Powell v. Cannon

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CARMELA POWELL, )
)
Plaintiff, ) C.A. No.: K26C-03-005 NEP
)
v. )
)
IKE CANNON, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: March 9, 2026
Decided: May 19, 2026

ORDER1

Upon Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
GRANTED

Upon Court’s Consideration of Complaint
DISMISSED

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court finds as follows:
1. On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff Carmela Powell (“Plaintiff”) filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis. According to the attached affidavit,
Plaintiff has limited liquid assets, no present employment, and receives $1200 a
month in social security benefits. The affidavit alleges facts sufficient to convince
the Court that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing costs and Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is therefore GRANTED. Having made this

1
Citations in the form of “D.I ___” refer to docket items.
determination, the Court must next consider whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed, as required by 10 Del. C. § 8803(b).
2. The Court views pro se in forma pauperis civil suits generously.2 “All
well-pled matters are accepted as true to determine whether . . . [a plaintiff] can
recover under any conceivable circumstances susceptible of proof under the
complaint.”3 Nonetheless, the Court will not allow itself or prospective defendants
“to become the victim[s] of frivolous or malicious claims” that are plainly “subject
to a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) or subject to a
defense of immunity or subject to some other defect.”4 After granting an application
to proceed in forma pauperis, Delaware law requires that the Court dismiss the
underlying complaint if it is legally frivolous, factually frivolous, or malicious.5 “If
a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, then it is deemed
legally frivolous.”6
3. While the allegations of the Complaint are difficult to discern,
Plaintiff’s allegations appear to be that she allowed Defendant Ike Cannon
(“Defendant”) to move into her mobile home (the “Property”) pursuant to some form
of agreement.7 Under that agreement, Defendant was permitted to remain in the
Property until Plaintiff sold it, and Defendant agreed to pay $1000 per month to the

2
Parsons v. Dushuttle, 2019 WL 1131956, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 8, 2019) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
3
Fatir v. Records, 2023 WL 6622214, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 11, 2023) (quoting Johnson v.
Howard, 1999 WL 743902, at *1 (Del. Aug. 12, 1999)).
4
Lee v. Johnson, 1996 WL 944868, at *1 (Del. Super. June 4, 1996).
5
Sanders v. Dep’t of Just., 2020 WL 1171045, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 11, 2020) (citing 10 Del.
C. § 8803(b)).
6
Fatir, 2023 WL 6622214, at *4 (quoting Johnson, 1999 WL 743902, at *1); Marvel v. State,
2014 WL 7009516, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 2014) (citing Cannon v. McCreanor, 2003 WL
943247, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 6, 2003)).
7
Compl. 1 (D.I. 1). The Complaint does not make clear whether the agreement between Plaintiff
and Defendant was written or oral.
2
Plaintiff, as well as costs relating to heat and electricity.8 After she informed
Defendant that someone intended to buy the Property, Defendant stopped paying
utilities to Plaintiff.9 Plaintiff verbally requested that Defendant vacate the Property,
but Defendant refused to leave despite knowing Plaintiff was attempting to show
and sell the Property.10
4. Ultimately, it appears to the Court that the gravamen of the Complaint
is an action for summary possession, and Plaintiff seeks to recover possession of the
Property from Defendant based on alleged nonpayment of rent or utilities and
Defendant’s refusal to vacate.
5. 25 Del. C. § 5702 supplies the statutory grounds for summary
possession proceedings. Two provisions appear applicable here: first, § 5702(1)
permits summary possession where “[t]he tenant unlawfully continues in possession
of any part of the premises after the expiration of the rental agreement without the
permission of the landlord,”11 and, second, § 5702(2) permits summary possession
where “[t]he tenant has wrongfully failed to pay the agreed rent.”12
6. Although Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant failed to comply
with an agreement concerning the Property, the Complaint does not identify the legal
claim Plaintiff intends to assert, attach or describe any written lease or contract, or
plead the material terms of any enforceable agreement beyond the alleged monthly
payment amount and utilities obligation. The Complaint also fails to allege when
Defendant moved into the Property, when any payment obligation became due, what
amount remains unpaid, and whether Plaintiff provided any legally operative notice

8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1–2.
11
25 Del. C. § 5702(1).
12
25 Del. C. § 5702(2).
3
terminating the arrangement. The Complaint does not plead a theory of damages
beyond the generalized assertion that Defendant has not paid money for utilities.
7. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, and Plaintiff’s claim is legally frivolous. Even a pro se plaintiff “must, at a
minimum, provide the Court with enough information to conduct a meaningful
consideration of the merits.”13 “When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, ‘a trial
court must accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations of fact,’ but is not
‘required to accept as true conclusory allegations without specific supporting factual
allegations.’”14
8. More importantly, it appears that Plaintiff has filed this action in the
wrong court. Under 25 Del. C. § 5701, “[a]n action for summary possession in
accordance with § 5702 . . . shall be maintained in the Justice of the Peace Court
which hears civil cases in the county in which the premises . . . is located.”
Therefore, even if the Complaint adequately stated a claim for summary possession,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim.
9. For these reasons, the Complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). It is also subject to dismissal under 25 Del. C. § 5701 insofar as this Court
lacks jurisdiction to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims.
WHEREFORE, in light of the preceding considerations, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13
Brown v. Delaware State Hous. Auth., 2024 WL 524550, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 30, 2024)
(quoting Harrison v. Hodgson Vocational Tech. High Sch., 2007 WL 3112479, at *2 (Del. Super.
Oct. 3, 2007)) (dismissing in forma pauperis complaint).
14
Page v. Oath Inc., 270 A.3d 833, 842 (Del. 2022) (quoting In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder
Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006)).
4
NEP/tls
Via File & ServeXpress and U.S. Mail
oc: Prothonotary
Carmela Powell, Pro Se – Via U.S. Mail

5