Sandonato v. Horsey

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JENIFER SANDONATO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No.: K25C-05-023 NEP
)
TRUDENA HORSEY and )
KENT COUNTY LEVY COURT )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: July 31, 2025
Decided: September 10, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Motion For Extension Of Time To File Responsive Pleading
To The Complaint
GRANTED

Upon Plaintiff’s Motion To Deny And Strike Defendant’s Motion For
Enlargement Of Time And For Sanctions
DENIED

Upon Plaintiff’s Motion For Default Judgment
DENIED

Upon Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion In Support Of Motion For Default
Judgment
DENIED

Jenifer Sandonato, Dover, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Scott G. Wilcox, Esq., Giordano & Gagne, LLC, Attorney for Defendants.

Primos, J.
Defendants Trudena Horsey and Kent County Levy Court prior to the deadline
for responding to Plaintiff Jenifer Sandonato’s amended complaint, filed a motion
for enlargement of time in which to do so (the “Motion to Extend”). Before the
Court ruled on Defendants’ motion, the deadline for Defendants’ responsive
pleading passed, and Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Plaintiff then moved to
strike Defendants’ Motion to Extend and requested that Defendants be sanctioned.
Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint—after the
original deadline to do so, but before the deadline requested by their Motion to
Extend.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion to
strike is without merit. It is therefore appropriate to consider the Motion to Extend
on its merits. Defendants’ motion shows sufficient cause for the Court to grant it.
In light of that conclusion, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is misplaced and
contrary to Delaware’s well-established policy preference for deciding cases on their
merits. Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are procedurally improper, and the Court
will not consider them.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for extension of time to file responsive
pleading to the complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to deny and strike
Defendants’ motion for enlargement of time and sanctions, Plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment, and Plaintiff’s supplemental motion in support of motion for
default judgment are all DENIED.

2
I. BACKGROUND 1
On May 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Horsey
related to Plaintiff’s employment with, and departure from, the Kent County Levy
Court, where Horsey is a human resources officer.2 On the same day, Plaintiff filed
a complaint against Defendants’ counsel (“Defense Counsel”), bringing five counts
closely related to the allegations giving rise to this case. 3
On June 18, 2025, Defendants entered an appearance through counsel. 4 Also
on June 18, 2025, Defendants moved for an extension of time to file a responsive
pleading, requesting an additional 30 days to do so. 5 In justifying this request,
Defendants cited the length and complexity of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 6
On June 24, 2025, Plaintiff moved for default judgment, noting that more than
20 days had elapsed since Defendants were served with the Complaint, but that no
responsive pleading had been filed, 7 and, on June 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “motion
to deny and strike defendant’s [sic] motion for enlargement of time and for
sanctions.”8 Also on June 25, 2025, the Court issued a letter instructing the parties
to appear at the courthouse for a scheduling conference on July 11, 2025.9 The Court
indicated that the purpose of the conference was “to discuss scheduling of the
pending motions, . . . including Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time and all

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items. This section contains only the
procedural history relevant to the instant motions.
2
D.I. 1.
3
See C.A. No. K25C-05-022 NEP.
4
D.I. 37.
5
D.I. 38.
6
Id. at 1–2.
7
D.I. 39 at 2. Because Plaintiff’s motion does not bear page numbers, the Court references the
pagination of the .pdf copies thereof on the electronic docket. The Court takes this approach with
each of Plaintiff’s filings because all lack page numbers. Defendants were served on June 3, 2025.
D.I. 35–36.
8
D.I. 40.
9
D.I. 45.
3
of Plaintiff’s pending motions.”10
The parties made various additional filings prior to the conference. Relevant
here, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on July
7, 2025. 11 On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “supplemental motion in support of
motion for default judgment” 12 and an “opposition to defendants’ response to motion
for default judgment.” 13 Finally, on July 10, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the Complaint under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). 14
At the scheduling conference on July 11, 2025, the Court informed the parties
that it would issue a written decision on Defendants’ Motion to Extend, Plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment, Plaintiff’s supplemental motion in support thereof, and
Plaintiff’s motion to deny and strike Defendants’ motion for enlargement of time
and for sanctions. The Court further instructed the parties not to file any further
pleadings until this decision issued, save for Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s
motion to deny and strike and to Plaintiff’s supplemental motion. All of the
materials, including Defendants’ additional responses, were submitted to the Court
for its decision on July 31, 2025.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s motion to strike relies on misunderstandings of this
Court’s rules.
Plaintiff takes the position that Defendants’ Motion to Extend should not be
heard on the merits, citing Superior Court Civil Rules 12(f), 5(b), and 6(b).
Specifically, Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendants’ motion because “it is
procedurally improper, untimely, and unsupported by any affidavit of service.” 15

10
Id.
11
D.I. 52.
12
D.I. 57.
13
D.I. 56.
14
D.I. 60.
15
D.I. 40 at 8.
4
Plaintiff’s motion is without merit. Defendants did file a certificate of service
in which Defense Counsel swore that he “caused a true and correct copy . . . to be
served via United States Postal Mail upon” Plaintiff at her home address.16 Such
mailing is sufficient to comply with Rule 5(b), which permits service of such a filing
“by mailing it to the . . . party . . . at the . . . party’s last known address.”17
Plaintiff also misapprehends Rule 6(b). Rule 6(b) does not impose strict time
limits on the filing of motions for extension of time. Rather,
the Court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period [for an act] enlarged if request
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect [subject to exceptions
not relevant here].18
Here, Defendants requested an extension of time to file an answer or motion
to dismiss before their first responsive pleading was due. Even if this were not so,
the Court could still grant Defendants’ request under Rule 6(b)(2) upon a showing
of excusable neglect. The Court’s rules in this regard are not as harsh or inflexible
as Plaintiff believes.
Finally, Rule 12(f) has no application here.19 Rule 12(f) permits the Court to
“order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” Nothing in Defendants’ motion can
be fairly characterized in this way. Such a motion is typically uncontroversial, and

16
D.I. 38.
17
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 5(b).
18
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b) (emphasis supplied).
19
Even if Rule 12(f) applied in this scenario, it would not yield the result Plaintiff hopes. This
Court disfavors motions to strike. Heisenberg Principals Fund IV, LLC v. Bellrock Intel., Inc.,
2018 WL 3460433, at *1 (Del. Super. July 17, 2018) (citing Vannicola v. City of Newark, 2010
WL 5825345, at *8 (Del. Super. Dec. 21, 2010)). Such motions “are granted sparingly, and then
only if clearly warranted, with doubt being resolved in favor of the pleading.” Id.
5
Defendants’ request in this case was entirely proper for the reasons that follow.
B. Defendants have shown cause to extend the deadline to file an
answer, and default judgment is therefore inappropriate.
As noted previously, motions for enlargement of time are governed by
Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b). If a motion is filed after the expiration of the allotted
time for a given act, the Court may only grant an extension upon a showing of
excusable neglect.20 Where the motion is made prior to expiration of such time
period, however, the Court has discretion to grant the extension for “cause shown.”21
Although Plaintiff complains 22 that Defendants have shown neither “good
cause” nor excusable neglect, this contention is beside the point, because neither is
the applicable standard. Because the Motion to Extend was filed prior to expiration
of the 20-day deadline for responsive pleadings, the Court need only be satisfied that
Defendants have shown “cause” for extension. 23 Plaintiff’s protest that Defendants
did not submit an affidavit detailing such cause 24 is likewise misplaced. The Court
may, consistent with Rule 6, find cause without a motion by Defendants, much less
a sworn affidavit.25
Defendants, though, did file a motion, and the motion articulates sufficient
cause to satisfy the Court. Defendants noted that their counsel did not enter his
appearance until June 18, 2025, and that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains
“280 paragraphs of facts and 14 legal theories.”26 Defendants therefore requested a
30-day extension. 27 In various filings, Plaintiff counters that Defendants and their

20
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(2).
21
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(1); see also Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1286 (Del. 2008)
(“Applications for extension of time . . . are addressed to the trial judge’s discretion[.]”).
22
D.I. 56 at 3.
23
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(1).
24
D.I. 56 at 3.
25
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(1).
26
D.I. 38 at 1–2.
27
Id. at 2.
6
counsel were aware of the facts underlying this litigation well prior to entering an
appearance. Although Plaintiff is likely right on this last score, this conclusion has
little weight in the Court’s analysis. Defendants still deserved adequate time to
respond to her Complaint, and motions like Defendants’ are granted almost as a
matter of course because the standard is a low one.
The Supreme Court has instructed that, even when a motion is subject to the
more stringent standard of “excusable neglect,” extensions should be granted
liberally “to the end that disputes be resolved on their merits.” 28 This Court will be
no less liberal in granting Defendants’ more timely motion. The Court is persuaded
that the complexity of Plaintiff’s Complaint and the necessity of expending
significant time to adequately respond to it bears on the analysis.29 The Superior
Court’s standard 20-day deadline for responsive pleadings 30 anticipates that
complaints will contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” raised. 31 Given
the length of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants’ request to extend the deadline for
response was not unreasonable.
In light of the Court’s decision to grant Defendants’ Motion to Extend, default
judgment is inappropriate. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss within the time
requested by the Motion to Extend, and motions to dismiss toll the deadline for
responsive pleadings. 32

28
PNC Bank, Delaware v. Hudson, 687 A.2d 915, 917 (Del. 1997).
29
Cf. In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2022 WL 7351803, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2022)
(finding good cause (as required by Ct. Ch. R. 6(b)(1)—as distinguished from the corresponding
Superior Court civil rule), where defendants “maintain[ed] that they ha[d] been diligent in
assembling the information to answer . . . interrogatories, drafting responses, and verifying them
with each defendant . . . [because] that [was] no small task and [would] take time, particularly
given the number of responding defendants and sheer volume of interrogatories.”).
30
See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12.
31
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a).
32
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(a); Unbound Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Invoy Holdings Inc., 251
A.3d 1016, 1028 (Del. Super. 2021).
7
C. Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are procedurally improper and
will therefore be denied.
Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are procedurally improper. Although
Plaintiff does not identify a specific basis for her sanctions requests, motions for
sanctions are generally governed by Superior Court Civil Rule 11, and the Court
interprets Plaintiff’s requests pursuant to that rule. In this light, Plaintiff’s requests
are defective. “A motion for sanctions under Civil Rule 11 must meet three
procedural requirements[.]”33 It must be made “separately from motions or other
requests;” “describe the specific conduct alleged to violate [Civil Rule 11(b)];” and
“not be filed with or presented to the Court unless, within 21 days after service of
the motion . . . the challenged claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” 34 Both of Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions
are incorporated into other motions—her motion to strike and her supplemental
motion—and she has provided no indication that she served either motion 21 days
prior to filing with this Court. Indeed, this would have been a temporal impossibility
given the materials referenced therein.
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s requests on this basis. 35 In the absence of a
motion properly before it, the Court declines to consider sanctions against Defense
Counsel sua sponte. 36

33
Muho v. Wilmington Tr., 2015 WL 4126327, at *1 (Del. Super. July 8, 2015) (emphasis
supplied).
34
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c)(1)(A).
35
See Speidel v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2003 WL 21524694, at *6 (Del. Super. July 3, 2003);
Laub v. Danberg, 2009 WL 1152167, at *4 n.20 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2009), aff’d on other grounds,
979 A.2d 1111, 2009 WL 2871883 (Del. Sept. 8, 2009) (ORDER); Magna-D Glob. Healthcare
No. 1 Private Equity Fund v. CoImmune, Inc., 2025 WL 1568186, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2025).
36
See Speidel, 2003 WL 21524694, at *6; Laub, 2009 WL 1152167, at *4 n.20; Shannon ex rel.
Shannon v. Meconi, 2006 WL 258313, at *4 n.11 (Del. Super. Jan. 5, 2006).
8
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for extension of time to file
responsive pleading to the complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to deny and
strike Defendants’ motion for enlargement of time and sanctions is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff’s supplemental motion
in support of motion for default judgment is DENIED.
The Court next intends to take up Plaintiff’s various motions to disqualify
Defense Counsel.37 The parties are directed to make no additional filings until that
order is issued,38 except that Defendants shall, within twenty days of the date of this
order, file responses to those motions.39 Upon receipt of those responses, the Court
will issue an order on Plaintiff’s motions in due course.

37
Those motions are Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest (D.I. 20),
Combined Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Judicial Notice Regarding Conflict of Interest and
Representation (D.I. 31), and Motion to Disqualify Scott Wilcox as Counsel for Defendants (D.I.
46).
38
This Court has inherent authority to manage its own docket. Solow v. Aspect Res., LLC, 46 A.3d
1074, 1075 (Del. 2012) (citing Coleman v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, 902 A.2d 1102, 1107
(Del. 2006)); Belfint, Lyons & Shuman, P.A. v. Pevar, 862 A.2d 385, 2004 WL 2127217, at *2
(Del. Sept. 17, 2004) (ORDER); see also Unbound Partners, 251 A.3d at 1031 (“It is beyond
debate that Delaware courts enjoy wide discretion to manage their affairs in a manner that
promotes economies of time and effort for the courts, litigants, and counsel. Indeed, Delaware
trial courts have inherent power to control their dockets and to maintain orderly adjudication of
claims.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); cf. Teat v. Neal, 1995 WL 945545, at *1 (Del.
Super. June 8, 1995) (“This is a case with over 70 docket entries and, from what can be gleaned
from the Court’s file, a case with very little progress to date. I think it is time to at least try to sort
it out and get the case on track for disposition. It is also time to end the paper avalanche of largely
useless documents.”).
39
Given the overlapping nature of Plaintiff’s motions, Defendants may respond in a single filing.
9
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Jenifer Sandonato, Pro Se (via U.S. Mail)
Counsel of Record (via File & ServeXpress)

10