State v. Guilford

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) ID No. 2202008181
)
SHAQUAN GUILFORD, )
)
Defendant. )

Date Submitted: July 7, 2025
Dated Decided: August 1, 2025

ORDER DENYING RULE 35 AND RULE 61 MOTIONS

Defendant Shaquan Guilford, filing pro se, moves this Court for relief from

his 2023 conviction and sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) arguing

he was illegally sentenced; under Rule 35(b) requesting his sentence be modified;

and under Rule 61 claiming he is entitled to postconviction relief. Guilford’s claims

are procedurally barred or lack merit; accordingly, all three motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND1

On March 28, 2022, Guilford was indicted for Murder First Degree,

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Possession

1
The facts recited herein are taken from the record in Case No. 2202008181 and, unless
otherwise noted, all Docket Items [“D.I. #”] refer to that case.
1
of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Carrying a Concealed Deadly

Weapon, Receiving a Stolen Firearm, and Resisting Arrest.2

Guilford pled guilty on December 14, 2022, with the assistance of counsel, to

the significantly reduced charges of Manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of

Murder First Degree), PFDCF, and PFBPP, as well as a Violation of Probation

(“VOP”) in an unrelated prior case,3 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining

charges in the indictment.4 Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, the State capped its total

unsuspended Level V recommendation at 20 years with the proviso “Level 5 is

consecutive.”5 Guilford signed the Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty

Plea Form (“TIS Form”) acknowledging the minimum mandatory period of

incarceration for the charges was a total of 17 years Level V,6 with the potential of

2
D.I. 2.
3
See Case No. 1710016401.
4
See D.I. 25 Plea Agreement [“Plea Agr.”]; D.I. 54 December 14, 2022, Plea Hearing
Transcript [“Plea Tr. #”].
5
Plea Agr.
6
The Plea Agreement provides the “Defendant acknowledges that he faces a total
minimum mandatory sentence of 17 years at Level 5. Manslaughter carries a 2 year
minimum mandatory sentence; Defendant faces a 10 year minimum mandatory sentence
for PFBPP and a 5 year minimum mandatory sentence for PFDCF due to his prior violent
felony convictions for [PFBPP] (2017) and Drug Dealing (2015).”
2
70 years Level V,7 based upon the statutory ranges of 2 to 25 years for Manslaughter,

5 to 25 years for PFDCF, 10 to 15 years for PFBPP, and 0 to 5 years for the VOP.8

During a colloquy with the Court, Guilford confirmed no one had promised

him what his sentence would be and stated he understood he faced 17 years Level V

minimum mandatory and that the Court could sentence him to up to 70 years Level

V.9 Guilford also stated he was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation.10 The

Court ordered a presentence investigation and set Guilford’s sentencing for a later

date.

After conferring with defense counsel and prior to Guilford’s sentencing, the

prosecution wrote the Court regarding an “error” in the plea paperwork:11

Pursuant to 11 Del. C. Sec. 3901(d), the Court must run all PFDCF
sentences consecutive to other sentences in a single case because the
underlying offense for the PFDCF charge was a violent felony.
However, the Court may, in its discretion, impose concurrent sentences
on Manslaughter, PFBPP and the [VOP]. Therefore, if the Court
chooses to run those sentences concurrent[ly] and only imposes the
minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years on the PFBPP, the total
minimum mandatory sentence the defendant faces is fifteen years, not
seventeen years as indicated on the plea paperwork. 12

7
See TIS Form D.I. 25.
8
Plea Agt. and TIS Form.
9
Plea Tr. 6:20–7:2, 7:3–5, 7:22–8:1.
10
TIS Form; Plea Tr. 6:3-5.
11
D.I. 27.
12
D.I. 27 (emphasis added). See also, 11 Del. C. § 3901(d), provides the Court will
determine whether a defendant’s sentence of confinement should run concurrently or
3
At the March 3, 2023 Sentencing Hearing, Guilford admitted, “I’m very, very sorry

for my actions, and I accept full responsibility for my actions.”13 The Court found

Guilford’s custody status at the time of the offense and lack of amenability to lesser

sanctions were aggravators14 and sentenced him to a total of 20 years of unsuspended

Level V-time including 17 years minimum mandatory, to run consecutively:

a. Manslaughter – 25 years Level V, suspended after 5
years, for varying levels of supervision, with 2 years
minimum mandatory.
b. PFDCF – 5 years Level V, with no probation to follow,
with 5 years minimum mandatory.
c. PFBPP – 10 years Level V, with no probation to follow,
with 10 years minimum mandatory.
d. VOP – discharged as unimproved.15

Guilford did not appeal his convictions.

Just over a month later, on April 17, 2023, Guilford, filing pro se, moved to

modify his sentence under Rule 35(b) (“First Rule 35(b) Motion”).16 In support,

Guilford argued he received a letter from his trial counsel stating the “Manslaughter

consecutively with any other sentence imposed by the State—but no sentence for PFDCF
will run concurrently with any other sentence.
13
D.I. 30 Sentencing Transcript [“Sent. Tr. #”] 17:21–23; D.I. 39.
14
Sent. Tr. 19:12–14.
15
Id. at 19:10–11, 20:9–13; D.I. 30.
16
D.I. 31 & 32.
4
and PFBPP charges can run concurrently according to the Benchbook statutes.”17

That same day, Guilford moved for postconviction relief, followed by ten

amendments or addenda to the initial motion (collectively, “Rule 61 Motion.”).18

The Court denied Guilford’s First Rule 35(b) Motion as meritless by Order

dated May 16, 2023.19 In pertinent part, the Court found no modification was

warranted because Guilford’s sentence was imposed after he signed a Plea

Agreement and acknowledged in open court that he understood the mandatory

minimum and maximum penalties provided by law and the range of possible

penalties, including the sentence imposed upon him.20 The Court further held the 17

years Level V minimum mandatory sentence was statutorily mandated and thus

prohibited from modification.21

The Rule 61 Motion is Guilford’s first and was timely filed. Guilford argues

he is entitled to postconviction relief because law enforcement engaged in

misconduct, the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v.

Maryland,22 and his defense counsel was ineffective. On September 6, 2023, the

17
D.I. 31 at *2.
18
See D.I. 32 and addenda or amendments (D.I. 36, 37, 37C, 43, 48, 50, 53, 56, 68 and 70).
19
D.I. 34.
20
Id. at 2.
21
Id.
22
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5
Court ordered the State to respond to Guilford’s Brady claim that the prosecution

withheld exculpatory information, including (1) the victim’s deleted phone call log

and deleted texts and (2) a portion of the surveillance footage from the James and

Jesse Barbershop (the “Barbershop”).23 The prosecution initially responded that it

provided the victim’s phone extraction and surveillance footage to the defense.24

But it supplemented its response after conferring with defense counsel, who stated

she did not receive the full two-hour surveillance footage from the Barbershop.25

The prosecution responded it did, in fact, supply the full footage to defense counsel

on May 11, 2022 and, in any event, the disputed footage was not exculpatory or

prejudicial.26

Guilford moved pro se to expand the record and compel production of his

entire discovery file.27 The next day, the Court ordered Guilford to clarify his request

for relief, instructed the prosecution to confirm the existence of the full video footage

from the Barbershop, and queried whether it could be sent to Guilford.28 The State

advised it sent the full footage to defense counsel a second time on September 19,

23
D.I. 38 (the missing surveillance footage showed the victim banging on a window with
a gun).
24
D.I. 40.
25
D.I. 41, 42.
26
Id.
27
D.I. 43–44.
28
D.I. 45.
6
2023, but could not send it directly to the defendant due to restrictions at the prison.29

Next, Guilford requested representation for his Rule 61 Motion, which the Court

ordered.30

Guilford’s postconviction claims are fairly summarized as (1) the prosecution

violated Brady by failing to turn over information to the defense; (2) his Level V

sentences for Manslaughter and PFBPP should have merged; (3) law enforcement

engaged in misconduct; and (4) his defense counsel was ineffective.

In February 2024, Guilford moved a second time to modify his sentence under

Rule 35(b) (“Second Rule 35(b) Motion”).31 The next month, he moved pro se to

correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a)32 and amended that motion in May 2024

and July 2025 (collectively, “Rule 35(a) Motion”).33

Meanwhile, Guilford’s defense counsel submitted an affidavit responding to

each of Guilford’s Rule 61 claims.34 Court-appointed postconviction counsel moved

to withdraw after finding no meritorious claims.35 The Court granted postconviction

counsel’s motion to withdraw and granted Guilford additional time to respond.

29
D.I. 47.
30
D.I. 55.
31
D.I. 51.
32
D.I. 52.
33
D.I. 57 and 70.
34
D.I. 67.
35
D.I. 59–61.
7
Guilford filed an amended brief,36 the State responded,37 and Guilford, although

given the opportunity to file a reply, failed to do so. This matter is now more than

ripe for decision.

II. DISCUSSION

All three of Guilford’s motions collaterally challenging his conviction and

sentence fail. Sentence modification and postconviction relief are only granted when

a defendant clears the procedural hurdles of Rules 35 and 61 and the claims

substantively merit relief. As detailed below, this Court finds the motions are either

procedurally barred or lack merit and are, thus, DENIED.

A. Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 35(a).

Rule 35(a) permits this Court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” 38

Illegal sentences include those that exceed statutory limits, violate double jeopardy,

are ambiguous regarding the time and manner of service, are internally

contradictory, omit a statutorily required term, are uncertain in substance, or are

unauthorized.39 Rule 35(a) allows this Court to “correct a sentence imposed in an

36
D.I. 68.
37
D.I. 69.
38
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
39
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1988) (citations omitted).
8
illegal manner” within 90 days after its imposition,40 but curbs Court consideration

of untimely applications to only those claiming “extraordinary circumstances.”41

Guilford contends his sentence is illegal for two reasons; first he alleges he

was sentenced to 17 years minimum mandatory at Level V when a portion of the

Level V time could be served concurrently42 and, second, he was subjected to

multiple sentences in violation constitutional principles against double jeopardy

because the Court did not merge his sentences. Guilford is wrong on both counts.

Guilford begins by arguing that because the parties acknowledged a portion

of his sentence could run concurrently, the Court’s sentence and holding that “17

years at Level 5 is mandatory and cannot be reduced or suspended”43 is “ambiguous”

and “internally contradictory.”44 Guilford is incorrect; because he conflates statutory

minimum mandatory sentences with whether a court may order a portion of two

minimum mandatory sentences be served concurrently.

Here, the Court’s sentence correctly articulated the minimum mandatory

sentences as totaling 17 years at Level V. The Delaware Criminal Code, enacted by

the state legislature, sets forth minimum mandatory periods of incarceration for

40
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
41
Id.
42
D.I. 52 ¶¶ 9–11.
43
D.I. 34 ¶ 3.
44
D.I. 52 ¶¶ 12 & 13.
9
certain crimes.45 The Court has no authority to suspend the minimum mandatory

portion of any sentence.46 According to statute, Guilford was subject to three

statutory minimum mandatory periods of incarceration for his convictions of

Manslaughter,47 PFDCF,48 and PFBPP.49 Separately, in limited circumstances, 11

Del. C. § 3901(d) permits a sentencing judge, as a discretionary matter, to impose

certain minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment concurrently or consecutively.

It follows that the sentencing judge could have ordered the sentences for

Manslaughter and PFBPP be served concurrently—but she did not. Instead, the

sentencing judge expressly chose to impose Guilford’s Level V sentences

consecutively.50 The Court’s Order denying Guilford’s first Rule 35(b) Motion

tacitly alludes to that discretion; the Court explained, “Concurrent Level 5 [was] not

appropriate in this case.”51 That 11 Del. C. § 3901(d) permits the Court, as a

45
11 Del. C. § 1405(c).
46
11 Del. C. § 1405(d).
47
See 11 Del. C. § 623 (classifying Manslaughter as a Class B felony); see also 11 Del. C.
§ 1405(b)(2) (the statutory range for a Class B felony is 2 years up to 25 years at Level V).
48
See 11 Del. C. § 1447A(c) (classifying PFDCF as a Class B felony and imposing a 5-
year minimum mandatory sentence where a defendant has been twice previously convicted
of a felony); see also 11 Del. C. § 1405(b)(2) (the statutory range for a Class B felony 2
years up to 25 years at Level V).
49
See 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2)(c) (requiring the minimum imposition of 10 years at Level
V).
50
Sent. Tr. 20:9–13.
51
Id. ¶ 5.
10
discretionary matter, to impose certain minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment

concurrently—and the sentencing judge declined to do so here—does not make

Guilford’s sentence illegal.

Guilford’s second illegality argument, that the Court’s sentence “to multiple

punishments for a single offense” violates his constitutional right against double

jeopardy under State v. Gibson,52 is equally unavailing. Guilford misunderstands

the holding in Gibson. That case concerned a defendant charged with four separate

counts of the same offense, PFBPP, on different dates.53 In contrast, Guilford was

convicted of one count each of Manslaughter, PFDCF, and PFBPP—all separate

offenses that do not merge.54

The Court reaches this conclusion by applying the Blockburger test, and finds

each offense requires “proof of a fact that the other does not.”55 Under 11 Del. C. §

632, Manslaughter is defined as (1) recklessly causing the death of another person,

(2) causing death with the intent to inflict serious physical injury, using means likely

to cause death, based on what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would

52
See generally D.I. 56; State v. Gibson, 2024 WL 939724 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2024).
53
State v. Gibson, at *2.
54
D.I. 30.
55
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (the Blockburger test states that
when a single criminal act violates two distinct statutory provisions, the determination of
whether there are two offenses or only one depends on whether each statute requires proof
of a fact that the other does not); See also, McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156 (Del. 2024)
(citing White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 399 (Del. 2020)).
11
perceive, or (3) intentionally causing death while under extreme emotional

disturbance, which does not qualify as murder. Under 11 Del. C. § 1447A(a), a

person possessing a firearm or projectile weapon during the commission of a felony

is guilty of PFDCF. In contrast, PFBPP under 11 Del. C. § 1448 provides that

individuals convicted of a felony or violent crime involving physical injury are

prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition. If such a person, due to a

violent felony conviction, negligently causes serious injury or death while

possessing a firearm, they commit a class B felony with a minimum sentence of ten

years at Level V if he was previously convicted of two or more violent felonies.56

Manslaughter does not merge with PFDCF or PFBPP because it requires death, as a

separate element; nor does it require the use of a weapon.57 Likewise, PFDCF

requires the contemporaneous commission of a separate felony. Moreover, while

the elements of PFDCF might overlap with PFBPP, 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2)(d)

reflects the General Assembly’s intent for PFBPP to be punished separately. The

statute specifies that PFBPP is not a related or included offense and does not

56
11 Del. C. § 1448.
57
See, e.g., State v. Melendez, 2024 WL 1005567, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2024)
(finding Assault First Degree and PDWBPP do not merge under the “Blockberger” test)
and Samuel v. State, 694 A.2d 48 (Del. 1997) (finding weapons offenses did not merge
with assault charges).
12
preclude sentencing under other provisions of the Code.58 Because each offense

requires proof of a distinct fact and § 1448(e)(2)(d) indicates a specific legislative

intent to punish PFBPP separately, Guilford’s convictions do not merge for

sentencing purposes under the Blockburger test. Further, the record shows no

evidence that Guilford requested the sentencing judge merge the offenses.

For all these reasons, the Court finds the sentence imposed was legal.

Accordingly, Guilford’s Rule 35(a) Motion lacks merit and is DENIED.

B. Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 35(b).

Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), the Court has the discretion to

reduce or modify a sentence of imprisonment if a motion is made within 90 days of

sentencing.59 The Rule provides a reasonable period for the Court to reconsider its

sentencing decisions60 and a second chance to assess the appropriateness of the

initial sentence.61 Sentence modification is only granted when a defendant clears the

requisite procedural hurdles and substantively merits relief.

58
11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2)(d) provides “Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to be a
related or included offense of any other provision of this Code. Nothing in this paragraph
shall be deemed to preclude… sentencing under any other provision of this Code.”
59
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
60
Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967).
61
Hewett v. State, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 2014); see also State v. Reed,
2014 WL 7148921, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2014) (first citing United States v.
Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541–43 (2d. Cir. 1968); then citing U.S. v. Maynard, 485 F.2d
247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); and then citing State v. Tinsley, 928 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996)).
13
Rule 35(b) motions filed after 90 days are generally time-barred, except under

“extraordinary circumstances” or as provided by 11 Del. C. § 4217.62 Delaware law

imposes a heavy burden on the movant to demonstrate such circumstances to

maintain the finality of judgments.63 An untimely motion may only be excused if

the extraordinary circumstances justifying the delay were entirely beyond the

movant’s control.64 Nor will the Court consider repetitive requests for reduction of

sentence.65 Under Rule 35(b), “[a] motion is ‘repetitive’ as that term is used in Rule

35(b) when it is preceded by an earlier Rule 35(b) motion, even if the subsequent

motion raises new arguments.”66 Moreover, unlike the 90-day time bar with its

“extraordinary circumstances exception, the bar to repetitive motions has no

exceptions and flatly “prohibits repetitive requests for reduction of sentence.”67

Here, Guilford’s Rule 35 Motion is barred as untimely, filed more than 90

days after his March 3, 2023 sentencing, with no “extraordinary circumstances” to

justify the delay. It is further barred as repetitive; this is Guilford’s second Rule

62
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
63
State v. Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015).
64
State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 145 (Del. 2016) (quoting Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2)
(internal quotations omitted).
65
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
66
State v. Culp, 152 A. 3d at 145.
67
Thomas v. State, 2002 WL 310681804, at *1 (Del.).
14
35(b) motion. Additionally, the issue of concurrent sentencing68 was already

addressed and decided by this Court’s May 16, 2023 Order denying his First Rule

35(b) Motion.69 Finally, Guilford’s request for a sentence review after completing

10 years of incarceration, based on leniency due to family circumstances and his

participation in rehabilitative programs, is premature.70

Since Guilford’s motion is procedurally barred, the Court will not consider

the merits of his claim;71 accordingly, his Second Rule 35(b) Motion is DENIED.

C. Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 61.

Rule 61 provides incarcerated individuals a chance to seek redress from a

prior sentence by setting aside a conviction if the Court lacked jurisdiction or if there

is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack on the conviction.72 The

Rule is “intended to correct errors in the trial process, not to allow defendants

unlimited opportunities to relitigate their convictions.”73

Before reaching the merits of any Rule 61 claim, the Court must consider the

Rule 61(i) procedural bars: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of the

68
Compare D.I. 31, with D.I. 51.
69
D.I. 34.
70
D.I. 51.
71
State v. Reed, 2014 WL 7148921, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2014).
72
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
73
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013), as corrected (Aug. 15, 2013).
15
conviction’s finality or a retroactive right; (2) repetitive motions are prohibited

unless certain requirements are met; (3) issues not raised before conviction are

deemed waived unless cause or prejudice is shown; and (4) claims already finally

adjudicated on the merits are precluded.74

Guilford’s Rule 61 claims and the Court’s rationales for denying them follow.

1. Guilford’s sentences do not merge.

Guilford’s Rule 35(a) Motion and Rule 61 Motion both argue the Court should

have merged his sentences for Manslaughter and PFBPP.75 Guilford’s sentences for

Manslaughter and PFBPP do not merge for sentencing purposes76 so the argument

does not support a claim for Rule 61 relief.

2. Guilford waived any argument based on police misconduct.

Guilford contends the police engaged in misconduct or deviated from protocol

by not charging him with additional crimes, such as possession of cocaine.77 Setting

aside whether there is even a factual basis to conclude there was any misconduct,

issues not raised before conviction are deemed waived unless cause or prejudice is

shown under Rule 61(i)(iii). Guilford has shown neither.

74
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1–4).
75
D.I. 56 at 2–3.
76
See Part II B, supra.
77
D.I. 32 at 3; D.I. 36 at 6.
16
If Guilford sought such information to attempt to impeach officers, he was not

constitutionally entitled to it because by pleading guilty, Guilford waived his right

to hear and examine witnesses against him.78 The plea colloquy reflects the Court

questioned Guilford about the factual basis for his plea and Guilford freely admitted

his guilt.79 Accordingly, the Court found Guilford’s guilty plea was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary.80 Guilford is bound by his statements to the Court and

cannot reopen his case to make claims unrelated to his guilt, particularly those

involving impeachment evidence that would only be relevant at trial. Nor can this

Court ascertain any prejudice to Guilford by the State’s decision to forego charging

him with additional crimes. Because Guilford waived any argument regarding

police misconduct by pleading guilty, he cannot use it now to support a claim for

Rule 61 relief.

3. Guilford did not establish a Brady violation.

78
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1206 (Del. 2015) (explaining the “Constitution does not
require the State to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant because a defendant who pleads guilty decides to
forgo not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees and
impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to
whether a plea is voluntary.”) (cleaned up). See also, Carrero v. State, 115 A.3d 1214 (Del.
2015) (TABLE) (denying postconviction relief when defendant claimed he was entitled to
potential impeachment evidence prior to guilty plea); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229 (Del.
2003) (same).
79
Plea Tr. 8:3-9:2.
80
Plea Tr. 9:3-5.
17
Guilford contends he is entitled to postconviction relief because the

prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose deleted cell phone calls and text

messages between himself and the victim81 and the full two-hour surveillance

video.82 Neither claim merits relief under Rule 61.

Brady teaches the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment

evidence that is favorable to an accused and is material to the case violates the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.83 A violation

may exist irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.84 To comply

with Brady, a prosecutor must “disclose all relevant information obtained by the

police or others in the Attorney General's Office to the defense.”85 There are three

components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused

because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the

State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.”86

81
D.I. 32 at 3; D.I. 35 at 4; D.I. 36 at 4–5.
82
Id.
83
See generally Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977
(Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence
that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing
prejudice to the defendant.”).
84
Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987.
85
See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987–
88).
86
See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164, 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del.
2014) (TABLE)). State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013), as amended (May 28,
2013); (“The State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . does not, alone and
18
The Court may consider any adverse effect from nondisclosure “on the

preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.”87 But, in the context of a Rule

61 Motion seeking vacatur of a guilty plea, a defendant who later learns of

impeachment information is not entitled to Rule 61 relief when the evidence does

not bear upon whether the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.88

Conversely, a prosecutor’s improper failure to turn over exculpatory evidence prior

to a plea may establish a Brady violation, but suppression of the exculpatory

evidence alone is insufficient to meet the test—the defendant must also show

prejudice.89 To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must demonstrate that the

without more, constitute a Brady violation. The State must release evidence only when
‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’”) (first citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 83;
and then quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). See also, Starling, 882 A.2d at 756. (The
“failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, . . . does not, alone and without more, constitute
a Brady violation. The State must release evidence only when ‘there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.’”) (quoting Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506, 516 (Del. 2001)).
87
Wright, 91 A.3d at 987-88 (citing U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985)).
88
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1201 (Del. 2015) (citing United State v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 623 (2002)(holding that the “Constitution, in respect to a defendant's awareness of
relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge, but permits a court to accept
a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various
forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor”)).
89
State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319 at 324; Starling, 882 A.2d at 756.
19
suppressed evidence “creates a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”90

Guilford’s first Brady claim is that the State failed to turn over the victim’s

cell phone log and texts. The first element of Brady requires the existence of

evidence that is favorable to the accused. Here, the State contends it turned over the

entire cell phone extraction to the defense.91 Defense counsel confirmed “the cell

phone extraction from the victim’s cells phone . . . indicated when messages and

calls had been deleted . . . [and] did not show the phone calls and text messages

which Guilford sought, nor did it show that those calls or messages had been

deleted.”92 Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence to corroborate Guilford’s

claim, the Court concludes he has failed to present facts to substantiate the State

possessed or controlled any exculpatory data from the victim’s cell phone. Further,

both Guilford and his counsel were aware of the cell phone data at the time of

Guilford’s guilty plea, during which he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

waived any trial right to test the validity of the cell phone evidence.93 Accordingly,

90
Cannon, 127 A.3d at 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del.
2014) (TABLE)) (emphasis in original). See also Starling, 882 A.2d 747 at 756.
91
D.I. 40.
92
D.I. 67 ¶ 6A.
93
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202 (Del. 2015) (when defendant admits the committed
the crime of which he is accused in a valid plea colloquy, he may not re-open his case to
make claims that do not address his actual guilt) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at
623).
20
this Court cannot find a Brady violation based on the purported deletion of cell phone

texts or logs.

Next Guilford contends the State violated Brady because it did not turn over

the entirety of the two-hour Barbershop surveillance video.94 The existence of the

full surveillance video is not disputed, but under the first prong of Brady, the

suppressed evidence must also be exculpatory. A factual and legal issue exists as to

whether the video was exculpatory, that is, tending to negate the defendant’s

culpability. Guilford argues the missing surveillance footage would have helped

him establish a justification defense; whereas, the State disputes the exculpatory

nature of the footage. Another factual issue exists as to the second Brady

component: whether the State suppressed the evidence. The prosecution argues it

turned over the entire two-hour video,95 but defense counsel states she only received

a 4.5-minute partial clip that recorded the murder and Guilford’s flight from the

scene.96 The third component of Brady requires that the prosecution’s suppression

of the exculpatory evidence cause prejudice to the movant. It is here that Guilford’s

claim fails.

94
D.I. 37 at 6.
95
D.I. 41 at 1.
96
Id.
21
To secure a Brady violation, Guilford must establish prejudice to his case. In

the context of a guilty plea, this requires Guilford to establish that had the full

surveillance video footage been known to him at the time of the guilty plea, he would

have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Although Guilford and his

counsel contend they were not aware of the full video’s existence until after the

guilty plea,97 nowhere in his many submissions does Guilford argue he would not

have entered the guilty plea and demanded trial. Nor does he contend his guilty plea

and concomitant waiver of the right to trial were unknowing or involuntary. Finally,

Guilford’s argument that not having the full video prevented him from pursuing a

self-defense argument98 is directly refuted by both his defense counsel and

postconviction counsel. The disputed video was one of six available recordings the

incident99 and thus cumulative of other evidence already in the defendant's

possession. Defense counsel affirmed she had access to all the other videos, the

portion the disputed video recording the murder and defendant’s flight, and eye-

witness testimony, all of which allowed her to negotiate a reduced plea to

Manslaughter.100 Postconviction counsel concurred. Prior to withdrawing,

97
D.I. 67 ¶ 6B.
98
Id.
99
D.I. 41 at 1.
100
See D.I. 67 ¶ 4 (“Had this case proceeded to trial, counsel would have presented a self-
defense theory. Additionally, this self-defense claim was one of the factors discussed and
considered by the parties during plea negotiations.”); D.I. 40 at 9 (Guilford “benefitted
22
postconviction counsel reviewed the entire video and concluded it would not have

aided Guilford’s self-defense argument.101

Without reaching a conclusion regarding the first two components of Brady,

the Court concludes Guilford did not demonstrate that the State’s alleged failure to

provide the entirety of the disputed video created a reasonable probability that, had

it been disclosed, he would have chosen to go to trial. Accordingly, this Court cannot

conclude the State’s actions prejudiced the outcome of his case, negating a Brady

violation and Guilford’s derivative claim for postconviction relief.

4. Effectiveness of Trial Counsel.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must

establish his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated

under the two-part test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington102 as adopted by the state of Delaware.103 Under the Strickland test, the

movant must show “first, that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and, second, that the deficiencies in counsel’s

from the plea agreement and the parties considered his potential self-defense claims when
crafting the heavily negotiated terms”).
101
D.I. 60 at 22.
102
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
103
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988).
23
representation caused him substantial prejudice.”104 The first prong of the test

requires the movant to “overcome ‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’”105 The Court must

objectively evaluate counsel’s performance, focusing solely on what is

constitutionally required, rather than what might be possible, prudent, or

appropriate.106 The heart of the Court’s analysis under the first Strickland prong is

whether trial counsel’s choices, strategies, and decisions, when viewed as a whole,

were reasonable.107 Thus, the burden rests with the movant to “establish his

counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,” meaning no reasonable

lawyer would have conducted the defense in the same way.108

To the extent a movant establishes a performance deficiency by counsel, he

must still overcome the second Strickland prong by proving that this deficiency

prejudiced the outcome of his case. In evaluating such a claim, concrete allegations

of prejudice, including specifying the nature of the prejudice and the adverse effects

104
Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174 (Del. 2020) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).
105
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
106
Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 (1987)).
107
Id. (citations omitted).
108
Id. (citing Burger, 483 U.S. at 791).
24
actually suffered are required;109 the Court dismisses conclusory allegations.110

When a movant collaterally attacks a guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance

of counsel, as Guilford does here, he must prove counsel’s actions were so

prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the

defendant would have insisted on going to trial instead of pleading guilty.111 “A

reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome, a standard lower than more likely than not. The likelihood of a different

result must be substantial not just conceivable.”112 Failure to satisfy either Strickland

prong renders the Rule 61 claim insufficient.113

Guilford contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge

purported police misconduct, subpoena witnesses, obtain the full two-hour

Barbershop surveillance video, call logs, and text messages, provide him with

discovery, and move to suppress the Barbershop surveillance video—and that,

cumulatively, all these failings compelled him to plead guilty. None of these claims

are sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

109
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
110
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555; Jordan v. State, 1994 WL 466142, at *1 (Del. Aug.
25, 1994).
111
MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Del. 2001); see also Somerville v. State, 703
A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (citing Albury, 551 A.2d at 58–60).
112
Green, 238 A.2d at 174 (quoting Starling, 130 A.3d at 325).
113
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1196.
25
a. Purported Police Misconduct

Guilford contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge alleged

police misconduct.114 Again Guilford appears to be focused on law enforcement’s

decision not to charge him with possession of cocaine, believing that if he had an

opportunity to confront officers with Operation Safe Streets, and if they were unable

to produce the cocaine, the “gun charge could be thrown out.”115 Defense counsel

disputes this amounted to police misconduct and, for strategic reasons, chose not to

pursue the issue at the risk of Guilford being charged with yet another felony.116

After reviewing the record, this Court cannot readily ascertain an evidentiary or

strategic reason for counsel to have sought an evidentiary hearing to challenge this

issue; accordingly, I find no performance deficiency under Strickland. Further, as

discussed above,117 Guilford claims the police failed to preserve or extract

information from the victim’s cell phone,118 violating Guilford’s rights. He says he

might have called the victim’s girlfriend to cross examine her regarding whether she

tampered with the phone.119 But again, by pleading guilty and waiving the right to

114
D. I. 32 at 3; D.I. 37 at 5.
115
D.I. 37 at 5.
116
D.I. 67 ¶ 5.
117
See supra § II.C.2.
118
D.I. 50 at 4.
119
Id. at 5.
26
trial, Guilford waived any pre-plea errors and the right to hear and question witnesses

against him in the absence of cause or prejudice—and the Court finds none here.

b. Witness Subpoenas

Guilford contends his counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing (1) a

witness who could testify the victim allegedly “kept calling . . . and texting” Guilford

“until [Guilford] blocked him[,]” and (2) a family member of the victim who

allegedly heard him say he “was on his way to kill [Guilford]” before the incident.120

Guilford elected to enter a guilty plea, resolving all instant charges against him. In

so doing, he waived the right to a trial and call witnesses in his defense. Further,

defense counsel stated she attempted to locate and interview all potential defense

witnesses identified by Guilford and leveraged information pertinent to a self-

defense argument to obtain a reduced plea from the State.121 Accordingly, the Court

finds no deficiency in counsel’s performance for failing to subpoena witnesses under

Strickland.

c. Existing Evidence

Guilford claims his counsel was ineffective for not asserting a self-

justification defense.122 This claim is not supported by the record. To recap, the cell

120
D.I. 32 at 3; D.I. 35 at 4; D.I. 37 at 3, 5; D.I. 43 at 4–5.
121
See supra note 100.
122
D.I. 36 at 3–4.
27
phone extraction did not support Guilford’s claims, as it showed no deleted calls or

messages.”123 Defense counsel attempted to obtain surveillance video independently

but was informed it no longer existed.124 She sought to interview all potential

defense witnesses identified by Guilford.125 She then successfully negotiated a

significantly reduced plea based on self-defense.126 Guilford had the option to refuse

the plea offer and go to trial to present a justification defense, but chose instead to

plead guilty, waiving his right to trial. Guilford’s factually unsupported contentions

do not establish counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under

Strickland.

d. Delivering Discovery

Guilford contends his counsel was ineffective for not timely providing him

with certain discovery items, including the autopsy report, redacted witness

statements, the cell phone extraction report, and photographs of the weapon and

clothes.127 Initially, a protective order limited the dissemination of discovery,

preventing counsel from sharing certain witness-identifying information with

123
D.I. 67 ¶ 6A.
124
D.I. 67 ¶ 6B.
125
D.I. 67 ¶ 2.
126
See supra note 100.
127
D.I. 32 at 3; D.I. 35 at 4; D.I. 37 at 3, 5; D.I. 43 at 4–5.
28
Guilford.128 Counsel stated Guilford agreed to the protective order and she provided

him non-protected discovery, while showing or discussing the remaining items,

including all surveillance videos.129 Guilford acknowledges receiving the disputed

discovery before “the defense deadline” and, in any event, well before pleading

guilty. Thus, the Court finds counsel’s performance was reasonable under

Strickland. Further, by entering the guilty plea, Guilford waived any pre-plea

defects.

e. Suppressing Surveillance

Guilford’s contention his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress

the Barbershop surveillance video on constitutional ground is meritless.130 First,

Guilford waived any alleged defects by entering a guilty plea. Second, there was no

unreasonable search or seizure as the surveillance video at issue were obtained from

a business—not from Guilford, his residence, or any other location where he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy. Because there were no factual or legal grounds

supporting suppression of the surveillance video, counsel’s decision not to move for

suppression was reasonable under Strickland.

f. Counsel’s Conduct

128
D.I. 5.
129
D.I. 67 ¶ 1.
130
D.I. 37 at 4.
29
Guilford contends his counsel’s “pervasive ineffectiveness” during pretrial

proceedings and misinformation about the 17-year minimum mandatory sentence

led him to plead guilty.131 Not so. Guilford signed the Plea Agreement

acknowledging a minimum mandatory sentence of 17 years at Level V, with specific

terms for Manslaughter, PFBPP, and PFDCF, due to his prior convictions (PFBPP

in 2017 and Drug Dealing in 2015).132 He signed the TIS Form acknowledging a

17-year minimum and a 70-year maximum.133 He is bound by the statements he

made during his guilty plea colloquy, during which he admitted the offenses,

understood the penalties, and expressed satisfaction with his counsel.134

Post-plea, the State informed the Court that, as a discretionary matter, it could

impose concurrent sentences for the Manslaughter, PFBPP, and VOP offenses.135

Defense counsel communicated this to Guilford by letter and in discussions before

sentencings136 as she was ethically required to do.137 That the Court chose to impose

Guilford’s minimum mandatory sentences for Manslaughter and PFBPP

consecutively does not evidence ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.

131
D.I. 36 at 8-9; D.I. 37 at 4–5; D.I. 53 at 2–3.
132
Plea Agr.
133
TIS Form.
134
Plea Tr. 6:3–4, 6:20–7:2, 8:2–9:2.
135
Id.
136
D.I. 61 at A21; D.I. 67 ¶ 3.
137
See Delaware Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4.
30
And even if there were evidence counsel’s representation fell below an objectively

reasonable standard, Guilford cannot establish prejudice under Strickland because

any advice indicating a 15-year sentence might be imposed would have only

benefitted Guilford.138

III. CONCLUSION

Guilford’s motions under Rules 35(a), 35(b), and 61 are either procedurally

barred or lacking in merit. Guilford entered a guilty plea to three offenses that carried

minimum mandatory period of imprisonment related to homicide. The 17 year Level

V minimum mandatory sentence was legal under Rule 35(a) and Guilford has not

shown entitlement to a sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). There was no Brady

violation and defense counsel was effective, ensuring Guilford’s plea was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary, negating his Rule 61 claims. Accordingly, Guilford’s Rule

35 and Rule 61 Motions are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Kathleen M. Vavala
The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala

138
Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, with State v. Newton, 1998 WL 731570 (Del.
Super. May 29, 1998) (prejudice was established where counsel failed to advise the
defendant the minimum mandatory was higher than what he advised).
31