EEOC Appeal 2025003712

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Dominica H.,1
Complainant,
v.
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2025003712
Hearing No. 531-2024-00057X
Agency No. NY-23-0566-SSA
DECISION
On July 24, 2025, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 21, 2025, final order concerning her equal
employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. 	For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Claims Specialist, GS-11, at the Agency’s Freeport, New York Field Office in
Freeport, New York.
On July 18, 2023, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the basis of disability (physical) when, on May 15,
2023, the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when it
denied her request to work at home by exception (WAHBE request).
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing
before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing. 	Over Complainant's objections, the AJ
assigned to the case granted the Agency’s June 18, 2024, motion for a decision
without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on June 11, 2025. 	The
Agency 	subsequently 	issued 	a 	final 	order 	adopting 	the 	AJ’s 	finding 	that
Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as
alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant asserts that although the Agency eventually approved her
request for full-time telework, from March 2023, through June 2023, she was
required to work three days a week in the office and only permitted to telework
two days a week, despite her own judgment and the judgment of her doctors that
she should not go into the office due to the potential damage to her health of being
in-office and of the commute between her home and the office. 	She asserts that
this caused her to lose salary and accrued leave, as well as costing the agency the
loss of her services. She asserts that the Agency mischaracterized its standard leave
policy as accommodation. She further asserts that although the agency “may claim
that 	it 	had 	not 	received 	sufficient 	medical 	documentation 	to 	approve 	her
accommodation request for full-time telework, the documentation was eventually
received, showing that her medical condition did justify full time telework from the
time it had first been requested.”

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She asserts that because her condition remained the same during those months of
2023 “when the agency claimed not to have what it needed,” it was only the
agency’s delay in providing her with the accommodation, not any change in her
condition, that stood in the way of providing her with the accommodation that she
needed. She asks that she be compensated for the salary and leave balances that she
lost.
In response to Complainant’s appeal, the Agency argues that Complainant failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was denied a reasonable
accommodation over a limited period of approximately 15 workdays when she was
not provided her preferred accommodation of full-time telework from March to
June 2023, essentially reiterating the arguments it made in its Motion for Summary
Judgment. It asserts, for example, that because Complainant was permitted to use
a combination of advanced sick leave, annual leave in lieu of sick leave, and an
interim accommodation of full-time teleworking while management engaged in the
interactive process, the Agency did not fail to accommodate her. It further
reiterates that the medical documentation Complainant submitted was insufficient
to support her request for full-time telework because it did not explain why full-
time telework was necessary to enable her to perform the essential functions of her
job, summarizing the medical documentation submitted by Complainant at various
points in the process and explaining why it was insufficient to establish that she
had a medical condition that necessitated full-time telework. It concludes that the
AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing and asks that its final order
adopting the AJ’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual
conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. 	See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action
shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, §
VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to
issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de
novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes.

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In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s,
and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate
fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of
whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. 	See id. at
Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that
the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the
documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant
submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).
We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing.
The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing
upon 	finding 	that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact. 	29 	C.F.R.
§ 1614.109(g). 	EEOC’s 	decision 	without 	a 	hearing 	regulation 	follows 	the
summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S.
Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines
no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 	477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a
summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine
issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary
judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must
draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine
issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving
party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to
affect the outcome of a case.
An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the
record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal
No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is
adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing,
Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present
further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant has
failed to do so.

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ANALYSIS
An agency is required to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical
and mental limitations of an individual with a disability unless the agency can
show 	that 	accommodation 	would 	cause 	an 	undue 	hardship. 29 	C.F.R. 	§§
1630.2(o), (p). 	In 	order 	to 	establish 	that 	she 	was 	denied 	a 	reasonable
accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a
disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified” as defined
by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation. See EEOC 	Enforcement 	Guidance 	on 	Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
EEOC 	Notice 	No. 	915.002 	(Oct. 	17, 	2002). 	(Reasonable 	Accommodation
Enforcement Guidance).
Here, Complainant asserts on appeal that “the matter was eventually resolved such
that 	[Complainant] 	was 	approved 	for 	full-time 	telework 	based 	on 	medical
evidence.” 	Her argument that the Agency nonetheless violated Rehabilitation Act
is that her request for full-time telework was not granted between March 2023 and
June 2023, and that she was instead required to work three days a week in the
office 	and 	only 	telework 	two 	days 	per 	week. 	Thus, 	her 	claim 	is 	that 	the
approximately three-month delay in granting her request for full-time teleworking
as a reasonable accommodation establishes a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
Unnecessary delay in processing a request for reasonable accommodation can
result in a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. In determining whether there has
been 	an 	unnecessary 	delay 	in 	responding 	to 	a 	request 	for 	reasonable
accommodation, relevant factors include: (1) the reason(s) for the delay, (2) the
length of the delay, (3) how much the individual with a disability and the employer
each contributed to the delay, (4) what the employer was doing during the delay,
and (5) whether the required accommodation was simple or complex to provide.
See Reasonable Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, at Question 10.
Where an individual’s disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the
agency may ask the individual for reasonable documentation about her disability
and functional limitations.

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The employer is entitled to know that the individual has a covered disability for
which she needs reasonable accommodation. “Reasonable documentation” means
that the employer may require only the documentation that is needed to establish
that 	a 	person 	has 	an 	ADA 	disability, and 	that 	the 	disability 	necessitates 	a
reasonable accommodation. See id., at Question 6. In this case, there is no dispute
that Complainant’s disability and need for accommodation were not obvious, that
the Agency was therefore entitled to request reasonable documentation, and that it
did so while engaging in the interactive process beginning in February 2023.
Moreover, Complainant failed to raise a genuine dispute as to whether the Agency
had the documentation it needed to make a determination about her request for
full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation prior to June 2023.
Specifically, 	the 	medical 	information 	Complainant 	initially 	provided 	did 	not
establish that she had a disability for which full-time telework was the only
effective accommodation. She first 	submitted 	a note from her primary 	care
physician dated February 22, 2023, which indicated that Complainant was under
the doctor’s care and “cleared to return to work but medically advised to stay at
home,” and did not include sufficient information to establish that because of her
disability, full-time telework was the only accommodation that would be effective.
Follow up notes on February 28, March 21, March 29 provided only more details
about 	her 	medical 	condition 	(noting 	she 	had 	palpitations, 	headaches, 	a
“cardiovascular 	condition,” 	and 	“medications 	prescribed”) 	but 	no 	additional
information about why or how these conditions impacted her ability to commute to
work or necessitated fulltime telework. 	Later documentation from Complainant’s
health care providers focused on the dangers that her condition would present if
she were required to drive because of the potential for a “sporadic symptomatic
event” that would distract her from proper driving, but did not provide any
information about why the alternative accommodations suggested by the Agency
(using public transportation, Uber, or Access-A-Ride) would not be effective.
The only information in the record as to why Complainant could not commute
using these types of transportation is an email dated May 31, 2023, in which she
asserted that she could not commute to work because needed to be with someone
familiar 	when 	traveling 	because 	her 	condition 	“comes 	with 	an 	unexplained
episode” and she feared that if she had a public episode due to her condition while
in public, she would be filmed. 	It is undisputed that this was Complainant’s own
assertion and that it was not provided by a health care provider.

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Moreover, it is undisputed that while engaging in the interactive process, the
Agency 	provided 	a 	variety 	of 	interim 	accommodations, 	including 	allowing
Complainant to work at home full-time between March 29 – April 28, 2023, as
well as providing advanced sick leave and annual leave in lieu of sick leave.2
Finally, 	on 	appeal 	Complainant 	herself 	acknowledges 	that 	she 	“eventually”
submitted enough documentation to show that her medical condition “did justify
full-time telework from the time it had first been requested” and argues that since
her condition remained the same throughout the interactive process, the Agency
should have provided full-time telework when she first asked for it. But this
argument overlooks the fact that where an individual’s disability and need for
accommodation are not obvious, the agency may ask the individual for reasonable
documentation about her disability and functional limitations and is entitled to
know that the individual has a covered disability for which she needs reasonable
accommodation. 	The 	fact 	that 	Complainant 	eventually 	provided 	sufficient
documentation 	does 	not 	render 	the 	Agency’s 	failure 	to 	provide 	her 	the
accommodation she requested before she provided this documentation a violation
of the law.
In these circumstances, we find that Complainant failed to raise a genuine dispute
as to whether the Agency’s failure to grant Complainant full-time telework for
approximately three months while it engaged in the interactive process resulted in
a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including
those not specifically addressed herein, we therefore AFFIRM the Agency’s final
order.
2 Complainant 	asserts 	on 	appeal 	that 	the 	use 	of 	leave 	is 	not 	a 	reasonable
accommodation. Although it is true that requests for leave related to disability can
often fall under existing employer policies, permitting the use of accrued paid
leave, or unpaid leave, is a form of reasonable accommodation when necessitated
by an employee's disability. See Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship,
at text preceding Question 17.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, 	Complainant 	can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

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Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District
Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. 	If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head,
identifying that person by their full name and official title. 	Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the
paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time
limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 14, 2026
Date