Neil Nettleton v. Jennifer Cohan, Director of the DMV

IN THE C()URT ()F COMM ()N PLEAS FOR TI“IE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND F()R NEW CAS“I`LI`§ C()UNTY

NEIL NE'I`TLETON,
Appellant,

C.A. No. CPU4-13-OO3812
v.

JENNIFER COHAN,
DIRECTOR ()F THE DELAWARE
DIVISION ()F I\/IOTOR VEHICLES

\._/\_/\./\_./\_.'-.../\_z\_/\_/\_/\_/\_/

Appellee.
Subniitted: june 11, 2014
Decided: July 1, 2014
Kevin P. O’Neill, Esq. Frederick H. Schranck, Esq.
1201 King Street Departrnent of Justice
Wilmington, DE 19801 P.O. Box 778
Al'lorneyfor the Appellant Dover, Delaware 19903

A!'lr)rneyfor Appellee

FINAL ORDER AND OPINI()N FOLLOWING
APPEAL FROM ’I`HE DIVISI()N ()F MO'I`OR VEHICLES

Neil Nettletoil, Appellant (hei‘eiriafter' "Nettletori" or "Appeilant") brings this appeal from
a decision of the Division of I\/lotor Vehicles (hereiiwaftei‘ "DMV") denying the reinstatement of

his license on the basis of an outstanding perinanerit revocation of privileges in the state of

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illinois The DMV denied the reinstatement, as l)claware and illinois are party states to the
iiiterstate Driver’s License Conipact (hereinafter "the Coiiipact"), and under illinois law, any
driver with four or more driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI") convictions will have

his license permanently revoked.
FACTS

Appellant was initially issued a Dela.ware Driver’s license i\lo. 1014750 on October 4,
1990. Appellant was also issued a Delaware license on l\/larch 4, 1999. Appellant possessed an
illinois driver’s license for a short period of time before surrendering it in July 2000 and
receiving a Delaware license. it was during the time Appellant possessed an illinois license that
he was convicted of DUI in lllinois.

Appellant has four DUI convictions.' On October 26, 2010, Appellant satisfied all of the
requirements necessaryz for reinstatement of his Delaware driving privileges However, the State
of illinois revoked Appellant’s illinois license after' receiving notice that Appellant had been
convicted of a fourth DUI, and as a result, the Delaware i)i\/IV refused to issue a new license.

T_he DMV did not issue a formal denial of Appellaiit’s request for reinstatement, and no
hearing was held. Tlie parties agreed that the issue will be addressed on the aforementioned
facts.

S'FANHAILD or Rl~:vlr<;w

"The standard of review of an appeal from an administrative decision of the DMV is on

the record, and, as such, is limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the hearing officer's factual findings and conclusions of

l 'l`wo in Delaware (1992 and 2006); one in illinois (2000); and one in New jersey (2004).
2 Appellant satisfied both the legal requirernezits and tile aicohol education and improvement
programs required for reinstatement.

law."3 'l` he Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the decision
below if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is the "product of an orderly and
logical deductive process."4' “'l`he substantial evidence standard demands more than a scintilla
but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Substaiitial evidence requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."$
Discusslon

Appellant argues that the Dl\/IV erred in refusing to issue a license due to the illinois
permanent revocation because the one-year limit on the extra-territorial revocation has passed.
Appellant also argues that the "blind coinputerizatioii"" present in this case violates Article I,
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.~

i. Tbe Dl\/IV Did Not Er'r in `Refusing to Reinstate Appellant’s Privileges

Pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2?'07(b)(2), "|_`t]he Departinent shall not issue an
operator’s...license to any: (2) Person whose license has been revoked under this chapter until
the expiration of 1 year after such license was revoi<ed."

The illinois statute specifically states that a person may not make an application for a

license if the individual has a fourth violation of "'siinilar out»of~state offenses."é Defendant,

although his fourth DUi occurred in Delaware, still connnitted four DUis, and the Delaware DUi

is considered a "sirnilar out-of-state oftense"’ for the purpose of applying the illinois statute '
Under the Compact, if the applicant held a license in another state, which was later

revoked, and the revocation was never terrninated, the licensing authority in the state where the

3 Lundz`rz v. Coharz, 2009 WL 188001, at * 2 (i`)el. Com. l’l. Jan. 28, 2009) (citing Shahan v.
Landing; 632 A.2d 1357 (Del 1994)).

4 Howard v. Vosh~ell, 621 A.2d 804, 806 (Del. Super. 1992) (quoting Quaker' I{z'll Place v. State
Hurnan Relalfons', Del.Super., 498 A.2d 175, 179 (1985`)).

5 Howard, 621 A.2d at 806 (citing Quaker~ Izii!! Pface, 498 A.2d at 179).

6 625 iii camp star sas-20a

application was made shall not issue a license to drive.? Appellant'relies heavily on the
exception contained within this .paragraph, which states that after one year has passed from the
date of revocation, the individual may apply for a license q`f`j)erlrtilled by lana Arguably,'with
slightly different facts, if the offense was committed in l`)elaware, the Court may permit a license
reinstatement. However, that is clearly not the case here. As the Court found in full v_
Cr)mrnissioiver o_flhe Departnzenz o_f[“`i,¢l)lic Sug‘iery:

Ait. V of the `Cornpact does not provide an exception to § 6-103(/§)(3)

[Oklahoma’s statute proliibiting the issuance of license to individuals meeting

certain criteria]. if he latter statute plainly proliibits the issuance of an Oklahoma

driver’s license to an individual who is silbie<.‘t to an extraterritorial revocation or

suspension. ...{'l`he Defendant] is ineligible...to apply for an Oklahoma driver’s

license because his driving privileges are currently revoked in another

jurisdiction. 'fo hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the general purpose

and object of both the Compact and § 6-103(./§)(3).8

'l`he Appellant argues that the Court si'zouid apply the law as set forth in Sfare v.
Vargasozr, a decision out of the Suprenie Court of lowa, in which the Court allowed the one-year
exception to apply when allowing for the issuance of a temporary restricted license to an
individual whose license had been pei‘rnarieiitly revoked in Florida.g I-Iowever, that case is
distinguishable from this matter, as the iowa Supi'eine Court granted the issuance of a lerrzporary

reslrz`c!ed Zicense, not a completely unrestricted license as the Defendant seeks here.

721 nat C. § 3101 Ai-~r_ v. § 2.
8 176 P.sa 1227, 1232 (oi<ia.civ.npp. 200'7;.
9 607 N.w.za 691, 699.

' The law of Delaware also encompasses the (_Toiiipact, which requires the state to respect
the laws of other party statcs. ln this inatter, then, Delaware law requires the DMV to abide by
the permanent revocation from lllinois. As the Court in Gwin v. M`otor Vehicle Adminz'.s“l'ral'ion
stated, "the Compact was not intended to encourage ‘the worst and most dangerous drivers to
avoid- the consequences of their conduct by siinply inoving into another party state.""lo The
Compact further states that “[t]he licenslrrg 'attthorit_v rnay refuse to issue a license to any such
applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority cleterniiiies that it will not be safe to grant
to such person the privilege of driving a inotoi' vehicle on the public liigliways."][

Delaware, as the licensing authority, has the authority to take into account safety when
determining whether to issue an individual a license. ‘“The licensing authority must make the
above-cited determination [whether it will or will not be safe to grant an individual the privilege
of driving] as to safety, and the prior revoeatiori, together with the circumstances thereof, will he
relevant considerations."”lz I)efendaiit has four l)l,l"is, which causes great concern to this Court
when deciding whether to aliow for the issuance of i`)eiendant"s Delaware license. Tlie Court
does not believe that it should risk the safety of its citizens by overturning the DMV’s refusal

Tlierefore, the Court has found that substantial evidence exists to uphold the decision of
the DMV to refuse to issue a license to Appellaiit. The State of Delaware may recognize
revocations that were not issued by Deiaware, but by party states to the Compact. This Court
recognizes Appellant’s argument that there does exist a one-year exception to the revocation
paragraph, liowevel‘, the Coinpact does not require that each state apply the exception. The State

of Delaware should not, as the Gn»z'n court reasoned for i\/Iaryland, become a "safe harbor for

10 Gwin v. Mr)tor Vehicle Adri'zirtzsiralion , 869 A.Qd 822, 335 (l\/ld.Ct_App. 2()05).
"21,0@1. C. §sioi Art.v. §2.
‘2 la parte :»V@i¢a, 519 seed 5'1')', 522 rata it)s'/").

=;
.,

extraterritorial drivers who have incurred liarsh penalties in their horne state for motor vehicle

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violations."

ll. The Use of 'Coinotlters to Transinit Driviiig lnli`ormation'Betweeii the State
Signatories of the Compact Does Not \i`iolate P_trt. l, 5 6 of the Delaware Constitution
Appellant argues that the information sharing between state computers violates his due
process rights, and "leads to Delaware’s blind enforcement of another state’s lion-substantially
similar law.""l Appellant argues that because the Delaware Constitution provides greater rights
for Delaware citizens than under tire Constitution of the llnited States, the Delaware courts must
"implicate the State’s own protections to vindicate the rights of Delaware citizens."l$
Wltile Appellant cites case law in support of his argument that he has a right to appeal the
decision of the DMV, and that the courts must strive to protect the rights of Delawareans, he
offers no actual support, other than his own words, for his argument that denying an individual a
license under Delaware law violates that same iiidi"vio'ual ”s du.e process rights.
Appellant may disagree with the sharing of iin"orinatioii between party states to the
Compact, but preventing information sharing ultim:aitely prevents the giving of full faith and

credit to the Compact.

‘~'* rat
‘4 Appellant’s Reply Brief, p. 6.
15 id at 7. Section 6 reads: "'l`he people sliall be seen in their pezrsons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or thing, shall issue ‘-)vit`hoiit tiescribi ng them as particularly as may be; nor then,
unless there be probable cause supported by oath or ar`firiitatioii." Dl§ls. CONST., Art. l, § 6.

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3.

Cor~icl,usg)_i§
lt is uncontested that Appellaitt "foolisltly"’ eonnnitted four DUIs,"’ ultimately resulting

in a permanent revocation of his driving privileges in lllinois, where Appellant formerly held a

license. Under the Compact, party states cannot issue an individual a license if the individual has `

a revoked license in another state. Althoiigh an exception exists, the Court does not apply it to
this rnatter, and instead follows the Cornpact’s terms and instead considers the safety of its
citizens utilizing the public highv»'ays.

After consideration of the case law, this Court is satisfied that it does not seek to allow a
potentially dangerous individual to avoid the consent uences of his four DUIS, which includes a
permanent license revocation The Court treas considered not only the application of the Coinpact
to this matter, but has applied a policy of protection for its citizens The Court has determined
that "it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the
public highways,"'? and therefore will not overturn the Dl\/l"V’s denial of a license to Appellarit.

IT lS S() ()RDI§REI) this 1“ DA`§r' OF .l"Ui,'lt', 2014

j¢/z_ l( t»»~l c h
.loltnvK. Welch, Judg,e

16 "l\/lr. Nettleton foolishly later picked up two more DUI’s [sic], one in New jersey in 2004 and
one in Delaware in 20(¥5." Appellant"s l`<‘e_t)l‘,./ Brie,f ;‘. 6.
" 211)@1. C. § 3101 Ai~t.v. §2.