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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 772 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4221
Matter of A-G-O-F-, et al., Respondents
Decided by Board June 26, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) “Brazilian children” and “abandoned Brazilian children” are not cognizable particular
social groups because they are not defined with sufficient particularity.
(2) The Immigration Judge clearly erred in determining that the respondent’s past harm
was perpetrated by individuals that the government of Brazil was unable or unwilling
to control when the government arrested one of the perpetrators in connection with other
crimes, the respondent has not shown that the other perpetrator is still at large because
of an inability or unwillingness of the government to investigate and punish his crimes,
and the government provides services for abused children to help authorities protect
them.
(3) The respondent did not establish eligibility for humanitarian asylum because he did not
show that the government was unwilling or unable to protect him from the harm he
suffered in the past.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Andrew G. Lattarulo, Esquire, Chelsea, Massachusetts
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Tori Gamelin, Assistant Chief
Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judge; PICOS, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The lead respondent and his wife and son, the co-respondents, are natives
and citizens of Brazil.2 	The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 7027-2026, dated July 20, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of A-G-O-F-, et al. (BIA June 26, 2026), as
precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3)
(2026). Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The co-respondents are derivative beneficiaries of the lead respondent’s asylum
application. See Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275, 279 (BIA 2007) (stating that derivative
withholding of removal is not permitted under any circumstances). They have not filed
separate applications.

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appeals from the Immigration Judge’s September 15, 2025, decision granting
the lead respondent’s application for humanitarian asylum under section
208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2024). The respondents oppose the appeal. We will sustain
the appeal, vacate the Immigration Judge’s grant of humanitarian asylum,
and 	remand 	the 	record 	for 	further 	proceedings 	regarding 	the 	lead
respondent’s request for protection under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).3
The lead respondent was physically abused as a child by his mother and
uncle, and he was drugged and raped as a child by two men. The Immigration
Judge found that the lead respondent established a rebuttable presumption of
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in
the following particular social groups: (1) “family unit;” (2) “family of
respondent’s biological father;” (3) “Brazilian children;” and (4) “abandoned
Brazilian children.” 	The Immigration Judge determined that DHS rebutted
the presumption because the lead respondent could reasonably relocate.
However, the Immigration Judge found that the lead respondent merited a
grant of humanitarian asylum.
We agree with DHS’ argument that the groups “Brazilian children” and
“abandoned Brazilian children” are not cognizable because they are not
defined with sufficient particularity. The Immigration Judge found that these
groups are particular because the term “children,” as well as the respondent’s
nationality, delineate the groups’ members. 	We disagree. 	“Brazilian
children” is not defined by discrete terms, as it encompasses children of
different 	ages, 	races, 	and 	other 	personal 	characteristics 	and 	therefore
comprises a large, diffuse portion of Brazilian society. See Perez-Trujillo v.
Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2021) (defining particularity). In addition,
the term “abandoned” is not adequately defined within the record evidence
and does not provide an adequate benchmark for who falls within the group
“abandoned 	Brazilian 	children.” 	See 	Enamorado-Rodriguez 	v. 	Barr,
941 F.3d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 2019) (affirming agency decision that the
proposed social group of “Honduran children lacking parental protection”
lacked 	the 	requisite 	particularity 	because 	it 	was 	ambiguous, 	largely
subjective, and had no definable boundaries).
3 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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We 	also 	reverse 	as 	clearly 	erroneous 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s
determination that the lead respondent’s past harm was perpetrated by
individuals that the Brazilian Government was unable or unwilling to control.
See Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that
whether a government is unable or unwilling to control a persecutor is a
question of fact); 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026). We recognize that the lead
respondent was a minor when harmed in the past, and we continue to observe
that it may be futile or dangerous for an abused child to seek protection from
the authorities. 	See Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740, 743 (BIA 2023).
Yet, the Brazilian Government arrested one of the men who raped the lead
respondent in connection with other crimes. 	See Gómez-Medina v. Barr,
975 F.3d 27, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2020) (evaluating police response to harm in the
“unable or unwilling” analysis). 	Although the other individual who raped
the lead respondent has not been apprehended, the lead respondent has not
shown that this individual remains at large because of an inability or
unwillingness of the Brazilian Government to investigate and punish his
crimes. 	See Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d at 42 (discussing the “unable or
unwilling” standard). 	Furthermore, the Brazilian Government provides
services for abused children, such as a national hotline to allow authorities to
protect children. 	See generally Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland, 121 F.4th
316, 325 (1st Cir. 2024) (stating that country reports are relevant in
evaluating whether a government is unable or unwilling to offer protection).
Moreover, we agree with the Immigration Judge that DHS has rebutted
any presumption of future persecution because the lead respondent could
reasonably relocate within Brazil. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B),
1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B) (2026). 	For these reasons, we conclude that the lead
respondent has not shown that he is statutorily eligible for asylum or
withholding of removal under the INA.
In addition, we reverse the grant of humanitarian asylum. 	To establish
eligibility for humanitarian asylum, a respondent must demonstrate that he
suffered past persecution on account of a protected ground and is unable or
unwilling to return to, or avail himself of, the protection of that country
owing 	to 	such 	persecution. 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1208.13(b)(l)(iii); 	see 	also
Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705, 710 (BIA 2012) (stating that, to be eligible
for 	humanitarian 	asylum, 	an 	applicant 	must 	have 	demonstrated 	past
persecution within the meaning of the INA). Since the lead respondent has
not demonstrated the Government of Brazil was unable or unwilling to
protect him, he did not establish past persecution under the INA and is thus
ineligible for humanitarian asylum.

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We will remand the record for the Immigration Judge to consider in the
first instance whether the lead respondent is eligible for CAT protection. We
express no opinion on the ultimate outcome of proceedings.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER 	ORDER: 	The 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	order 	dated
September 15, 2025, granting humanitarian asylum is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and for the entry
of a new decision.