 (Chanelle
Brooks Testimony [hereinafter “Brooks Test. at [_]”] at 14:16–16:5).
11
AA51, AA71 (Reid Test. at 196:23–197:12; 60:23–61:10).
12
AA51, AA71 (Reid Test. at 197:16–198:10; 61:11–20).
13
AA36, AA38 (Antoine Harrison Testimony [hereinafter “Harrison Test. at [_]”] at 136:14–
137:16; 144:9–16).
14
AA71 (Reid Test. at 62:3–5).
15
AA51, AA72 (Reid Test. at 198:2–13; 63:1–15).
16
AA10–11 (Master Corporal Casey Bouldin Testimony [hereinafter “Bouldin Test. at [_]”] at
34:15–36:15); see also AA12 (Detective Ronald Phillips Testimony [hereinafter “Phillips Test. at
[_]”] at 42:20–22).
4
was “cold and stiff” with multiple gunshot wounds.17 They observed that he had “a

hoodie around his head” and “a couple marks in the back of his jacket.”18

B. The Police Interview Matthews and Search His Cellphone
On December 28, 2017, two detectives from the New Castle County Police

Department interviewed Matthews about Terry’s death.19 During the interview, the

detectives asked Matthews about his cellphone. At first, he told them that he did not

have a cellphone.20 Matthews ultimately relented and provided them with a

cellphone number.21 When asked why he initially refused, he told them that he

“didn’t want to give the number out.”22 The detectives then had the following

exchange with Matthews:

[Unknown Detective]: Well, listen, here’s one thing I want
to go over with you, okay? So everybody that we’ve
talked to, okay, uh, I know you’re kind of like funny about
your cellphone, and you don’t want to give me the
cellphone number.

[Matthews]: You can, you can have it [unintelligible][.]

17
AA11 (Bouldin Test. at 35:20).
18
Id. (Bouldin Test. at 36:1–3); see also AA14 (Phillips Test. at 47:2–5). Detective Reid described
a photograph of Terry from the scene: “[i]t appears as though he has a – starting from the top, he
has a white hood over his head, a black jacket, like a black puffy jacket.” AA72 (Reid Test. at
66:11–13).
19
See AA338–52 (Matthews Int.). The interview transcript identifies one of the detectives as
“Detective Smith” and the other as “unknown detective.” See, e.g., AA338 (Matthews Int.). The
interview was captured on Detective Smith’s body camera. Id.
20
AA338 (Matthews Int.).
21
AA345 (Matthews Int.).
22
Id.
5
[Unknown Detective]: Well, here’s the thing; we have a
search warrant for it.

[Matthews]: Okay.

[Unknown Detective]: Okay? So, uh, we’re going to take
it anyway.

[Matthews]: Yeah, you can [unintelligible][.]

[Unknown Detective]: Um, and I don’t want you to think
there’s any ill will behind it.

[Matthews]: Mm-hmm.

[Unknown Detective]: But what happens is if, if we know
somebody had contact with him, we take their cellphone.
And it’s not saying that we think you did anything wrong.

[Matthews]: Uh, I don’t have it on me, but you can, you
can definitely have the number.

[Unknown Detective]: Okay. Where is, where is the
physical cellphone at?

[Matthews]: In town, uh, at my brother’s house.

[Unknown Detective]: Okay. Um, we’re going to need to
get [ahold] of that.

[Matthews]: I got to buy a whole new phone?

[Unknown Detective]: No, no, no, so here’s what happens,
um, we get the phone. We do what’s called a forensic
examination.

[Matthews]: Yeah, that’s –

[Unknown Detective]: Basically hook it up to a computer.

6
[Matthews]: Oh, okay, alright.

[Unknown Detective]: Um, they dump the contents of it,
and then we give it right back to you.23

At trial, Detective Eugene Reid, one of the lead detectives on the case, confirmed

that the police seized Matthews’s cellphone: “we had a search warrant to collect his

[cellphone], and we collected that from him at his residence.”24 In fact, the police

did not secure a search warrant until the following day.25

On June 18, 2018, a grand jury indicted Matthews for first-degree murder,

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession or control of

a firearm by a person prohibited, and purchase of ammunition by a person prohibited

(which was dropped by the State).26 The possession or control of a firearm by a

person prohibited charge was severed and proceeded to a bench trial.27

C. The Trial of Shaheed Matthews
Matthews was tried for first-degree murder and for possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony in April 2019. At the outset, the State

23
AA349 (Matthews Int.).
24
AA64 (Reid Test. at 32:21–23).
25
The detectives interviewed Matthews on December 28, but the warrant was not applied for nor
issued until the following day. See App. to Opening Br., Ex. I.
26
Matthews v. State, 241 A.3d 220, 2020 WL 6557577, at *2 (Del. 2020) (TABLE) [hereinafter
“Direct Appeal Order”].
27
Id.
7
acknowledged that its case was “entirely circumstantial.”28 On numerous occasions

throughout the trial, the State both referred to and asked witnesses about the evidence

derived from Matthews’s cellphone.

1. The State’s Opening Statement
The State repeatedly referred to evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone

in its opening statement. For example:

• “[Y]ou will hear evidence taking the form of video
surveillance, [cellphone] evidence, and witnesses.”29

• “[Y]ou will also hear evidence pertaining to the
defendant’s [cellphone] . . . . And you will hear the
contents of the defendant’s phone as it pertains to the
evening of December 27th, 2017, into the following
morning on the 28th.”30

• “[G]oing with the defendant’s phone, ladies and
gentlemen, you will hear evidence beginning with 7:36
p.m. on the evening that Antoine Terry was murdered, and
you will hear evidence that the defendant texted Antoine
Terry.”31

• “And you will hear additional [cellphone] evidence taken
from the defendant’s [cellphone] where we expect you
will hear that the defendant called his girlfriend, Devon
Johnson, at 10:45 p.m. They have a 29-second
conversation.” 32

28
AA174 (Trial Tr. at 41:19–23) (“Our case is entirely circumstantial with respect to video
evidence, gunshot residue, and the inconsistencies in the statements from prior witnesses, along
with the reenactment video[.]”).
29
AA5 (Trial Tr. at 14:6–8) (emphasis added).
30
Id. (Trial Tr. at 14:10–18).
31
AA5–6 (Trial Tr. at 14:20–15:1) (emphasis added).
32
AA6 (Trial Tr. at 18:17–21) (emphasis added).
8
• “Going back to the defendant’s [cellphone] again, you will
hear much evidence from that where you will hear
evidence that the defendant calls a gentleman named
Kevin Scott.”33

• “You will also see from the records that are discussed that
the evidence will show the defendant made zero calls or
zero text messages to Antoine Terry after they parted ways
the evening of December 27.”34

• “[I]t’s the State’s burden to prove to you beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant was the one who
murdered Antoine Terry . . . through the totality of the
evidence of the defendant’s [cellphone], the statements
from the witnesses . . . .”35

2. The Cause of Terry’s Death & Related Physical Evidence
The medical examiner assigned to the case testified that Terry’s cause of death

was multiple gunshot wounds.36 She acknowledged that the State “[did not] know

the time of [Terry’s] death.”37

The police never found the murder weapon.38 Although the Delaware State

Police’s firearm identification expert was able to identify the caliber class of the

bullet fragments found at the scene—.38 caliber—he acknowledged that a “.38

33
AA7 (Trial Tr. at 20:9–12) (emphasis added).
34
Id. (Trial Tr. at 20:20–21:1).
35
AA9 (Trial Tr. at 27:5–14) (emphasis added).
36
AA140 (Dr. Jennie Vershvovsky Testimony [hereinafter “Vershvovsky Test. at [_]”] at 113:14–
114:2).
37
Id. (Vershvovsky Test. at 114:21).
38
AA156 (Reid Test. at 176:8–14).
9
caliber class includes several cartridge designations” that are all “very close in

diameter” and can include “all of your 9 millimeters, .380’s, your .38’s, and .357

magnum[,]” all of which are “very close in diameter.”39 He noted that there are

many types of firearms that could fire a .38 caliber bullet and he therefore could not

identify the specific type of firearm that was used.40

3. Surveillance Video Evidence
The State presented video surveillance evidence taken from the following

locations:

• A residence at 241 Parma Avenue.41

• A residence at 19 Briarcliff Drive (which runs parallel to
Parma Avenue).42

• A playground near the Arbor Place Apartments (located in
part on Parma Avenue).43

• A laundromat at 256 Parma Avenue.44

39
See AA146 (James Storey Testimony [hereinafter “Storey Test. at [_]”] at 136:9–18).
40
Id. (Storey Test. at 136:19–138:9). He also acknowledged that it was possible that more than
one firearm could have been used. See id. (Storey Test. at 138:4–9) (“Q. Yes. So whatever
generated the whole Projectile 3, it could have been the same gun that fired 1 and 2, or it could
have been a different gun, correct? A. I couldn’t tell you whether it was the same or whether it
was not.”).
41
See AA45–46, AA49 (Detective Brandon Morris Testimony [hereinafter “Morris Test. at [_]”]
at 171:1–178:11; 188:14–16).
42
See AA46–47 (Morris Test. at 178:12–182:2; AA34–35 (Rasheeda Lee Testimony [hereinafter
“Lee Test. at [_]”] at 129:12–131:2).
43
See AA40–41 (Detective Alexandra Knorr Testimony [hereinafter “Knorr Test. at [_]”] at
154:7–155:4, 156:19–157:14).
44
See AA52–53 (Reid Test. at 202:17–203:7)
10
• A 24-hour continuously operating pole camera that was
physically located on Parma Avenue but looked out on the
nearby intersection of Bizarre Avenue and Briarcliff
Drive.45

The video surveillance evidence—devoid of sound and mostly in black and

white—is of varying, and often poor, quality. In the portions of the videos in which

people are visible, the low quality of the images and the distance from which the

video was recorded preclude any conclusive identification of the individuals.

The State played eight video clips from a home surveillance system at 19

Briarcliff Drive taken on the night of the shooting:

• Two videos, approximately thirty seconds long (one is
zoomed in), from 8:34 p.m. showing two distant figures
exiting 227 Parma Avenue.46

• Two videos, approximately forty-five seconds long
(identical except for the fact that the latter is zoomed-in),
from 9:47 p.m. showing three distant figures entering 227
Parma Avenue.47

• Three videos, approximately three minutes long, from
10:38 p.m. showing a light go off and two grainy figures
appearing to walk out of 227 Parma Avenue (identical
except for the fact that the second video displays a yellow

45
See AA42 (Detective Michael Santos Testimony [hereinafter “Santos Test. at [_]”] at 159:12–
160:23). Santos, a detective on the case who specializes in electronic surveillance, described the
“covert camera system located on Parma Avenue”: “[t]hat system is a video only retention system
where a covert camera is deployed to provide coverage of Parma Avenue at different locations.
And that video is saved on a network video recorder at headquarters[.]” Id. (Santos Test. at
159:12–13, 17–22).
46
See AA59 (Reid Test. at 11:13–13:12).
47
See id. (Reid Test. at 13:13–14:14).
11
circle highlighting the entrance to 227 Parma, and the third
is a zoomed-in version).48

• One video, twenty-seven seconds long, from 10:46 p.m.
showing one grainy figure walking out of the home.49

When asked about whether he saw some type of altercation or argument in the above

videos, Detective Reid said that “[a]ll [he] could testify to is that they’re just seen

walking.”50

The State also played three better quality clips of the surveillance video taken

from 241 Parma Avenue. Two videos, about eight seconds long, show two

individuals running down Parma Avenue at 10:46 p.m.51 One individual appears to

have at least one arm outstretched and seems to be running behind another individual

wearing a dark jacket and a hood on their head. The third video shows a car driving

down Parma Avenue at 10:47 p.m.52 Detective Reid acknowledged that he could

not clearly discern the vehicle’s make and model, nor could he see the vehicle’s

license plate number or its occupants.53

The State also showed the jury footage provided by management from the

nearby Arbor Place Apartments. One twenty-second-long video shows a playground

48
See AA60–61 (Reid Test. at 14:15–17:20, 18:9–19:12).
49
See AA62 (Reid Test. at 24:13–25:11).
50
See AA69 (Reid Test. at 53:19–54:2).
51
See AA61–62 (Reid Test. at 19:20–24:12).
52
See AA62 (Reid Test. at 25:15–26:8).
53
See AA70 (Reid Test. at 56:8–58:17).
12
and a car driving down Parma Avenue at 10:47 p.m.54 Another thirty-four second

video shows the front of a laundromat at 256 Parma Avenue and a car driving down

the street.55

The last set of video surveillance clips shown by the State was from a New

Castle County Police Department pole camera that looked out on the nearby

intersection of Bizarre Avenue and Briarcliff Drive. The first twenty-one second

video from 10:48 p.m. shows a vehicle driving on Parma Avenue and taking a left

turn at the end of the street.56 The second clip, which is fifteen seconds long and

shot at 11:31 p.m., shows a car turning left onto Parma Avenue.57 The final sixteen-

second clip from 11:57 p.m. shows a car turning right onto Parma Avenue and

driving down the street.58

4. Non-Law Enforcement Witness Testimony
The State also presented testimony from several civilian witnesses, including

Matthews’s girlfriend, Devon Johnson; Terry’s then-girlfriend, Tia Mosley;

Matthews’s close friend, Chanelle Brooks; Matthews’s friend, Kevin Scott, who

lived at 231 Parma Avenue; and Antoine Harrison, a nearby resident who looked

through his blinds after he heard gunshots.

54
See AA62–63 (Reid Test. at 26:9–27:3).
55
See AA63 (Reid Test. at 27:4–16).
56
Id. (Reid Test. at 27:17–28:19).
57
Id. (Reid Test. at 30:3–13).
58
See AA63–64 (Reid Test. at 30:14–31:1).
13
Johnson testified about the state of Matthews’s and Terry’s friendship on the

night of Terry’s shooting. She noted that the two men had been “friends for about

six years” and that on the evening of December 27, “everybody[] [was] having a

good time” and that no one was “fighting, or yelling, or doing anything . . . to

antagonize anyone else during the game.”59 And, as further described below, the

State questioned Johnson about several pieces of evidence derived from Matthews’s

cellphone, including questions about his call logs—including calls between the two

of them and as calls between Matthews and others—and some of their text message

exchanges.60

Mosley, for her part, had little recollection of the night of the shooting.61 She

could not recall the events of December 27 and 28, 2017, nor what she told Detective

Reid when he interviewed her on December 28.62

Chanelle Brooks, a close friend of Matthews, also testified. She stated that

her grandfather passed away on December 27 and that Matthews had visited her that

day to offer his condolences.63 She told the jury that, later that night, Matthews came

to her house before midnight to drop off her car, which he frequently borrowed.64

59
See AA99 (Johnson Test. at 171:17–172:23).
60
See infra I(C)(6).
61
See AA76 (Tia Mosley Testimony [hereinafter “Mosley Test. at [_]”] at 80:18–81:5).
62
See AA76–77 (Mosley Test. at 81:6–84:20).
63
AA114–115 (Chanelle Brooks Testimony [hereinafter “Brooks Test. at [_]”] at 10:7–11:7).
64
AA115–116, AA121 (Brooks Test. at 14:15–15:7, 36:4–7).
14
She said that Matthews came inside to give her back her keys.65 Mosley assumed

that Johnson dropped Matthews off because “[Johnson] rarely [came] in the house,

but [Matthews] never has anyone else drop him off or pick him up to my house

besides [her].”66

Harrison, a nearby resident, testified that when he looked through his blinds

around 10:30 p.m. after hearing gunshots, he “[saw] a dark figure” who “had a

hoodie on. . . . And [] was big.”67 He thought that the figure was wearing an outfit

that was either “real dark gray or black” and that his hood “was over his head.”68

Harrison told the jury that the figure appeared to have an extended arm, but he was

not able to tell “whether . . . he was pointing,” and he “didn’t see a weapon” because

“[i]t was too dark.”69 He also observed that “the pole light was not on, and that’s

one of the bad parts about that too.”70 “If it was on[,]” Harrison speculated, “[he]

might have [something] [more] [he] could really say about the situation.”71 He “just

did not see what the figure looked like” and could not see “the figure’s face.”72

65
AA116 (Brooks Test. at 15:3–6).
66
Id. (Brooks Test. at 15:7–12); see also AA121 (Brooks Test. at 38:1–4).
67
See AA36–38 (Harrison Test. at 136:14–145:4).
68
AA38 (Harrison Test. at 143:1–13).
69
AA37 (Harrison Test. at 140:17–23, 141:3–4).
70
Id. (Harrison Test. at 139:7–10).
71
Id.
72
AA37 (Harrison Test. at 141:7–8, 142:18–20).
15
5. Physical Evidence
The State also presented evidence of gunshot residue that was found on the

right cuff of a dark blue winter jacket that the police recovered from Matthews when

he was arrested.73 He wore the jacket to the New Castle County Police Department

headquarters the day he gave the detectives his phone.74 A forensic scientist from a

materials characterization lab testified that “there was a population of gunshot

residue present” on Matthews’s jacket.75 She acknowledged that she could not tell

how long the gunshot residue had been present on his coat, noting that she could not

“say how [gunshot residue] got there, [or] when it got there. Just that it’s there.”76

She conceded that “it was possible” that “it could have gotten there a month ago, a

year ago” or even “multiple years ago” and that gunshot residue “can sometimes get

trapped within the weave of the fabric” and can “actually stay . . . on fabric[] for a

long period of time.77 She also described how gunshot residue can get on fabric by

means other than firing a weapon, namely through being in close proximity to

someone firing a weapon or through transfer, such as someone grabbing the material

73
See AA132, AA133 (Tarah Helsel Testimony [hereinafter “Helsel Test. at [_]”] at 81:3–82:1;
83:7–84:17); see also AA8 (Trial Tr. at 23:1–6).
74
AA4 (Trial Tr. at 7:2–4).
75
AA134 (Helsel Test. at 90:6–10).
76
AA135 (Helsel Test. at 91:18–19).
77
AA134–35 (Helsel Test. at 90:23–91:23).
16
or rubbing up against it.78 No gunshot residue was found on the left cuff or front

right pocket of Matthews’s jacket.79

6. Evidence from Matthews’s Cellphone
The State presented and questioned witnesses extensively about the evidence

that police derived from Matthews’s cellphone, including call records and text

messages.

The State questioned Johnson about the timing and content of text messages

and calls between her and Matthews.80 For example, the State questioned her about

a text message exchange she and Matthews had the morning after the shooting:

Johnson: “I love you so much, and I cannot lose
you.”

Matthews: “You won’t babe. Come to me as soon
as you get off[.]”

Johnson: “Changes have to be made now, okay[.]”

Matthews: “I agree.”81

The prosecution also asked Johnson about the phone calls she made to Matthews

around 11:00 p.m. on the evening Terry was killed, as well as the two brief

78
AA135 (Helsel Test. at 93:15–94:17).
79
See AA133 (Helsel Test. at 83:7–84:17).
80
See AA94–95 (Johnson Test. at 153:15–155:14, 157:12–158:9).
81
See id.
17
conversations they had within the span of a few hours that night and a phone call

they had around 7:00 a.m. the following morning.82

The State next presented Brooks with Matthews’s call records. The

prosecution asked her about a phone conversation the pair had at 11:20 p.m. on the

night of the shooting.83 The State also asked her about what appeared to be a missed

call she received from Matthews at 11:35 p.m. and a twenty-four second call she

made to Matthews five minutes later.84

The State also questioned Kevin Scott, Johnson’s neighbor at 231 Parma

Avenue, about Matthews’s call records, including calls between Scott and Matthews

on the night of the shooting. Scott told the jury that, during a call at 11:09 p.m.,

Matthews asked if Scott was “okay” because he heard that shots were fired nearby.85

The State also asked Scott about a missed call he received from Matthews at 11:18

p.m. and a brief conversation the two had at 11:20 p.m.86

Additionally, the State presented evidence of Matthews’s text messages and

internet search history related to a potential gun purchase. The trial judge admitted

the evidence over trial counsel’s objection under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Specifically, the State introduced text messages that Matthews exchanged with an

82
See AA93–94 (Johnson Test. at 149:23–153:14).
83
AA116 (Brooks Test. at 15:16–16:21).
84
See id.
85
AA123 (Kevin Scott Testimony [hereinafter “Scott Test. at [_]”] 46:10–22).
86
AA123–126 (Scott Test. at 46:23–55:6).
18
unknown person on December 20, 2017, in which Matthews inquired about the cost

of a “Taurus Millennium,” and, after the individual replied “450[,]” Matthews

responded with, “[t]hat’s too much.”87 In addition, the State presented evidence of

Matthews’s search history on December 25 and 26, 2017, showing that he “searched

through Google” the terms “Ruger 45” and “Ruger P97.”88 On cross-examination,

Detective Reid acknowledged that Matthews’s internet search was “just a general

search” and that “[t]here’s no indication a purchase was made, or any

attempt to purchase.”89

7. The State’s Closing Argument
Evidence from Matthews’s cellphone also featured prominently in the State’s

closing argument. For instance:

• “Now, [I] mentioned the defendant’s cellphone.
[Matthews’s] [c]ellphone is important, it’s one of those
things that’s consistent. You got three calls, incoming
missed from Devon Johnson at 10:49. You got a call to
Kevin Scott right afterwards at 11:09.”90

• “You heard Detective Reid testify he went through the
defendant’s cellphone, there’s no texts from anybody
indicating that there had been shots fired from Parma and
there were no other calls in between those missed calls
from Devon Johnson and when the defendant called Kevin
Scott to see if everything was [alright].”91

87
AA184, AA185 (Reid Test. at 82:17–23; 83:5).
88
AA184 (Reid Test. at 80:8–19).
89
AA191 (Reid Test. at 109:13–17).
90
AA220 (Trial Tr. at 34:15–21) (emphasis added).
91
Id. (Trial Tr. at 35:8–14).
19
• “But then we go through the defendant’s cellphone some
more, 7:34 in the morning: I love you so much and I can’t
lose you. Just seven minutes later. . . . [H]ow are those
text messages in relation if she did not know already?”92

• “There’s more from the defendant’s cellphone. . . .
December 25th and 26th, the defendant has three searches
for a firearm on his cellphone. You heard Detective Reid
testify that these searches were subsequently deleted
before he handed that cellphone over to [the] New Castle
County Police.”93

• “December 20th, got text messages from an unidentified
person on defendant’s phone saying: These folks just hit
him. They have a Taurus Millennium – the detective
testified to is a gun. He asks how much? It’s 450. There’s
a picture of the gun. The defendant says that’s too
much.”94

• “[A]t some point in time [Matthews] learns that his good
buddy has been murdered blocks from his house – we
don’t see a single text message. Not to Antoine Terry
asking him if he’s okay or to anyone else talking about
how his good friend has now passed. We don’t see a single
phone call to Antoine Terry after the shots fired. . . .
[M]aybe he didn’t call Antoine Terry because he knew he
was dead because he’s the one that killed him.”95

In total, the State mentioned the cellphone evidence at least eighteen times in its

closing argument.

92
AA221 (Trial Tr. at 38:18–39:15) (emphasis added).
93
Id. (Trial Tr. at 39:18–40:1).
94
Id. (Trial Tr. at 40:8–13).
95
AA229 (Trial Tr. at 71:7–72:5) (emphasis added).
20
8. The Verdict & Sentencing
The jury found Matthews guilty on both charges. On July 1, 2019, the

Superior Court sentenced Matthews to life plus three years in prison.96 Matthews’s

direct appeal of his convictions followed.

D. Matthews’s Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, Matthews “raise[d] one narrow ground[—]whether the

Superior Court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to admit evidence at

trial about Matthews’s internet search history and text messages related to the

possible purchase of a gun.”97 Specifically, he “limited his challenge to relevance,

and contend[ed] that the State did not show a nexus between the possible gun

purchase and the actual gun used to kill Terry.”98 This Court affirmed his

convictions.99

E. Matthews’s Motion for Postconviction Relief & Appeal
In October 2021, Matthews filed a pro se Rule 61 motion for postconviction

relief.100 He argued that trial counsel was ineffective on four grounds: (i) for failing

to disclose the pole camera “and/or investigate camera footage for exculpatory

96
AA334 (Sentencing Order).
97
Direct Appeal Order at *1.
98
Id. at *2.
99
Id. at *3.
100
See AA240–245 (Matthews’s Motion for Postconviction Relief).
21
evidence[;]”101 (ii) for “unlinking” Matthews’s two criminal cases;102 (iii) for failing

to call Detective Smith (Detective Reid’s partner) to testify;103 and (iv) for failing to

prepare for trial “and/or for failing to challenge the introduction of Mr. Matthews[’s]

[cellphone] evidence[.]”104

The Superior Court ordered Matthews’s trial counsel to respond and counsel

subsequently submitted an affidavit.105 As to Matthews’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel on the ground that trial counsel should have moved to suppress

the evidence derived from Matthew’s cellphone, counsel averred that he “did not see

a basis for objecting to the exclusion of all the [cellphone] information as a whole”

and “recall[ed] objecting to a portion of the [cellphone] data in conference with the

State and [the trial judge] . . . but [the] objection was overruled.”106

On January 3, 2023, the Superior Court rejected all of Matthews’s arguments

for postconviction relief.107 Relevant to this appeal, the Superior Court made several

holdings regarding whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to

101
AA244.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
AA245. Matthews separately argued that his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective
on two grounds. See id. Neither of these arguments were raised on this appeal.
105
See AA281–85 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).
106
AA283 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).
107
See State v. Matthews, 2023 WL 21545, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2023) [hereinafter
“Postconviction Decision”].
22
suppress the evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone.108 The court first

acknowledged that the cellphone warrant was invalid given that it was an

unconstitutional general warrant.109 Even so, the court found that it did not matter,

holding that Matthews provided valid consent to the officers because he “offered to

provide his phone to the police” and that he “made the offer before officers notified

him that they had already obtained a warrant for his phone.”110 The court further

held that even if the consent was defective, the cellphone evidence “had no bearing

on the outcome of the case” and thus was not prejudicial, because “[t]he video

evidence, combined with [] Johnson’s statements, leaves the [c]ourt with no room to

reasonably conclude anyone other than [] Matthews could have been the shooter.”111

On appeal, Matthews sole ground for claiming that his trial counsel was

ineffective is that trial counsel failed to move to suppress the evidence obtained from

his cellphone. The Court appointed pro bono counsel as amicus curiae for purposes

of this appeal in August 2023.

108
See id. at *8.
109
Id.
110
Id. at *8–9 (emphasis in the original).
111
Id. at *9.
23
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief

for abuse of discretion.112 We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de

novo.113

III. ANALYSIS

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the

right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. 114 Our Court has

time and again reiterated that the right to counsel is the bedrock of our adversary

system.115 Under Strickland v. Washington, a criminal defendant pursuing an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim must show two things: (1) that his counsel’s

performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his

defense.116

Defense counsel is deficient where counsel’s representation falls below an

objective standard of reasonableness.117 Judgments made by trial counsel that are

“so far out of the realm of reasonable trial strategy” can qualify as ineffective

112
Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del.
2013)).
113
See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325; see also Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1093–94 (Del. 2021)
(citation omitted).
114
See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
115
See, e.g., Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807, 821 n.55 (Del. 2021) (citing Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d
1053, 1104 (Del. 2021) (citing cases)).
116
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
117
See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325 (citing Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997)).
24
assistance.118 To prove that trial counsel was deficient, a criminal defendant must

show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.119 A defendant bears a heavy burden to

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range

of reasonable conduct.120

To demonstrate that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice, a

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.121 A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome and is a lower standard than “more likely than not.” 122 For the reasons

stated below, we find that Matthews has satisfied both prongs of this test.

A. Trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the cellphone
evidence constituted deficient performance under Strickland’s
first prong.

Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the cellphone evidence on two

grounds: (1) the warrant for Matthews’s cellphone was an unconstitutional general

warrant; and (2) Matthews did not provide valid consent to the police to search the

contents of his cellphone. Failure to do so was deficient under Strickland.

118
Id. at 330.
119
See Panuski v. State, 41 A.3d 416, 421–22 (Del. 2012).
120
Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014).
121
See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
122
See Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d at 821 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94).
25
1. Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the
cellphone evidence because the warrant for Matthews’s
cellphone was an unconstitutional general warrant.

As a general matter, absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement,

warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.123 Here, the Superior

Court held that the warrant obtained by police to search Matthews’s cellphone was

an unconstitutional general warrant.124 The State does not dispute this holding or

argue otherwise.125 And we agree—the warrant permitted police to conduct an

“exploratory rummaging” through Matthews’s phone.126 And trial counsel should

have been aware of the issues with the warrant, as Wheeler and Buckham had already

123
See Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1063 (Del. 2015) (citations omitted).
124
See Postconviction Decision at *8 (citations omitted) (“[T]he [c]ourt finds the [cellphone]
warrant to be a general warrant[—]that scrouge of executive overreach ‘abhorred by the colonists’
that permitted ‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for vaguely-defined
categories of contraband.”). This Court has recently addressed general warrants directed to the
search of electronic devices at length. See, e.g., Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 661–67 (Del.
2024); Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 613–19 (Del. 2021); Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 18–19
(Del. 2018); Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 299–304 (Del. 2016).
125
See Answering Br. at 8–10; AA306–312.
126
Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d at 298; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
For example, in the affidavit to the warrant, the officer attested that “through investigative
interviews, it is alleged that Antoine Terry had shot Shaheed Matthews’[s] girlfriend in the leg
approximately two years ago.” App. to Opening Br., Ex. E. at ¶ 11. Yet the scope of the search
is not limited to the date of that supposed shooting, rather it is undefined. And the scope of the
search is broad and was targeted at “[t]he digital contents of any and all attached storage devices”
to “include[,] but not limited to call logs, SMS (text messages), MMS (Media) messages, internet
browsing history, images and or videos, any and all information that may identify subjects and or
co-conspirators,” and “any and all information[.]” App. to Opening Br., Ex. E.
26
been decided before the pendency of this case. Matthew’s trial counsel plainly

should have challenged the warrant’s constitutionality.

Review of counsel’s performance under Strickland is deferential and we

respect the “wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.”127 But

on this record, nothing suggests trial counsel’s choice was tactical. In his affidavit,

trial counsel averred that he “did not see a basis for objecting to the exclusion of all

the [cellphone] information as a whole.”128 And during trial, counsel only made an

evidentiary objection under D.R.E. 404(b) as to a subset of information derived from

Matthews’s phone. Here, the decision to object, “rather than being a tactical

decision, is better described as damage control” after failing to move to suppress the

warrant in the first instance.129 Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to do so was

deficient under Strickland.

2. Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the
cellphone evidence because Matthews did not provide
valid consent to search his phone.
Even if a search warrant is found to be an unconstitutional general warrant, a

search will not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted with a person’s

127
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see id. (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after
it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable.”).
128
AA283 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).
129
See Starling, 130 A.3d at 328.
27
valid consent.130 Consent can be express or implied.131 Under Bumper v. North

Carolina,132 the State has the burden of proving that Matthews voluntarily consented

to the search of his cellphone.133 Its burden “cannot be discharged by showing no

more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”134 The State did not meet

its burden here.

In its decision below, the Superior Court concluded that Matthews provided

valid consent because he “offered to provide his phone to police” and did so “before

officers notified him they had already obtained a warrant for the phone.”135 We

disagree and believe the record supports a different conclusion. The interview

between Matthews and the detectives shows that Matthews did not provide the

detectives with valid consent to search his phone:

[Unknown Detective]: Well, listen, here’s one thing I want
to go over with you, okay? So everybody that we’ve
talked to, okay, uh, I know you’re kind of like funny about
your cellphone, and you don’t want to give me the
cellphone number.

[Matthews]: You can, you can have it [unintelligible][.]

130
See Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1023 (Del. 2017).
131
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 855 (Del. 2009).
132
391 U.S. 543 (1968).
133
Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (footnotes and citations omitted) (“When a prosecutor seeks to rely
upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent
was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”).
134
Id. at 548–49.
135
Postconviction Decision at *8–9.
28
[Unknown Detective]: Well, here’s the thing; we have a
search warrant for it.

[Matthews]: Okay.

[Unknown Detective]: Okay? So, uh, we’re going to take
it anyway.

[Matthews]: Yeah, you can [unintelligible][.]136

This exchange cannot be fairly read to show that Matthews unequivocally consented

to a search of his cellphone. It is ambiguous at best. The above excerpt suggests

that before the detectives told Matthews that they had a warrant, they were

discussing his cellphone number rather than the cellphone itself. At most, Matthews

provided consent to search his cellphone after law enforcement told him they had a

warrant. This is insufficient. Under Bumper, there can be no consent where the

official conducting the search has first asserted that they have a warrant.137

The trial court and the State both assert that this case is factually analogous to

the Blackwood case that this Court recently affirmed.138 There, the defendant’s

consent was not obtained upon the announcement that the police had a warrant.

Instead, the defendant’s consent was given freely: he volunteered the pattern

passcode that was required to search his phone, when the detective had trouble

136
AA349 (Matthews Int.) (emphasis added). The State does not dispute the unintelligible portions
of the interview transcript.
137
Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548.
138
Postconviction Decision at *9 (citing State v. Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465, at *6–7 (Del.
Super. Feb. 27, 2020), aff’d, 306 A.3d 529 (Del. 2023)).
29
accessing his phone with the passcode, he entered the passcode for the detective and

instructed him again on how to gain access to his phone, and he also freely provided

his cellphone number.139 He also encouraged the detective to access information in

his cellphone to verify his alibi.140 Blackwood is thus inapposite. Here, it is not clear

that Matthews was referring to his cellphone when he said, “you can have it.”

Rather, given the unintelligible portions of the transcript, and the context of the

conversation, the statement was ambiguous at best.

Ambiguity as to whether a party provided valid consent is resolved against a

finding of consent.141 Here, we find that Matthews did not provide valid consent to

the detectives to search his cellphone. Thus, trial counsel’s failure to move to

suppress the evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone was deficient under

Strickland. We now must determine whether Matthews’s claim passes muster on

the prejudice prong of Strickland.

B. Trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the cellphone
evidence prejudiced Matthews.

We find that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced Matthews. “When a

defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable

139
See Blackwood v. State, 306 A.3d 529, 2023 WL 6629581, at *6 (Del. 2023) (TABLE).
140
Id.
141
See State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Del. Super. 1993) (finding “ambiguous and
equivocal” purported “consent” insufficient); United States v. Taverna, 348 F.3d 873, 878 (10th
Cir. 2003) (cleaned up) (government must “proffer clear and positive testimony that consent was
unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given”).
30
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt

respecting guilt.”142 This is the case here. We disagree with the Superior Court’s

holding that “even if the consent was defective, the [cellphone] evidence had no

bearing on the outcome of the case.”143 The trial record shows, and the State has

repeatedly conceded, that it relied heavily on the cellphone evidence given that its

theory of the case was premised entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The other circumstantial evidence that the State presented was not so

overwhelming that we can be confident that Matthews would have been found guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt without the cellphone evidence. The trial court held that

“[t]he video evidence, combined with [] Johnson’s statements, leaves [it] with no

room to reasonably conclude anyone other than Mr. Matthews could have been the

shooter.”144 We cannot agree.

The video surveillance evidence is not as strong as the trial court purports.

First, the video evidence from 19 Briarcliff does not—as the trial court suggests—

show with any certainty that two people were getting into a fight. The nighttime

video quality is very poor and the individuals in the video are not identifiable. They

142
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
143
Postconviction Decision at *9.
144
Id.
31
appear to be walking.145 In the clearest set of surveillance footage from 241 Parma,

although it shows two individuals running down the street with one person appearing

to chase the other with an outstretched arm, the individuals remain unidentifiable,

and their faces are never shown. The other videos show an unidentifiable vehicle.

Thus, even given Johnson’s statements as to when Matthews and Terry left the

home, there is in fact room to conclude that the shooter could be someone other than

Matthews.

The remaining circumstantial evidence fares little better. No murder weapon

was found, the gunshot residue found on Matthews’s coat could not be linked to

Terry’s killing, no witnesses linked Matthews to the shooting, and the trial testimony

of both Johnson and Brooks was inconsistent with the prior statements they gave to

the police. Without the cellphone evidence, the State’s case is significantly weaker.

And our objective assessment of the likely prejudicial effect of the evidence derived

from Matthews’s cellphone is consistent with the trial court’s own statements that it

made during trial.146

145
Indeed, when asked about the footage, Detective Reid did not testify that it showed a physical
altercation. Rather, he told that jury that “all [he] could testify to was that it showed two
individuals walking.” AA69 (Reid. Test. at 54:1–2). When asked about his opinion on what was
happening in the video, he stated that “[w]hen [he is] viewing the video, it appears as though there
are two figures standing there, granted, very small. . . . At some point in time those figures appear
to be going back and forth, which I took as a physical altercation.” AA202 (Reid Test. at 153:15–
22) (emphasis added).
146
See, e.g., AA175–176 (trial judge acknowledging that certain cellphone evidence was both
material and prejudicial).
32
Moreover, the trial record is replete with references to evidence obtained from

the search of Matthews’s cellphone and demonstrates that it was material and

significant. From the start to the end of Matthews’s trial, the State repeatedly

admitted how important Matthews’s cellphone evidence was to its case, including

for purposes of proving plan, motive, and intent.147 The arguments that the State

made in support of the admission of Matthews’s text messages about purchasing a

gun and gun-related internet search history are particularly illustrative. For example,

the State underscored how “probative” and “material” that evidence was to its case,

while also acknowledging that it was “certainly” prejudicial.148 Indeed, the

prosecutor argued that the evidence was “need[ed]” because “[n]o gun was

recovered[,]” “[t]here [we]re no eyewitnesses saying the defendant murdered

Antoine Terry[,]” and the State’s case was “entirely circumstantial.”149 The State

cannot now change position and disclaim the importance of the evidence.150

147
See, e.g., AA220 (Trial Tr. at 34:15–17) (stating in closing argument how “important” evidence
was from Matthews’s cellphone due to its “consistenc[e]” given that the testimonial evidence was
inconsistent).
148
AA173, AA174 (Trial Tr. at 37:13; 41:1–2).
149
AA174 (Trial Tr. at 41:17–20). The trial judge agreed: “I think it is material. Both the text
message[s] and the [i]nternet search are material to the ultimate fact in dispute in this case as to
whether or not the defendant intentionally killed the victim, Antoine Terry, with a gun.” AA175
(Trial Tr. at 45:10–16) (emphasis added). And the judge concurred that such information was
prejudicial: “I think it’s got prejudice, and the State’s acknowledged that.” AA176 (Trial Tr. at
45:10–16).
150
At oral argument, while conceding that its case was circumstantial, the State appeared to change
tack, arguing that the cellphone evidence was merely “duplicative.” See Delaware Supreme Court,

33
Without the evidence derived from Matthews’s cellphone, there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of Matthews’s trial would have been

different. Accordingly, Matthews was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient

performance under Strickland’s second prong.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court erred in denying Shaheed

Matthews’s Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief. We therefore REVERSE and

VACATE Matthews’s convictions. We REMAND this case to the Superior Court

for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Oral Argument Video, Vimeo, at 32:12–33:38; 45:12–24; 46:14–19 (March 12, 2024)
https://vimeo.com/922089824.
34