A-W-M-K-

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805
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 805 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4227
Matter of A-W-M-K-, Respondent
Decided by Board June 25, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent poses a flight risk that
cannot be mitigated by a bond where there is evidence the alien gave inconsistent
representations to immigration officials and may have been involved in human rights
violations, rendering his prospects for relief highly speculative.
(2) Evidence that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services had denied the
respondent’s application for adjustment of status was properly admitted because it was
probative of the respondent’s prospects for obtaining lawful status and hence probative
of his flight risk.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: 	Stephanie Elona Young Marzouk, Esquire, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judge; TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s March 18, 2026,
decision 	denying 	bond. 	The 	Immigration 	Judge 	concluded 	that 	the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) established by a preponderance
of the evidence that he presents a flight risk that no bond amount can
mitigate. We agree and will dismiss the appeal.2
“Whether an alien poses a flight risk is a question of judgment that we
review de novo, but the factual findings underlying the judgment are
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 7078-2026, dated July 29, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of A-W-M-K- (BIA June 25, 2026), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The respondent’s supplemental filings during the pendency of this appeal are not new,
previously unavailable evidence and are not considered a motion to remand.

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reviewed for clear error.” 	Matter of Dobrotvorskii, 29 I&N Dec. 211, 212
(BIA 2025).
As an initial matter, we see no error in the Immigration Judge’s decision
to admit the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”)
denial 	of 	the 	respondent’s 	affirmatively 	filed 	Application 	to 	Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) into the record over his
objections that it contains hearsay and is factually inaccurate and unreliable.
“[I]t is well settled that hearsay rules are not binding in immigration
proceedings.” Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 337 (BIA 2021). Rather,
“[i]n immigration proceedings, the sole test for admission of evidence is
whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.”
Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 458 (BIA 2011) (citation modified),
remanded on other grounds sub nom., Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x
646 (9th Cir. 2015). 	Here, evidence that USCIS denied his Form I-485 is
probative of his flight risk because it shows that his prospects for obtaining
lawful status in the United States are diminished. 	See Matter of Andrade,
19 I&N Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (stating that an alien with a greater
likelihood of being granted relief has a stronger motivation to appear for a
hearing than one who has less potential to obtain relief).
While the respondent argues that the USCIS denial misinterprets and
misconstrues facts, Immigration Judges need not exclude such evidence
merely 	because 	portions 	are 	disputed. 	Rather, 	potential 	errors 	in 	a
government document prepared in the ordinary course of agency business go
to that document’s weight, not its admissibility. 	See, e.g., Matter of D-R-,
25 I&N Dec. at 458–59; Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA
1988) (providing that a “contested document may be admitted into the
record”). As the respondent mentions, the Immigration Judge appropriately
afforded this document limited weight, and her analysis of his flight risk does
not expressly reference it.
The respondent also argues that the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible
Alien (Form I-213) “reiterates the information in the I-485 denial” but does
not claim that the document contains incorrect or unreliable evidence relating
to his alienage and removability, which are relevant to the Immigration
Court’s jurisdiction over his bond proceedings. 	See Matter of Barcenas,
19 I&N Dec. at 611 (explaining that a Form I-213 is “admissible as evidence
to prove alienage and deportability”). 	Therefore, the admission of such
document was proper. The respondent does not renew any objection to DHS’
other documentary evidence, including transcripts of USCIS’ interviews
with him. He does not explain how the Immigration Judge’s reference to the
notice to appear, which is not in the bond record, affected these proceedings.

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Turning to the merits of the case, on de novo review, we affirm the
Immigration Judge’s flight risk determination. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)
(2026). 	In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the
jurisdiction in which this case arises, DHS has the burden of proving flight
risk by a preponderance of the evidence, Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th
19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021), a standard that “simply requires the trier of fact to
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence
before he may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the
judge of the fact’s existence.” 	Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (citation
modified). Because bond determinations are “a preliminary evaluation of the
facts and evidence presented by the parties” before “conclusive factual
findings and legal determinations are made based on the testimony and
evidence 	presented 	at 	a 	full 	[merits] 	hearing,” 	they 	are 	necessarily
circumstance-specific, meaning that “any ‘probative and specific’ evidence
may be considered . . . , including unfavorable evidence of his conduct.”
Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 804 (BIA 2020), abrogated on other
grounds by Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.
In this case, the Immigration Judge found the record contained potentially
serious 	unfavorable 	evidence 	which, 	considering 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances, showed that the respondent was an irredeemable flight risk.
Specifically, the Immigration Judge observed that the record showed the
respondent 	gave 	USCIS 	inconsistent 	and 	“potentially 	fraudulent”
information in connection with affirmative applications for relief and refused
to 	answer 	questions 	about 	his 	possible 	involvement 	in 	human 	rights
violations during the United States’ war in Afghanistan. 	Based on these
observations, the Immigration Judge concluded that relief from removal was
“highly speculative.” For purposes of bond consideration, we disagree with
the respondent’s contention that these findings are unsupported. See Matter
of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 454.
First, we see no error in the Immigration Judge’s observation that the
record shows the respondent may have been involved with human rights
violations in Afghanistan, which makes the respondent’s relief application
eligibility “highly speculative.” 	Even acknowledging the respondent’s
argument that the evidence DHS submitted for this preliminary bond
determination does not conclusively establish that he was part of an Afghan
security forces group known to have committed human rights abuses, he does
not dispute that it shows his involvement coincided with a period in which
such 	groups 	were 	participating 	in 	human 	rights 	abuses, 	including
interrogations resulting in torture and death. In interviews with USCIS, the
respondent confirmed that he brought people to a room to be interrogated

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and gave nonanswers when questioned about his possible commission of
human rights abuses.
Further, the respondent does not challenge that he provided USCIS with
inconsistent and potentially fraudulent information and documentation about
his ties to Pakistan in support of his affirmative applications. See generally
Matter of Akhmedov, 29 I&N Dec. 166, 167–68 (BIA 2025) (illustrating that
discrepant representations to immigration officials may be a negative factor
when determining flight risk). For example, the respondent has not resolved
why he supplied applications and identity documents stating all his children
were born in Afghanistan yet told an interviewer that some were born in
Pakistan.
The foregoing potentially serious adverse evidence in the bond record
tends to show his prospects for immigration relief are “highly speculative.”
While “any assessment of a removal defense at the bond hearing . . . is
necessarily 	tentative” 	given 	the 	preliminary 	nature 	of 	such 	hearings,
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 34, the likely success or failure of any viable
defense against removal is a proper factor in evaluating flight risk. 	See
Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. at 490 (explaining that lack of potential
eligibility for relief from deportation may be a disincentive to appear). Like
the 	Immigration 	Judge, 	we 	acknowledge, 	without 	evaluating, 	the
respondent’s assertion that he did not commit human rights violations in
Afghanistan; however, where the evidence indicates that an alien could have
assisted in such acts, it is reasonable to conclude that relief may ultimately
be remote. 	See, e.g., sections 101(a)(42), 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 241(b)(3)(B)(i),
of 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1101(a)(42),
1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 	1231(b)(3)(B)(i) 	(2024); 	8 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	1208.16(d)(2),
1240.8(d) (2026); see also Matter of E-Y-F-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 103, 104–05
(BIA 2025) (providing that even an Immigration Judge’s grant of relief may
not adequately mitigate flight risk). 	At this juncture, the respondent’s
prospects for a favorable exercise of discretion on any application are at best
unclear. 	Similarly, record discrepancies regarding his ties to Pakistan are
relevant not only to his prospective eligibility for relief, but also whether an
Immigration Judge can trust his assurances that he will appear for future
hearings.
The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge’s decision lacks
express findings about potentially relevant factors in his case, including the
following: his employment; lack of a criminal record; lawful presence in the
United States for 4 years until his parole expired; immigration court
appearances; fixed address; significant community ties in the United States,
including his 11 children, two of whom are United States citizens; family

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members with medical issues; and affidavit of support. 	See Matter of
R-A-V-P-, 	27 	I&N 	Dec. 	at 	805 	(listing 	potentially 	relevant 	factors).
However, we see no reason to disbelieve that this evidence was considered.
The respondent also argues that the Immigration Judge made clear factual
errors. 	However, 	we 	see 	no 	clearly 	erroneous 	factual 	findings 	that
meaningfully affected the outcome of this decision when the record is viewed
in 	light 	of 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances. 	See 	Matter 	of 	Santos,
19 I&N Dec. 105, 109 (BIA 1984) (noting a harmless error is one that “was
not unfair or did not demonstrably prejudice the respondent”).
Finally, the respondent argues that because he does not present a danger
to the community, the Immigration Judge needed to consider whether “there
was some bond amount sufficient to assure his presence at future hearings.”
See Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009). 	Given the
potentially serious adverse information in the record, the Immigration Judge
appropriately concluded that no reasonable bond amount, even if coupled
with alternatives to detention, could be calculated to ensure his appearance.
See, e.g., Matter of Akhmedov, 29 I&N Dec. at 168 (concluding the same
where the record contained discrepancies and the merits of any applications
for relief were “unknown”). 	Overall, the Immigration Judge’s decision
contains no legal or factual errors warranting reversal or remand.
To 	conclude, 	the 	record 	shows 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	properly
considered 	and 	weighed 	the 	relevant 	factors 	in 	determining 	that 	the
respondent 	presents 	a 	significant 	flight 	risk 	and 	should 	remain 	in
immigration custody pending his removal proceedings’ outcome. Although
the respondent disagrees that DHS’ evidence should be dispositive, the INA
does not instruct that any factor must outweigh another when evaluating
flight risk; instead, it gives Immigration Judges broad discretion in deciding
the factors to be considered. See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. at 804–
05 (“The Immigration Judge is in the best position to analyze these
considerations and ‘may choose to give greater weight to one factor over
others, as long as the decision is reasonable.’” (quoting Matter of Guerra,
24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006))).
Like in Matter of Andrade, “the respondent obviously has equities that
could weigh in favor of a grant of . . . relief” and other favorable factors
relevant to his bail risk. 	19 I&N Dec. at 491. 	However, evidence of an
alien’s inconsistent representations to immigration officials and potential
involvement in human rights violations are “very serious adverse factors”
and compelling reasons to conclude that the alien is a poor bail risk. 	Id.
Therefore, “[w]ithout ruling on the merits of such an application,” id., it was
permissible for the Immigration Judge to determine that this potentially

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serious adverse evidence met DHS’ burden to prove his risk of flight by a
preponderance of the evidence.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.