Patricia A. Breitenbach v. John M. Wissler

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF
DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

PATRICIA A. BREITENBACH
Plaintiff-Below/Appellant
C.A. No. CPU4-22-001231

Vv.

JOHN M. WISSLER

Nee Name Nee Ne Nee Nee ree ee eee”

Defendant-Below/Appellee.

Submitted: March 10, 2023
Decided: May 30, 2023

Alpa V. Bhatia, Esq. Ann M. Kashishian, Esq.

222 Delaware Ave., Suite 1105 501 Silverside Rd., Suite 85
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19809
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Anthony D. Delcollo, Esq. Patricia C. Meringer, Esq.

222 Delaware Ave., Suite 1105 5020 Clark Rd. #238
Wilmington, DE 19801 Sarasota, FL 34233

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

Admitted Pro Hac Vice

FINAL ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
DISMISS DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIMS

DANBERG, CJ.
This matter is an appeal de novo from a decision of the Justice of the Peace
Court. Two motions are before the Court: (1) Defendant-Below/Appellee John
Wissler’s Motion to Transfer the case to Superior Court,’ and (2) Plaintiff-
Below/Appellant Patricia A. Breitenbach’s motion to dismiss all crossclaims
asserted against her. Having reviewed and considered the pleadings, the briefing,
the record, the oral arguments presented by the parties, and for the reasons stated
below, Defendant’s Request to Transfer is DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

i. Factual Background

This action stems from a 2009 agreement between the parties, pursuant to
which Mr. Wissler stored two trailers (the “Trailers”), along with business-related
carpentry tools (collectively, the “Trailers/Tools”) on Ms. Breitenbach’s property
for a monthly fee. The relationship between the parties eventually soured, and a
breach occurred in 2015. Although the parties’ narratives diverge as to the precise
date and nature of the breach, it occurred no later than May 18, 2015, when Mr.
Wissler traveled to Delaware to remove the Trailers/Tools and was denied access to

the property by Ms. Breitenbach.”

'Mr. Wissler’s request to transfer the matter was raised in a letter to the Court; however, given the
subsequent briefing on the issue, the Court will construe his letter request as a Motion to Transfer.
* Pl. Reply Supp. Resp, § 14; Def. Supp. Resp., J 8; Def. Answ., § 7.

2
Meanwhile, in May 2014, Mr. Wissler filed for divorce from his then-wife,
Sherri (who is also the daughter of Ms. Breitenbach), thereby triggering a
preliminary injunction under 13 Del. C. § 1509, which enjoined Mr. Wissler and/or
Sherri from “transferring, encumbering, concealing or in any way disposing of any
property.”> In February 2015, Mr. Wissler learned that, subsequent to her initial
filings, Sherri had accounted the Trailers as marital property.*_ On March 9, 2016,
Sherri filed for bankruptcy, which stalled the divorce proceedings for nearly three
years.© The bankruptcy matter concluded on June 14, 2019,° and the divorce was
finalized shortly thereafter on September 10, 2019.’

ii. Legal Proceedings Pertaining to the Trailers/Tools

Ms. Breitenbach initiated this litigation in the Justice of the Peace Court on
February 6, 2020, when she filed two Abandoned Property actions under 25 Del. C.
§ 4002.8 Specifically, Ms. Breitenbach sought to obtain title to the Trailers; she
claimed the Trailers were abandoned when Mr. Wissler ceased making storage fee

payments in 2015. Mr. Wissler contested the action,’ and a hearing was held on

313 Del. C. § 1509(a)(1).

4 Def. Aff., 4 6 (Dec. 19, 2022).

> In re Sherrie L. Wissler, Pet. # 16-10603-BLS. Importantly, Sherri did not claim the Trailers as
an asset subject to the bankruptcy proceeding.

6 Id.

’ Wissler v. Wissler, Del. Fam. C,A, No. CN14-02186 (Order)(Sept. 10, 2019).

8 Breitenbach v. Wissler, J.P. C.A. JP9-20-000354; Breitenbach v. Wissler, J.P. C.A. JP9-20-
000353.

° Mr. Wissler did not assert any counterclaims against Ms. Breitenbach in the course of the Justice
of the Peace Court proceedings.
April 8, 2022.'° In a written decision dated May 11, 2022, the Justice of the Peace
Court found that Ms. Breitenbach did not meet her burden of proof to establish that
Mr. Wissler abandoned the Trailers. Specifically, the Justice of the Peace Court
found that, pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 4001(b), the Trailers could not be deemed
“abandoned personal property” because the Trailers were marital property subject to
divorce ancillary hearings."!

On May 26, 2022, Ms. Breitenbach timely filed a notice of appeal and
complaint in this Court. In her complaint, Ms. Breitenbach did not assert a claim for
abandoned property, as she had done in the Justice of the Peace Court; rather, she
asserted a garagekeeper’s lien under 25 Del. C. § 3901 and a replevin claim. On
both causes of action, she requested judgment in the amount of $24,999, plus interest
accruing from April 2015.

On September 8, 2022, Mr. Wissler filed an answer, which included a demand
for a trial by jury on page 17 of the document, as well as three counterclaims: (1)
breach of contract; (2) tortious interference with business opportunity; and (3)
conversion. In support of his counterclaims, Mr. Wissler asserted that, although he
ceased making payments for the storage of the Trailers/Tools in 2015, the parties

agreed that he would remove the Trailers/Tools by May 31, 2015. He further alleged

10 Breitenbach v. Wissler, J.P. C.A. JP9-20-000353, Perez-Chambers, J. (May 11, 2022).
11 Td
that on May 18, 2015, he traveled to Delaware to retrieve the Trailers/Tools, but Ms.
Breitenbach denied him access, which rendered him unable to continue his carpentry
business. In all, Mr. Wissler sought $140,000, plus punitive damages for emotional
distress.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in motion practice, with Ms. Breitenbach
moving to dismiss Mr. Wissler’s counterclaims on September 22, 2022, and Mr.
Wissler moving to transfer the matter to Superior Court on October 11, 2022.'7 On
November 9, 2022, the Court held a status conference, during which the parties
presented oral argument on the pending Motions. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the Court ordered supplemental briefing.”’

iii. | The Motion to Transfer

In his Motion to Transfer and related briefing, Mr. Wissler argues that the case
must be transferred to Superior Court for two reasons. First, he argues that his

counterclaims, which total $145,000, exceed this Court’s $75,000 jurisdictional

!2 Tn the Motion to Transfer, which was submitted via e-filing on October 11, 2022, Mr. Wissler
noted that a check in the amount of $210.00 was enclosed, presumably to satisfy the deposit needed
to transfer the matter to superior court. The docket indicates that the check was received by the
Court on November 1, 2022.

3 Ip all, the parties submitted the following briefs: Mr. Wissler’s Response (Oct. 12, 2022); Ms.
Breitenbach’s letter response (Oct. 12, 2022); Mr. Wissler’s letter response (October 13, 2022);
Ms. Breitenbach’s Reply (Oct. 26, 2022); Mr. Wissler’s Supplemental Response (Dec. 20, 2022);
Ms. Breitenbach’s Reply to Supplemental Response (Jan. 5, 2023); Mr. Wissler’s Response to the
Court’s order for supplemental briefing (Feb. 15, 2023); Ms. Breitenbach’s Reply to Response to
the Court’s order for supplemental briefing (March 8, 2023); and, Mr. Wissler’s Letter in response
to Ms. Breitenbach’s Reply (March 9, 2023).
limit.'4 Second, he argues that he demanded a jury trial in his first responsive
pleading and paid the requisite fee to transfer the case to Superior Court.!° He
concedes that the jury trial demand was not included on the first page as required
under court rules, but asserts that such was “mere scrivener’s error,” which can be
corrected with leave to amend the pleading to comply with court rules.'®

Ms. Breitenbach counters that, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1322(b), the Court of
Common Pleas has no monetary jurisdictional limits on counterclaims.'’ She argues
that the jury trial demand was not endorsed on the first page of his pleading, nor was
the fee paid within five days after service of the Answer and, by failing to comply
with those statutory requirements, Mr. Wissler waived his right to a trial by jury.'®

iv. The Motion to Dismiss

In her Motion to Dismiss and related briefing, Ms. Breitenbach raises a
number of arguments, chiefly that Defendant’s counterclaims are time-barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations.'? Specifically, she argues that all of Mr. Wissler’s
counterclaims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which commenced

no later than May 18, 2015 and expired three years later in May 2018.” She also

4 Def. Mot. Transfer, § 4.

'S Td.; Def. Supp. Resp., § 8, 31-35.
16 Trp. 5 at § 12-23.

'7 Pl. Reply, § 2.

18 Td. at (2; Pl. Rep., J 25-28.

19 Pl. Mot. Dismiss, J 7, 11, 14.

20 Td.
argues that the breach of contract claim should be dismissed because the agreement
was not “valid” at the time the alleged breach,”! and the tortious interference claim
was not pled with sufficient specificity and in violation of the Mirror Image Rule.”

In response, Mr. Wissler argues that his claims are not time-barred because
extraordinary circumstances—the divorce proceedings—warrant equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations.7? He contends that the Trailers/Tools were subject to the
preliminary injunction imposed upon the initiation of the divorce proceedings, thus
any effort to retrieve them during the pendency of the divorce would be in violation
of the injunction and expose him to civil or criminal penalties.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether the

claimant may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances

susceptible of proof under the complaint.*? If recovery is possible, the court must

*1 Iq.,4 4. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court need not address these contentions.

22 Id., 410, 12.

3 Initially, Mr. Wissler suggested that an automatic stay in the bankruptcy proceeding precluded
him from asserting his crossclaims. Def. Resp. § 10; Tr. at p. 10, (19-23. On January 20, 2023,
the Court entered an order directing Mr. Wissler to produce documentation to support his claim
that the Trailers/Tools were subject to the bankruptcy proceeding. In his written response, Mr.
Wissler indicated that he did not “definitively assert that the personal property at issue in this case
was included as assets” in the bankruptcy. Def. Resp. to Ct. Order, 94. Mr. Wissler subsequently
indicated that the issue of the bankruptcy proceeding was “likely moot” given the divorce and
relevant timeline. Def. Supp. Resp. to Ct. Order. The Court agrees. Nevertheless, the same
conclusions drawn with regards to the divorce proceeding likewise apply to the bankruptcy
proceeding.

4 Def. Resp., | 8-9; Def. Supp. Resp. J 4, 13, 15

25 Karl Owens v. Carman Ford, Inc., 2013 WL 5496821, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2013).

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deny the motion to dismiss.”° The court must view the record “in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are considered most

strongly in favor of the [non-moving party].”?’

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Transfer

As an initial matter, the Court notes that this is an appeal de novo from the
Justice of the Peace Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9571. As there are no civil jury
trials in the Court of Common Pleas, a demand for a jury trial would necessitate
transfer of the case to Superior Court, which would seemingly obfuscate the
statutorily enacted procedure for appeals from the Justice of the Peace Court.”
However, this Court need not determine whether a jury trial demand can be raised
in the first instance on appeal in the Court of Common Pleas because, even if this
action had been initiated in this Court, Mr. Wissler failed to properly demand a jury
trial, thereby waiving his right to a trial by jury.

Under 10 Del. C. § 1328(b), where an action is initiated in the Court of
Common Pleas, a non-commencing litigant may demand a trial by jury by satisfying

two inevasible conditions. First, the non-commencing litigant must demand a trial

26 Id.

27 Halpern Eye Assoc., P.A. v. E.A. Crowell & Assoc., Inc, 2007 WL 3231617 (Del. Comm. Pl.
Sept. 18, 2007).

28 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rossi Auto Body, Inc., 787 A.2d 742 (Del. Super. Jan 12, 2001).

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by jury, either by endorsement on the first page of the pleadings immediately
following the case caption, or by filing and serving a demand upon the other parties
within “[five] days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.””
Second, the non-commencing litigant must deposit the fee for commencement of an
action in Superior Court with the Clerk of the Court; the deposit must be tendered
within five days of the service of the demand.*° Importantly, § 1328(c) specifies that
failure to timely file and serve a demand or failure to timely deposit the applicable
fee “constitutes a waiver of trial by jury.”?!

Here, Mr. Wissler filed his responsive pleading on September 8, 2022.
Although he did demand a jury trial within the pleading, the demand was set forth
on page 17 of the filing—not on the first page immediately below the case caption
as required under §1328(b). At the status conference, counsel for Mr. Wissler
attributed the placement of the demand to “mere scrivener’s error” which, she
maintained, could be corrected with leave to amend her pleading.*? However,
counsel did not point to, and this Court is not aware of, any legal authority to support

her assertion that deviation from the demand placement mandated in § 1328(b) can

be corrected months later, and the temporal limitations set forth in the statute suggest

2° 10 Del. C. § 1328(b).
30 Td.

31.10 Del. C. § 1328(c).
32 Tr, p. 5 at J 12-23.
otherwise.*? Further, even if the demand had appeared on the first page as required,
Mr. Wissler still failed to properly invoke the right to a jury trial because he did not
deposit the necessary fee with the Clerk of the Court within five days as required
under §1328(b).** Therefore, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1328(c), Defendant has
waived his right to a trial by jury, and his late-asserted demand for a jury trial cannot
serve as a basis to transfer the matter to Superior Court.

Mr. Wissler’s argument that the case must be transferred on the grounds that
his counterclaims are beyond this Court’s jurisdictional limit is likewise without
merit. Indeed, this Court’s civil jurisdiction is limited to claims that do not exceed
$75,000.25 However, 10 Del. C. § 1322(b) explicitly excludes counterclaims from
this Court’s monetary jurisdictional limit, and affords this Court unlimited
jurisdiction over counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims.*°

For those reasons, Mr. Wissler’s Motion to Transfer is DENIED.

II. Motion to Dismiss

33 Even after filing the responsive pleading, § 1328(b) afforded Mr. Wissler the opportunity to
properly demand a jury trial by serving the demand within five days. He did not. Instead, Mr.
Wissler did not serve his jury trial demand until October 11, 2022, more than a month after the
filing of his responsive pleading,

34 Mr. Wissler identified the check in his motion, which would have been untimely, but also it was
not actually deposited with the clerk of the court until November 1.

35.10 Del. C. § 1322(a).

36 Specifically, 10 Del. C. § 1322(b) provides that this Court “shall have unlimited jurisdiction
over counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims . . . and any judgment rendered on any
such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim which exceeds the sum of $75,000 shall be
valid in all respects.”)

10
It is undisputed that all of Mr. Wissler’s counterclaims are subject to three-
year statutes of limitations.*’ It is also undisputed that the statutes of limitation
commenced no later than May 18, 2015, when Mr. Wissler was denied access to the
Trailers/Tools.** |The question before the Court is whether the ensuing
circumstances warrant tolling of the statutes of limitations such that Mr. Wissler’s
claims would not be time-barred.

Delaware law recognizes the doctrine of equitable tolling, which “stops the
running of the statute of limitations in light of established equitable
considerations.”?? Equitable tolling may be appropriate where it is shown that
extraordinary circumstances prevented the claimant from timely asserting his
rights.”

The parameters of “extraordinary circumstances” have not been explicitly
delineated, but Delaware courts have considered the following factors when
analyzing whether the circumstances warrant tolling of the statute of limitations: (1)
whether the party, through litigation or other means, asserted the claim before the
statute of limitations ran; (2) whether the delay was attributable to a material,

unforeseeable change in personal or financial circumstances; (3) whether the delay

37 P], Mot. to Dismiss, J 7, 11, 14; Def. Supp. Resp., § 21; 10 Del. C. § 8016; 10 Del. C. § 8106.
38 P]. Reply Supp. Resp, 4 14; Def. Supp. Resp., { 8; Def. Answ., 7.

39 Qwens v. Carman Ford, Inc., 2013 WL 5496821, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 20, 2013)(quoting
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 116 (D. Del. 1986).

* Td.

il
was due to a legal decision in another jurisdiction; (4) the extent to which the
opposing party knew of, or participated in any prior proceedings; and (5) whether at
the time this litigation was filed, there was a bona fide dispute as to the validity of
the claim.’! The Court may exercise its discretion, considering all relevant facts, in
determining whether tolling of the statute of limitations is warranted.”

(1) No pursuit of counterclaims before the statute of limitations expired

Mr. Wissler waived any argument as to factor (1) by not raising it in his
briefing. Regardless, there is no intimation that Mr. Wissler made any effort to
assert his claims prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In fact, Mr.
Wissler’s inertia in pursuing his claims is particularly highlighted when juxtaposed
against cases in which the party’s efforts to timely assert their claims supported
equitable tolling.“ For example, in Levey v. Brownstone Asset Management, LP,
the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the first factor in that it had previously

asserted it’s claim as a counterclaim against the defendants in a proceeding in

41 [4C/InterActiveCorp v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011); see also Levey v. Brownstone
Asset Management, LP, 76 A.3d 764, 770 (Delaware 2013).

42 [4C/InterActiveCorp v. O'Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011).

43 Emerald P'rs y. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (“Issues not briefed are deemed
waived”).

44 See, e.g., O’Brien, 26 A.3d. at 175, 176-77, 178 (plaintiff initiated arbitration proceeding before
statute of limitations ran); Stewart v. Wilmington Trust SP Services, Inc., 112 A.3d 271 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 26, 2015)(finding plaintiff adequately pursued claims by engaging in “extensive litigation”
activity in related actions).

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another jurisdiction, sent a letter demanding payment and warning of potential for
litigation, and demanded arbitration.*°

Here, despite ample opportunity, Mr. Winkler gave no intimation that he
intended to pursue claims against Ms. Breitenbach for over seven years.*° Therefore,
factor (1) does not weigh in favor of tolling the statutes of limitations.

(2) Delay in filing was not attributable to an unforeseeable change in
personal or financial circumstances.

Mr. Wissler argues that his financial circumstances were changed in a material
and unforeseeable manner when he was denied access to the property on May 18,
2015. He reasons that the denial of access to the Trailers/Tools “deprived him of his
entire livelihood” resulting in a significant change to his financial circumstances.*’

This is not the type of circumstantial changes contemplated in the
“extraordinary circumstances” analysis. For one, Mr. Wissler’s alleged change in
financial circumstances was not unforeseeable, as it is the very basis of his
counterclaims—that is, his counterclaims are to recover for financial damages
allegedly incurred as a result of the May 18 denial of access to the Trailers/Tools.

Further, what Mr. Wissler is asking is, in effect, for the statute of limitations to

45 Levey v. Brownstone Asset Management, LP, 76 A.3d 764, 771 (Del. 2013).
46 Although the statute of limitation had run by the time this litigation was initiated in the Justice
of the Peace Court, it is worth noting that Mr. Wissler failed to assert his claims in the course of

those proceedings.
“” Tr. at p.10, J 3-23; p.11, J 1-7.

13
simultaneously be triggered and tolled, which is not appropriate where the harm was
readily apparent.*®

In any event, the existence of a change in financial or personal circumstances
alone are insufficient to tip the scale in favor of Mr. Wissler. Rather, he must relate
that change in financial circumstances to the delay in the pursuit of his claims. He
did not. Given the lack of connection between his purported change in financial
circumstances and his over seven-year delay in pursuing his claims against Ms.
Breitenbach, this factor does not weigh in Mr. Wissler’s favor.

(3) No legal determination caused delay

As to factor (3), Mr. Wissler argues that he was delayed in bringing his claims
due to his divorce proceedings, which remained open from May 2014 through
September 10, 2019. He claims that, because of the preliminary injunction, he could
have been subjected to civil and criminal penalties had he made any attempt to
retrieve his Personal Property while the preliminary injunction was in effect.

This argument is untenable. Mr. Wissler’s claims against Ms. Breitenbach
are factually and legally distinct from the divorce proceedings. At most, the

preliminary injunction precluded Mr. Wissler from “transferring, encumbering,

concealing or in any way disposing of” the Trailers/Tools. However, Mr. Wissler’s

48 See Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement Fund vy. Collis, 287 A. 3d 1160, 1178 (Del. Ch.
2022).

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claims have no bearing on the possession or title of the property—he did not assert
a claim for replevin or detinue. Rather, his claims against Ms. Breitenbach (who
was not a party to the divorce proceedings) are strictly to recover money damages.
Mr. Wissler’s contract and tort-based causes of action against Ms. Breitenbach were
wholly unencumbered by the preliminary injunction imposed in the divorce
proceeding. Further, it is also evident from Mr. Wissler’s own actions that he was
not operating under the mistaken belief that, during the pendency of the divorce, he
could not pursue his claims against Ms. Breitenbach. Specifically, Mr. Wissler tried
to retrieve and relocate the Trailers/Tools on May 18, 2015, at which time the
preliminary injunction was in place. Therefore, it cannot be said that Mr. Wissler’s
failure to timely pursue his claims was attributable to fear of violating the
preliminary injunction.

(4) Participation in prior proceedings.

In arguing that involvement in prior proceedings weighs in his favor, Mr.
Wissler generally referenced the divorce proceeding. However, Ms. Breitenbach’s
awareness or participation in the divorce proceeding is not relevant here. As
discussed above, that proceeding had no factual or legal overlap with the claims

asserted in this action.” Therefore, it is not a “prior proceeding” for purposes of the

49 Chertok v. Zillow, Inc., 2021 WL 4851816, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2021)(action in another
court was “factually and legally distinct from this action and can hardly be characterized as a “prior

15
equitable tolling analysis. The only litigation that could be characterized as a “prior
proceeding” in this context is the original Justice of the Peace Court action—a case
which emphasizes Mr. Wissler’s dilatory approach to his claims, because he did not
raise the claims against Ms. Breitenbach in the Justice of the Peace Court.

(5) No bona fide dispute as to the validity of the claims

Mr. Wissler did not raise any argument as to factor (5), therefore the issue is
waived. However, “the Delaware Supreme Court ‘[i]nterprets a ‘bona fide dispute’
to mean that the claim would survive a motion to dismiss or, in other words, is not
futile.”’°° “In application, this factor is most commonly fulfilled by a previous
affirmative court finding that the untimely claims are valid.”*! No such finding has
been made as to Mr. Wissler’s crossclaims and, “even if a ‘sound’ claim was
pleaded, that factor alone ‘does not justify a finding of extraordinary circumstances
when the weight of the other factors cuts against such a finding.””*
Mr. Wissler failed to sufficiently allege facts to support a finding that

extraordinary circumstances existed that prevented him from bringing his claims

before the statute of limitations expired. He took no action that would be recognized

proceeding”); Winklevoss Capital Fund, LLC v. Shaw, 2019 WL 994534, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1,
2019).

°° Td. (quoting Daugherty v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 2018 WL 3217738, at *7 (Del. Ch. June
29, 2018)

>! Winklevoss, 2019 WL 994534, at *9.

>2 Chertok, 2021 WL 4851816, at *10 (quoting BioVeris Corp. v. Meso Scale Diagnostics,
LLC,Corp., 2017 WL 5035530, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2017)).

16
as important in the pursuit of his claims before the end of the limitations period, and
equitable tolling is not available for such garden variety claims of excusable neglect.
Therefore, Mr. Wissler’s counterclaims are barred by the applicable three-year
statutes of limitations, and the Court need not address Ms. Breitenbach’s remaining
arguments.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s request to transfer the matter to
Superior Court is DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s
Counterclaims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

cc: Patricia Thomas, Judicial Case Manager

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