State v. Walker

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) I.D.: 2402004359
v. )
)
RASHAD WALKER )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: October 4, 2024
Decided: October 9, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress,

DENIED

Paige Todaro, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
820 N. French Street, 7th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Alicia Brown, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, State Office Building, 820 N.
French Street, 3rd Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.

JONES, J.
INTRODUCTION

On February 8, 2024, as the result of a protective sweep, incident to an

administrative search prompted by a different probationer, of Defendant’s listed

probation residence, Wilmington Police Department Sergeant Sean Nolan seized

Defendant’s firearm. Defendant, a Level III probationer, was charged with

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Ammunition by a

Person Prohibited. On July 29, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to

Suppress. This is the Court’s decision on that Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

On October 4, 2024, a suppression hearing was held. At the suppression

hearing, the State proved the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence.

At approximately 5:24pm on February 8, 2024, Detective McNamara, of the

Wilmington Police Department, and Special Probation Officer Scioli, of Probation

and Parole, stopped the vehicle of Marquan Berry-Mills, a Level II Probationer, after

it was flagged regarding a shoplifting investigation. 1 Mr. Berry-Mills gave officers

consent to search his vehicle after the officers saw marijuana in plain view on the

center console.2 From the vehicle search, officers found approximately 117.5 grams

of marijuana and drug paraphernalia prompting SPO Scioli to send SPO Collins and

Sergeant Nolan to Mr. Berry-Mill’s listed probation address at 701C North Jefferson

1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 18, at 2.
2
D.I. 25, at 2.

2
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.3 SPO Scioli testified that it is common practice to

immediately send officers from a car search scene to the probation address for an

administrative search because timeliness is key. It is common knowledge among

officers that “phone calls will be made” to move contraband from the probationer’s

residence. SPO Scioli then called Supervisor Wolfram and relayed to her

information he had from Mr. Berry-Mills’ traffic stop so that she could determine

whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an administrative search of 701C

North Jefferson Steet. Supervisor Wolfram gave her approval, and SPO Scioli

notified SPO Collins, who was already at the residence, and indicated for him to

conduct the administrative search. Sergeant Nolan, who was with SPO Collins,

began a safety sweep of the residence.

Upon arrival at the residence, Mr. Berry-Mills’ sister, Domunicque Berry-

Mills, informed the present officers, Sergeant Nolan, SPO Collins, and Detective

Rosembert, that she resided there along with her boyfriend, the Defendant, and

pointed them towards the location of Mr. Berry-Mills’ bedroom. 4 She informed

officers that another female was currently upstairs.5 She further stated that she was

unsure whether others were present or where they might be within the house.

Sergeant Nolan and SPO Collins were concerned about the lack of handle over the

3
Id. at 2-3.
4
Id. at 3-4; D.I. 18, at 3.
5
D.I. 25, at 4.

3
number and location of people in the residence and conducted a safety sweep of the

home. 6 During this sweep, Sergeant Nolan opened a closet door in Defendant’s

bedroom and discovered a loaded firearm with an extended magazine loaded with

27 rounds of ammunition.7 Ms. Berry-Mills told officers the firearm was not hers

and gave consent for officers to search the bedroom.8 There was a child sleeping in

the bedroom, and Ms. Berry-Mills informed officers it was her and Defendant’s

child. 9

Officers then discovered Defendant was a Level III probationer and that the

residence was his listed probation address.10 SPO Scioli contacted Supervisor

Wolfram to obtain approval for an administrative search for Defendant.11

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION

Defendant seeks to suppress the seizure of Defendant’s firearm on the basis

that it was seized during an illegal search of his bedroom during an administrative

search prompted by and for probationer, Mr. Berry-Mills – not the Defendant. The

State contends, and this Court agrees, that Defendant’s firearm was lawfully

obtained in plain view to the officers while conducting a protective sweep of

Defendant’s home.

6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 5; D.I. 18, at 4.

4
STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to suppress, the burden of proof is on the State to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the contested evidence was not obtained as the

product of an illegal search and seizure.12

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §6 of

the Delaware Constitution shields an individual’s right from unreasonable searches

and seizures. 13 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable.14 However, there are

exceptions under certain circumstances that allow officers to conduct a warrantless

search.15

One exception to a warrantless search is an administrative search. The State

has a special interest in the supervision of a probationer.16 Therefore, probationers

have reduced expectations of privacy, and officers may conduct a valid, warrantless

search of a probationer’s residence “when the search is prompted by the officer’s

reasonable suspicion and is conducted in accordance with Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) procedure.”17 Officers may search areas they have “reason to believe . . .

12
State v. Barrett, 2019 WL 5110126, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 11, 2019).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
State v. Monroe, 2015 WL 721441, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 2015).
17
Id; see 11 Del. C. § 4321(d)(“Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables under the
laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance
with Department procedures while in the performance of the lawful duties of their employment.”)

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is owned, possessed, or controlled by the probationer.” 18 The probationer does not

need “exclusive control” over these areas. 19 Officers complied with the procedure

in obtaining approval for and initiating the administrative search regarding Mr.

Berry-Mills. The basis of the search shifted from an administrative search to a

protective sweep after Ms. Berry-Mills informed officers other people were

potentially present in the residence.

A protective sweep is an exception to a warrantless search and is defined as a

“quick and limited search of premises . . . conducted to protect the safety of police

officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those

places in which a person might be hiding.” 20 A protective sweep does not require

prior authorization and must be based on reasonable grounds pertaining to officer

safety.21 It is proper to conduct a protective sweep when a searching officer

“posses[es] reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer

in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to officer or

others.”22 Considered under the totality of the circumstances, the potential presence

of another person or persons within a residence warrants reasonable articulable

18
State v. Tucker, 2007 WL 1065134, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 10, 2007).
19
Id.
20
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
21
Monroe, 2015 WL 721441, at *5.
22
State v. Wallace, 2011 WL 2552640 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2011)(quoting Buie, 494 U.S., at 327).

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suspicion for officers to conduct a protective sweep. 23 It is reasonable for officers

to infer that “relatives will lie about probationer’s whereabouts” making a protective

sweep valid even if a co-habitant says that no one else is home. 24 At the time

Defendant suggests the officers did not comply with the proper administrative search

procedures, officers were not conducting an administrative search but rather a

protective sweep of the residence. During a protective sweep, officers can search

any area where a potentially dangerous person may be.25 Therefore, Sergeant Nolan

opening the closet door in Defendant’s bedroom is valid because a person can easily

hide in a closet. 26

Seizure of contraband that is in plain view is proper because “the mere

observation of an item in plain view does not constitute a Fourth Amendment

search.”27 Sergeant Nolan’s discovery of the firearm in plain view in this case is

synonymous to the discovery of drug paraphernalia in Monroe.28 In that case,

officers found and lawfully seized drug paraphernalia in plain view while conducting

23
Wallace, 2011 WL 2552640, at *3 (holding the protective sweep was justified because officers had a reasonable
articulable suspicion to believe probationers were home based on a parked vehicle outside and the reasonable
inference that the co-habitant was potentially lying about probationers’ whereabouts.)
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
The difference between Defendant’s case and cases cited in Defendant’s Motion is that in the cited cases, the
plain-view contraband was not lawfully seized as the result of a protective sweep. In both Reese and Tucker, the
evidence suppressed was unlawfully obtained from areas outside the scope of the administrative search. See State v.
Tucker, 2007 WL 1065134 (Del. Super. Apr. 10, 2007) (granting a motion to suppress when officers conducted an
administrative search in a co-habitant’s bedroom that probationer told officers not to go into and of which
probationer had no control over); State v. Reese, 2010 WL 3707793 (Del. Super. Sept. 13, 2000) (granting a motion
to suppress when officers searched an entire empty apartment despite sufficient signs that only one bedroom was the
probationer’s).
27
State v. Swiggett, 2019 WL 245292, at *3 (quoting Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 985 (Del. 2004)).
28
2015 WL 721441, at *5-6.

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a protective sweep on the suspicion that other people were in the residence.29

Officers were able to confirm the drug paraphernalia was the defendant’s based on

identifying clues indicating the defendant occupied the bedroom it was found in.30

In this case, Ms. Berry-Mills, the co-occupant of the bedroom, denied ownership of

the gun and confirmed to officers that she shared the bedroom from which the

firearm was seized with the Defendant.31

The Delaware Supreme Court held substantial compliance, not absolute

compliance, with DOC guidelines is sufficient to lawfully conduct an administrative

search.32 Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19B requires officers and their

supervisors to have a “case conference” for the supervisor to determine whether

there is reasonable suspicion for the execution of an administrative search.33

Defendant contends SPO Scioli’s phone conversation with Supervisor Wolfram at

the scene of Mr. Berry-Mills’ car search was not a sufficient case conference.

Defendant argues there needed to be more back-and-forth dialogue to meet the

requirements. The court disagrees with this argument and finds that SPO Scioli and

Supervisor Wolfram’s conversation substantially complies with the case conference

requirements. According to SPO Scioli’s testimony, he relayed all necessary

29
Id. at *5.
30
Id. at *2.
31
D.I. 25, at 4.
32
Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010) (citing Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 291 (Del. 2004)).
33
Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19B (D). Probation and Parole update the procedures on June 30, 2023 and
eliminated the search checklist that was required before conducting an administrative search.

8
information to Supervisor Wolfram for her to come to decision, and a longer

conversation was not in their best interest because of the importance of timeliness in

this situation.

Finally, Defendant points to the rule in Probation and Parole Procedure

7.19B34 which only allows probation officers, not police officers, to conduct

administrative searches. Defendant argues the State violated this rule by allowing

Sergeant Nolan to be part of the search. Defendant’s contention that Sergeant Nolan

should not have taken part in the administrative search is misguided because at the

time Sergeant Nolan was in Defendant’s bedroom he was conducting a protective

sweep and not an administrative search.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable,

articulable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of Defendant’s residence and

lawfully discovered and obtained Defendant’s firearm in plain view during this

protective sweep. Additionally, an occupant of the bedroom searched advised that

the gun found was not hers but the Defendants. The seized firearm was not the result

of an unlawful, warrantless search, and the Defendant’s protections against

unreasonable searches and seizures were not violated.

34
Id. at (VI)(F.3).

9
CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of October, 2024.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones Jr., Judge

cc: Original to Prothonotary

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