EEOC Appeal 2026002796

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Wesley P.,1
Complainant,
v.
Hung Cao,
Acting Secretary,
Department of the Navy,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026002796
Hearing No. 570-2024-00833X
Agency No. 23-62688-01183
DECISION
On June 4, 2026, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s May 4, 2026, final order2 concerning his equal
employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 	For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS, in
part, and VACATES and REMANDS, in part, the Agency’s final order.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.
2 	The Agency’s final order included language that the final order would be
presumed received within five days of issuance, which makes the June 4 th appeal
filing timely.

2026002796	2
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Maintenance Supervisor (Outdoor), NF-4749-07, at the Agency’s Commander
Navy Installations Command (CNIC), Naval Station Norfolk in Norfolk, Virginia.
On November 1, 2023, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the
Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to harassment:
1. on the bases of race (Caucasian), color (White), and reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when,
from June 9, 2023, to October 31, 2023, the following occurred:
a. 	On June 9, 2023, Complainant’s co-worker (Fitness Coordinator/FC)
yelled at, screamed obscenities at, and chased Complainant from the
office to the parking lot and pounded on the truck until Complainant
was able to drive away to safety;
b. On June 9, 2023, the Fitness Program Director (RMO2) failed to
address Complainant’s concerns after Complainant called him about
the situation that had just occurred that day when FC not only
threatened to physically harm Complainant, but also his life;
c. 	From August 7, 2023, to present, the Operations Manager (RMO1)
continuously failed to provide Complainant with any information
regarding 	his 	request 	for 	the 	Judge 	Advocate 	General’s 	[JAG]
investigation to be re-opened [as Complainant had previously voiced
his belief that the internal investigation was improperly conducted];
and,
d. On October 31, 2023, Complainant received a Notice of Proposed
Termination from his position as Outdoor Maintenance Supervisor,
NS-4749-07, after RMO1 and RMO2 provided “a negative report”

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regarding Complainant’s employment while he was assigned to Naval
Weapons Station Yorktown, Virginia;3 and
2. on the basis of reprisal when the following occurred:
a. 	On November 24, 2023, RMO1 informed Complainant that he was
taken off paid Administrative Leave status based on the effective date
of termination on his Proposed Termination for Cause letter, although
Complainant’s rebuttal was still being processed and he had not yet
received an official termination letter; and
b. On December 20, 2023, RMO1 issued a Revised Decision to the
Notice of Proposed Termination for Cause, wherein the decision to
terminate Complainant from his position as Outdoor Maintenance
Supervisor, NS-4749-07, was upheld.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing
before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ
assigned to the case granted the Agency’s September 13, 2024, motion for a
decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 25,
2026. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that
Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as
alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
The record reveals that Complainant timely requested an extension to file a brief in
support of his appeal and was granted a 10-day extension which expired on July
14, 2026.
3 A de novo review of the record and, in particular, the Notice of Acceptance and
Complainant’s affidavit, establishes that Complainant asserted that the incidents
described in Claim 1(a), (b), and (c) were based on his race and color and the
incident described in 1(d) (as well as those described in Claim 2) were based on his
prior EEO activity.

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On July 13, 2026, Complainant emailed the appropriate Commission employees
and indicated he was having technical difficulties uploading materials to the portal.
An exchange of emails ensued, in which Complainant was provided additional
information about uploading materials and told that he could submit his submission
to a provided address via regular mail. Complainant eventually did so, in a package
postmarked August 21, 2026. Complainant provided no explanation for why he
waited a month after he realized he was having difficulty uploading materials (on
July 13, 2026) and a week after he was reminded that he could submit materials
through regular mail (on August 13, 2026), to mail his submission. Moreover, by
the time this submission was mailed, the Agency had already submitted its brief in
response to Complainant’s appeal and, therein, noted that Complainant had not
submitted a brief in support of his appeal, i.e., had already made arguments
dependent on the absence of Complainant’s appeal brief. In these circumstances,
we find that Complainant’s submission was untimely and will not consider it on
appeal.
In response to Complainant’s appeal, the Agency essentially summarized some of
the arguments made in its Motion for Summary Judgment and asked that the final
order adopting the AJ’s finding of no discrimination be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual
conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. 	See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action
shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, §
VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to
issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de
novo). 	This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In
other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and
Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of
whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any
federal employment discrimination statute was violated. 	See id. at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. 	(explaining 	that 	the 	de 	novo 	standard 	of 	review 	“requires 	that 	the
Commission 	examine 	the 	record 	without 	regard 	to 	the 	factual 	and 	legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the
documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant

2026002796	5
submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).
We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing.
The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing
upon 	finding 	that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact. 	29 	C.F.R.
§ 1614.109(g). 	EEOC’s 	decision 	without 	a 	hearing 	regulation 	follows 	the
summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S.
Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines
no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 	477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a
summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine
issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary
judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must
draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine
issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving
party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to
affect the outcome of a case.
An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the
record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal
No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is
adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing,
Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present
further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant has done
so for his retaliation claim but has failed to do so for his claim of race/color
harassment.
ANALYSIS
Complainant essentially raised two claims. The first, made up of the actions
described in Claim 1(a), (b), and (c) is that he was harassed on the bases of his race
and color. The second, made up of Claim 1(d) and Claim 2, is that the Agency
subsequently retaliated against him. We will first address Complainant’s claim of
race/color harassment and then turn to his claim of retaliation.

2026002796	6
Harassment
To prevail on a claim of harassment on the bases of race or color, a complainant
must show: (1) that he is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) that he was
subjected to 	unwelcome conduct 	related 	to 	his 	protected 	class; 	(3) that 	the
harassment complained of was based on his protected class; (4) that the harassment
had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance
and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5)
that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Celine B. v. Dep’t of
Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 2019001961 (Sept. 21, 2020); Humphrey v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998). See also Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), approved in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); Flowers v. Southern Reg’l Physician Serv.
Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001). The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated
from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
In other words, to prove his hostile work environment claim, Complainant must
establish that he was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive
that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s position would have found the
conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was
taken because of a protected basis; in this case, his race and/or color.
After a de novo review of the file, we agree with the AJ that Complainant failed to
raise a genuine dispute as to his claim that he was subjected to harassment based
on race or color as described in Claim 1(a), (b) and (c).
In terms of Claim 1(a), Complainant alleged that harassment he suffered was based
on his race and color because FC “lured” him into a room where Complainant was
the only Caucasian person. Complainant did not allege, nor does a de novo review
of the evidence reveal that any race or color-based comments were made. Nor does
Complainant point to any evidence that his race or color had anything to do with
the incident in question other than the fact that he is White and the alleged harasser
(FC), as well as two other people in the room who Complainant does not allege
were involved in the harassing behavior, are Black. This does not suffice to raise a
material dispute as to whether this incident was based on Complainant’s race or
color.

2026002796	7
Moreover, the other incidents which make up Complainant’s harassment claim
involve Complainant’s assertion that, due to his race and/or color, RMO1 and
RMO2 did not handle his complaints about FC’s harassment properly. But it is
undisputed that when Complainant reported the incident to RMO2 on Friday, June
9, 2023, RMO2 responded immediately, even though he was on leave, and told
both Complainant and FC to stay in their designated areas and that when RMO2
was back in the office on Monday, a full investigation would be done. The record
establishes 	that 	an 	investigation 	was 	conducted 	and 	that 	while 	witnesses
corroborated the use of profanity and questionable conduct by FC, none of the
witnesses confirmed Complainant’s claim that threats were made on his life. It is
further undisputed that FC received a Letter of Reprimand for the incident.
Moreover, even assuming that there was evidence that raised a genuine dispute as
to whether RMO1 and/or RMO2 handled Complainant’s allegations of harassment
properly, there is no evidence to suggest that any of their behavior was motivated
by Complainant’s race or color. The only evidence Complainant provides on this
issue is his assertion that this was the case, along with the fact that he is white and
was the only Caucasian employee in the room when the incident began. As noted
above, this is not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute as to whether the incidents
described were based on Complainant’s race or color.
The Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s finding of no discrimination in regard
to Claim 1(a), (b), and (c), is therefore AFFIRMED.
Retaliation
Complainant further alleged that he was retaliated against as described in Claim
1(d) and Claim 2. After a de novo review of the record, we find that he raised
genuine disputes of material fact regarding these allegations.
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie
case by demonstrating that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action
under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. 	Furnco
Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will
vary depending on the facts of the particular case. 	McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S.
at 802 n.13.

2026002796	8
The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a complainant must demonstrate that:
(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected
activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency;
and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.
Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
Here, there is no dispute that Complainant engaged in protected activity when he
initiated EEO Counselor contact concerning the subject complaint on August 2,
2023, 	after 	which 	the 	counselor 	interviewed 	RMO1 	and 	RMO2 	about 	the
allegations in late September 2023, Complainant received a notice of right to file
on October 10, 2023, and 	the formal complaint was filed on November 1, 2023.
There is likewise no dispute that the Agency was aware of this activity or that
Complainant was subsequently subjected to adverse treatment in the form of a
proposed termination (late October 2023) which was finalized (December 2023)
and 	removal 	from 	administrative 	leave 	status 	before 	he 	had 	been 	officially
terminated (November 2023). Moreover, the record establishes that a nexus existed
between the protected activity and the adverse treatment, based not only on the
temporal 	proximity 	outlined 	above, 	but 	also 	on 	the 	fact 	that 	responsible
management officials named in this prior EEO activity were the same management
officials (RMO1 and RMO2) that he claimed retaliated against him because of it.
Moreover, although the Agency articulated legitimate-non-discriminatory reasons
for 	proposing 	and 	finalizing 	Complainant’s 	termination, 	Complainant 	raised
genuine disputes of material fact concerning these explanations.
The AJ concluded that the Agency articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for proposing and finalizing Complainant’s termination; specifically, that a
prior debarment order barred Complainant from Naval Weapons Station Yorktown
and Naval Station Norfolk. The AJ determined that although Complainant argued
that the debarment was overturned, the relevant question was whether the decision
makers were aware of that fact.

2026002796	9
Apparently determining that there was no genuine dispute on this point, the AJ
went on to find that there was no evidence to dispute the Agency’s stated reasons
for the termination. But a de novo review of the record reveals that Complainant
asserted 	that 	RMO2 	was 	informed 	years 	prior 	to 	proposing 	Complainant’s
termination that the debarment order had been overturned. Complainant further
explained that he attempted to get the paperwork to prove this from the Agency’s
Consolidated Adjudication Facility but was told that he did not have the authority
to request it and that only authorized personnel such as the head of security of
Naval Station Norfolk (NSN) could do so. 	Complainant asserted that when he
asked this individual to request the paperwork, he refused to do so and that
Complainant provided all of this information to RMO1 and RMO2 and was told
that they could not speak with him about the proposed termination. 	Complainant
has therefore raised genuine disputes as to whether the debarment order had been
overturned and whether the relevant management officials were aware of that fact
either before they proposed the termination or before they finalized the proposal,
i.e., a genuine dispute as to whether the disbarment order was the motivation for
his termination (or its proposal).
Although not mentioned by the AJ or featured with any prominence in the
affidavits of the decision makers, the notice of proposed termination included a
reason other than the debarment order for terminating Complainant. 	Specifically,
it indicated that Complainant had engaged in conduct unbecoming on September 7,
2023, when he left a “rambling, harassing, and potentially threatening” voicemail
message for his supervisor of several years before. The Agency determined that
“each of these charges [i.e., the voicemail and the issues related to the debarment
order]. . . are sufficiently egregious to warrant [Complainant’s] termination.”
Thus, even given that Complainant raised a genuine dispute as to whether the
debarment order was the motivation for his termination, the question remains as to
whether he raised a genuine dispute related to the September 7, 2023, voicemail
that was given as a stand-alone reason for his termination.
After a de novo review of the record, we find that he has done so. Complainant
denied that he made a threatening phone call, asserting that while he did receive a
call from a staff member at “Nostra Yorktown” and attempted to return it, he did
not make any threatening statements in a voicemail message. 	Complainant asked
for a transcript of the alleged message in his rebuttal affidavit so that he could
properly dispute its contents.

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But a de novo review of the record does not reveal a transcript of the voicemail,
suggesting that the Agency never provided one despite Complainant’s request.
Moreover, although Complainant asserted that the report of investigation (ROI)
included a recording of a barely audible message which the Agency alleged was
the message at issue, he also asserted that the only audible part of this message was
the greeting which said it was recorded in July of an unstated year, not September
2023. The ROI includes a December 6, 2023, email from a labor and relations
specialist to Complainant indicating that a copy of the relevant voicemail is
attached, but, again, our de novo review of the record did not unearth a copy of this
voicemail. Nor does the ROI include an affidavit from the recipient of the alleged
voicemail or anyone else who heard it. In these circumstances, we find that
Complainant has raised a genuine dispute as to whether he left a “rambling,
harassing, and potentially threatening” voicemail for his former supervisor in
September 2023. Moreover, to the extent that the relevant issue is whether RMO1
and RMO2 knew that Complainant did not leave such a message, the record
establishes that Complainant provided his assertions in his rebuttal to the proposed
termination, including his claims that he did not leave a threatening message and
that the recording provided by the Agency did not support its conclusion that he
did leave such a message.
Complainant has therefore raised genuine disputes as to whether the decision
makers believed that the reasons provided for terminating him were accurate.
These 	disputes 	are 	material 	because 	if 	it 	is 	established 	that 	Complainant’s
debarment was revoked and the voicemail was not as described in the proposed
termination, and that RMO1 and RMO2 were aware of these facts, then these facts,
along with Complainant’s prima facie case of retaliation, raise a genuine dispute as
to whether the termination and its proposal were motivated by retaliatory animus.
The AJ therefore erred in determining that Complainant failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact in regard to Claim 1(d) and 2(b).
Given that Claim 2(a) involves an allegation closely related to Claim 1(d) and 2(b),
as well as one of the same responsible management officials, we find that it would
be inappropriate to bifurcate this claim from those being remanded. We are
therefore remanding Claim 1(d), Claim 2(a), and Claim 2(b) for further processing.
We 	further 	find, 	however, 	that 	Claim 	1(a), 	(b), 	and 	(c), 	encompassing
Complainant’s claim of harassment based on his race and sex, are not so closely
related to the remanded claims as to require remand.

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As noted above, the AJ properly determined that these claims involved no genuine
disputes of material fact.
Upon remand of Claim 1(d), Claim 2(a) and Claim 2(b), the AJ assumes full
responsibility for their adjudication and has the power to regulate the conduct and
scope of the hearing as appropriate, under the provisions of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109.
See Complainant v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 0520130425 (Oct.
29, 2013).
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and evidence
not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission AFFIRMS, in part, and
VACATES, in part, the Agency's final order. The Agency’s final order adopting
the AJ’s finding of no discrimination in regard to Claim 1(a), (b) and (c) is
AFFIRMED. Claims 1(d), 2(a), and 2(b) are REMANDED to the Agency in
accordance with this decision and the Order below.
ORDER
The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC
Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at
the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the
Hearings Unit. Thereafter, a different Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing
and issue a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109 and
the Agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719)
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and §1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s
corrective action is mandatory. 	Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion
of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector
EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the
Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance
was being monitored. 	Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit
via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the
Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).

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The Agency’s final report must contain supporting documentation when previously
not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
Complainant and his/her representative.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may
petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).
The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with
the Commission’s order prior to or following 	an 	administrative petition 	for
enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a
civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42
U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil
action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition
for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.
Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the
orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the
referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration.

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A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	within 	which 	to 	submit 	a 	brief 	or 	statement 	in
opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof Of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the
party’s 	request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating
circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting
documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration.
The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the
deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0124)
This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires
the 	Agency 	to 	continue 	its 	administrative 	processing 	of 	a 	portion 	of 	your
complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has
affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued
administrative processing.

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In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180)
calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal
with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on
your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head,
identifying that person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere 	Gul Chaudhry’s signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 21, 2026
Date