Joan Doe v. Snap, Inc

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOAN DOE, as Guardian ad litem for )
JANE DOE, a minor, )
Plaintiff,)
)
v. ) C.A. No.: N24C-09-030-PRW
)
SNAP, INC., a/k/a SNAPCHAT, INC., )
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, )
INC., APPLE INC., and ANTHONY )
N. OMEIRE )
Defendants. )

Submitted: July 31, 2025
Decided: October 15, 2025

Upon Defendants Snap, Verizon, and Apple’s Motions to Dismiss,
GRANTED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Raeann Warner, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE WARNER WOLOSHIN, Wilmington,
Delaware; Lee W. Davis, Esquire (argued), LAW OFFICES OF LEE W. DAVIS,
ESQUIRE, LLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Plaintiff Jane Doe.

Aaron M. Nelson, Esquire, and Denis S. Kraft, Esquire, HEYMAN ENERIO GUTTUSO
& HIRZEL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Leah Godesky, Esquire (argued), and Louis
W. Fisher, Esquire, O’MELVENY & MEYERS LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys
for Defendant Snap, Inc., a/k/a SnapChat, Inc.

John Sensing, Esquire, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; Scott A. Elder, Esquire (argued), and Jenny A. Hergenrother, Esquire,
ALSTON & BIRD LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, Attorneys for Verizon Communications, Inc.

Mary F. Dugan, Esquire, and Michael A. Luakaitis, Esquire, YOUNG CONAWAY
STARGATT & TAYLOR LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Wesley Sze, Esquire (argued),
and Christopher Chorba, Esquire, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Palo Alto,
California, Attorneys for Apple Inc.

WALLACE, J.
Plaintiff, Joan Doe, has asserted a number of claims against various

technology companies—Apple Inc., Snap, Inc., and Verizon Communications

Inc.—stemming from the sexual assault of her then ten-year-old daughter, Jane, that

she alleges was facilitated, in part, by Jane’s use of the smart phone Joan gave her.

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions to dismiss (D.I. 34; D.I. 35; D.I.

36) are GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice without leave to

amend.

I. FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2021, Joan Doe purchased a new Apple iPhone 12 for her daughter

Jane’s tenth birthday from Verizon.2 In connection with that purchase, Ms. Doe also

subscribed Jane in a “Kids Unlimited Plan” that included access to Verizon’s Smart

Family App.3 That application permitted Ms. Doe to filter and block content she

deemed inappropriate for her daughter’s use.4

After receiving the phone, Jane requested permission through the Smart

Family App to download Snapchat, a messaging service that allows communications

1
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.I. 1).
See Windsor I, LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 873 (Del. 2020) (“In most
cases, when the Superior Court considers a 12(b)(6) motion, it limits analysis to the ‘universe of
facts’ within the complaint and any attached documents.”).
2
Compl. ¶ 14.
3
Id. ¶ 16.
4
Id. ¶¶ 18, 20, 23.

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to disappear following their viewing.5 Ms. Doe approved the request, permitting

Jane to download the application through the Apple App Store.6 Thereafter,

Ms. Doe and Jane became connected on Snapchat as contacts.7

About sixth months later, Ms. Doe attended a networking event at a local

restaurant, where she encountered Anthony N. Omeire.8 During that event, Ms. Doe

provided Mr. Omeire with her contact information.9 Once shared, Snapchat’s

contact synchronization function linked Ms. Doe’s information with Jane’s iPhone,

thereby enabling Mr. Omeire to add Jane to his Snapchat contacts.10

Mr. Omeire subsequently used Snapchat to contact Jane.11 He then—first via

impersonation of a teenage girl and later a “friend” of her mother— befriended Jane

online and eventually sexually assaulted her when they met in person.12 For that

crime, Mr. Omeire has been convicted of two counts of first-degree rape13 and

imprisoned for a term of sixty years.14

5
Id. ¶¶ 23, 41.
6
Id. ¶¶ 23-25.
7
Id. ¶ 25.
8
Id. ¶ 28.
9
Id. ¶ 28.
10
Id. ¶¶ 31-33.
11
Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
12
Id. ¶¶ 36-39.
13
Id. ¶ 39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a)(5) (2022) (defining an adult’s sexual intercourse
with a child who has not yet reached his or her twelfth birthday as first-degree rape).
14
Compl. ¶ 39.

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Joan Doe, as Guardian ad litem for Jane Doe, filed this action against Snap,

Verizon, Apple, and Mr. Omeire.15 As to the technology company defendants, the

Complaint asserts thirteen counts: (1) negligence; (2) failure to warn; (3) design

defect; (4) breach of express warranty; (5) breach of the implied warranty of

merchantability; (6) breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular

purpose; (7) negligent performance of services; (8) aiding and abetting; (9) violation

of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 2513 and 2525; (10) violation of

the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 2532 and 2533; (11)

fraudulent misrepresentation; (12) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and

(13) intentional infliction of emotional distress.16

Each of the technology companies moved to dismiss all counts of the

Complaint targeting them.17

II. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

The Does contend that Snap, Verizon, and Apple each played a critical role in

facilitating the harm suffered by Jane for which they can be held liable under the

15
See generally id.
16
Id. ¶¶ 133-461.
17
See generally Opening Brief in Support of Defendant Apple Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 36)
[hereinafter Apple’s Motion to Dismiss]; Defendant Snap Inc.’s Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss Complaint (D.I. 34) [hereinafter Snap’s Motion to Dismiss]; Defendant Verizon
Communications Inc.’s Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.I.
35) [hereinafter Verizon’s Motion to Dismiss].

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theories penned in the Complaint.18 Among other allegations, Ms. Doe posits that

Apple distributed Snapchat through its App Store without adequate safeguards;19

that Snap’s platform design created the conditions that allowed Mr. Omeire to

contact Jane;20 and that Verizon marketed its Smart Family App as a safety feature

but failed to ensure it worked as promised.21 Ms. Doe maintains that these acts and

omissions sound in negligence, consumer fraud, and related theories of liability.22

A. APPLE CLAIMS LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.

Apple, alone, asserts that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because

Apple is incorporated in California and has its principal place of business there.23

Apple maintains that its national distribution of products and services does not

constitute the type of purposeful activity in Delaware necessary to support

jurisdiction.24

18
See generally Compl.
19
See Jane Doe’s Answering Brief to Apple Inc.’s Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss Complaint (D.I. 47) [hereinafter Pl.’s Answer to Apple].
20
See Plaintiff’s Answering Brief to Defendant Snap Inc.’s Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss Complaint (D.I. 45) [hereinafter Pl.’s Answer to Snap].
21
See Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Response to Defendant Verizon Communications Inc.’s
Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.I. 46) [hereinafter Pl.’s
Answer to Verizon].
22
See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Answer to Verizon; Pl.’s Answer to Apple; Pl.’s Answer to Snap.
23
See Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 4-9.
24
See id.

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B. SEEKING DISMISSAL OF ALL CLAIMS BROUGHT AGAINST THEM, ALL
MOVING DEFENDANTS INVOKE THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT.

While the Moving Defendants advance arguments that are at times similar and

at other times distinct, ultimately they all rely in large part on the federal

Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230 as their shared shield

against liability.25 They maintain that each qualifies as a provider of an “interactive

computer service,” that Plaintiff’s claims impermissibly seek to treat them as

publishers of third-party content, and that the content at issue was created entirely

by Mr. Omeire, not by them.26 Accordingly, they contend that Section 230 affords

complete immunity.27

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may move to dismiss under this Court’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.28 In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the Court: (1) accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the

complaint; (2) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the

claim; (3) draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant; and

25
See generally Apple’s Motion to Dismiss; Snap’s Motion to Dismiss; Verizon’s Motion to
Dismiss.
26
Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 30-34; Snap’s Motion to Dismiss, at 6-13; Verizon’s Motion to
Dismiss, at 9-18.
27
Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 30-34; Snap’s Motion to Dismiss, at 6-13; Verizon’s Motion to
Dismiss, at 9-18.
28
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

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(4) denies dismissal if recovery on the claim is reasonably conceivable.29 The Court,

however, need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts

or . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”30 Nor must

the Court adopt “every strained interpretation of the allegations the plaintiff

proposes.”31 Still, even with those cautions in mind, Delaware’s pleading standard

is “minimal.”32

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court considers three issues presented by Defendants’ motions. First, the

Court addresses whether Apple should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(2). Second, the Court examines whether Plaintiff’s claims are

barred under Section 230 of the CDA. Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiff

should be granted leave to amend her Complaint.

For the reasons that follow, Apple’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction is DENIED. Defendants Snap, Verizon, and Apple’s motions to dismiss

based on Section 230 immunity are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to

amend the Complaint is DENIED.

29
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011).
30
Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on other
grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1277 (Del. 2018).
31
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001).
32
Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 895 (Del.
2002)).

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A. THE COURT CANNOT SAY AT THIS STAGE THAT IT LACKS PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER APPLE.

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under

Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a proper basis for the

Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.33 At this point, a

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists, and all factual

disputes and reasonable inferences thereon are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.34

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court’s review is limited. The parties here

dispute whether Ms. Doe’s claims arise from Apple’s distribution of the iPhone into

Delaware or, instead, from the general availability of third-party applications on the

App Store.35 If the claims arise from the iPhone itself, it’s reasonably conceivable

that Apple’s distribution agreement with Verizon––through which iPhones are sold

to Delaware consumers––constitutes purposeful availment under Delaware’s long-

arm statute and the stream of commerce theory.36 That said, Apple may ultimately

33
Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner EnviroPower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 727 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1996).
34
Id.
35
Compare Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 30-34 (“[T]he only suit-related conduct at issue is
Apple’s routine publication of third-party apps on the App Store that are available across the
country, and its general marketing statements. There are no allegations that Apple specifically
targeted these acts toward Delaware.”) with Pl.’s Answer to Apple, at 7 (“Apple designed and
contracted for the manufacture . . . and distribu[tion of] Jane’s iPhone 12.”).
36
See Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150, 1157-60 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (describing the
analysis, this Court stated that it needs “to determine whether there is an intent or purpose on the
part of the manufacturer to serve the Delaware market with its product.”).

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prevail in demonstrating that the claims do not “arise from” the iPhone but instead

from applications available on the App Store which, standing alone, just might not

suffice for jurisdiction.37

Both arguments require resolution of a dispute as to the factual nature of

Plaintiff’s claims—a dispute this Court can’t resolve against the Plaintiff at this

juncture. Accordingly, under the forgiving standard applicable at the motion to

dismiss stage, the Court concludes that Apple cannot be dismissed at this time for

lack of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, Apple’s motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction is DENIED.

B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST SNAP, VERIZON, AND APPLE ARE BARRED
BECAUSE SECTION 230 OF THE CDA IMMUNIZES THOSE DEFENDANTS.

Snap, Verizon, and Apple say that Ms. Doe’s claims must be dismissed,

arguing that CDA Section 230(c)(1) immunizes them from liability from the

Delaware state-law claims that Ms. Doe brings.38 In effect, the companies contend

that Congress has afforded service providers immunity from state tort law, and that

such immunity is dispositive here.39

37
See Rotblut v. Terrapinn, Inc., 2016 WL 5539884, at *5-6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2016)
(citing Kloth v. S. Christian Univ., 494 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279 (D. Del. 2007)) (requiring “‘something
more’ from the defendant than ‘the knowledge that their website could be viewed or that their
product could be used in a forum state.’”).
38
Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 30-34; Snap’s Motion to Dismiss, at 6-13; Verizon’s Motion to
Dismiss, at 9-18.
39
Apple’s Motion to Dismiss, at 30-31; Snap’s Motion to Dismiss, at 6-8; Verizon’s Motion to
Dismiss, at 9-10.

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The CDA itself makes clear that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive

computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information

provided by another information content provider.”40 And this Court has recognized

that “Section 230 grants ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability.’”41 The immunity, however, is not boundless. The CDA does not displace

“any State law that is consistent with [it].”42

The question before the Court, then, is whether the Defendants fall within the

protection of the CDA. That inquiry requires two showings: (1) that Snap, Verizon,

and Apple satisfy the CDA’s definitional requirements, and (2) that Delaware law,

as attempted to be applied here, is inconsistent with the federal provision and thus

preempted.

1. Snap, Verizon, and Apple are Protected Under the CDA.

Section 230 of the CDA provides broad immunity to interactive computer

service providers.43 Both the Third Circuit and this Court have engaged a three-part

40
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2025); see generally Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., 116 F.4th 180, 183 (3d
Cir. 2024) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
41
Page v. Oath Inc., 2021 WL 528472, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2021) (citing Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. ConsumerAffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 270
A.3d 833 (Del. 2022); see also Moretti v. Hertz Corp., 2017 WL 1032783, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 17,
2017) (“[C]ourts have interpreted [Section 230] as providing broad immunity” where claims relate
to “dissemination of information originating from a third party”).
42
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added).
43
The First Circuit has stated, “[t]here has been near-universal agreement that section 230 should
not be construed grudgingly.” Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
2016) (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc’n Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir.2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316,

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test for determining whether a defendant is immune under Section 230.44 To

establish immunity, a defendant must show: (1) it provides an “interactive computer

service”; (2) the plaintiff’s claim treats it as the publisher or speaker of information;

and (3) the information at issue was created by a third party—“information provided

by another information content provider.”45 If these three elements are met, then the

CDA immunizes the Defendants from Delaware liability, unless the statute itself

carves out an exception.46

The first step is straightforward. The CDA defines an “interactive computer

service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that

provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,

including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet.”47

Courts give that definition a liberal read.48 And Ms. Doe does not adequately

dispute that Snap, Verizon, and Apple fall within it.49 On this point, then, there is

1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.
2003)).
44
Metroka v. Pennsylvania State L. Enf’t, 2024 WL 4164272, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024);
Page, 2021 WL 528472, at *6; see also Moretti, 2017 WL 1032783, at *2.
45
Metroka, 2024 WL 4164272, at *2 (citing Kabbaj v. Google, Inc., 2014 WL 1269864, at *2
(D. Del. Apr. 7, 2014) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1))).
46
Id.; see generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (e).
47
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
48
Doe v. Grindr Inc., 709 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2023), aff’d, 128 F.4th 1148 (9th
Cir. 2025) (citing Dryoff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019)).
49
Pl.’s Answer to Apple, at 31-34; Pl.’s Answer to Snap, at 5-9; Pl.’s Answer to Verizon, at 8
(“Only one element of three required to bar Jane’s suit is satisfied under the CDA . . .”). Previously,
courts have found Reddit, Grindr, Snapchat, and the Apple App Store fit within the definition. See

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no genuine dispute. The Court concludes that the Defendants qualify as providers

of an interactive computer service under Section 230 and proceeds to the remaining

inquiries: whether the claims in this case seek to treat the Defendants as speakers or

publishers, and whether the information at issue originated with another content

provider other than Snap, Verizon, and Apple, individually.

a. Plaintiff Doe Seeks to Treat Snap, Verizon, and Apple
as Speakers or Publishers.

The second consideration in determining Section 230 immunity asks whether

the plaintiff’s claims necessarily treat the defendants as publishers or speakers of

third-party content.50 Again, courts have read this requirement broadly, in keeping

with Congress’s design to afford sweeping protection to interactive computer

services for content they did not create themselves.51

Yet, this prong is sometimes easily muddled or confused: the determination

is not whether the defendants did in fact publish or speak, but rather if the plaintiff’s

claims in effect allege that they did. Courts have consistently looked beyond the

generally Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) (observing that there was no
dispute that Grindr is an interactive computer service provider); L.W. through Doe v. Snap Inc.,
675 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (noting that plaintiff did not dispute that Snap is an
interactive computer service provider and “[c]ourts have noted that providers of interactive
computer services include entities that create, own, and operate applications that enable users to
share messages over its internet-based servers, like [Snap, Apple, and Google]”); Free Kick Master
LLC v. Apple Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 975, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that there was no dispute
that Apple is an interactive computer service provider).
50
Page, 2021 WL 528472, at *6-7.
51
See generally Doe v. Grindr, 709 F. Supp. 3d 1047; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).

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plaintiff’s chosen labels––whether negligence, product liability, or otherwise––to

ask whether the gravamen of the claim truly is the defendant’s handling of third-

party speech.52 No doubt, Plaintiff valiantly attempts to cast her claims similarly

(but not too similarly) to those others’ failed pleadings—saying it is not the content

of Mr. Omeire’s communications that she seeks to hold Snap, Verizon, and Apple

to account for but rather their failures in allowing Mr. Omeire access to Jane.53 But

when, as here, the claim truly turns on decisions about whether the entity was

required to monitor, review, and edit content, then a court must recognize that the

defendant is being sued as a publisher, regardless of how the pleading is crafted.54

And a claim treats the interactive computer service provider as the publisher

or speaker when it casts the defendant “in the same position as the [information

content provider].”55 “Courts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the

defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or

52
See id. at 1054-57.
53
See generally Compl.
54
See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 739
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding “monitoring, reviewing, and editing” content is publishing activity); Doe
v. Grindr, 709 F. Supp. 3d at 1052-54 (citing HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918
F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2019)) (“A court must therefore look to ‘what the duty at issue actually
requires:’ i.e., ‘whether the duty would necessarily require an internet company to monitor third-
party content.’”); Page, 2021 WL 528472, at *6-7 (citing Perlman v. Vox Media, Inc., 2020 WL
3474143, at *2 n.24 (Del. Super. Ct. June 24, 2020) (“Section 230 ‘protects websites from
liability . . . for material posted on their websites by someone else.’ This is true regardless of
whether [the defendant] exercised ‘traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.’”); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d
1093, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2019).
55
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).

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speaker.”56 “Artful pleading” will not circumvent the CDA if “allegations are

merely another way of claiming [a defendant] was liable” for harms occasioned by

“third-party-generated content.”57

While the Court has reviewed the myriad claims asserted against the

Defendants––ranging from negligence and misrepresentation to product defect and

intentional infliction of emotional distress––they all ultimately stem from the same

factual premise: that Snap, Verizon, and Apple failed to prevent Mr. Omeire from

gaining access to Jane Doe, and therefore owed her a duty to block or restrict his

communications.58 However framed, the claims seek to impose liability for the

Defendants’ alleged failure to “monitor, screen, or regulate” third-party interactions

on their platforms or devices.59 But Section 230 forecloses precisely such theories

of liability.

Against Snap, the Complaint identifies duties such as verifying user ages and

identities, restricting strangers from connecting with minors, and preventing the

creation of multiple accounts.60 But these are editorial functions—the very activities

of publication that Section 230 immunizes. Even allegations about Snap Maps and

56
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
57
Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420.
58
Compl. ¶¶ 133-461.
59
Cf. Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1123.
60
Compl. ¶¶ 135-147.

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Bitmojis61 describe features that allegedly facilitated the transmission or disguise of

third-party information. Put another way, such an allegation flows from how Snap

disseminated or allowed transmittal of Mr. Omeire’s user-generated content.

The same analysis applies to Verizon. Among other allegations that follow a

similar thread, Ms. Doe contends that Verizon assumed a “non-delegable duty”

through its Smart Family App to “Childproof the Internet.”62 But liability again

turns on Verizon’s purported failure to block, filter, or restrict Mr. Omeire’s

communications on Snapchat.

Apple is similarly situated. The Complaint asserts that Apple negligently

distributed Snap’s and Verizon’s applications through its App Store, and that Apple

misled users by advertising that all apps are reviewed for safety.63 But the core

theory is that Apple should have excluded Snapchat or Verizon’s Smart Family App

because they did not adequately screen or block harmful content. Again, that is an

allegation about editorial decisions of a publisher or speaker––what third-party

applications and communications to host, allow, or restrict.

Nor do the related claims of false misrepresentation, consumer fraud,

deceptive trade practices, product defect, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

61
Compl. ¶¶ 111, 147.
62
Compl. ¶¶ 158-165.
63
Compl. ¶¶ 169-175.

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or state statutes change the analysis. Each theory depends on the same factual

premise: That defendants failed to prevent Mr. Omeire’s third-party

communications with Jane Doe. That kind of claimed liability falls precisely within

the scope of Section 230’s protection.

b. The Communications at Issue Were Not Created nor Provided
by Snap, Verizon, or Apple.

The last query in the 230 analysis requires the Court to ask whether the

information giving rise to Ms. Doe’s claims originated from the Defendants

themselves or from a third party.64 Section 230 immunity applies only when the

platform is not the “information content provider,” a term the statute defines as one

who is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” the

disputed information.65 The distinction is crucial. A platform that merely hosts or

transmits content is protected; a platform that creates or meaningfully shapes the

content is not.66

Courts have given substance to this distinction. First, simply offering tools,

functions, or design features—such as “friend-suggestions” and datamining

64
Metroka, 2024 WL 4164272, at *2-3; Page, 2021 WL 528472, at *6-7; see also Moretti, 2017
WL 1032783, at *2.
65
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); id. § 230(f)(3).
66
Id. § 230(c)(1); Compare Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
that a website was protected by the CDA when hosting alleged libelous statements on their
platform) with Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a website was not protected by the CDA when it
“encourage[d]” its customers to participate in illegal conduct).

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features67—does not amount to “creation or development.”68 Allowing users to post

messages,69 share location data,70 join chatrooms,71 and create profiles and images72

involves no contribution to the substance of the content itself. The platform has not

authored the speech; it has only provided the stage. Immunity holds in such

circumstances. Indeed, Section 230 was enacted to prevent courts from imposing

liability on services for failing to screen or block third-party material.73

67
Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098 (“It is true that [the defendant’s software] used features and functions,
including algorithms, to analyze user posts . . . and recommended other user groups. This includes
the heroin-related discussion group to which [plaintiff’s son] posted and (through its emails and
push notifications) to the drug dealer who sold him the fentanyl-laced heroin. Plaintiff, however,
cannot plead around Section 230 immunity by framing these website features as content.”); see
generally Doe v. Grindr, 128 F.4th at 1152 (holding that the app’s suggestion of men to date minor,
who later raped a child, was not a form of communication by the app).
68
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1169
(“[P]roviding neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount
to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity exception.”); see generally Courtright v. Epic
Games, Inc., 2025 WL 2319148, at *4-5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2025).
69
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270-71 (discussing libelous posts of users).
70
Doe v. Grindr, 709 F. Supp. 3d at 1053-54 (discussing the geolocation feature on software that
was used to facilitate the multiple rapes of a young boy, the Court explained: “The harm Doe
alleges does not flow solely from the product software. Rather, the harm animating Doe’s claims
is directly related to the geolocation and content provided by users, which facilitates the match,
direct messages, in-person meetings, and ultimately here, Doe’s assaults.”) (emphasis added).
71
Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416-21 (citing Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471
(3d Cir. 2003)) (finding that MySpace was free from liability when predators used MySpace
chatrooms to communicate with, and later rape, a child).
72
See generally Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319 (D.N.J. 2015); Doe v. Grindr, 709
F. Supp. 3d at 1053-54.
73
The statute itself expressly states Congress’s intent was “to remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). This
is why “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Giovanni De Gregorio, & Maayan Perel, Social Media as
Contractual Networks: A Bottom Up Check on Content Moderation 107 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1014-

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The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley

v. Roommates.com, LLC illustrates the other side of the line.74 Roommates.com

operated a housing website that required all users to disclose protected

characteristics such as sex, sexual orientation, and family status before posting or

searching for listings.75 It then used this information to create profile pages and to

filter search results and email notifications so that users were channeled toward or

away from listings based on those protected traits.76 The federal appeals court held

that Roommates.com was not merely hosting third-party content but was itself

“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development” of the

discriminatory material.77 By designing and mandating a system that solicited

unlawful preferences and enforced them through search and notification tools, the

company “contribute[d] materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct,” forfeiting

CDA immunity.78

Not so here. Neither Snap, Verizon, nor Apple created tools that required

users to enter or act on unlawful information. There is no allegation they engineered

15 (2022) (“Congress passed Section 230 of the CDA . . . primarily to ensure the development of
the digital environment . . . . The legal (and political) choice was to introduce a system based on
an exemption from liability for computer services which merely host third-party content.”).
74
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
75
Id. at 1161.
76
Id. at 1161-62.
77
Id. at 1162 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
78
Id. at 1168.

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or encouraged Mr. Omeire’s harmful content, let alone compelled its creation.

Even the most plaintiff-generous read of Ms. Doe’s charges, suggests the

platforms here functioned solely as conduits. They provided neutral tools that

allowed users to communicate and share information, but they neither authored nor

materially shaped the content in dispute. Unlike Roommates.com, Defendants Snap,

Verizon, and Apple did not “develop” the challenged communications in whole, or

even part. Under the Complaint’s allegations, the content at issue was created

entirely by Mr. Omeire. Ms. Doe’s claims rest on the theory that Snap, Verizon, or

Apple allowed such material to circulate and make its way to Jane. That theory falls

squarely within the editorial and structural functions Congress chose to immunize.

The Defendants are not “information content providers” under the CDA.

2. The CDA Preempts All the Claims Against Snap, Verizon, and Apple.

Section 230 does not automatically preempt all causes of action involving a

technology company; in fact, the statute expressly states that it allows state law that

is “consistent” with the CDA.79 The statute only applies where liability is premised

on a defendant’s role in hosting third-party content.80 The proper inquiry, therefore,

is whether Plaintiff’s alleged injuries stem from content created by another user and

the Defendants’ treatment of that content.

79
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
80
47 U.S.C. § 230(b); Page, 2021 WL 528472, at *6-7.

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On close inspection—whether styled as negligence, failure to warn, design

defect, warranty breach, fraudulent misrepresentation, emotional distress, or the

Delaware statutory claims—the quintessence of each claim that Plaintiff attempts to

bring under Delaware law is that Defendants allowed Mr. Omeire’s third-party

communications to reach Jane and failed to prevent or filter those communications.

Courts have consistently held that imposing liability for such conduct treats the

service provider as a publisher of user-generated content, a role that Section 230

immunizes.81

The attempt here to “plead around” Section 230 by labeling the challenged

conduct as product liability, failure to warn, or negligent provision of services must

be rejected.82 The core of each these claims is the same. At bottom, Ms. Doe seeks

to hold Defendants Snap, Verizon, and Apple responsible for the consequences of

third-party speech and connections. And Section 230 bars such claims.

Accordingly, all claims against Snap, Verizon, and Apple are barred by

Section 230 of the CDA and their Motions to Dismiss must be GRANTED.

C. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST SNAP, VERIZON, AND APPLE WOULD BE FUTILE.

Civil Rule 15 governs how and when parties may amend their pleadings. It

provides that leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely given when justice so

81
See, e.g., Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th at 1152.
82
Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098.

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requires.”83 And this Court “freely allows amendment in all but the most limited

circumstances.”84 So as a general matter, “[i]n the absence of prejudice to another

party, the [Court] is required to exercise its discretion in favor of granting leave to

amend.”85

All that said, while this Court “generally grant[s] motions to amend

liberally,” it’s “not automatic.”86 “A motion to amend may be denied . . . if the

amendment would be futile, in the sense that the legal insufficiency of the

amendment is obvious on its face.”87

Plaintiff seeks to amend,88 but the proposed amendment would not cure the

insurmountable deficiencies already identified. Because no such amendment could

survive dismissal, granting such leave would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

request for leave to amend is DENIED.

83
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15.
84
Ferrari v. Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 2020 WL 3444106, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23,
2020).
85
Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258, 263 (Del. 1993) (citing Ikeda v.
Mollock, 603 A.2d 785, 787-88 (Del. 1991)).
86
AluminumSource, LLC v. LLFlex, LLC, 2021 WL 1997893, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19,
2021).
87
NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 2008 WL 2082145, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008); Clark
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 131 A.3d 806, 811-12 (Del. 2016) (“Although Rule 15
provides that leave to amend a complaint should be ‘freely given,’ leave to amend should be
denied when the proposed amendment would be futile. A motion for leave to amend
a complaint is futile where the amended complaint would be subject to dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”) (cleaned up).
88
Pl.’s Answer to Apple, at 34; Pl.’s Answer to Snap, at 33; Pl.’s Answer to Verizon, at 30.

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V. CONCLUSION

Jane Doe was the innocent child victim of an unspeakable crime. The (no-

longer-merely-alleged) perpetrator of those horrific acts has been criminally

prosecuted and is, and remains, a defendant in this civil suit. Yet, it is wholly

understandable that Ms. Doe would like to take aim at any other person or entity she

feels is the least bit responsible for her daughter’s harm. Any parent would.

But the execrable use of certain technology that in some circumstances lies

along the path to such atrocities—as occurred in so many of the cases cited herein—

cannot be remedied by misdirected claims such as Ms. Doe’s. When so aimed, they

are preempted by federal law. Resultingly, Defendants Snap, Verizon, and Apple’s

Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 34; D.I. 35; D.I. 36) must be GRANTED, and each count

of the Complaint dismissed as to each of those entities with prejudice and without

leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul R. Wallace
_______________________
Paul R. Wallace, Judge

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