RICHARDS

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4199
Matter of Erlin Orande Ahinsha RICHARDS, Respondent
Decided by Board April 21, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
An alien’s lack of candor regarding his criminal history is a significant adverse factor
when exercising discretion on an application for cancellation of removal.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Michael Z. Goldman, Esquire, New York, New York
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges;
TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
and 	a 	lawful 	permanent 	resident 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	appeals 	the
Immigration Judge’s May 16, 2025, decision denying his application for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2024). 	The Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not filed a brief on appeal. The appeal will
be dismissed.
The respondent became a lawful permanent resident of the United States
on May 4, 1992. On November 16, 2009, the respondent was convicted of
possession of marijuana in violation of section 481.121(b)(1) of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. 	On March 9, 2025, the respondent applied for
admission to the United States as a returning lawful permanent resident.
DHS issued a notice to appear for the respondent designating him as an
arriving 	alien 	and 	charging 	him 	with 	inadmissibility 	under 	section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2024), as an
alien “convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements” of violating a State
law relating to a federally controlled substance. 	The Immigration Judge
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6874-2026, dated May 26, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Richards (BIA Apr. 21, 2026), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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sustained the charge of removability. 	The Immigration Judge additionally
found that the respondent did not testify credibly and denied the respondent’s
application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	we 	affirm 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	adverse
credibility 	finding, 	as 	it 	is 	not 	clearly 	erroneous. 	See 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026); Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 872 F.3d 188,
196–97 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that an Immigration Judge’s credibility
determination is viewed with “exceptional deference, recognizing that the
[Immigration Judge] ‘alone is in a position to observe an alien’s tone and
demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in testimony, and to apply workable
and consistent standards in the evaluation of testimonial evidence’” (quoting
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003))). 	The
Immigration Judge provided specific and cogent reasons to support an
adverse credibility finding under the totality of the circumstances. See INA
§ 240(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2024); Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d
at 597 (observing that an adverse credibility finding must be “grounded in
evidence in the record” and be based on “specific cogent reasons”).
Specifically, the Immigration Judge relied on material inconsistencies
between the respondent’s testimony regarding his criminal history and a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) criminal history report submitted by
DHS. See Sunuwar v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 989 F.3d 239, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2021)
(upholding the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination based
on inconsistencies and omissions). The respondent testified that his criminal
history was limited to a single arrest for marijuana possession in 2005 or
2006 in connection with his aforementioned conviction. However, the FBI
criminal history report reflects that the respondent has been arrested for or
charged with multiple criminal offenses on several occasions, including
making a false report to law enforcement, possession of stolen property,
knowingly displaying false license plates, driving with a suspended license,
assault involving domestic violence, and violating a protection order—some
of which resulted in convictions.
The Immigration Judge permissibly rejected the respondent’s explanation
that he has no memory of these other incidents, in light of his extensive
contact with law enforcement and his testimony that he does not suffer from
memory issues. 	See Matter of E-F-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 591, 595 (BIA 2022)
(recognizing 	that 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	is 	not 	required 	to 	accept 	an
applicant’s explanation for a discrepancy in the record where there are other

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permissible views of the evidence).2 	While we acknowledge competing
views 	of 	the 	evidence 	advocated 	by 	the 	respondent 	on 	appeal, 	the
Immigration Judge is permitted to make reasonable inferences among the
plausible explanations for discrepancies in the record, and he did so here.
See Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 299, 309 (2017) (holding that under
clear error review, a court may reverse only when “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” and where there are
“two permissible” views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous (citations omitted)); Matter of J-Y-C-,
24 I&N Dec. 260, 263 (BIA 2007) (explaining that a factual finding is not
“clearly erroneous” merely because there are two permissible views of the
evidence (citing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Est. Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
495 (1950))).
We additionally affirm the discretionary denial of the respondent’s
application for cancellation of removal. 	See Matter of Castillo-Perez,
27 I&N Dec. 664, 670–71 (A.G. 2019); Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7,
11–12 (BIA 1998). 	The Immigration Judge considered the respondent’s
positive equities including his lengthy residence in the United States, his
close family ties in the United States, and his established history of
employment. 	See Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)
(finding residence of long duration in this country and history of employment
are appropriate discretionary factors to consider). 	The Immigration Judge
also considered the potential hardship to the respondent’s children.
The foregoing equities are significant, but we agree with the Immigration
Judge that they are outweighed by the respondent’s lack of candor regarding
his criminal history and his criminal record. 	See id. at 584 (outlining the
existence of a criminal record as an appropriate discretionary factor to
weigh); Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23 (BIA 1995) (stating that
evidence of unfavorable conduct, including criminal conduct that has not
culminated in a final conviction, may be considered in a discretionary
analysis). 	We acknowledge the respondent’s argument on appeal that his
absence of any arrests or criminal offenses since 2008 demonstrates the
requisite level of rehabilitation. 	However, we discern no clear error in the
Immigration Judge’s findings of fact with respect to these issues. 	8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i). 	The Immigration Judge permissibly concluded that the
2 	The respondent does not allege that the FBI criminal history report submitted by DHS
is inaccurate or otherwise unreliable. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, we presume
that government agencies properly discharge their official duties, and we afford a
presumption of regularity to the records they create. United States v. Chem. Found., Inc.,
272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926).

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respondent’s lack of candor regarding his criminal history undermines his
rehabilitative 	efforts 	and 	his 	testimony 	regarding 	those 	efforts. 	The
respondent’s disagreement with the ultimate outcome of the Immigration
Judge’s decision is insufficient to demonstrate that the outcome was the
result of an improper view of the facts and evidence presented. See Matter
of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 455. Therefore, upon consideration of the totality
of the circumstances presented in this case and a balancing of the appropriate
factors, we agree with the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny the
respondent’s application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).