Navaretta v. Duong

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN NAVARETTA, individually )
and as Personal Representative of the )
ESTATE OF SABRINA )
NAVARETTA, MARA )
NAVARETTA, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) C.A. No. N24C-01-024 DJB
v. )
)
BRITNEY DUONG, PHI SIGMA )
SIGMA, INC., DAVID SULLIVAN )
and UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: August 28, 2024
Decided: August 29, 2024

Memorandum Opinion On Defendant
University of Delaware’s Motion to Dismiss – DENIED

Decision on University of Delaware’s Motion to Stay Discovery and Motion for
Protection Order – DENIED AS MOOT

Gary S. Nitsche, P.A., James Gaspero, Jr., Esquire, Nitsche & Fredricks, LLC,
Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Plaintiffs

James D. Taylor, Jr., Esquire, Marisa R. De Feo, Esquire, Jessica M. Jones,
Esquire, Juliana G. Clifton, Esquire, Saul Ewing LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Counsel for the University of Delaware

BRENNAN, J.
This civil action arises from a motor vehicle collision in which Sabrina

Navaretta (“Navaretta”), a University of Delaware (“University”) student, was killed

while driving home from a University sponsored Greek life event called “Airband.”

Navaretta was a member of the Phi Sigma Sigma, Inc. (“Phi Sigma Sigma”) sorority

at the University. While a passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Britney Duong

(“Duong”), the two were struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant David Sullivan

(“Sullivan”). This collision occurred at the intersection of Library Avenue and

Wyoming Road in Newark, Delaware. Tragically, Navaretta passed away from her

injuries she suffered in the crash.1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging Wrongful Death against Duong for the

negligent operation of her motor vehicle,2 Phi Sigma Sigma under the doctrine of

Respondeat Superior,3 Sullivan for the negligent operation of his motor vehicle,4 and

the University for negligence in that they failed to “provide safe transportation to

and from the Airband event.”5 Plaintiffs complaint includes a claim against all

1
Navaretta v. Duong, et al., N24C-01-024 DJB, D.I. 1, ¶¶12-16. For purposes of a
Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes all well pled allegations are true. Cent.
Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings, LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del.
2011).
2
Id. at ¶ 21.
3
Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23.
4
Id. at ¶ 24.
5
Id. at ¶¶ 19, 25.
defendants for willful and wanton misconduct.6 In lieu of an Answer, both Phi

Sigma Sigma7 and the University8 filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs opposed

each motion.9

Prior to argument on these motions, Plaintiffs and Phi Sigma Sigma reached

an agreement and that motion was withdrawn.10 Following argument, a Stipulation

of Dismissal was filed for then-Plaintiffs Nicolle Navaretta and Andrew Navaretta,

siblings of Sabrina, regarding their respective mental anguish claims against all

defendants.11 Following argument, the University filed a Motion to Stay Discovery

and a Motion for Protective Order requesting relief from entertaining the deposition

of Duong pending the decision on its Motion to Dismiss.12 For the reasons that

follow, the University’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, thus necessitating that the

Motion to Stay and the Motion for Protective Orders are DENIED as MOOT.

6
Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. Plaintiffs have a pending Motion to Amend the Complaint
seeking to add the parents of Defendant Sullivan, a minor, to the claim for
negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. D.I. 43. This motion was filed post-
argument on the instant matter and is scheduled to be heard in October per the
parties agreement. D.I. 48.
7
D.I. 15.
8
D.I. 23.
9
D.I. 21, 33.
10
D.I. 38.
11
D.I. 39.
12
D.I. 57, 68.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “must

determine whether the claimant ‘may recover under any reasonably conceivable set

of circumstances susceptible of proof.’”13 It must also accept all well-pleaded

allegations as true and draw every reasonable factual inference in favor of the non-

moving party.14 Even vague allegations must be accepted, if they give the opposing

party notice of the claim.15 The “reasonable conceivability” standard asks whether

there is a “possibility” of recovery.16 The Court need not give weight to conclusory

allegations of fact or law.17 At this preliminary stage, dismissal will be granted only

when the claimant would not be entitled to relief under “any set of facts that could

be proven to support the claims asserted” in the pleading.18

13
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n, 2018 WL 3805740,
*1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2018) (quoting Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del.
1978)).
14
Id.
15
See Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings, LLC, 27 A.3d at
536; Doe v. Cedars Academy, 2010 WL 5825353, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 27,
2010).
16
Sustainable Energy Generation Grp., LLC v. Photon Energy Projects B.V., 2014
WL 2433096, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014).
17
Cantatore v. Univ. of Delaware, 2021 WL 2745107, at *2 (Del. Super. June 30,
2021).
18
See Furnari v. Wallpang, Inc., 2014 WL 1678419, at *3–4 (Del. Super. Apr. 16,
2014) (quoting Clinton v. Enter. Rent–A–Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. July 29,
2009)).
III. ANALYSIS

The University’s argument centers upon the claim that Plaintiffs cannot

recover under the derivative Wrongful Death Statute and the Survival Act statute

unless they can prove negligence.19 The University posits Plaintiffs are unable to

make a showing that it neither owed Navaretta “an applicable duty and did not

proximately cause her injuries,”20 therefore there is no reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances for which Plaintiffs can recover and the claims against it should be

dismissed.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the University’s motion “obstructs the

discovery process.”21 They continue that they are “entitled to investigate the facts

and theories of liability during discovery.”22 Plaintiffs also argue that both prior

decisional case law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 323 supports their

position regarding the duty the University owed to Navaretta.23

19
D.I. 21, ¶23.
20
Id. at ¶ 9.
21
D.I. 33.
22
D.I. 33, ¶12.
23
Restatement § 323 provides as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).
To pursue a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant owed

plaintiff a duty of care, the duty was breached by the defendant, and the breach was

the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.24 Whether said duty exists is a question

of law for the trial judge to determine.25 If the trial judge finds the defendant owed

no duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.26 Under Delaware law, there is no affirmative duty to aid or protect a plaintiff

unless the defendant and the plaintiff share a special relationship.27

In certain circumstances, a duty of care can be borne from a special

relationship existing between a student and a university.28 Here, however, the record

is currently devoid of any special relationship existing between the University and

Navaretta for this circumstance. Navaretta’s status as a University student alone

does not create a special relationship.29 The current record establishes that Navaretta

was a passenger in a privately owned, non-University vehicle, traveling on public,

non-University following a University sanctioned event.30 The fact that Navaretta

24
Pipher v. Parsell, 930 A.2d 890, 892 (Del. 2007).
25
Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Del. 1991).
26
Id.
27
Murray v. Mason, 244 A.3d 187, 195 (Del. Super. Jan. 5, 2021).
28
Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506, 519 (Del. 1991); see also
Connolly v. Theta Chi Faternity, Inc., 2018 WL 1137587, at *8 (Del. Super. Feb.
28, 2018).
29
Furek v. Univ. of Delaware, 594 A.2d at 519-520.
30
D.I. 1.
was coming from a University sanctioned event alone does not establish a duty of

care owed to Navaretta by the University.

As the record currently stands, § 323 of the Restatement does not advance

Plaintiffs’ position. This section “addresses the duty owed by one who assumes

direct responsibility for the safety of another through the rendering of services in the

area of protection.”31 “Section 323 addresses only the duty of care to a person

physically on the property of the entity owing the duty.”32

Plaintiffs’ most compelling argument in opposition to this motion is that

public policy in this State favors resolution of cases on their merits, and it follows

that an opportunity for discovery should be given prior to a dismissal of any claims.33

The Complaint alleges: “Upon information and belief, Defendant, University of

Delaware, delegated the responsibility of transportation of attendees to third-parties,

including Defendant Phi Sigma Sigma, Inc.”34 In recognition of the standard of

review, accepting all well-pled allegations in the Complaint as true here, there is a

sufficient basis to allow discovery to proceed on the issue of whether the University

owed a duty of care to Navaretta.

31
Furek v. Univ. of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
32
Buford v. Ligon, 2021 WL 5630048, at *7 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2021).
33
D.I. 33, ¶¶ 9, 12; see also Biggins v. Igwe, 2022 WL 2204823, at *1 (Del. Super.
Ct. Jun. 16, 2022).
34
D.I. 1, ¶¶ 18.
While, as noted, the record is currently devoid of facts supporting the

allegation the University owed Navaretta a duty of care in this scenario, a period of

discovery will be afforded to Plaintiffs in accordance with the public policy of this

State. At this juncture, despite the University’s compelling basis to move for

dismissal at this time, given the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6), this matter

will be ripe for adjudication following the discovery process and upon a motion for

summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2024.

_____________________________
The Honorable Danielle J. Brennan