CORNEJO-AGUILAR

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Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4253
Matter of Leticia CORNEJO-AGUILAR, Respondent
Decided by Board August 7, 2026 1
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent did not merit
cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2018), as a matter of discretion, where the respondent’s significant
equities were outweighed by her involvement in money laundering and alien smuggling,
conviction for child abuse, history of abuse and neglect investigations, and attempt to
minimize her involvement in and knowledge of events that led to her grandson’s death.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Siovhan S. Ayala, Esquire, Tucson, Arizona
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Jennifer M. Wiles, Senior
Attorney
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; WHITE, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent
resident 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	appeals 	from 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s
November 6, 2020, decision denying her application for cancellation of
removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2018), and ordering her removal from the
United States. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the
appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident
on September 10, 1968. On March 12, 2016, the respondent’s 20-month-old
grandson died in her home. 	Based on the resulting criminal investigation
into her grandson’s death, on June 20, 2016, the respondent was charged with
and indicted on three counts: 1) child abuse of a person under 15 years of age
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 7211-2026, dated September 24, 2026, the Attorney General
designated 	the 	Board’s 	decision 	in 	Matter 	of 	Leticia 	Cornejo-Aguilar 	(BIA
August 7, 2026), as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026). 	Editorial changes have been made consistent with the
designation of the case as a precedent.

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likely to result in death or serious physical injury; 2) second degree murder;
and 3) endangerment. 	On November 18, 2019, the respondent ultimately
pled guilty to one count of child abuse, non-death or serious physical injury,
in violation of section 13-3623.B(3) of the Arizona Revised Statutes. 	On
February 24, 2020, DHS issued a notice to appear charging the respondent
as an alien “who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of
domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment” pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2018).2 On June 4, 2020, the Immigration
Judge sustained the charge of removability.3
On being found removable as charged, the respondent filed an application
for cancellation of removal. 	In denying the respondent’s application for
cancellation 	of 	removal, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	concluded 	that 	the
respondent had not testified credibly. 	The Immigration Judge further
concluded that the respondent had not established that she merited a
favorable exercise of discretion.
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	we 	affirm 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	adverse
credibility finding, because it is not clearly erroneous. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026) (stating that findings as to the credibility of
testimony are factual findings); Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 299, 309
(2017) (holding that under clear error review, a court may reverse only when
“left 	with 	the 	definite 	and 	firm 	conviction 	that 	a 	mistake 	has 	been
committed,” and where there are “two permissible . . . views of the evidence,”
the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous (citations
omitted)). 	The Immigration Judge’s credibility determination is supported
by specific and cogent reasons tethered directly to the evidence of record.
See INA § 240(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2018).
In finding that the respondent was not credible, the Immigration Judge
relied on material inconsistencies between the respondent’s testimony and
the extensive documentary evidence of record. In addition to the child abuse-
2 	We note that following the issuance of the notice to appear, several amendments were
made to the factual allegations contained therein but no amendments were ever made to
the sole charge of removability.
3 	The respondent has not challenged the Immigration Judge’s removability finding on
appeal. Accordingly, we deem this issue waived. See Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330,
336 n.5 (BIA 2021) (explaining that when a respondent does not substantively appeal an
issue addressed in an Immigration Judge’s decision, that issue may be deemed waived by
the Board).

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related conviction resulting from the death of her grandson that rendered her
removable, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had additional
criminal history including a conviction for contributing to the delinquency of
a minor and involvement in money laundering related to alien smuggling.
The Immigration Judge also noted that the respondent had been investigated
by the Arizona Department of Child Safety 10 times including 3 cases where
investigators substantiated claims of abuse or neglect committed against her
children. In this regard, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s
testimony regarding the extent of her criminal history, as well as the
circumstances surrounding her criminal conduct, was directly contradicted
by 	police 	reports, 	medical 	examination 	reports, 	and 	contemporaneous
newspaper articles written about the events surrounding her grandson’s
death.
Specifically, the Immigration Judge first found that the respondent’s
testimony that she was only involved in two Western Union transactions was
directly contradicted by the investigation report that determined that the
respondent was involved in many transactions over the period of about
1 year. The Immigration Judge also found that the investigation resulted in
a recommendation that the respondent be charged with 11 counts of money
laundering. 	When confronted with this inconsistency, the respondent was
unable to provide an explanation. See Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 455
(BIA 2011) (providing that an Immigration Judge is not required to adopt an
applicant’s explanation for an inconsistency if there are other permissible
views of the evidence based on the record), remanded on other grounds sub
nom., Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x 646 (9th Cir. 2015). 	The
respondent has not challenged this finding on appeal and as such has not
established clear error in the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that her
testimony was not credible regarding the extent of her involvement in a
money laundering scheme.
Next, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s testimony
regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of her grandson was
completely 	contradicted 	by 	the 	documentary 	evidence. 	Before 	the
Immigration Judge, the respondent repeatedly testified that her grandson’s
death was due to a ruptured appendix, delayed care by paramedics, and CPR
that crushed his ribs. She testified that before her grandson’s death there was
no indication that he was sick and that, aside from a bruise on his thigh, he
had no other injuries. The respondent also testified that there were no drugs
in her home and that her grandson was never allowed to be around any drugs.
The Immigration Judge found this testimony wholly inconsistent with the
documentary evidence including the respondent’s pre-sentencing report,
several police reports, and medical examination findings. 	Contrary to the

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respondent’s 	testimony, 	the 	documentary 	evidence 	reflects 	that 	her
grandson’s death was caused by acute peritonitis due to blunt force trauma
to the torso and that, at the time of death, he had contusions to his chest and
abdomen, fractures to several ribs at various stages of healing, contusions
and abrasions on his head and extremities, and oxycodone and THC in his
system. Police reports also establish that there was evidence the respondent’s
grandson had been repeatedly vomiting earlier in the day, that during
resuscitation attempts a family member suggested to paramedics that they
should administer Narcan, and that drug paraphernalia and marijuana was
later 	found 	in 	the 	respondent’s 	home. 	One 	of 	the 	respondent’s
granddaughters also reported that she had seen the respondent’s son-in-law
hitting and punching the respondent’s grandson.
When confronted with this evidence, the respondent claimed that she had
no knowledge that there were any drugs in her home until her criminal
proceedings, 	did 	not 	know 	anything 	about 	her 	grandson’s 	repeatedly
vomiting, and did not know why her daughter would suggest that Narcan
should be administered. The respondent also claimed that her granddaughter
is a liar, asserted that the report indicating that her grandson had been
exposed to drugs was a lie, and denied the reports from the medical examiner
and paramedics. 	In light of the blatant inconsistencies, the Immigration
Judge concluded that the respondent was not credible and had attempted to
convince the court that her grandson had died at the hands of paramedics
despite the fact that the respondent and five other family members had pled
guilty to criminal offenses related to his death. Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec.
at 454–55 (explaining that an Immigration Judge may make “reasonable
inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence in the record” and is not
required to accept an applicant’s account where the record supports other
plausible views of the evidence).
On appeal, the respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge erred in
finding her not credible. Specifically, she asserts that her testimony was not
inconsistent with the documentary evidence because she had only expressed
her belief regarding what had happened to her grandson, had no medical
training to be able to determine the exact causes of her grandson’s death,
and had no way of knowing that her account of events did not match the
medical reports. 	Despite affirmatively testifying that her grandson’s ribs
were broken by the paramedics who administered CPR, on appeal the
respondent also argues that she would have no way of knowing that his ribs
were broken. 	The respondent’s arguments are unavailing because they are
not 	supported 	by 	the 	record 	and 	do 	not 	establish 	clear 	error 	in 	the
Immigration Judge’s credibility determination. Contrary to the respondent’s
appellate assertions, information concerning her grandson’s official cause of

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death, the nature of his injuries, and the circumstances surrounding his death,
were available to the respondent long before she testified in Immigration
Court. 	These facts were outlined in the respondent’s own pre-sentencing
report prepared in January of 2020. Additionally, several publicly available
articles from 2016 provided detailed coverage of her grandson’s death and
the findings of the criminal investigation. 	Moreover, these same records
were submitted by DHS and made a part of the record almost a month before
she testified. Accordingly, the respondent’s assertions that she had no way
of knowing her grandson’s actual cause of death or that her testimony was
directly contrary to the medical evidence are wholly meritless.
In sum, the Immigration Judge permissibly relied on extensive and
material 	inconsistencies 	in 	the 	respondent’s 	testimony 	and 	concluded,
without 	clear 	error, 	that 	the 	respondent 	was 	not 	credible. 	See 	INA
§ 240(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec.
260, 266 (BIA 2007) (concluding that the Immigration Judge properly
considered the totality of circumstances in finding that the respondent lacked
credibility 	based 	on 	his 	demeanor, 	implausible 	testimony, 	lack 	of
corroboration, and inconsistent statements). The Immigration Judge did not
clearly err in determining that the respondent’s testimony was entirely
contradicted by the objective documentary evidence including police and
medical reports. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 309.
Exercising de novo review, we also affirm the discretionary denial of the
respondent’s 	application 	for 	cancellation 	of 	removal. 	See 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026); Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 670–
71 (A.G. 2019); Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811, 817 (BIA 1999);
Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 10–12 (BIA 1998). 	In exercising
discretion, we “must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s
undesirability 	as 	a 	permanent 	resident 	with 	the 	social 	and 	humane
considerations presented in his [or her] behalf to determine whether the
granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this country.” Matter of
C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Matter of Marin,
16 I&N Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978)). 	Factors relevant to discretion include
family ties within the United States, length of residence in this country,
evidence of hardship to the respondent’s family if deportation occurs,
military service, history of employment, property or business ties, service to
the community, and, where a criminal record exists, proof of rehabilitation.
Id. 	Where adverse factors are present, the respondent should present
offsetting 	favorable 	evidence, 	which 	may 	require 	unusual 	or 	even
outstanding equities, to outweigh the negative factors. Id. at 11–12.

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The Immigration Judge considered the respondent’s positive equities
including the long duration of her residence in the United States, her status
as a lawful permanent resident for 50 years, her extensive family ties in the
United States including 13 children and approximately 27 grandchildren who
are United States citizens, and her ownership of a trailer and pickup truck.
See Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. at 584–85 (finding residence of long
duration 	in 	this 	country 	and 	history 	of 	employment 	are 	appropriate
discretionary factors to consider). 	Despite finding that the respondent had
several significant positive equities, the Immigration Judge concluded that
those equities were outweighed by several negative factors including the
respondent’s involvement in alien smuggling and money laundering, the fact
that she had been the subject of 10 investigations by the Arizona Department
of Child Safety, including 3 substantiated findings of abuse or neglect, her
involvement in her grandson’s death, and her attempt to downplay that
involvement.
We, like the Immigration Judge, find that the respondent’s attempts to
minimize her involvement in and knowledge of the events that led to her
grandson’s death to be a significant negative factor that weighs against an
exercise of discretion. 	See Matter of Richards, 29 I&N Dec. 658, 660–61
(BIA 2026) (recognizing that a lack of candor regarding criminal history
constitutes a significant discretionary factor in the exercise of discretion);
Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 876 (BIA 1994) (“[L]ack of candor in
itself serves as an adverse factor weighing against a favorable exercise of
discretion.”). 	Moreover, 	the 	respondent’s 	attempts 	to 	mislead 	the
Immigration Judge regarding her grandson’s cause of death are devious and
disingenuous. 	See Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N Dec. 765, 768 (BIA
2016) (“Truthful testimony and disclosures are critical to the effective
operation of the immigration court system.”). These factors, when combined
with the respondent’s involvement in money laundering and alien smuggling,
her conviction for child abuse, and her history of abuse and neglect
investigations, drastically tip the scale against an exercise of discretion
particularly in the absence of unusual or outstanding equities. See Matter of
C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11–12. Having reweighed these factors de novo, we
arrive at the same conclusion as the Immigration Judge. Therefore, we will
not disturb the decision to deny relief on discretionary grounds. See Pereida
v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 231 (2021) (explaining that an applicant for
discretionary relief from removal bears the burden of demonstrating both that
he is statutorily eligible for such relief and that he merits a favorable exercise
of discretion).
Finally, we are not persuaded by the respondent’s assertion that the
Immigration Judge demonstrated extreme bias against her. 	While we

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acknowledge the respondent’s argument concerning the propriety of the
Immigration Judge’s finding that her testimony that she is a full-time
housewife who spends her time cleaning and caring for her home was
inconsistent 	with 	the 	paramedic’s 	report 	indicating 	that 	there 	were
cockroaches 	everywhere 	and 	the 	respondent’s 	trailer 	was 	filthy, 	the
Immigration Judge did not err in characterizing this as an inconsistency. See
Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 454 (explaining that an Immigration Judge
may make “reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence”
in the record). 	Moreover, merely noting discrepancies in the respondent’s
testimony, without more, does not support the respondent’s assertion that the
Immigration 	Judge 	abandoned 	his 	neutrality 	and 	is 	insufficient 	to
demonstrate bias.
ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for deportation by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of deportation, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2018).