EEOC Appeal 2026000078

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Marina A.,1
Complainant,
v.
Troy E. Meink,
Secretary,
Department of the Air Force,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026000078
Hearing No. 520-2024-00279X
Agency No. 7W1M2304998F25-2
DECISION
On October 10, 2025, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 12, 2025, final order concerning her
equal 	employment 	opportunity 	(EEO) 	complaint 	alleging 	employment
discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons,
the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Contract
Specialist, GS-1102-12, at the Agency’s Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
(AFLMC) in Hanscomb Air Force Base, Massachusetts. Complainant’s first-line
Supervisor (Supervisor 1) was a named individual. Complainant rotated into
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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Supervisor 1’s work section AFLCMC/HBIK (undefined acronym) on or about
March 1, 2021, and remained working for Supervisor 1 until her retirement on or
about May19, 2023. Prior to working for Supervisor 1, Complainant worked in
another contracting division of the AFLCMC on Hansom AFB. Complainant had a
physical disability because in or around 2017, she was hurt when she tripped on
some torn carpet, injuring her back. Report of Investigation (ROI) at 765-67 and
770.
Complainant initiated EEO contact on June 14, 2023. On September 28, 2023,
Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against
her on the bases of disability (physical) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity
under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when:
1. On or between August 30, 2021, and February 2, 2023, Supervisor 1 provided
Complainant a notice of decision based on a February 3, 2023, notice of
proposed removal and amended notice of decision on March 2, 2023.
2. Complainant was provided a notice of decision based on a February 3, 2023,
notice of proposed removal and amended notice of decision based on incorrect
information received from Supervisor 1; and
3. The 	Chief 	of 	Resource 	Management 	(Chief) 	denied 	Complainant 	the
opportunity for re-employment at AFLCMC/PK at Hanscom AFB, MA with
no reason given based on the notice of decision from February 3, 2023, notice
of proposed removal, based on incorrect masked information from Supervisor
1.2
The Agency conducted an investigation. The investigation revealed that after
Complainant began working for Supervisor 1 in AFLCMC/HBIK, she alleged that
she injured her back a second time when she fell, exacerbating her previous alleged
back injuries. Complainant informed Supervisor 1 that she had reinjured her back.
Supervisor 	1 	asked 	Complainant 	many 	times 	if 	she 	needed 	reasonable
Accommodation to assist Complainant with her back because Complainant was
asking to telework due to her back issues. Supervisor 1 emailed Complainant and
the Disability Program Manager (DP Manager), to connect the two so Complainant
could pursue a reasonable accommodation as needed.
2 Claims were slightly reworded for clarity.

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Complainant acknowledged that Supervisor 1 repeatedly asked her whether she
needed a reasonable accommodation due to the alleged back injury. ROI at 24-6.
Complainant told Supervisor 1 multiple times that she did not need, nor did she want
any reasonable accommodation. ROI at 687, 690-91, 693, 766, 770, 775, 780, and
815. Complainant believed that because she did not listen to Supervisor 1 and seek
a 	reasonable 	accommodation, 	Supervisor 	1 	became 	angry 	and 	alleged 	that
Complainant had performance problems in order to remove her from federal service.
ROI at 709, 872, 874, and 964.
Complainant also believed that Supervisor 1 alleging that she had work performance
issues was a true case of personal animosity and not anything to do with physical
limitations. Complainant stated that Supervisor 1 hated her from day one and she
was treated in the same way as the previous contract specialist who was transferred
out of Supervisor 1’s section. Complainant also stated that in retrospect, she realized
that she was treated poorly by Supervisor 1 because Supervisor 1 felt threatened by
her.
Supervisor 1 worked through her supervisory chain, alerting them to Complainant
poor performance; and seeking guidance and permission to place Complainant on a
Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). On or about August 9, 2022, Supervisor 1
placed Complainant on a PIP for a period of 90 days to give Complainant the
opportunity to improve her performance. During the performance improvement
period, Supervisor 1 worked with Complainant on her performance in order to assist
Complainant in bringing her performance up to an acceptable level. ROI at 61-73,
344-45, 394-95, 426-27, 442-43, 458-59, 630-33, and 900-01.
On or about February 3, 2023, Supervisor 1 proposed Complainant’s removal for
failing 	to 	bring 	her 	performance 	up 	to 	the 	minimal 	acceptable 	level. 	By
Memorandum dated May 4, 2023, Complainant received an amended Notice of
Decision on her removal from federal service due to an unsuccessful performance
rating and subsequent failure to improve her performance under a PIP. On April 27,
2023, Complainant notified the Agency of her decision to retire effective May 4,
2023.
On that same date, a named Lieutenant Colonel (Lieutenant Colonel) issued an
amended decision stating that management was staying the decision to remove
Complainant and allowing her to retire per her request.

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Complainant stated that she had never met Lieutenant Colonel, and she did not know
whether he believed that she had work performance problems. ROI at 264-76 and
900-04.
On May 29, 2023, Complainant wrote Chief, informing him that she applied for
Vacancy Announcement Number AFPC-STEM-DHA-11778000-1102, Contracting
Specialist, GS-11-15, various locations. She advised that she could be reinstated
because her Standard Form (SF)-50 stated voluntary retirement. See ROI at 328-29
for email and 520-26 for vacancy announcement.
Chief never received the certificate of eligibles containing Complainant’s name and
did 	not 	hire 	any 	applicants 	off 	the 	list 	under 	which 	Complainant 	applied.
Complainant herself admitted that she did not know whether Chief hired anyone off
the certificate of eligibles associated with the position she applied under. Chief also
informed Complainant that he would not consider hiring her back as a Contract
Specialist, GS-1102-12, at Hanscom AFB because management had just proposed
Complainant’s removal for performance issues. ROI at 330 and 839-41.
The Agency selected a named employee (Selectee) on May 19, 2023, to fill
Complainant’s position following her retirement. Chief stated that on or about May
19, 2023, they interviewed and selected about 18 individuals. ROI at 841-42.
Complainant approached the local EEO office for the first time on or about June 14,
2023, to file a complaint, which was almost one month after Selectee had already
been chosen by Chief. Chief did not learn about Complainant’s EEO complaint until
on or about August 16, 2023, when he was contacted by a named individual from
the EEO office. Complainant admitted that she did not know when Chief learned of
her protected activity. ROI at 15, 766-67, and 838-39.
On June 26, 2023, and July 7, 2023, Complainant emailed Chief requesting status
updates regarding the referral certificate for the Contracting Specialist position for
which she had applied. On July 11, 2023, Chief emailed Complainant advising her
that if she made the referral certificate for the position, she would not be interviewed
or offered a position at Hanscom AFB. On July 12, 2023, Chief informed
Complainant that she was not barred from future federal service. He also informed
her that she could apply to any position; however, she would not be considered for
future employment as a Contracting Specialist, GS-1102, at Hanscom AFB. See ROI
at 327-42 for emails.

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At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before
an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing before
an AJ.
After considering the entire record, including the ROI and the submissions and
documentary evidence in the parties’ respective briefs, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Complainant, the AJ determined that no issues of material
fact existed and summary judgment in favor of the Agency was appropriate. On
August 18, 2025, the AJ granted the Agency’s motion and issued a decision without
a hearing pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g) in favor of the Agency, finding no
discrimination.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s finding
that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as
alleged. The instant appeal followed.
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, the Agency's decision
is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal
Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO
MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard
of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the
factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC
“review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely
and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the
Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”); see
also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an
administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the
decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo).
The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when they
find that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue
of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in
favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). A fact is “material”
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. Id. When considering
summary judgment, facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

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To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must
identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing
further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material
under applicable law. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; see
also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 7, § III.E. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing
is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the Agency was motivated
by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such
a dispute.
At the outset, we do not find that Complainant is an individual with disability. The
record reflects that Complainant requested to telework at times because of her
alleged back injuries. The record also reflects, and Complainant acknowledged, that
Supervisor 1 attempted on multiple occasions to assist her in the reasonable
accommodation process, however, each time Complainant rejected the assistance
believing she did not need any accommodation, as she was not disabled. ROI at 770,
775, 777, 780, and 802-803; Agency’s motion at 25-7, 61, 70, 79, and 87-8.
Therefore, while she may have had a back injury, Complainant repeatedly told
Supervisor 	1 	that 	she 	had 	no 	disability 	and 	refused 	to 	request 	reasonable
accommodation even when advised and provided necessary information with which
to do so. She also insinuated that Supervisor 1 did not perceive her to have a
disability, asserting that Supervisor 1’s actions were allegedly due to personal
animosity and not anything to do with physical limitations. See Agency’s motion at
105 and AJ’s Decision at 8-9.
The record is however devoid of any evidence that Supervisor 1 took any action that
was motivated by discriminatory animus based on Complainant’s alleged disability.
See William B. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 2019003149 (Sept.
17, 2020) (applying motivating factor to Rehabilitation Act).
We agree with the AJ that the Agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its decision to terminate Complainant. The record is also absent of any
evidence that the stated reason was pretextual. Nor did Complainant demonstrate
that her termination was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus based on
any disability or prior protected EEO activity.
Regarding 	Claims 	1-2, 	Supervisor 	1 	proposed, 	and 	management 	eventually
terminated Complainant for unimproved performance.

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As the AJ observed, Complainant’s termination was due to her poor performance,
struggling with handling multiple tasks simultaneously, failing to meet deadlines for
mandatory training, failing to complete tasks without supervision, and failing to be
diligent in ensuring ongoing compliance with contract terms. Complainant also often
needed her work reviewed and revised, and often failed to implement supervisor
instructions, which required increased workload for other staff. See AJ’s Decision
at 8. Lieutenant Colonel also confirmed in Complainant’s Removal Notice that her
level of performance “negatively impacted mission accomplishment.” ROI at 319.
Complainant did not dispute that she had performance deficiencies; that she was
placed on a PIP; and that Supervisor 1 worked with her, without success, in order to
bring her performance to an acceptable level. Nowhere in the entire record did
Complainant describe any false information that Supervisor 1 allegedly provided to
Lieutenant Colonel, Chief or any other management official.
Notably, Complainant herself stated that she had never met Lieutenant Colonel, and
she did not know whether he believed that she had work performance problems.
Agency’s motion at 30-1. We also note Complainant’s Union President’s statement
that he represented Complainant for several months and while he believed that the
PIP was flawed, he did not see any discriminatory behavior on the part of the
Agency. ROI at 604.
As to Claim 3, the record reflects that Chief never received the certificate of eligibles
containing Complainant’s name and did not hire any applicants off the list under
which Complainant applied. Also, Complainant did not dispute that Chief also
informed her that he would not consider hiring her back as a Contract Specialist
because Management had just proposed Complainant’s removal for performance
issues. This means that Chief did not deny Complainant the opportunity for re-
employment in retaliation for her protected EEO activity as alleged.
Importantly, Complainant herself admitted that she had never met Chief, he was not
in her rating chain; and she did not know whether he believed her performance was
unacceptable or when he learned of her protected activity. Nor did she know whether
Chief hired anyone off the certificate of eligibles associated with the position she
applied under. Agency’s motion at 33-4.

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Moreover, Complainant’s initial EEO contact regarding the instant complaint
occurred on or around June 14, 2023, almost one month after she retired from the
Agency and had been replaced by Selectee. Nor did Chief become aware of
Complainant’s EEO contact until August 16, 2023, about two months and two days
after it occurred. Therefore, Chief’s alleged action could not have been motivated
by retaliatory animus based on Complainant’s protected EEO activity.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record and construing any inferences raised by the
undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, we find that a reasonable fact-finder could
not find in Complainant’s favor. Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the
evidence of record, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the
AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that
Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order implementing the AJ’s decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request,
that 	statement 	or 	brief 	must 	be 	filed 	together 	with 	the 	request 	for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).

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Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. 	In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either
party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC
Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented
the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must be
submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission will
consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court
within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. 	If
you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person
who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their
full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. 	“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to
reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.

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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You
must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere 	_________ 	Gul Chaudhry’s signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 22, 2026
Date