EEOC Appeal 2026002326

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Karol K.,1
Complainant,
v.
Douglas A. Collins,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026002326
Agency No. 200J-636-2024-159507
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
April 10, 2026, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 	For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the
Agency’s final decision.
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was employed by
the Agency as a Social Worker Assistant, GS-7, at the Agency’s Omaha VA
Medical Center, part of the VA Nebraska-Western Iowa Healthcare System, in
Omaha, Nebraska.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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On August 29, 2024, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging the Agency
discriminated against her and subjected her to a hostile work environment on the
bases of race (Caucasian), sex (female), age (69), and reprisal for prior protected
EEO activity (reporting sexual harassment) when:
1. Since July 2023, S1 and S2 did not address Complainant’s issues of bullying
and harassment by coworkers;
2. From July 2, 2023, to February 29, 2024, Complainant was not allowed to
telework;
3. From July 2, 2023, to October 2023, Complainant was not provided proper
training for the position and supervisors requested Complainant complete
additional training;
4. Beginning in August 2023, Complainant was required to complete an
excessive number of Veteran orientations to the HUD-VASH program to
ensure eligibility;
5. From March 2024 to until June 24, 2024, Complainant did not receive credit
for the work she was performing and coworkers took credit for her work
during meetings;
6. On June 5, 2024, S1 subjected Complainant to a fact-finding investigation;
and,
7. On June 24, 2024, Complainant was terminated during her probationary
period.2
The Agency accepted the foregoing claims for investigation.3 At the conclusion of
the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of
investigation 	and 	notice 	of 	her 	right 	to 	request 	a 	hearing 	before 	an 	Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge, or a final decision
from the agency.
2 Complainant’s original complaint included other allegations that were dismissed
on procedural grounds. Because Complainant does not challenge these partial
dismissals on appeal, we decline to address them here.
3 Claim 6 was accepted only as to the basis of retaliation. Additionally, Claims 2
and 3 were accepted as part of Complainant’s overall hostile work environment
claim, but not as independently actionable claims due to their untimeliness.
Complainant did not challenge this on appeal.

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After Complainant requested a decision, the Agency issued a final decision
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant did
not prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The Agency
found that as to the timely independently actionable claims of disparate treatment
raised by Complainant (Claims 4, 6, and 7), Complainant failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment. Complainant did not establish disparate
treatment based on reprisal because she did not show that a nexus existed between
the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Complainant did not establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment based on her sex, age, or race because she
did not show that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees
outside of her protected class or there was some other evidentiary link between
membership in the protected class and the adverse employment action. The
Agency 	further 	found 	that 	Complainant 	had 	not 	established 	a 	claim 	of
discriminatory or retaliatory harassment based on her age, race, sex, or prior
protected EEO activity because the record showed that the alleged incidents
constituted normal managerial oversight and common workplaces disputes, which
the Commission has found do not establish a hostile work environment.
Complainant then filed the instant appeal. Complainant did not file a brief or
statement in connection with her appeal. She included a recording of an undated
voicemail but does not explain its relevance or the grounds for her appeal.
The Agency also did not file a brief or statement in connection with this appeal.
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), 	the 	Agency's 	decision 	is 	subject 	to 	de 	novo 	review 	by 	the
Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). 	See Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 	29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-16 (Aug. 5,
2015) 	(explaining 	that 	the 	de 	novo 	standard 	of 	review 	“requires 	that 	the
Commission 	examine 	the 	record 	without 	regard 	to 	the 	factual 	and 	legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the
documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant
submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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A complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that
would support an inference of discrimination. 	Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts
of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804 n.14. The burden then
shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. 	Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To
ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Complainants may establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race,
sex, or age by providing evidence that: (1) they are a member of a protected class;
(2) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) either that similarly
situated individuals outside their protected class were treated differently, or other
circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference
of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13; Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743-
44 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Complainant established that she is a member of a protected class based on
her age, sex, and race, and she has alleged adverse actions with respect to Claims
4, 6, and 7. However, she did not identify any similarly situated employees who
were treated differently, nor did she identify other circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. Therefore, she did not establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment based on her age, sex, or race.
Complainants may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) they
engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity;
(3) subsequently, they were subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a
nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v.
Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
When establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, close temporal
proximity is sufficient to infer a causal nexus between an employee's protected
activity and an adverse action on the part of an employer.

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See Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (noting that
“cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of
protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of
causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity
must be ‘very close”’).
Here, Complainant identified her protected activity as reporting harassment on
September 7, 2023. Claim 4 began occurring prior to this reporting. Claims 6 and 7
occurred nine months after Complainant’s report of harassment and prior to the
EEO complaint. Thus, there is no temporal nexus between Claims 4, 6, and 7, and
Complainant prior protected EEO activity. Complainant has not provided any other
evidence to support a nexus between her protected EEO activity and the alleged
adverse actions.
As for Complainant’s overall harassment/hostile work environment claim, in order
to establish a prima facie case of harassment, Complainant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of five elements: (1) that he is a
member of a statutorily protected class; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome
conduct related to his protected class; (3) that the harassment complained of was
based on his protected class; (4) that the harassment had the purpose or effect of
unreasonably 	interfering 	with 	his 	work 	performance 	and/or 	creating 	an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) that there is a basis
for imputing liability to the employer. See Celine B. v. Dep't of Navy, EEOC
Appeal No. 2019001961 (Sept. 21, 2020); Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998). See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), approved in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66-67 (1986); Flowers v. Southern Reg'l Physician Serv. Inc., 247 F.3d 229
(5th Cir. 2001). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective
viewpoint 	of 	a 	reasonable 	person 	in 	the 	victim's 	circumstances. 	Oncale 	v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
In other words, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she
was 	subjected 	to 	conduct 	that 	was 	either so 	severe or so 	pervasive that 	a
“reasonable person” in Complainant's position would have found the conduct to be
hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken
because of a protected basis. Only if Complainant establishes both of those
elements -- hostility and motive -- will the question of Agency liability present
itself.

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For a retaliatory harassment claim, the alleged retaliatory actions need not impact a
term, condition, or privilege of employment. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). A complainant need only show that a
materially adverse action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id., 548 U.S. at 68. The
Commission's guidance states if the conduct would be sufficiently material to deter
protected activity in the given context, even if it were insufficiently severe or
pervasive 	to 	create 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment, 	there 	would 	be 	actionable
retaliation. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, No.
915.004 (August 25, 2016).
While Complainant has alleged a pattern of harassment beginning in July 2023, we
find that Complainant has not shown that any of the complained of conduct was
based on her protected classes or her prior protected EEO activity. A finding of a
discriminatory or retaliatory hostile work environment related to Claims 4, 6, and 7
is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of
the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory
animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21,
2000). Complainant has not provided any evidence to show that the alleged
harassment in her other claims was based on her protected classes or prior
protected EEO activities. She makes only generalized assertions that the Agency’s
actions were based on her protected classes because the Agency employees
engaging in these actions did not share her protected classes. Such generalized
assertions 	are 	generally 	insufficient 	to 	establish 	discriminatory 	motivation.
Discrimination statutes prohibit only harassing behavior that is directed at an
employee because of their protected bases. Jenee W. v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs,
EEOC Appeal No. 2022003989 (Sept. 19, 2024). We find that Complainant has
not established that the harassment complained of was based on her protected
classes or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.
Therefore, based on our review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final
decision finding no discrimination.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. 	See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

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Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District
Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. 	If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head,
identifying that person by their full name and official title. 	Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the
paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time
limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere __________ 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 15, 2026
Date