State v. Staats

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
v. ) Case No. 2308015660
)
)
DARREN STAATS, )
Defendant. )

Submitted: February 19, 2025
Decided: April 8, 2025

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

This 8th day of April, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Darren Staats’

(“Defendant”) February 19, 2025 Motion for Postconviction Relief, Defendant’s

Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, and the record in this matter, the following

is my Report and Recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2023 at approximately 11:42 p.m., Wilmington Police

Department (“WPD”) officers were notified of gunshots fired in the 1200 block of

West 3rd Street, Wilmington, Delaware.1 As WPD officers arrived to the area, they

observed and later seized six 9-millimeter shell casings on the southern sidewalk,

1
State v. Staats, Case No. 2308015660, Adult Complaint and Warrant, Exhibit B, p. 1.
1
just east of 1200 West 3rd Street.2 On August 28, 2023, WPD Corporal Shea

reviewed surveillance video from the Latin American Community Center

(“LACC”), which recorded the August 19 shots fired incident.3 The video showed

a shirtless black male exit the residence of 1202 West 3rd Street and approach a black

colored vehicle parked in front of the same residence.4 After some discussion with

the vehicle occupants, a subject later identified as the Defendant exited the rear right

side of the vehicle and walked to the entrance of an alleyway just east of 1200 West

3rd Street.5 At 10:47 p.m., the video depicted Defendant “raising his right arm and

what appear[ed] to be approximately five (5) muzzle flashes [were] then seen

emanating from his hand area, which is consistent with a firearm being discharged.”6

Defendant then walked westbound on the southern sidewalk, at which point the

shirtless person approached him. Defendant handed the shirtless person a small,

shiny metallic object consistent with a firearm.7 The shirtless man then re-entered

1202 West 3rd Street.8

Defendant re-entered the black vehicle on the rear right passenger side.9

When the police arrived at the scene on August 19, 2023, they contacted the

2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
2
occupants of the vehicle, including Defendant,10 who was the sole rear occupant of

a black Dodge Magnum.

A DELJIS inquiry revealed Defendant was a person prohibited from

possessing a firearm and ammunition due to September 22, 2015 felony convictions

for Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault Second

Degree and Conspiracy Second Degree.11

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 31, 2023, three days after the police reviewed the LACC

surveillance camera footage, WPD officers arrested Defendant and charged him with

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited; Possession of Firearm Ammunition

by a Person Prohibited; and Discharging a Firearm on a City Street.12 On December

4, 2023, a New Castle County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for Possession of a

Firearm by a Person Prohibited13 and Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a

Person Prohibited.14 On June 3, 2024, Defendant pled guilty to Possession of a

Firearm by a Person Prohibited,15 and this Court immediately sentenced him to an

10
Id., p. 2.
11
Id. See State v. Darren Staats, Superior Court Case No. 1411008391.
12
State v. Staats, Case No. 2308015660, Adult Complaint and Warrant, Exhibit A. Discharging
a Firearm on a City Street is a violation of the Wilmington City Code.
13
11 Del. C. § 1448.
14
Id. See D.I. 5, Indictment. The State did not indict the Defendant for the Wilmington City
Code violation.
15
D.I. 18, Plea Agreement.
3
aggregate term of fifteen years at Level V, suspended after serving ten years,

followed by probation.16

The plea colloquy reflects Defendant spent approximately thirty minutes

discussing the State’s plea offer with counsel before entering the plea, 17 and

Defendant expressly advised the Court: the Plea Agreement reflected the “entire

agreement with the State;”18 no one had forced or threatened him to enter the plea;19

he had not been promised anything that was not in the Plea Agreement;20 and

Defendant had an opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with counsel, and if he

had any questions for counsel prior to the entry of the plea, counsel answered them

to his satisfaction.21

This Court then reviewed the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with

Defendant. Defendant acknowledged he answered all the questions on the form

truthfully,22 and he was “satisfied with [his] lawyer’s representation [ ] and that

[counsel had] fully advised [him] of [his] rights.”23 This Court then read the charge

of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited to Defendant, and the following

discussion occurred:

16
D.I. 20, Sentence Order.
17
D.I. 25, June 3, 2024 Guilty Plea Colloquy and Sentencing Proceeding at 17:18 – 18:15.
18
Id. at 21:22 – 22:1.
19
Id. at 22:2-4.
20
Id. at 22:5-7.
21
Id. at 22:8-15.
22
Id. at 23:8-11
23
Id. at 24:17-20.
4
The Court: Do you understand that charge?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: How do you plead?
Defendant: Guilty.
The Court: Are you pleading guilty because you committed the
offense that I just read to you?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: The Court finds the plea knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently made, with an understanding of the nature of the charges
and consequences.24

On November 18, 2024, counsel filed Appellant’s Non-Merit Brief Under

Rule 26(c) (“Appellant’s Brief”).25 Appellant’s Brief included a Motion to

Withdraw from Representation, wherein counsel concluded that, “based on a

complete and careful examination of the record, there [were] no arguably appealable

issues.”26 Consistent with Supreme Court Rule 26, counsel notified Defendant he

would include in his Opening Brief any appellate points Defendant wished the

Supreme Court to consider on appeal. Defendant did not respond to counsel’s

invitation.27 On January 3, 2025, the Supreme Court denied Defendant’s appeal,

opining:

Having reviewed the record, we conclude Staats’ appeal is wholly
without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We are also
satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the
record and the law and has properly determined that Staats could not
raise a meritorious claim in [his] appeal.28

24
Id. at 26:1-21.
25
Staats v. State, No. 251, 2024, Appellant’s Brief.
26
Staats, 2025 WL 25804, at *1 (Del. Jan. 3, 2025).
27
Staats v. State, No. 251, 2024, Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.
28
Staats, 2025 WL 25804, at *1.
5
On December 23, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief

Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Motion”),29 and a Motion for the

Appointment of Postconviction Counsel.30 For the reasons discussed infra, I

recommend this Court summarily dismiss both of Defendant’s pending Motions.

III. DISCUSSION

1. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL.

Rule 61 provides this Court the discretionary authority to appoint

postconviction counsel when a Defendant enters a guilty plea.31 In that regard, Rule

61(e)(3) expressly provides:

(3) First postconviction motions in guilty plea cases. The judge may
appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction
motion and request for appointment of counsel if the motion seeks to
set aside a judgment of conviction that resulted from a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere only if the judge determines that: (i) the conviction has
been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review or direct
appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the motion sets forth a substantial
claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of counsel in
relation to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere; (iii) granting the
motion would result in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which
the movant is in custody; and (iv) specific exceptional circumstances
warrant the appointment of counsel.32

Defendant has failed to satisfy all four requirements of Rule 61(e)(3). Specifically,

while Defendant raised a claim that counsel was ineffective in relation to the guilty

29
D.I. 34.
30
D.I. 35.
31
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
32
Id.
6
plea because he alleged counsel coerced him into entering the plea, that claim is not

“substantial” as it is contradicted by both counsel’s affidavit33 and the plea colloquy

transcript.34 During the plea colloquy, Defendant admitted he was satisfied with

counsel’s representation, was fully advised of his rights, and was neither coerced nor

forced to plead guilty by anyone. Defendant has also failed to identify any “specific

exceptional circumstances” which warrant the appointment of counsel. Under these

circumstances, I recommend Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of

Postconviction Counsel be denied.

2. MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

When a defendant seeks to collaterally attack a guilty plea based on ineffective

assistance of counsel, he bears the burden of proving counsel provided ineffective

representation.35 To that end, where a defendant enters a guilty plea, they must

show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”36

33
D.I. 40.
34
D.I. 25.
35
MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Del. 2001).
36
Id., also see Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997), citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d
53, 58 - 60 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 - 694 (1984), Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)).
7
a. Defendant’s Claims.

Defendant raises several postconviction claims. First, he asserts counsel was

ineffective because he did not call a witness to testify at the preliminary hearing, and

Defendant contends that witness “was responsible for and claimed ownership of the

firearm that Defendant had been charged with.” Defendant next argues counsel was

ineffective for failing to “file a motion to suppress [a] firearm and a video

purportedly depicting Defendant possessing said firearm.”37 Third, Defendant

asserts “the Grand Jury refused to indict [him] on gun charges.” Fourth, Defendant

argues counsel was ineffective because he “did not meet with Defendant outside of

scheduled court appearances to discuss the case and evidence,”38 and “counsel failed

to communicate with Defendant at any point in the case to discuss trial strategy or

discovery materials.”39 Fifth, Defendant asserts counsel was ineffective “for failing

to file a Motion to Dismiss the case or for bail reduction” after the State failed to

indict Defendant within forty five days of arrest.40 Sixth, Defendant argues counsel

was ineffective for not “requesting medical records of Defendant to corroborate

Defendant’s claims of serious medical conditions.”41 Finally, Defendant asserts

counsel “coerced Defendant into pleading guilty by giving him a daunting

37
D.I. 34, p. 4.
38
Id.
39
Id., p. 5.
40
Id.
41
Id., p. 5-6.
8
ultimatum: take 10 years as a result of pleading guilty and try to give it back, or go

to trial and get life when [Defendant] is found guilty.”42

b. Application of Procedural Bars.

Before considering the merits of any postconviction claim, this Court must

first determine whether any of Rule 61’s procedural bars are applicable.43 Under

Rule 61, a postconviction motion can be procedurally barred for being untimely

filed, successive, procedurally defaulted, and/or subject to former adjudication.44

Here, upon review, the procedural bars are inapplicable. This is Defendant’s

first, timely filed Motion. His claims are not procedurally barred pursuant to Rule

61(i)(3) because Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not have

been raised at any earlier stage in the proceeding,45 and these claims were not

formerly adjudicated.46

c. Defendant’s Claims are Waived.

Generally, as a matter of law, when a defendant enters a knowing and

voluntary guilty plea, postconviction claims which allege “defects or errors

occurring prior to the entry of the plea” are waived.47 Additionally, with respect to

42
Id., p. 6.
43
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
44
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
45
See Green v. State, 230 A.3d 160, 175-76 (Del. 2020); Saab v. State, 2021 WL 2229631 at *2
(Del. May 18, 2021); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904 at *3 (Del. April 28, 2016).
46
See generally Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
47
Johnson v. State, 2008 WL 4830853, at *1 (Del. Nov. 7, 2008); also see Alexander v. State,
4809624 (Del. Nov. 5, 2008) (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)).
9
Defendant’s first claim – that counsel failed to call a witness at the preliminary

hearing – this Court has long held a defendant’s subsequent indictment by the Grand

Jury corrects any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or procedural, in the original

complaint, warrant, or preliminary hearing.48 All of Defendant’s claims allege

errors or defects which occurred prior to the entry of the plea, except for his final

claim, where he argues counsel coerced him into entering the plea. By virtue of

Defendant entering a knowing and voluntary plea, Defendant cannot prosecute his

claims in a postconviction proceeding, and he cannot demonstrate prejudice.

As to Defendant’s remaining claim – wherein he alleges counsel coerced him

into entering the guilty plea by giving him a “daunting ultimatum” – the record

simply does not support Defendant’s claim. As noted supra, during the plea

colloquy, Defendant informed this Court that no one had forced or threatened him

to enter the plea.49 And, on the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea form, Defendant

represented that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, counsel fully

advised him of his rights, and he answered all of the questions on the form

“truthfully.”50 The Defendant then pled guilty to the PFBPP offense because he in

48
McGlotten v. State, 2011 WL 3074790, at *2 (Del. July 25, 2011). Evans v. Redman, 1987
WL 37253 at *1 (Del. Apr. 28, 1987), citing United States v. Walker, 9th Cir., 491 F.2d 236, 238
(1974); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 201 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. 1964). Additionally, a
petitioner's failure to timely raise these claims before trial constitutes a waiver of same. Id. citing
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b)(2); United States v. Bistram, 153 F.Supp. 816, 818 (D.N.D. 1957), aff'd,
253 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1958).
49
D.I. 25 at 22:2-4.
50
Id. at 22:8 – 23:11.
10
fact committed it.51 A defendant’s statements during a plea colloquy are presumed

to be truthful,52 and a defendant’s representations to this Court during the plea

colloquy create a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” 53

The record does not support a reasonable probability Defendant would have insisted

on going to trial.

d. Assuming arguendo that Defendant’s claims were not
waived, they are nonetheless unsupported by the record, and he
cannot demonstrate prejudice.

In a postconviction proceeding where a defendant alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel in the context of the entry of a guilty plea, he “must show that

‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’”54 The record does not

support a conclusion that Defendant would not have pled guilty and insisted on a

trial, and he has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

First, Defendant received a very favorable plea. Due to Defendant’s criminal

history, if he were convicted of both charges at trial, he faced between ten to thirty-

one years incarceration.55 If the State moved to have Defendant declared a habitual

offender (which he qualified for, given his criminal record), he faced a minimum

51
D.I. 25 at 26:1-21.
52
See State v. Smith, 2024 WL 1577183, at *6 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2024), citing Somerville, 703
A.2d at 632.
53
Id., quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
54
MacDonald, 778 A.2d at 1075 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
55
Id. at 7:12-17.
11
mandatory sentence of fifteen years up to life imprisonment (due to the application

of 11 Del. C. § 4214(d)).56 On June 3, 2024, the State offered Defendant a plea to

the PFBPP charge, and the State agreed not to seek to have Defendant declared and

sentenced as a habitual criminal. The State also agreed to limit its sentence

recommendation to fifteen years at Level V, suspended after serving ten years,

followed by probation.57 Defendant’s plea took a potential life sentence off the table

and the State recommended the non-habitual minimum mandatory sentence despite

Defendant’s extensive violent felony criminal record.

Next, Defendant’s claims are not supported by the record. First, Defendant

claims there was a prospective witness who could have testified at the preliminary

hearing that they were “responsible for and claimed ownership of the firearm that

Defendant had been charged with.” But Defendant does not identify the alleged

witness, and more importantly, whether someone else was “responsible for” or

“owned” the firearm is not dispositive. The Defendant was observed on a video

recording firing off 5-6 rounds from a handgun. By virtue of his criminal record, he

is prohibited from possessing any firearm. Ownership or responsibility for a firearm

is not a relevant consideration.

56
Id. at 7:18-22.
57
Id. at 21:10-21. The Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea form, which Defendant reviewed and
signed, indicates his criminal record includes fourteen prior felony convictions – four convictions
for Burglary Second Degree; five convictions for Burglary Third Degree; one conviction for Theft
of a Senior; one conviction for Attempted Theft; one conviction for Theft; and two convictions for
Escape Second Degree. See D.I. 21.
12
Defendant also asserts counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the gun

and the video recording obtained from the LACC. But, according to counsel’s

affidavit, the police searched the suspect’s apartment for the gun only after obtaining

a valid search warrant for that property, and the Defendant lacked standing to object

to the search of that apartment, as he “maintained he had not lived, had recently or

temporarily stayed, and had no ownership or possessory rights in the place

searched.”58 And, Defendant cannot claim an expectation of privacy in a third

party’s surveillance video which captured him firing a handgun on a public sidewalk,

so a motion to suppress the gun and the LACC video would have been meritless.

Defendant next claims the “Grand Jury refused to indict [him] on gun

charges.”59 Not so. Defendant was arrested for three offenses: Possession of a

Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a Person

Prohibited, and Discharging a Firearm on a City Street, a misdemeanor violation of

the Wilmington City Code.60 When the State presented the case to the Grand Jury,

they sought to indict him for two felony, gun related offenses: Possession of a

Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a Person

58
D.I. 40, p. 3.
59
D.I. 34, p. 4.
60
D.I. 1, Adult Complaint and Warrant.
13
Prohibited.61 The Grand Jury did not “refuse to indict [him] on gun charges,”62 it

indicted him on gun and related ammunition charges.

As to Defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with

him “outside of scheduled court appearances to discuss the case and evidence,”63

counsel represents he “spoke to Darren Staats via phone calls, videos and letters.” 64

Further, that Defendant reviewed “all videos related to his case via Zoom.”65 More

importantly, however, Defendant fails to articulate how meeting with counsel would

have made him insist on going to trial instead of accepting the plea.

Defendant next argues counsel “failed to file a motion to dismiss the case or

for bail reduction after the State failed to have Defendant indicted within 45 days of

arrest.” But, for an indictment to be dismissed under Rule 48(b) for “unnecessary

delay,” the delay must be attributable to the State, and must have had a prejudicial

effect on the Defendant.66 The types of prejudice recognized by Rule 48(b) include:

[T]he unexplained commencement of a new prosecution long after a
dismissal by the State of the same charge in another court; the anxieties
suffered by a defendant as the result of delay and uncertainty in
duplicative prosecutions against him; the notoriety suffered by a
defendant and his family as the result of repeated commencement of
prosecutions for the same offense; and the expenses, legal and

61
D.I. 5, Indictment.
62
D.I. 34, p. 4.
63
Id. p. 5.
64
D.I. 40, p. 3.
65
Id. Defendant has failed to articulate how his alleged postconviction claim prejudiced his
defense.
66
State v. Moore, 2024 WL 2292230, at *4 (Del. Super. May 21, 2024), citing State v. Willis, 2001
WL 789667 (Del. Super. April 24, 2001).
14
otherwise, attendant upon a subsequent renewal in another court of a
dismissed prosecution.67

Defendant was arrested on August 31, 2023 and indicted on December 4,

2023, reflecting a 45-day indictment delay. Defendant has offered no evidence that

the State engaged in egregious conduct which caused the delay, and he has not

identified actual prejudice suffered due to the delay.68

Defendant contends counsel was ineffective because the “Court requested that

counsel obtain medical records of Defendant to corroborate Defendant’s claims of

serious medical conditions.”69 Defendant further argues this Court agreed to “waive

Defendant’s bail if counsel obtained the records,” and the Court would have reduced

his bail, allowing him to be released back to the community pending trial.70

On January 18, 2024, counsel filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail.71 Attached

to the bail reduction motion was thirty-seven pages of Defendant’s medical records.

In the bail motion, counsel argued:

Defendant has health issues that are better addressed and treated by his
current physician, and which are exacerbated by prolonged
incarceration: Defendant is currently suffering from liver disease and
Alcohol Induced Polyneuropathy. (Please see attached medical records
attached as Exhibit A).

67
Id., quoting State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 1971).
68
As to Defendant’s related claim that counsel failed to file a Motion for Bail reduction, (D.I. 34,
“Ground Four,” p. 5-6) that claim is unsupported by the record. On January 18, 2024, counsel
filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail. See D.I. 8.
69
D.I. 34, p. 5
70
Id. at p. 5-6.
71
D.I. 8.
15
After considering the Motion (which included Defendant’s medical records),

the State’s opposition to the Motion, and the DELPAT Pre-Trial Risk Assessment,

this Court denied the Motion for Reduction of Bail.72 There is no evidence that any

court expressly agreed to reduce Defendant’s bail pending trial if he produced

medical records indicating a compromised health condition, or that if he were

released on bail, Defendant would have insisted on going to trial.

Under these circumstances, and considering all of Defendant’s non-

meritorious claims, I recommend Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief be

summarily dismissed.

72
D.I. 10.
16
CONCLUSION

Defendant has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to the appointment of

postconviction counsel, and all but one of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims

were waived the moment he entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea. As

to the remaining claim, and specifically considering this Court’s plea colloquy with

Defendant, the record is devoid of any evidence that counsel coerced him into

entering the Plea Agreement. Therefore, I recommend Defendant’s Motion for the

Appointment of Postconviction Counsel be DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for

Postconviction Relief be SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/ Martin B. O’Connor
The Honorable Martin B. O’Connor

Cc: Prothonotary
Stephen McCloskey, Deputy Attorney General
Raymond Armstrong, Esquire
Darren Staats (SBI # 00467006)

17