Current Solutions, Inc. v. Appoquinimik School District

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CURRENT SOLUTIONS, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N23C-11-042 PAW
)
APPOQUINIMINK SCHOOL )
DISTRICT, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: September 30, 2024
Decided: December 13, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss;

DENIED, in part and GRANTED, in part.

Scott Earle, Esq., of Goldberg Segalla LLP and Judith Jones, Esq., of Zarwin Baum
DeVito Kaplan Schaer Toddy PC, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

William Gamgort, Esq. and Carmella Cinaglia, Esq., of Young Conaway Stargatt &
Taylor LLP, Attorneys for Defendant.

WINSTON, J.
I. INTRODUCTION

Current Solutions, Inc., (“CSI”) sues Appoquinimink School District, (“the

District”) for breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. In response, the District moves to dismiss. CSI pleads facts supporting an

inference of breach of contract, and it is reasonably conceivable that CSI is entitled

to recover. The implied covenant claims, however, conflict with the express terms

of the agreement. Accordingly, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, in

part and GRANTED, in part.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

CSI is an electrical subcontractor that was the successful bidder for the

electrical work to construct a new elementary school, Crystal Run Elementary

School (“the Project”), for the District.2 The Electrical Contract (“the Contract”)

was prepared using AIA Document A132-2019.3 The Contract sum was

$2,086,400.00.4 The Contract provides that the Project’s Construction Manager

(“CM”) will create, publish, and update or revise the formal Project Construction

1
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and documents incorporated by
reference. Windsor I, LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 873 (Del.
2020). Citations in the form of “Ex. __” refer to documents attached to the
Complaint.
2
Compl. ¶ 1.
3
Compl. ¶ 13.
4
Compl. ¶ 13.

2
Schedule throughout the Project’s construction.5 The Contract also provides for an

initial review and decision process overseen by the Project’s architect for certain

claims or disputes.6

By no fault of CSI, the Project was delayed from the beginning.7 To remedy

these delays, the District compressed CSI’s work schedule and engaged other

electrical subcontractors to complete CSI’s scope of work.8 This engagement led to

CSI’s constructive discharge.9 Additionally, throughout the Project, the District

failed to issue contractually required schedules and instead, issued informal

schedules on an ad hoc basis.10 Lastly, CSI contends that the District failed to pay

CSI for work performed, wrongfully projected its failures onto CSI, and wrongfully

back-charged CSI for costs attributable to the District.11 Despite the District’s

conduct, CSI performed its obligations under the Contract.12

On November 7, 2023, CSI filed its Complaint seeking damages for breach of

contract (“Count I”) and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“Count

5
Compl. ¶ 15.
6
Ex. B at Article 15 (“Claims and Disputes”).
7
Compl. ¶ 6.
8
Compl. ¶ 8.
9
Compl. ¶ 8.
10
Compl. ¶ 9.
11
Compl. ¶ 10.
12
Compl. ¶ 10.

3
II”), relating to the District’s alleged failure to pay CSI for completed electrical

work, allow CSI additional time to complete its work, and increase CSI’s fixed price

contract for the hiring of additional workers.13 In response, the District moves under

Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.14

III. ANALYSIS

Upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true; (2) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing party notice

of the claim; (3) draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party;

and (4) denies dismissal if recovery on the claim is reasonably conceivable.15

When both parties present their positions and reference materials neither

incorporated into nor integral to the complaint, the Court can convert the motion to

one for summary judgment.16 However, this will not occur if “the additional

documents are incorporated by reference into the complaint and are integral to the

claims of the complaint” or “the documents are not being relied upon to prove the

13
See Compl.
14
Def. Mot. to Dismiss at Introduction.
15
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holding, LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535
(Del. 2011).
16
Driggus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 7599490 at *1 (Del. Super.
Nov. 15, 2023).

4
truth of its contents.”17 If either of these situations exists, a conversion will not

occur.

At present, both parties submitted additional documents not incorporated by

reference. Although the documents are “being relied upon to prove the truth of its

contents” and were submitted by the parties to demonstrate the veracity of the

allegations in the Complaint, at oral arguments, both parties acknowledged the Court

should not consider the additional documents.18 Accordingly, the Court will address

the Motion by considering only the Complaint and documents incorporated by

reference.

A. COUNT I – BREACH OF CONTRACT

The allegations set forth in the Complaint are sufficient to state a breach of

contract claim, and it is reasonably conceivable that CSI is entitled to recover. For

a breach of contract claim to survive a motion to dismiss, it is sufficient to “simply

allege first, the existence of the contract; second, the breach of an obligation imposed

by that contract; and third, the resultant damage to the plaintiff.” 19

17
Cambridge Strategic Mgmt. Grg. v. IDT Domestic Telecom, Inc., 2013 WL
2480887 at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 8, 2013).
18
The District clarified it would be comfortable with the Court not considering its
submitted affidavit. CSI agreed that it believed converting the Motion to one for
summary judgment would be premature without time for additional discovery.
19
Nucor Coatings Corp. v. Precoat Metals Corp., 2023 WL 6368316 at *13 (Del.
Super. Aug. 31, 2023) (quoting Garfield v. Allen, 277 A.3d 296, 328 (Del. Ch.

5
CSI first alleges that the District breached the Contract by terminating CSI

without the requisite justification provided for under Section 14.2.1 of the Contract

Documents.20 CSI also alleges that the Construction Manager breached his duties

under the Contract when the CM “failed to issue or otherwise revise the Project

Construction Schedule per the requirements set forth” in Section 013216(2)(A)&(B)

or the Contract.21 The Complaint further alleges that the District breached the

Contract by failing to adjust the Contract time and sum to accommodate for the

truncated work schedule issued by the CM on an arbitrary and ad hoc-rolling basis,

a failure which breached, among other provisions, Article 7 regarding Changes in

the Work and Article 8.3 regarding Delays and Extensions of Time of the General

Conditions.22 Finally, CSI claims that the District breached Article 5 of the Contract

by failing to pay CSI for the work performed in accordance with payment

applications 7 and 8, and by routinely failing to pay CSI for its work by the 15th of

the following month.23

2022)); see also Humanigen, Inc. v. Savant Neglected Diseases, Inc., 238 A.3d 194,
202 (Del. Super. Aug. 17, 2020) (quoting Garfield, 277 A.3d at 328).
20
Compl. ¶ 42.
21
Compl. ¶ 43.
22
Compl. ¶ 44.
23
Compl. ¶ 45.

6
The District contends that CSI’s breach of contract claim must be dismissed

due to failure to satisfy preconditions to litigation required under the Contract. In

its Motion, the District states that “where a contract is clear and unambiguous in

requiring that a condition precedent to litigation be satisfied before a lawsuit is

initiated, failure to meet such condition constitutes a material breach of the contract

and a forfeiture of rights.”24 Under the Contract, an initial decision from the architect

“shall be required as a condition precedent to mediation” of a claim, and a mediation

is a condition precedent to filing suit regarding such a claim.25 Thus, the District

argues that CSI’s failure to demonstrate that specific conditions precedent were

satisfied forfeited its rights to bring a claim for breach of contract.

Under Delaware law, to recover damages for a breach of contract, the plaintiff

must demonstrate substantial compliance with all of the provisions of the contract.26

“[A] party may only be excused from performance of a contract when the other party

24
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4 (citing Millsboro Fire Co. v. Constr. Mgmt. Serv., Inc.,
2009 WL 846614 at *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2009)).
25
Ex. B at Article 15.2.1 (“General Conditions”).
26
Commonwealth Const. Co. v. Cornerstone Fellowship Baptist Church, Inc., 2006
WL 2567916 at *19 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2006) (citing Eastern Elec. & Heating
Inc. v. Pike Creek Prof'l Ctr., 1987 WL 9610 at *4 (Del. Super. April 7, 1987))
(citing Emmett Hickman Co. v. Emilio Capano Developer, Inc., 251 A.2d 571 (Del.
Super. 1969)).

7
has materially breached the contract.”27 Likewise, a party in material breach of the

contract cannot then complain if the other party fails to perform. 28 Performance

under a contract is justifiably excused when the other party to the contract commits

a material breach.29 Whether a breach is material is a fact-sensitive analysis.30

CSI alleges it met all its performance obligations under the Contract and was

constructively discharged. At oral argument, CSI argued that its discharge was a

material breach of the Contract which excused its performance of the condition

precedent. CSI’s allegations, coupled with the District’s alleged breaches of

contract, create a reasonable inference that CSI is excused from the preconditions of

mediation and additional claim submission under the Contract. Accordingly, any

factual disputes, including the applicability of the preconditions to litigation within

the Contract, will not be resolved in the current procedural posture.31

27
Daystar Const. Mgmt., Inc. v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2053649 at *7 (Del. Super. July
12, 2006).
28
Commonwealth Const. Co. v. Cornerstone Fellowship Baptist Church, Inc., 2006
WL 2567916 at *19 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2006) (citing Hudson v. D & v. Mason
Contractors, Inc., 252 A.2d 166 (Del.Super. 1969)).
29
Id. (citing Eastern Elec. & Heating Co. v. Pike Creek Prof’l Ctr., 1987 WL 9610
at *4 (Del. Super. April 7, 1987)).
30
Id. (citing SLMSoft.com, Inc. v. Cross Country Bank, 2003 WL 1769770 at *13
(Del. Super. April 2, 2003)).
31
See Bryant v. Way, 2011 WL 2163606 at *3 (Del. Super. May 25, 2011) (“Factual
issues cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage…”).

8
Next, the District contends that there was no breach of the Contract because

it had “the right to assign work to other contractors where Plaintiff failed to carry

out the work in accordance with the terms of the Contract,”32 and it exercised this

right following CSI’s failure to complete its obligations.33 The Court cannot

determine on the pleadings whether the District materially breached the Contract

terms.34 For now, the claims cannot be dismissed on the pleadings because, until the

material breach issue is decided, the allegations that the reassignment of all Contract

duties acted as a termination must be accepted as true.

The Complaint alleges that the District had no cause under Section 14.2.1 to

terminate CSI.35 And, even if cause existed, the District failed to abide by the notice

provision in Section 14.2.2.36 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving party, the Court finds that it is reasonably conceivable that CSI is entitled to

recover on its breach of contract claim.

The Court finds that CSI has sufficiently pled the basic elements of a breach

of contract claim. CSI has alleged the existence of a contract, an alleged breach of

32
See Ex. B, General Conditions §§ 2.5 (Owner’s Right to Carry Out Work); 12.2
(Correction of Work).
33
Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 15.
34
See SphereCommerce, LLC v. Caulfield, 2022 WL 325952 at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2,
2022).
35
Compl. ¶ 42.
36
Compl. ¶24.

9
the terms of the Contract, and resulting damage. Further, CSI generally pled it had

met all its performance obligations under the Contract.37 Thus, the facts and

allegations set forth in the Complaint are sufficient to state a breach of contract

claim, and it is reasonably conceivable that CSI is entitled to recover.

B. COUNT II – BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING

The allegations set forth in the Complaint do not sufficiently state a claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Merill v. Crothall-

American, Inc.,38 the Delaware Supreme Court held that every employment contract

includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under the implied

covenant, an employer may be liable on a contract claim if they act in bad faith in

the hiring or firing of an employee.39 To properly plead a claim for breach of the

implied covenant, Plaintiff must allege some injury to its contractual interest because

of the breach of the implied obligation.40 In summary, Plaintiff must allege: (1) a

37
Plaintiff generally averred that it complied with all obligations under the Contract
when stating that the District had no basis under Section 14.2.1 to terminate CSI
from the Project. Compl. ¶ 27. See Eisenmann Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 2000
WL 140781, at *18 (Del. Super. Jan. 28, 2000), cert. denied (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to plead specific
conditions precedent were satisfied when plaintiff “certainly alleges complete
performance generally.”).
38
606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del.1992).
39
Id.
40
Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC, 971 A.2d 872, 888-89 (Del. Ch. 2009).

10
specific implied contractual obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3)

resulting damage.41

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, infers

contractual terms to handle developments or contractual gaps that neither party

anticipated.42 Thus, the implied covenant does not apply when the express terms of

the contract govern the subject of the conduct at issue.43

Here, CSI alleges that the District breached the implied covenant through (1)

systematically assigning work covered by the Contract to other electrical trade

contractors; (2) establishing commercially unreasonable and arbitrary deadlines for

the completion of Plaintiff’s work; and (3) excessively back charging Plaintiff for

supplemental work performed by other contractors to offset the amount owed under

the Contract.44

CSI’s claims for breach of the implied covenant address the same allegations

raised in its claim for breach of contract.45 Accordingly, each of these alleged

breaches are covered by express contractual provisions. The Contract addressed the

41
Id.
42
Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Holdings, LLC, 112 A.3d
878, 896 (Del. Mar. 28, 2015) (emphasis added).
43
Id.
44
Compl. ¶¶ 48-51.
45
See Compl. ¶¶ 42-45; see also Compl. ¶¶ 48-51. CSI also seeks damages in the
same amount (“in excess of $470,705.00”) for both claims. See Compl. ¶¶ 46, 51.

11
Project schedule and the rights of the parties to modify that schedule in Article 3.46

The Contract authorized the District to engage other labor where CSI failed to meet

its contractual obligations under Sections 2.5 (Owner’s Right to Carry Out Work)

and 12.2 (Correction of Work), and, in the event that the District intended to reassign

the remainder of the Contract, the Contract provided a process for termination with

cause under Section 14.2 (Termination by the Owner for Cause). Finally, the

Contract granted the District the right to perform uncompleted work called for by

the agreement and back charge CSI for said work if CSI failed to perform as

required.47

Any factual disputes regarding whether CSI failed to perform under the

Contract cannot be determined at this juncture.48 At this early stage, the Court must

accept both sides’ well-pled allegations as true.49 Accordingly, the Court finds that

the conduct at issue is covered under express contractual provisions; however, the

46
Ex. B § 3.10.1 (“The schedule shall be revised at appropriate intervals as required
by the conditions of the Work and Project.”); Ex. B § 3.10.3 (“The Contractor shall
make revisions to the construction schedule and submittal schedule as deemed
necessary by the Construction Manager to conform to the Project schedule.”).
47
Ex. B, General Conditions § 2.5 (“If the Contractor defaults or neglects to carry
out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents… the Owner may, without
prejudice to other remedies the Owner may have, correct such a default or neglect.
[…] If current and future payments are not sufficient to cover such amounts, the
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner.”).
48
Bryant, 2011 WL 2163606 at *3.
49
Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 535.

12
Court will not determine at this time whether the conduct at issue was a material

breach under the Contract.

Thus, the facts here do not implicate the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing. Simply mirroring the factual allegations that support a breach of

contract claim is insufficient to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing.50

More, the Court finds that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

cannot be pled in the alternative if the Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim does not

survive under these circumstances.51 Here, CSI does not plead an unanticipated

development or contractual gap; it simply realleges its breach of contract claim as

an implied covenant claim.52 Accordingly, the Court finds that CSI’s claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be pled in the

alternative to breach of contract and must be dismissed.

50
See 3M Company v. Neology, Inc., 2019 WL 2714832 at *10 (Del. Super. June
28, 2019).
51
3M Company, 2019 WL 2714832 at *11 (holding that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing cannot be plead in the alternative where the alleged
breach of the implied covenant mirrors the factual allegations used to support a
breach of contract claim).
52
Id.

13
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the District’s Motion to Dismiss DENIED, in

part and GRANTED, in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Winston
Patricia A. Winston, Judge

14