EEOC Appeal 2020001702

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Harriet J.,1
Complainant,
v.
Louis DeJoy,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Northeast Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 2020001702
Hearing No. 520-2018-00304X
Agency No. 1B-012-0019-17
DECISION
On December 16, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
October 24, 2019, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the Agency’s final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly granted the
Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing; and whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the AJ’s finding of no discriminatory or retaliatory harassment based on
Complainant’s sex and in reprisal for protected EEO activity.
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Lead Clerk at the
Agency’s Springfield Network Distribution Center in Springfield, Massachusetts.
In her formal complaint, Complainant stated that on July 26, 2017, she was helping a female
coworker (CW1) retrieve forms on a computer when a male coworker (CW2) stated to another
employee, “maybe the girls are looking up new diets.” Complainant stated that CW2 left the area
and she and CW1 overheard CW2 say, “I can hear them in there mooing.” 	In her deposition,
Complainant indicated that she responded to CW2, “well, maybe you should be the one looking
up new diets.” Complainant stated she immediately reported what CW2 said to her to the Acting
Manager of Distribution Operations (Acting MDO). 	According to Complainant, Acting MDO
disregarded her complaint and told her to return to her work area. Complainant stated that several
hours later, CW2 walked near her work area and mooed at her two times. Complainant’s second-
level supervisor (S2) testified that Acting MDO reported the incident to him and Complainant’s
third-level supervisor. S2 stated that Acting MDO conducted interviews with the parties and felt
as though it was a “he said, she said” situation to which he informed them that they needed to be
professional and corrective action would be taken if they continued.
Complainant stated that on October 20, 2017, while conducting a safety walk, she observed an
offensive drawing and the words “no cows” written in magic marker on a pole. Complainant stated
that she reported the incident to a supervisor. The offensive drawing was removed on the following
day. 	Complainant did not know who posted the offensive drawing but surmised that CW2 or
another male painted the drawing.
Complainant stated that on December 30, 2017, Acting MDO directed a supervisor (S3) to
improperly record her sick leave as Leave Without Pay (LWOP). 	S3 denied that Acting MDO
instructed her to do so and stated that it was a mistake that was corrected. Complainant believed
that the error was intentional on behalf of Acting MDO because a union official informed her that
he spoke with the supervisor, who advised that Acting MDO had given her a small pile of slips
with Complainant’s on top and instructed the supervisor to program the slips for LWOP.
Complainant stated that on January 21, 2018, her supervisor (S1) instructed her to work away from
Acting MDO’s wife based on a complaint. Complainant had been assisting CW1 in an area that
was shared by Acting MDO’s wife. Complainant stated that she and CW1 were sent to work in
another area of the building
On January 22, 2018, Complainant’s coworker (CW3) submitted a statement regarding the July
26, 2017 incident. CW3 stated that she was at a desk in the HAZMAT cage and she witnessed the
following:
“CW2 went into the HAZMAT cage to do something. He said, ‘what are you two
doing in here? You’re not supposed to be in here (referring to the HAZMAT cage).’
He went back out to the leakers. 	[Complainant] yelled in a very strong voice,

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‘FUCK YOU CW2’ and CW1 said ‘yeah, FUCK YOU CW2.’ 	CW2 said in a
normal voice to no one in particular that [CW3] knew of ‘do you hear a cow?
Moo.’”
Following CW3’s statement, the Agency conducted pre-disciplinary interviews (PDI) with
Complainant, CW1, and CW2.
Complainant stated that on an unknown date, S1 presented her with two sheets of paper that
contained a list of duties. Complainant averred that some of the duties were not clerk duties and
while the change was never implemented, she did not know why there was an attempt to change
her duties.
On March 2, 2018, the Agency issued Complainant a 14-day suspension for unacceptable conduct.
The notice stated that on July 26, 2017, CW2 asked Complainant why she was in the HAZMAT
cage, which was not her assigned work area, and Complainant responded, “Fuck yourself [CW2].”
The notice further stated that during the Complainant’s February 4, 2018, PDI she had
acknowledged her behavior and offered no plausible explanation for her action.
EEO Complaints
On November 7, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint (Complaint 1) alleging that the
Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex (female) when: on July 26, 2017, CW2 made
inappropriate comments to her, mooed at her like she was a cow, and put offensive graffiti on the
workroom floor, and when Complainant notified the Agency, it failed to take appropriate action.
On March 20, 2018, Complainant filed another EEO complaint (Complaint 2) alleging that the
Agency discriminated against her in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:
1. 	On December 30, 2017, the Acting Manager of Distribution Operations (Acting MDO)
directed a supervisor to improperly record Complainant’s sick leave as LWOP;
2. 	On January 21, 2018, she was instructed to work away from Acting MDO’s wife;
3. 	In late January/early February 2018, the Agency attempted to change her work duties;
4. 	On February 4, 2018, Acting MDO threatened her with discipline; and
5. 	On March 2, 2018, she was issued a notice of disciplinary suspension.
At the conclusion of the investigations, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
reports of investigation (ROI-1 and ROI-2) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an
AJ. 	Complainant timely requested a hearing on both complaints. 	The AJ assigned to the case
consolidated Complainant’s complaints.

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Over Complainant's objections, the AJ granted the Agency’s September 9, 2019 motion for a
decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on October 18, 2019. The
Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to
prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.
In the decision, the AJ noted that the Agency provided 24 undisputed facts and that Complainant
had failed to adhere to the AJ’s order, which instructed Complainant to state whether she disputed
or did not dispute any of the facts presented in the Agency’s Statement of Facts. The AJ stated
that the Agency’s Statement of Facts was accurate and supported by the record. The AJ concluded
that, therefore, there were no disputed material facts. In doing so, the AJ stated that Complainant
presented her own version of facts, which duplicated many of the facts presented by the Agency;
presented immaterial facts and others that were not supported by the record; and presented facts
that were based upon pure speculation or unsworn statements.
As for Complainant’s claims, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to establish that the events
in complaint 1 were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment.
The AJ further held that the incidents did not change Complainant’s employment conditions into
an abusive working environment because they were not severe, not physically threatening, and did
not unreasonably interfere with her work. Regarding the inappropriate comments, the AJ found
that Complainant was involved in a verbal altercation on a single day. While a coworker stated
that CW2 mooed at Complainant and CW1, Complainant never spoke with CW2 again and
recounted seeing him working in her area only five times in the prior two years. 	Finally, with
respect to the graffiti, there was no evidence that CW2 was responsible for the graffiti. Further,
management officials covered the graffiti the next day after it was discovered, and the graffiti was
located in an area where Complainant only saw it because she was conducting a safety inspection.
Regarding complaint 2, the AJ found that Complainant failed to show any causal connection
between her protected activity and the alleged events.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ erred in “sanctioning” Complainant for the way that
she framed the undisputed facts in her response to the Agency’s motion to dismiss.2 Complainant
2 Before sanctions are imposed, the Commission requires the AJ to issue an order to the offending
party that makes clear that sanctions may be imposed, and the type of sanctions that could be
imposed for failure to comply with the order, unless the party can show good cause for its action.
Rountree v. Dep’t of Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 07A00015 (July 13, 2001). 	Although
Complainant asserts that the AJ “sanctioned” her when she accepted the Agency’s Statement of
Facts and determined that there were no disputed material facts, there are no indications that the
AJ issued a sanction in the matter. 	Rather, the AJ’s decision provides an explanation for her
conclusion 	that 	there 	were 	no 	disputed 	material 	facts, 	including 	a 	discussion 	regarding
Complainant’s failure to adhere to the AJ’s order. It appears that Complainant perceived the AJ’s
admonishment as punitive, and thus a sanction. 	Despite the admonishment for failure to adhere

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argues that there is no precedent allowing an AJ to make inferences in favor of the Agency based
on the way motion responses are written. 	Complainant asserts that the AJ failed to consider
evidence and that evidence in the record reflects credibility and material facts in dispute. 	In
support, Complainant states that the AJ accepted the statement of CW3 and dismissed statements
provided by witnesses on her behalf. Complainant contends that the AJ erred in finding no basis
for her hostile work environment and reprisal claims based on the Agency’s version of events.
The Agency states that Complainant failed to copy the Agency’s EEO office on her notice of
appeal. As for her appeal, the Agency asserts that Complainant presented no basis to disturb the
AJ’s decision. 	In support, the Agency argues that Complainant failed to show that the AJ
improperly applied the law to the facts of the case and failed to specifically identify material facts
in the record that are in dispute. The AJ asserts it is clear that the AJ scoured the entire record and
did not rely solely on the Agency’s Statement of Facts. 	According to the Agency, summary
judgment was proper because Complainant, despite having had opportunity to engage in discovery,
proffered nothing more than self-serving averments, and failed to produce factual evidence which
shows that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. The Agency adds that Complainant
failed to show that she experienced actionable harassment. 	The Agency states that even if
management officials were aware of Complainant’s prior protected activity, as Complainant
argues, that did not shield Complainant from Postal procedures, including disciplinary procedures.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and
the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a
“decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”);
see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO
MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s
determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed
de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words,
we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual
conclusions 	and 	legal 	analysis 	– 	including 	on 	the 	ultimate 	fact 	of 	whether 	intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination
statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its
interpretation of the law”).
to the order, a review of the record in its entirety indicates that the AJ did not rely solely on the
Agency’s Statement of Facts and did not issue a sanction.

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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Decision Without a Hearing
We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The
Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there
is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing
regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The
U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine
issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the
summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one
that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material”
fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case.
An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been
adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose
a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute
or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant has failed to
establish such a dispute. 	Complainant concedes on appeal that she “does not disagree with the
Agency’s carefully crafted list of undisputed issues as far as they go.” 	However, Complainant
asserts that credibility issues remain regarding statements provided by CW3 and the Acting MDO.
She argues that material facts are in dispute concerning whether management officials had
knowledge of her prior EEO activity, and whether the incidents occurred as she alleged. 	Even
construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable
factfinder could not find in Complainant’s favor, as discussed below.
Disparate Treatment
In Complaint 2, claim 5, Complainant alleged that she was subjected to disparate treatment.
Complainant’s allegation regarding the disciplinary action raises a claim of disparate treatment. A
claim of disparate treatment in examined under the three-art analysis first enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie
case by demonstrating that he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action under
circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). 	Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the
particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

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To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if
unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in
McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp.
318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs,
EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of
reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware
of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the
agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire
v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on
her 	sex 	and 	in 	reprisal 	for 	protected 	EEO 	activity, 	the 	Agency 	articulated 	legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for issuing the notice of disciplinary suspension. Further, we find no
nexus between the disciplinary notice and Complainant’s protected bases. Specifically, the record
supports the AJ’s finding that the discipline was imposed after CW3 filed a written statement about
the incident on January 22, 2018.
As evidence of pretext, Complainant argues that CW3’s statement was manufactured for a
promotion. However, the record does not support this assertion and even if CW3’s statement was
not accurate, management officials reasonably believed the statement because it was consistent
with prior statements provided by the parties involved in the incident. 	Moreover, an Agency
Staffing Specialist affirmed that the position to which CW3 was promoted had opened and closed
in November 2017; the selecting official had no connection to Complainant’s position or duties;
and the record evidence shows that CW3 interviewed in January 2018. Complainant’s argument
that the Agency disciplined her in reprisal for protected activity is further belied by the fact that
each of the parties, including CW1, were disciplined for the incident. ROI-2 at 148, 265, 269.
At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Agency’s reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on the
basis of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. We find that Complainant has not shown that the
proffered reasons were pretext for discrimination. As a result, the Commission finds that
Complainant has not established that she was subjected to reprisal as alleged.
Regarding this claim, a finding of a hostile work environment is precluded based on our findings
that Complainant failed to establish that the discipline was motivated by her protected bases.
Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000).

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Hostile Work Environment
To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily
protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her
statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or
had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing
liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further,
the incidents must have been “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[complainant’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” 	Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Therefore, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to
conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s
position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that
the conduct was taken because of her protected classes. Only if Complainant establishes both of
those elements, hostility and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself.
The Commission agrees with the AJ that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Complainant, the alleged incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a legally
hostile work environment. The Commission notes that Title VII is not a civility code. Rather, it
forbids “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Even assuming
that the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment,
the Commission finds that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were based on
discriminatory or retaliatory animus.
The record reflects that the alleged incidents were more likely the result of routine supervision,
personality conflicts, and general workplace disputes and tribulations. For example, complaint 1
involves a workplace dispute that management officials addressed and complaint 2 consists of
claims regarding time and attendance, supervisory instruction, work duties, and disciplinary action.
Complainant contends that she was subjected to discriminatory harassment based on sex in the
incident July 26, 2017, involving CW2 and the aftermath. 	However, Complainant acknowledged
that she engaged in the verbal altercation with CW2 and all parties involved in the incident were
issued discipline that was subsequently withdrawn. 	Complainant’s Deposition, at 13; ROI-2 at
148, 265, 267. 	Moreover, by Complainant’s own account and witness statements, CW2 was
angered because Complainant overheard him badmouthing management officials and not because
of Complainant’s sex.
Complainant argues that the Agency subjected her to retaliatory harassment as evidenced by the
incidents in complaint 2. However, the record does not indicate that the Agency acted based on
Complainant’s prior protected activity. 	With respect to the LWOP allegation, the supervisor
reported that she inadvertently chose the wrong mark for the requested leave. ROI-2 at 155.

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As for the instruction to move away from Acting MDO’s wife, witnesses noted that while Acting
MDO’s wife complained about Complainant being in an area that she did not belong, Complainant
was never instructed to move. ROI-2, at 166.
With respect to Complainant’s claim that the Agency attempted to change her work duties, Agency
officials affirmed that the proposed changes applied to all Lead Clerks and email correspondence
corroborates their statements. ROI-2 at 43, 144, 168. Nevertheless, the changes never materialized
and there is no record evidence showing that Complainant was assigned work inconsistent with
her Lead Clerk position.
Regarding Complainant’s claim that the Agency threatened her with discipline, as noted above,
Agency officials stressed that the PDI was a result of CW3’s written statement regarding the July
26, 2017 incident.
The Commission agrees with the AJ that Complainant has not shown that she was subjected to a
discriminatory or retaliatory hostile work environment. We find that the complained of conduct
did not have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. 	Complainant contends that
witness statements provided by CW2 and her union representative support her claim of retaliatory
harassment. 	However, even crediting these two witness statements, we do not find that all the
incidents, taken together, rise to the level of severe or pervasive harassment. 	Moreover, to the
extent Complainant claims that she was subjected to disparate treatment, the Commission finds
that, as discussed above, Complainant has not proffered any evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that the Agency’s explanation for its actions was pretext for
discrimination or reprisal.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0620)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if the complainant or the
agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the agency.

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Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO)
within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration
elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed
together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days
from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in
support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx.
Alternatively, complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to
P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, complainant’s request to reconsider
shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the
applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s
Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or
statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless
complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service
is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for
reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the
request. 	Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for
reconsideration. 	The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the
deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.

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Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ 	Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 3, 2020
Date