2025003362•EEOC Appeal 2025003362
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Sector P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Marielle L.,1 Complainant, v. Scott Bessent, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency. Appeal No. 2025003362 Hearing No. 451-2023-00125X Agency No. IRS-23-0249-F DECISION On July 2, 2025, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 16, 2025, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
2025003362 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant, who has since left the employ of the Agency, worked as a Human Resource Specialist (HRS), GS-7, at the Agency’s Human Capital Office facility in Austin, Texas. On March 13, 2023, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of disability (physical) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when: 1. On March 24, 2023, she was denied a reasonable accommodation requested in July 2022; 2. She received no final response to her request for approval of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) made in October 2022; 3. Effective November 20, 2022, she was downgraded from her temporary promotion of Human Resources Specialist, GS-11, to a GS- 05/07, instead of being selected for the position of HR Specialist, GS- 12, advertised under Vacancy Announcement No. 22-113440113- B_PRN-0201-11T12; 4. On March 20, 2023, Complainant was offered a job and then the job was rescinded; 5. Complainant’s supervisor failed to approve Complainant’s career ladder increase to the GS-12 level; 6. On various dates, Complainant was subjected to acts of harassment including, but not limited to: a. In September 2022, her request for a temporary hardship was denied and she was directed to report to an office in Franklin, Tennessee from an office in Austin, Texas;
2025003362 3 b. In October 2022, her manager did not properly address her work injury, which exacerbated her injury; and c. In October 2022, she was not provided proper training. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s April 23, 2024, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on May 14, 2025. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant essentially reiterates arguments made below. She asserts, among other things, that she requested a reasonable accommodation to continue to work full-time remotely due to her disability and that not only was the request denied, but she was also denied interim accommodations and, due to the request and the disclosure of her disability, was not selected for a permanent position, was disqualified from a GS-12 position, and had a GS-13 job offer rescinded. The Agency submitted an untimely response to Complainant’s appeal. We decline to consider this response given that the only justification for its untimeliness is that Agency counsel “failed to update his Outlook calendar.” STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de
2025003362 4 novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant has failed to do so.
2025003362 5 ANALYSIS Denial of Reasonable Accommodation Turning first to Complainant’s claim that her July 2022 request for accommodation was denied on March 24, 2023, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), (p). In order to establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified” as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (Reasonable Accommodation Enforcement Guidance). Where an individual’s disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the agency may ask the individual for reasonable documentation about her disability and functional limitations. The employer is entitled to know that the individual has a covered disability for which she needs a reasonable accommodation. “Reasonable documentation” means that the employer may require only the documentation that is needed to establish that a person has an ADA disability, and that the disability necessitates a reasonable accommodation. See id., at Question 6. In this case, there is no dispute that Complainant’s disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, that the Agency was therefore entitled to request reasonable documentation, and that it did so while engaging in the interactive process beginning initially in July 2022.2 Moreover, Complainant failed to raise a 2 Although Complainant disputes S1’s assertion that Complainant verbally revoked her July 2022 request for reasonable accommodation soon after making it and indicted that she would wait until she actually relocated to the Franklin office to pursue it, this dispute is not material given the undisputed evidence that Complainant failed to provide sufficient medical documentation in support of her request either during the time she was officially working in the Franklin position or after she moved back to her original position.
2025003362 6 genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Agency unlawfully failed to provide a reasonable accommodation because the record establishes that prior to the denial of her accommodation, Complainant failed to provide medical documentation that established that she needed full-time telework as an accommodation, as opposed to an alternative accommodation such as the ability to take breaks in a quiet room away from the work area. Specifically, the record establishes that on July 29, 2022, several months after Complainant’s selection for a temporary position reporting to the Franklin, Tennessee facility became effective, but before she actually reported to the Franklin office,3 Complainant informed S1 that she needed a reasonable accommodation and provided a partially completed reasonable accommodation request form that indicated her disability and her desire for full-time telework but did not include medical documentation in support of this request. Instead, the only information Complainant provided concerning her limitations was her own assertion that she was “[u]nable to sit for extended periods of time in desk chair. Need to have heat applied while working and somewhere to extend legs or lie down during breaks/lunch times to relieve stress on spine.” It is undisputed that in response to this request, S1 told Complainant that medical documentation would be needed and that there would be options once she reported to the Franklin location, such as the ability to rest in a quiet room. It is further undisputed that medical documentation was not submitted until October 2022 (although this documentation appears to have been submitted in support of a request for leave) and that although at this point, Complainant’s doctor indicated that “working from home” was a “medical necessity,” the documentation did not provide any details about why Complainant’s disability required full-time telework as opposed to alternative accommodations. In response to the question in her affidavit as to whether she provided medical documentation, Complainant asserted that she did so after she returned to her original position in Austin, Texas. But she references no documentation that establishes that full-time telework was the only effective accommodation for her disability, as opposed to an alternative accommodation, nor does a de novo review 3 It is undisputed that even though Complainant’s temporary position at the Franklin facility was effective March 27, 2022, she did not report to the Franklin location until September 15, 2022, because she was permitted to delay her move due to difficulties getting out of her lease at her original location.
2025003362 7 of the record reveal any such documentation. Although Complainant asserted that S1 failed to help her with her request, the record establishes that Complainant had the proper instructions for how to submit a request for reasonable accommodation when she first requested accommodation and, as noted above, was told by S1 that medical documentation in support of the request was needed. Even assuming that S1 could have been more proactive in helping Complainant complete the reasonable accommodation process, this failure does not establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The record further establishes that once Complainant returned to her original position on November 19, 2022, the interactive process continued and that Complainant submitted documentation indicating that severe neck pain made driving difficult, that she would need frequent breaks, and that it was recommended she drive no more than 30 minutes at a time for six months. Neither a de novo review of the record, nor assertions made by Complainant herself, indicate that any more detailed medical documentation was provided. In these circumstances, we agree that Complainant failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was unlawfully denied a reasonable accommodation when she was not granted the ability to work from home full-time. Other Allegations In addition to her allegation that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant raised allegations of discrete acts of discrimination and a claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. The Commission has found that a discrete action states a claim outside the framework of harassment analysis and can also be reviewed as disparate treatment. See Moylett v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120091735 (Jul. 17, 2012); Sedlacek v. Dep't of Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120083361 (May 11, 2010). Because certain of Complainant's allegations could alternatively be interpreted as discrete acts of disparate treatment and harassment (specifically, portions of Claim 6), we will begin the analysis with a focus on the discrete acts of discrimination before turning to an analysis of Complainant's claim that certain of these actions created a hostile work environment based on her disability and prior EEO activity.
2025003362 8 To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Here, assuming Complainant established a prima facie case of retaliation and/or disability-based discrimination, the Agency provided legitimate non-discriminatory explanations for its actions. Specifically, as for Complainant’s claim that she received no final response to her October 2022 request for FMLA leave, the Agency indicated that it was provisionally approved on November 1, 2022, but that Complainant refused to sign the provisional approval because she wanted it to include leave that she had already used, despite the fact that the FMLA does not allow for retroactive approval. The Agency further noted that when Complainant later submitted a request for FMLA leave that included sufficient supportive documentation, that request was granted. The Agency also provided legitimate non-discriminatory explanations for the November 20, 2022, downgrade from Complainant’s temporary promotion of Human Resources Specialist, GS-11, to a GS-05/07 instead of being selected to fill the HR Specialist, GS-12, position permanently. The record establishes that although the temporary position including a potential to become permanent, Complainant was told that this required a 7-9 month period of review to demonstrate the needed skills and abilities. S1 further explained that the temporary position came to an end before the original 1-year expiration date because the Agency decided to reallocate the funds for the position because there was an
2025003362 9 insufficient workload for two Human Resources Specialists, meaning that Complainant needed to return to her original position in Texas.4 The Agency further explained that Complainant’s March 2023 job offer for the Frontline Management position was rescinded because after the selecting official (SO) submitted the hiring certificate to Human Resources, the usual audit reveals that Complainant was not eligible for the position due to lack of time-in-grade (TIG) and specialized experience. SO explained that the only reason the job offer was rescinded was because HR advised her that Complainant did not qualify for it based on this audit. Similarly, S1 explained that Complainant’s career ladder increase to the GS-12 level was not approved in October 2022 because Complainant did not yet have the 1-year TIG at the next lower level, having been performing at the GS-11 level for approximately 7 months before the position was terminated. S1 further explained that it was later brought to her attention that Complainant had not been qualified for the GS-11 HRS position due to her lack of specialized experience at the GS-11 level in the appropriate series. The Agency further explained that although career ladder increases are at the discretion of the manager, the employee must meet the one-year TIG and one year specialized experience for the position, which Complainant did not meet at the time. Although Complainant described the events outlined in Claim 6 as creating a hostile work environment, the events she described therein appear to be discrete actions and will therefore first be addressed as such. In terms of Complainant’s request for a hardship transfer, the Agency acknowledged Complainant’s assertion that after being selected for the temporary position located in Franklin, Tennessee, Complainant, in her words, “requested 4 A de novo review of the record reveals that it was determined in June 2023 that Complainant should not have been selected for the temporary promotion to the GS- 11 position because she did not meet the specialized experience at the GS-09 grade level. At the time of the selection, she only had 10 months and 18 days at the GS- 0201-05 level. She did not possess one-year of specialized experience at the GS- 0201-09 level for the position. Although Complainant asserted that a combination of her time in different positions was sufficient to render her qualified, the determination that she was not qualified for the temporary promotion or the later GS-12 promotion was based on her lack of specialized experience, not general time in grade.
2025003362 10 anything available that would prevent her from reporting to the Franklin, Tennessee” location. The record establishes that her initial request to remain at her original location until she worked out difficulties with her lease was granted and that she thereafter requested reasonable accommodation to allow her to work remotely from her existing location full-time (as described above), as well as a hardship transfer. As with the request for reasonable accommodation, the Agency asserted the hardship transfer was denied due to lack of sufficient medical documentation to establish that she was unable to report to the location of the job for which she had applied and had accepted the offer. Although Complainant asserted that she was denied proper training, S1 explained that when Complainant asked about training for the temporary position, S1 told her that training would be provided when opportunities presented themselves, that Complainant took at least four relevant on-line courses between April and June 2022 and received on-the-job training from a senior analyst and former training coordinator in a variety of subjects and was always invited to meetings where communities of practice met to share program updates and issues. Complainant’s supervisor in her original position (S2) likewise described a number of on-the-job training opportunities provided to Complainant when she returned to work in her original position after her temporary promotion was revoked. Complainant asserted that on October 20, 2022, the left side of her body went numb, that she contacted S1 because she was not sure what to do to address a workplace injury, and that S1 failed to provide her with her options. S1 acknowledged that she received an email from Complainant on October 20, 2022, asking for 1 hour of leave and providing medical documentation to support a request for 2 weeks of full-time teleworking and asserted that she granted the leave and submitted the request for telework for approval to the appropriate channels. S1 explained that Complainant did not mention in this email that she had experienced a workplace injury, an assertion supported by the copy of the email in the record. The record also contains an email from S1 to Complainant dated October 21, 2022, in which S1 provided a description of options available to those who believed they were unable to meet the requirement of reporting to the office two times per pay period, including the ability to request a hardship transfer, reasonable accommodation, and various types of leave. In providing these explanations for its actions, the Agency satisfied its burden of articulating legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the actions at issue.
2025003362 11 Complainant failed to raise a genuine dispute as to whether her prior EEO activity and/or disability, rather than these explanations, motivated the Agency’s actions. In attempting to raise a genuine dispute, Complainant asserted that once she requested a reasonable accommodation, S1 began to harass and treat her terribly and, essentially, that every action the Agency took thereafter was motivated by retaliatory and/or discriminatory animus. But other than her own assertions, she offered no evidence of this claim. For example, although Complainant asserted that S1’s decisions to end her temporary position was due to her request for accommodation, she did not provide any evidence other than her own assertion to dispute S1’s explanation that funds were reallocated because there was not sufficient work to justify the temporary position beyond November 2022. Nor did she dispute that after she requested accommodation in July 2022, S1 continued to allow her to work remotely for an additional two months while she worked out her housing issues, advised her to submit medical documentation to support her accommodation request, and informed her that once she did move to the new location, there were alternatives to full-time telework such as using a quiet room to take breaks. Likewise, although Complainant asserted that she had the appropriate qualifications for the GS-11 temporary position, the record includes a letter from the Associate Director of the Program Execution Office that “through no fault of her own, [Complainant] was erroneously selected from internal merit promotion announcement 22-11344013B-RPN-0201-11T12 effective March 27, 2022, to November 20. 2022” which explains in detail the reasons that she lacked the necessary specialized experience. Complainant’s disagreement with the findings of this letter and assertion that the Agency, at the behest of S1, made this and other decisions due to Complainant’s request for a reasonable accommodation, is not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Complainant did not dispute that she received the training S1 and S2 described but instead argued that this training was not sufficient without identifying why or, if so, how any denial of training that did occur was motivated by her membership in a protected group. Her allegation that S1 failed to adequately respond to her request for assistance with a workplace injury is likewise not supported by the evidence.
2025003362 12 As the AJ explained, mere allegations, speculations, and conclusory statements, without more, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Lee v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0520110581 (Jan. 12, 2012), citing to Baker v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01981962 (June 26, 2001), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 05A10914 (Oct. 1, 2001). Here, after a de novo review of the record, we agree with the AJ that Complainant failed to provide evidence beyond her mere assertions, that the Agency’s explanations for its decisions were motivated by her prior EEO activity or disability.5 Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we therefore AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s finding of no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M1125) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector (OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment 5 Because Complainant has not raised a genuine dispute as to whether any of the actions she described were motivated by her membership in a protected group, no further inquiry is necessary as to whether those incidents rise to the level of harassment.
2025003362 13 Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, Complainant can submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
2025003362 14 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: T. Gimbrere ________________________ Chaudhry’s signature T. Gimbrere, Acting Director Office of Federal Sector 9/21/2026 Date
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