Sanchez v. Hendrix

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHANJULIA SANCHEZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) C.A. No. N23C-02-077 KMV
)
AMANDA E. HENDRIX, and )
KATHRYN A. HENDRIX, )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: October 10, 2024
Decided: December 13, 2024

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Having considered defendant Kathryn A. Hendrix’s motion for summary

judgment and the record in this matter, it appears that:

BACKGROUND

1. On October 15, 2022, U.S. postal carrier Shanjulia Sanchez had a very

bad day.1 Around 4:30 p.m., more than halfway through her shift for the U.S. Postal

Service, Shanjulia was lugging mail to a section of row homes in Wilmington,

Delaware.2 Meanwhile, the family who lived at 730 South Broom Street (the

1
See Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. The facts in this decision reflect the record developed through
the pleadings. This background provides only the predicate necessary to this Court’s
ultimate holdings; interested readers are directed to the docket in this matter for additional
predicate. First names are used to avoid confusion; this Court intends no disrespect or
familiarity. The lodged depositions are cited as Last Name Dep. See D.I. 23, Ex. A–C.
2
Sanchez Dep. 31:6–10.
“Property”) just finished a grocery run and was returning home for a pit stop.3

Defendant Amanda Hendrix stayed in the car parked on the street to smoke a

cigarette as her husband, James Miller, and their two daughters went inside to grab

some drinks, use the bathroom, and fetch the keys for a concession stand they were

helping out with later that evening.4

2. Shanjulia arrived at the Property right after James and the girls went

inside; she then scanned a package and put it in the mailbox just outside the front

door.5 Just then, Shanjulia heard a deafening “WOOF!”6 Shanjulia recoiled at the

loud barking and, noticing the storm door was ajar, yanked it shut and hurried to the

next house.7 Then she heard a young lady’s voice call out: “[N]o, get back here!”8

But it was too late. Through her peripherals, Shanjulia spotted a black figure

bursting through the storm door.9 She screamed for help as a black pitbull named

Midnight pounced on her, tearing at her flesh.10

3
Hendrix, A. Dep. 14:17–15:10, 15:20–23.
4
Id. at 6:11–13, 15:15–18.
5
Sanchez Dep. 39:6–12.
6
Id. at 39:13–14.
7
Id. at 39:13–16.
8
Id. at 39:17–18.
9
Id. at 39:19–20.
10
Sanchez Dep. 39:20–40:1.

2
3. Hearing the shrieks of pain and cries for help, Amanda stopped

smoking and jumped out of the car to stop the attack.11 Midnight released

Shanjulia’s arm by the time Amanda got to him, but the damage was done.12 He had

bitten Shanjulia’s right shoulder, forearm, and leg.13 Amanda promptly instructed

her daughters to drag Midnight back inside as she searched for water, paper towels,

and hydrogen peroxide.14

4. Shocked and angered by the whole ordeal, Shanjulia dismissed

Amanda’s apologies and refused offers of aid.15 Instead, Amanda called her

supervisor, Tracy, to inform her about the attack.16 Tracy instructed her to return to

work if possible, so Shanjulia hobbled back to her delivery van and drove to the post

office.17 She debriefed another supervisor, Jessica, who then drove her to Saint

Francis Hospital.18

11
Hendrix, A. Dep. 16:2–10.
12
Id. at 16:8–12; Sanchez Dep. 40:2–6.
13
Sanchez Dep. 44:3–11.
14
Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:5–19, 19:1–5; Sanchez Dep. 40:7–11.
15
Hendrix, A. Dep. 18:22–23; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–19.
16
Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:6–9; Sanchez Dep. 40:12–20.
17
Hendrix, A. Dep. 19:9–12; Sanchez Dep. 48:3–12.
18
Sanchez Dep. 49:24–50:11.

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5. The medical providers cleaned and sutured Shanjulia’s wounds, took

pictures and x-rays, then prescribed her pain medication.19 After she was released

from the hospital, Shanjulia went back to the post office to get her workers’

compensation paperwork, and then her son picked her up from work and drove her

home.20 Following the post office’s instructions, Shanjulia did not return to work

until mid-November.21 Since the attack, she often wakes up from nightmares in cold

sweats and becomes anxious whenever she sees a black dog.22

6. On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff brought this action against Amanda and

her mother, Kathryn Hendrix, who owns the Property, seeking damages related to

the incident.23 After some discovery practice, on April 30, 2024, Kathryn moved for

summary judgment (the “Motion”).24 Briefing on the Motion was completed on July

26, 2024, and an oral argument was scheduled for October 10, 2024.25 Thereafter,

the Court took this matter under advisement. This is the Court’s decision.

19
Id. at 50:18–51:9.
20
Id. at 51:12–16.
21
Id. at 54:8–11.
22
Id. at 75:3–21.
23
D.I. 1.
24
D.I. 23.
25
D.I. 24, 35, 39.

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ANALYSIS

7. “Summary judgment is only appropriate where there are no genuine

issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 26

“There is no right to a summary judgment.”27 “[W]hen the facts permit a reasonable

person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter

of law.”28 At this stage, this Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.29 The burden rests with the moving party.30 Here, that is

Kathryn.

8. The primary issue pending before this Court is whether Kathryn had

actual knowledge of Midnight’s vicious nature. Delaware’s dog-bite statute, 16 Del.

C. § 3053F, provides that the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by

26
Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A.3d 878, 883 (Del. 2024) (citing Super. Ct.
Civ. R. 56(c)); Eco-Mail, Inc. v. Firstsource Health Plans & Health Servs., LLC, 2024 WL
3738705, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2024) (first citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); and then
citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962)).
27
Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (first citing Anglin v. Bergold,
565 A.2d 279 (Del. 1989); and then citing Brunswick Corp. v. Bowl-Mor Co., Inc., 297
A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 1972)) (internal quotation omitted).
28
Feaster v. Tyler, 2024 WL 4039721, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2024) (citing Wooten v.
Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967)).
29
Northan v. Thomas, 2024 WL 2974271, at *2 (Del. Super. June 12, 2024) (citing DiOssi
v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1362 (Del. 1988)); Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at
*3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Legion P’rs Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at
Lloyds London, 2021 WL 6621168, at *6 (Del. Super. Sept. 30, 2021)).
30
Feldman v. Marks, 2024 WL 4263931, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Radulski
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2020)).

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such dog.31 This strict liability “relieves a plaintiff from ‘proving specific acts of

negligence’ and ‘protects him from certain defenses’ like that embodied in

Delaware’s comparative negligence statute.”32 An “owner” is “any person who

owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog.”33

9. Conversely, a landlord only owes a duty to protect an invitee from a

tenant’s dog in the landlord’s capacity as “(1) harborer of the dog or (2) as a landlord

of the dog’s owner and only if Defendant had knowledge of the dog’s vicious

propensities.”34 Put differently, “[t]he imposition of liability on a landlord occurs

when the landlord ‘knows of the animal’s dangerous propensities and the landlord

has the power, through its control over the premises, to remove or confine the

animal.’”35

31
16 Del. C. § 3053F (“The owner of a dog is liable in damages for any injury, death, or
loss to person or property that is caused by such dog, unless the injury, death, or loss was
caused to the body or property of a person who, at the time, was committing or attempting
to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the property of the owner, or was
committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense against any person, or was teasing,
tormenting, or abusing the dog.”).
32
Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536, 540 (Del. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
33
16 Del. C. § 3041F(7); Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A3d 878, 887–88
(Del. 2024).
34
Dougherty v. Hibbits, 2015 WL 5168157, at *3 (Del. Super. 2015) (quoting Smith v.
Isaacs, 1999 WL 587350, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 21, 1999)) (emphasis in original).
35
Id. at *3 (quoting Kirshner v. Wilm. Hous. Auth., 1997 WL 587350, at *1 (Del. Sept. 11,
1997)).

6
10. Here, Kathryn claims Shanjulia “cannot identify any factual dispute or

evidence to suggest negligence on the part of Kathryn.” Shanjulia contends that

Kathryn is liable through her capacity as landlord of the Property.36 Citing

Wilmington Country Club v. Cowee, Shanjulia asserts that Kathryn, as landlord, “had

a duty to provide Shanjulia with safe ingress and egress to the property.”37 Although

Cowee deals with a motor vehicle accident on a country club’s private roadway, it is

analogous; and this Court recognizes the standard for property owners owing a duty

to warn invitees of open and obvious dangers.38

11. Here, it is undisputed that James—not Kathryn—is the owner of

Midnight. 39 Thus, strict liability does not apply to Kathryn. But, because she is the

landlord of the Property, the remaining issue is whether Kathryn knew of Midnight’s

vicious propensities. Shanjulia thinks so. In support, she asserts that Kathryn’s

deposition testimony shows that she knew about Midnight’s vicious nature.40

Kathryn disagrees contending that she testified generally about whether a dog could

be protective and vicious if it thought someone was harming its owners. 41 Kathryn

36
D.I. 24 ¶ 1–2.
37
Id. ¶ 1 (citing Wilm. Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2000)).
38
Cowee, 747 A.2d at 1089–90.
39
Hendrix, A. Dep. at 6:11, 9:10–19.
40
D.I. 24 ¶ 3.
41
Hendrix, K. Dep. at 39:24–40:18.

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further argues that such testimony was in response to hypotheticals posed by

opposing counsel instead of a clear understanding of Midnight’s vicious

propensities.42

12. Although Kathryn has not resided at the Property since February

2020—before Midnight moved in and nearly three years before the incident—she

testified that she visits the Property often.43 Kathryn claims she never noticed or

heard stories about Midnight acting viciously;44 yet her daughter, Amanda, testified

that Midnight barks at delivery persons.45 Amanda also admitted that Midnight was

involved in another incident where he jumped over their fence and attacked a

neighbor’s dog, which prompted animal control to conduct a second visit.46 Amanda

further stated that because another incident would require putting Midnight down,

he now lives with a relative in New York.47

42
D.I. 35 at 2.
43
Hendrix, K. Dep. at 6:13–14, 7:3–9.
44
Id. at 44:2–13 (“Q: Were you ever aware of any prior aggressive tendencies of that dog,
Midnight, before this incident? A. No. Q. Did anybody ever tell you that he went after
anybody or broke through the screen door or the storm door? A. No. Did you ever hear of
him being aggressive, or barking at, or trying to attack mail carriers before this incident?
A. No.”) (emphasis removed).
45
Hendrix, A. Dep. 28:17–24 (“Q. Did the dog bark when the mail person came to the
door? A. Yes. When the mail person comes, when Amazon comes. Q. He tends to bark
every time somebody comes to the door? A. Not usually, but usually with delivery
services.”) (emphasis removed).
46
Id. at Dep. 21:3–11.
Id. at Dep. 22:4–11. But see Hendrix, K. Dep. 17:13–18:17 (Kathryn testified that
47

Amanda’s family moved to New York and Midnight still lives with them).

8
13. Another fact also moves the needle away from summary judgment—

the need for a storm door. The record evinces that one of Amanda’s daughters may

have left the storm door unlatched, unleashing Midnight on unlucky passersby and

postal workers.48 But why was a secondary barrier installed in the first place? 49 It

is unclear exactly when Kathryn installed the additional barrier. If the storm door

was already part of the house before Kathryn moved out because she owned dogs

previously, this decision would be easy. On the other hand, if Kathryn installed the

storm door after Midnight moved in, that may give a reasonable juror pause. Thus,

the date the storm door was installed is highly probative.

14. Following the October 10, 2024 hearing, this Court instructed the

parties to provide clarity on when the storm door was installed. No updates have

been provided to date. Consequently, like a dog after a rainstorm, genuine issues as

to the material facts in this case are still muddy.

CONCLUSION

15. This Court finds factual disputes exist and summary judgment is

inappropriate. The better course is to proceed to trial, where the factual predicate to

determine whether Kathryn had actual knowledge of Midnight’s vicious propensities

48
Sanchez Dep. 36:6–10.
49
See Hendrix, K. Dep. 29:12–30:12 (“It adds the additional barrier of another door
between the mail carrier and any animals.”)

9
can be explored and the credibility of all involved can be judged. Accordingly, the

Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________ _

The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala

Original to Prothonotary.
cc. Stephen A. Hampton, Esquire
Kenneth M. Doss, Esquire

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