JONES

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850
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 850 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4236
Matter of Sarah J. M. JONES, Respondent
Decided August 24, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) An individual who is eligible to practice law and is a member in good standing in one
jurisdiction does not meet the regulatory definition of “attorney” if he or she is barred
from or otherwise restricted in practicing law in another jurisdiction.
(2) Reinstatement is unwarranted because, during the respondent’s indefinite suspension,
she registered for and obtained an Executive Office for Immigration Review
identification number and practiced before the Immigration Courts in several cases.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL: Nathan S. Henriksen, Acting Disciplinary Counsel
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Catherine M. O’Connell,
Disciplinary Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE
and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges.
CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”), the Immigration Courts,
and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on August 25, 2011. On
May 12, 2026, the respondent filed a petition for reinstatement. 	The
Disciplinary Counsels for the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) and DHS oppose the petition. 	The respondent’s petition for
reinstatement will be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 8, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
pursuant 	to 	its 	own 	disciplinary 	rules, 	issued 	an 	order 	accepting 	the
respondent’s resignation from the Ninth Circuit bar, with disciplinary
proceedings pending, and deeming her no longer eligible to practice law
before the Ninth Circuit. 	On June 30, 2011, Disciplinary Counsel for the
Executive Office for Immigration Review petitioned for the respondent’s
immediate suspension from practice before the Board of Immigration

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Appeals 	and 	the 	Immigration 	Courts, 	pending 	further 	disciplinary
proceedings. 	On July 5, 2011, Disciplinary Counsel for DHS similarly
requested that the respondent be suspended from practice before that agency.
We granted Disciplinary Counsels’ petitions on July 13, 2011. 	In a final
order dated August 25, 2011, we suspended the respondent from practice
before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS for an indefinite period
of time.
The respondent now petitions to be reinstated to practice before the
Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS. She asserts that she did not receive
a copy of our August 25, 2011, suspension order, which had been mailed to
her address of record in California, because she had moved from that address
in 2010 and left no forwarding address. 	The respondent avers that she
consented to disbarment before the Illinois Supreme Court on January 13,
2012, but has now been fully reinstated to practice law by that court. 	She
further claims that she meets the definition of attorney contained in 8 C.F.R.
§ 1001.1(f) (2026). 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(a)(1) (2026) (discussing
requirements for reinstatement).
The Disciplinary Counsels for EOIR and DHS oppose reinstatement,
arguing that the respondent has not met the definition of attorney as set forth
in 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f) and has not complied with her period of suspension.
The 	Disciplinary 	Counsels 	also 	describe 	how, 	during 	her 	indefinite
suspension, the respondent registered and obtained an EOIR identification
(ID) number to practice before the Board and the Immigration Courts, filed
a Notice of Entry of Appearance Before the Immigration Court (Form EOIR-
28) on January 8, 2025, and appeared by video at a special master calendar
hearing on a client’s behalf. 	The Disciplinary Counsels also list a separate
instance on January 20, 2025, in which the respondent filed four Form EOIR-
28s and motions to accept late-filed documents in four related cases.
II. ANALYSIS
The Board may grant a petition for reinstatement after suspension or
disbarment in appropriate circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107 (setting forth
procedures for obtaining reinstatement). However, we must deny a petition
for reinstatement without further consideration if an individual does not meet
the 	definition 	of 	“attorney” 	under 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1001.1(f). 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.107(b)(3). 	Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f), an attorney is defined
as:
“any person who is eligible to practice law in and is a member in good standing of
the bar of the highest court of any State, possession, territory, or Commonwealth of
the United States, or of the District of Columbia, and is not under any order

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suspending, enjoining, restraining, disbarring, or otherwise restricting him [or her]
in the practice of law.”
Thus, an individual who is eligible to practice law and is a member in good
standing in one jurisdiction does not meet the regulatory definition of
“attorney” if he or she is barred from or otherwise restricted in practicing law
in another jurisdiction. 	In addition, the Board “shall” deny the petition for
reinstatement “[i]f the petition for reinstatement is found to be otherwise
inappropriate or unwarranted.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b)(3).
The respondent is not eligible for reinstatement because she has not
shown that she meets the definition of “attorney.” The Ninth Circuit’s order
barred the respondent from “practic[ing] law in this court in any fashion” and
directed copies of its order to be served on EOIR Disciplinary Counsel and
the Supreme Court of Illinois. 	The respondent does not claim that she has
been reinstated to practice in the Ninth Circuit or otherwise claim that the
basis for her resignation in lieu of suspension has been modified or vitiated
by the Ninth Circuit since our 2011 final order of suspension. Thus, she has
not shown that she “is not under any order suspending, enjoining, restraining,
disbarring, or otherwise restricting” her practice of law before the Ninth
Circuit. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f).
The respondent argues that she meets the definition of an attorney
because she claims, without evidence, that she is now in active status in good
standing in Illinois after having been disbarred there in 2012. However, even
assuming she is currently in active status and good standing in Illinois, she
has not presented any evidence of a change in status in the Ninth Circuit. See
8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f).
Moreover, reinstatement is “otherwise inappropriate or unwarranted” due
to the respondent’s noncompliance with the Board’s August 25, 2011,
suspension order. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b)(3). 	During her indefinite
suspension, the respondent registered for and obtained an EOIR ID number
and practiced before the Immigration Courts in several cases, and she has not
shown that she should be excused due to her assertion that she was unaware
of the suspension.
The respondent’s claim that she should be excused due to nonreceipt of
our August 25, 2011, suspension order is unpersuasive. A copy of that order
was not returned to the Board. The respondent also does not claim that she
was unaware of our June 30, 2011, immediate suspension order. She has not
explained when she received notice of the suspension before filing this
petition. It is also undisputed that she was aware of the Ninth Circuit order

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accepting her resignation in lieu of disciplinary proceedings, and there is no
evidence 	regarding 	any 	change 	in 	her 	status 	in 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit.
Accordingly, the respondent’s actions and inactions during our imposed
period of indefinite suspension preclude reinstatement.
In sum, the respondent is ineligible for reinstatement because she does
not meet the definition of “attorney” under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f) and because
reinstatement is not warranted in light of her conduct during the Board’s
indefinite suspension period. 	Accordingly, we will deny the petition for
reinstatement.
ORDER: The respondent’s petition for reinstatement is denied.