Huggins v. Benson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHAD HUGGINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. K24C-03-020 NEP
)
ANDREA BENSON, )
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant. )

Submitted: August 16, 2024
Decided: September 25, 2024

ORDER

Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
GRANTED

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Transfer the Defenses and Counterclaims to the
Court of Chancery
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1. Plaintiff Chad Huggins (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on March 14, 2024,
pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 6701, seeking ejectment and damages. Defendant Andrea
Benson filed her amended answer and counterclaims on June 7, 2024.
2. On August 16, 2024, the Court heard argument on Plaintiff’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and on Defendant’s Motion to Transfer the Defenses
and Counterclaims to the Court of Chancery Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902. For the
reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, and Defendant’s
Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court cautions the parties,
however, that both of these decisions are interlocutory, which will have some impact
on the future progress of this case, as will be more fully explained infra.
3. Turning to Plaintiff’s Motion, summary judgment is warranted when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.1
4. Here, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the sole issue of ejectment.
In an ejectment action, the plaintiff must prove (1) lack of possession and (2) legal
title.2 There is no dispute that Plaintiff is out of possession of the property in
question. Moreover, attached to his Complaint is a deed granting Plaintiff legal title
to the property, and Defendant conceded at oral argument that Plaintiff is the record
title owner of the property.3
5. Despite this, Defendant argues that she is entitled to possession of the
property. The bases for this contention, however, are certain equitable claims, as
Defendant concedes in her Motion to Transfer. As the Court explained in a bench
decision on July 12, 2024, denying an earlier motion of Defendant to transfer the
entire action to the Court of Chancery, such claims may not be raised as defenses in
an ejectment action.4
6. The Court must clarify, however, that the grant of partial summary
judgment to Plaintiff does not entitle him to immediate possession of the property,
as the decision is interlocutory. A bench trial is scheduled for January 22, 2025.
Other issues—most notably Plaintiff’s claim for damages—await decision. A final
order in this case will be issued following the bench trial, barring the possibility of

1
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
2
Nelson v. Russo, 844 A.2d 301, 302 (Del. 2004); Taylor v. Vanhorn, 2023 WL 3946342, at *2
(Del. Super. June 9, 2023).
3
See Woogen v. Hamilton, 2003 WL 22064246, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2003) (court granted
ejectment where plaintiff was record title owner of property).
4
See Enuha v. Enuha, 694 A.2d 844 (TABLE), 1997 WL 328582, at *1 (Del. May 16, 1997) (in
ejectment action, Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to address defendants’ claim of equitable
ownership, as such a claim must be brought before the Court of Chancery).
2
an earlier conclusion as the result, for example, of additional dispositive motions.5
7. Turning to Defendant’s Motion, Defendant seeks transfer of its defenses
and counterclaims to the Court of Chancery pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902. As noted
supra, this Court denied a prior motion of Defendant to transfer the entire case to the
Court of Chancery. In that prior motion, Defendant conceded that all of its
counterclaims were equitable in nature.6 In announcing its previous decision, the
Court indicated that, because those counterclaims are equitable, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over them, and furthermore that defenses advanced in an ejectment
action must be, in the explicit terms of the statute, “defenses in law.”7 The Court,
however, did not “dismiss” Defendant’s counterclaims, as erroneously stated by
Plaintiff in his Response to Defendant’s Motion.8
8. 10 Del. C. § 1902 provides that “[n]o civil action . . . shall be dismissed
solely on the ground that such court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter” but
“may be transferred to an appropriate court . . . provided that the party otherwise
adversely affected, within 60 days after the order denying the jurisdiction of the
first court has become final . . . files in [the appropriate] court a written election
of transfer . . . .”9 Therefore, the statute by its own terms contemplates a transfer of
claims to another court following the issuance of a final order dismissing those
claims for lack of jurisdiction. This Court’s order denying Defendant’s previous
Motion to Transfer was an interlocutory one. Thus, just as Plaintiff must await a
final order of this court before executing on the order granting his ejectment claim,

5
This is consistent with what the Court indicated to the parties in its July 12, 2024, bench
decision—i.e., that the Court’s decision on a dispositive motion could limit or expand the scope
of discovery as well as the issues at trial.
6
Defendant’s Motion to Transfer to the Court of Chancery at 2 (D.I. 27).
7
10 Del. C. § 6701(b).
8
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Defenses and Counterclaims to
Chancery Court Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902 at 1 (D.I. 43).
9
10 Del. C. § 1902 (emphasis supplied).
3
Defendant must await a final order of this Court before filing an election of transfer
as to its counterclaims pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, and
Defendant’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP:tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Counsel of record

4